APPENDIX (NOT FOR PRINT PUBLICATION)

Information and the Acquisition of Social Network Connections

Authors

Toman Barsbai (University of Bristol and IfW Kiel)

Victoria Licuanan (AIM Manila)

Andreas Steinmayr (LMU Munich, CESifo, IZA, IPL, and IfW Kiel)

Erwin Tiongson (Georgetown University)

Dean Yang (University of Michigan, NBER, and BREAD)

Appendices

A A Simple Model of Social Network Investment

We present here a simple model of social network investment in the context of imperfect information. We are interested in the interplay between information imperfections and individual efforts to expand one's social network. In particular, we are interested in the potential impact of interventions to alleviate information imperfections. If an intervention reduces information imperfections, does this raise or reduce individual efforts to expand one's social network? We will see that it is theoretically possible for reductions in information imperfections to either raise or lower optimal choice of social network size.

Individuals have imperfect information about a variety of things in life that matter to them, such as jobs (how to find them and what jobs are available), financial services, government services, and the like. People also have social networks ("friends"), which provide *information*, helping to reduce information imperfections. This can come about simply in the process of friends conversing and sharing information with one another about topics relevant to their lives. Network theory suggests that efficient information gathering typically requires *expansive* networks with many short network paths (cf. Granovetter, 1973). Thus, we use the number of first-degree friends as a proxy for network expansiveness.

Because friends are valuable, people make efforts to acquire them, but making friends is to some degree costly. The costs of friend acquisition may include effort costs of socializing, as well as monetary costs incurred to facilitate networking, such as travel costs to meetings and social events, costs of membership in clubs or organizations, and the like.

We focus on the benefits friends bring by reducing information imperfections. We abstract away from other benefits of friends that the network literature typically refers to as *cooperation capital*, such as various forms of *assistance* (transfers, informal insurance, and psychological support).[1]

We model individual utility as depending on baseline or starting-point information imperfections (prior to any reduction in information imperfections resulting from friend investments), θ, and endogenous friend investment $f \geq 0$. For simplicity, we abstract from other determinants of utility that are independent of friends. Individuals choose f to maximize the benefits from friends $B(\theta, f)$ net of the cost of friend investment $C(f)$:

$$U = B(\theta, f) - C(f)$$

People therefore acquire friends only up to the point at which the marginal cost does not

[1]These other non-information benefits of friends could be thought of as entering the cost term in the maximization problem we write down below, reducing the *net* cost of friends.

exceed the marginal benefit of friends. With reasonable assumptions on functional forms one can obtain an interior solution for the optimal number of friends. A corner solution is also possible of course, if the cost of friend investments is so high relative to benefits that the optimal number of friends is zero. Once functional forms are posited, we can make statements about the responsiveness of friend investments to changes in baseline information imperfections θ.

Some simple assumptions and functional forms generate useful possibilities. Let information imperfections θ range from 0 to 1 ($\theta \in [0, 1]$), and allow individuals to have both exogenous friends (those that are given at baseline without cost), e, and endogenous friends, f, which they acquire at a cost. Let $e \geq 1$.[2] Let one's amount of information I be a function of information imperfections θ, exogenous friends e, and endogenous friends f as follows:

$$I = 1 - \frac{\theta}{e + f}$$

In this setup, one's amount of information can range from 0 (no information) to 1 (full information). If baseline information imperfections θ are 0, then one starts with full information. A higher number of friends $e + f$ reduces the importance of one's baseline information imperfections and raises one's amount of information I.

For simplicity, let the cost of endogenous friends be linear with a per-friend cost c, so the total cost of friend acquisition is cf.[3] As mentioned, exogenous friends e, as part of one's endowment, are costless.

We now analyze three distinct cases: constant, decreasing, and increasing returns to infomation. Analysis of the different cases makes clear that reductions in information imperfections (increases in information) have indeterminate impacts on friend investments.

Case 1: Constant Returns to Information

Let the benefit $B(\theta, f)$ be constant or linear in the amount of information I. The individual's maximization problem is as follows:

$$\max_f 1 - \frac{\theta}{e + f} - cf$$

The first order condition is:

$$\frac{\theta}{(e + f)^2} = c$$

[2] In our empirical context, assuming that individuals start with at least one friend is reasonable. For new immigrants to the U.S., the exogenous friend could be the individual who officially sponsors the immigrant for their immigration visa.

[3] The main predictions of the model are robust to the assumption of increasing per-friend net cost, which might result from decreasing per-friend assistance benefits in larger networks.

The individual chooses endogenous friends f so that the marginal benefit of friends equals their marginal cost. Solving for f gives the optimal number of friends f^*:

$$f^* = \sqrt{\frac{\theta}{c}} - e$$

(Checking the second order condition confirms this is a maximum.)

Now we can ask: what effect do baseline information imperfections have on the optimal number of friends? We can take the partial derivative of f^* with respect to θ:

$$\frac{\partial f^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{1}{2c\sqrt{\frac{\theta}{c}}} > 0$$

This partial derivative is always positive. Therefore a reduction in information imperfections θ (e.g., our information treatment for new immigrants) should reduce friend investments.



Figure A.1: Constant returns to information

Figure A.1 graphically shows the impact of reducing information imperfections when returns

to information are constant. Parameter values used in the figure are: $e = 1$, $c = 0.25$. The red line is the marginal cost function, which is horizontal because the cost of friends is constant. The green curve is the marginal benefit function for the control group (without the information treatment), with $\theta = 0.9$. The orange curve is the marginal benefit function for the information treatment group, which due to the treatment has lower information imperfections ($\theta = 0.6$). The reduction in information imperfections due to treatment lowers the marginal benefit of friends (the orange curve is always lower than the green curve).

The optimal number of friends is given by the intersection of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions. In the control group, the optimal number of friends is f_0^*. In the treatment group, the optimal number of friends is f_1^*, which is lower than f_0^*. The reduction in information imperfections due to treatment lowers the marginal benefit of friends, lowering the optimal number of friends.

Case 2: Decreasing Returns to Information

The case of decreasing returns to information is very similar to the constant-returns case. We modify the benefit function so that benefits are a function of the square root of information, so the migrant's optimization problem is:

$$\max_f (1 - \frac{\theta}{e+f})^{\frac{1}{2}} - cf$$

The first order condition is:

$$\frac{\theta}{2(1 - \frac{\theta}{e+f})f^2} = c$$

Aside from the change in the benefit function and thus the marginal benefit functions, assumptions are otherwise the same as for the constant-returns case in Figure A.1. As in Figure A.1, the reduction in information imperfections due to treatment lowers the marginal benefit of friends (the orange curve is always lower than the green curve).

Case 3: Increasing Returns to Information

Assuming increasing returns to information leads to ambiguous predictions regarding the impact of information imperfections on friend investments. We modify the benefit function to add a quadratic term in information, allowing for increasing returns to information. So the migrant's optimization problem is:

$$\max_f 1 - \frac{\theta}{e+f} + \alpha(1 - \frac{\theta}{e+f})^2 - cf$$

The parameter α measures the strength of increasing returns to information. The first order

condition is now:

$$\frac{\theta}{(e+f)^2} + \frac{2\alpha\theta}{(e+f)^2}(1 - \frac{\theta}{(e+f)}) = c$$

These marginal benefit and cost curves now allow an information treatment (that lowers θ) to either raise or lower optimal friend investments.

We analyze this case graphically in Figure 1. The parameter values used in the figure are $e = 1$, $c = 2.4$, and $\alpha = 5$. As in Figure A.1, the horizontal red line is the marginal cost function. The green and orange curves are the marginal benefit functions for the control group and treatment groups with, $\theta = 0.9$ and $\theta = 0.6$ respectively. The marginal benefit functions can have upward-sloping (increasing returns to friends) and downward-sloping (decreasing returns to friends) sections. The optimum is found at the intersection of the marginal cost function and the downward-sloping part of the relevant marginal benefit function. (The optimum would not be at the intersection with the upward-sloping part of the marginal benefit function, because at that intersection the marginal benefit of friends is increasing, so the individual could continue to increase utility by raising friend investments.)

The figure depicts the case where the cost of friend investments is high enough that for the control group (blue marginal benefit curve), there is a corner solution where $f^* = 0$ (utility is maximized with no friend investments.) For the control group, there is no amount of friend investments for which the marginal benefit of friends is positive, so the individual makes no friend investments.

From this starting point, a reduction in (in this figure, from 0.9 in the control group to 0.6 in the treatment group) can lead the marginal benefit function to shift so that there is an interior solution with positive friend investments ($f^* > 0$).

There is also of course the possibility, for lower values of the cost of friends c, that reductions in θ lead to reductions in the optimal number of friends. This would be the case if the marginal cost of friends was lower, so that the marginal cost function (the horizontal red line) would intersect both the control group and treatment group marginal benefit functions on their downward-sloping portions. If this were the case, a reduction in θ would have effects similar to those depicted in Figure A.1: a reduction in optimal friend investments.

Overall, therefore, depending on parameter values and functional forms, it is possible for an information intervention, such as the one we implemented among new U.S. immigrants from the Philippines, to either raise or lower investments made in building one's social network. This possibility arises when there are increasing returns to information (Case 2 above), but not when returns to information are constant (Case 1 above).

In Figure A.2, we examine the impact of the information treatment on friend acquisition and on utility for a range of marginal cost levels, from the highest (on the left of the x-axis) to the lowest (to the right of the x-axis).

In the upper panel of Figure A.2, we show optimal friends in the treatment group (orange line) and control group (green line). In the control group, there is no friend acquisition for the highest cost levels. Friend acquisition only becomes positive as costs fall below a certain threshold, and increase as marginal costs continue to fall. In the treatment group, on the other hand, there is always (for these cost values) positive friend acquisition, and optimal friends rise continuously as costs fall.



Figure A.2: Effect heterogeneity by cost per new friend (c)

In the central panel of Figure A.2, we examine the treatment effect on friend acquisition (optimal friends in the treatment group minus optimal friends in the control group). Ini-

tially, reductions in marginal costs make the treatment effect on friend acquisition even more positive, because we are in the region where information and friends are complements. As we lower marginal costs further into the zone where there is now positive friend acquisition in the control group, friends and information are now substitutes. The treatment effect on friends becomes negative, and increasingly so as marginal costs fall more.

In the lower panel of Figure A.2, we examine the treatment effect on utility. The treatment effect on utility (solid line) follows a pattern similar to the central panel. Starting from the highest marginal costs, reductions in marginal costs make the treatment effect on utility even more positive, as long as one remains in the region where information and friends are complements. As we lower marginal costs further, friends and information become substitutes, and the treatment effect on utility declines, and eventually can be even lower than when marginal costs were very high.

All told then, the impact of the treatment on friend acquisition and on utility is not monotonic. There is a range (when marginal costs start from a "high" level) where information and friends are complements, during which the treatment effect on friends and on utility rises as marginal costs fall. Then as marginal costs continue to fall, we transition to a region where information and friends are substitutes. In this region, the treatment effect on friends becomes negative, and the treatment effect on both friends and utility declines as marginal costs continue to fall.

B Further Details on Treatments and Survey Implementation

Content of the New PDOS

The new PDOS and the corresponding handbook consist of the following components.

Travel – This short module helps migrants to prepare for the journey to the U.S.. It covers travel-related issues such as travel documents, airport and immigration procedures, luggage, and restricted items. The new module is considerably shorter than the previous module, but the new expanded handbook provides comprehensive information on these matters.

Settlement – This is the broadest of all modules and covers issues related to migration in general and migration to the U.S. in particular. The module addresses topics such as cultural differences and culture shock, rights and obligations of U.S. permanent residents, important things to take care of after arrival (such as obtaining a social security number, health insurance, a driver's license, etc.) as well as information about health care, education,

and housing.

Associations in the U.S. – Filipino associations, but also non-Filipino associations such as neighborhood associations, may be an important provider of post-arrival support for migrants. The module informs migrants about the potential benefits of associations for expanding their social network. Such contacts may ultimately help migrants to integrate into the U.S. and find a decent job.

Employment – This module aims to help migrants to find a decent job in the U.S., which our preparatory interviews identified as the single most important challenge for Filipino migrants. It informs about the U.S. labor market and addresses important issues such as the recognition of certificates and diplomas, job search strategies, how to prepare a CV and cover letter, and behave in a job interview. There are two versions of the new PDOS, one with and one without employment module.

Financial literacy – This module is based on the fact that migrants often experience a substantial increase in income when starting a job abroad. The module teaches basic rules of thumb on opening a bank account, financial planning, savings, sending remittances, and making a joint financial plan with the family in the Philippines on the amount and use of remittances.

Diaspora engagement – This module aims to strengthen the links between Filipino migrants and the Philippines. It covers Filipino culture and values, overseas voting rights, the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship and government programs such as BalinkBayan and Linkapil, which help migrants to stay in touch with their home country and give them the possibility to contribute to development causes in the Philippines.

The new PDOS provides each migrant with a comprehensive 116-page paper handbook, which covers the above topics in detail and provides easy-to-follow checklists as well as links to online resources. While the old PDOS provides written information in the form of a booklet, the handbook of the new PDOS offers much richer and practical information. Figures B.3 and B.4 below illustrate this difference in terms of both quantity and quality for information provided on opening a bank account.

All material used in the different treatment conditions including the presentation slides and handbooks can be downloaded at https://sites.google.com/view/tomanbarsbai/pdos.

Opening a Bank Account

One of your first steps in the US should be opening a US bank account. Having an account allows you to manage your day-to-day financial transactions, which may involve buying daily necessities, or renting or purchasing a new home. Moreover, with an account, you are a step closer to fully realizing your financial goals – may it be short, mid-, or long term.

Below are the general steps to be taken in opening an account:

1 **Do your research**. Since banks come in various types and sizes and offer a diverse range of services and fees, it is best to do research on which bank is suitable to your goals, needs, and lifestyle. You may want to ask around, read online, or speak directly to a bank representative to have your questions answered.

2 **Know more about your prospective bank**. Consult the website of your preferred bank or call a bank representative for the complete requirements. Factor in considerations such as banking hours, distance, fees, interest rates, etc. Ask about ATM related bank services like location, customer protection, fees, withdrawing limit, etc. For you it might be of particular importance what the fees are for international transactions to or from the Philippines. Some banks have special relationships with foreign banks that reduce fees for international transactions—this will be listed on their websites.

3 **Determine what type of account you want**. Familiarize yourself with the various types of accounts and know what suits your needs best. The two common kinds of bank accounts are: Savings Account and Checking Account. Compare your options.

4 **Gather the requirements**. Make sure you have the complete requirements with you before heading to the bank. Each financial institution has its own requirements, but the standard requirement includes:

- Social Security Number
- Identification Card with Photo (Passport, Driver's License, etc.)
- Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (for some banks)

Note: Banks sometimes require an additional deposit. Many banks also wave the fees if you keep a minimum balance in the account. Consult your bank for the exact amount.

5 **Head to the Bank**. Present additional documents and fill out the provided forms. Schedule an appointment, if necessary. Check with the bank for online applications.

Note: For joint bank accounts, consult with the bank if both signatories need to be present when opening the account.

Remember:

- Prepare your questions in advance and do not hesitate to ask them.
- Consult with a bank representative who can walk you through the various products, offers, and services available.
- Decide on what is convenient for you – telephone, mobile, or online banking.
- Do not sign up for a bank account without comparing several options.
- Do not sign the terms and agreements unless you have read and understood the document.

Finding a Place to Live (Housing)

The decision whether to rent or buy a home is greatly influenced by your personal consideration, for instance your preferences, suitability, and financial situation.

The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) website (**http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD**) provides an exhaustive list of tools that can guide you in your decision. You will see vast number of services, checklists, and information by state.

The first decision to make is whether buying a home or renting is the best option for you. Below is a guide to help you evaluate your options. [19]

Buying	Renting
If you plan to stay in one location	If you plan to move around and don't want to be tied in one location
If you have funds for a down payment and closing costs	If you don't have the funds for a down payment and closing costs
If you can afford the maintenance costs of owning (repairs, lawn care, etc.)	If you can't afford the potential maintenance costs of owning (repairs, lawn care, etc.)
If you want to build equity over the long-term	If you are saving for the future
If you want the potential tax advantages	

19. Decide what's right—rent or buy? (n.d.). Retrieved from FannieMae KnowYourOptions: http://knowyouroptions.com/rent/overview/decide-whats-right-rent-or-buy

Figure B.3: Information on how to open a bank account provided in the handbook of the new PDOS

to present your social security number and other documents to confirm your identity.

Bank Account

Open a bank account to safe keep your money. It will also help facilitate your financial transactions. Before opening bank accounts, compare the services, fees, working hours and location of banks so you can choose the one that best meets your needs.

Taxes

As permanent residents, you will be taxed by the U.S. Government for your income inside and outside of the U.S. You must file your income tax statements at the Internal Revenue Service regardless of whether you are earning an income or not.

For more information, please visit the website http://www.irs.gov/localcontacts/index.html, or call 1-800-829-1040.

U.S. Military Selective Service

All male permanent resident aliens aged 18 to 25 years must register with the Selective Service System (SSS). Registration must be accomplished within 30 days before and after the 18th birthday. If the age upon arrival in the U.S. is between 18 and 25 years, registration must be done within 30 days upon arrival. There are no exceptions to the said age bracket. Even mentally or physically disabled persons must register.

Figure B.4: Information on how to open a bank account provided in the booklet of the old PDOS

Association Email

Below is the template for the association email. Each email provides contact details of Filipino associations in the migrant's U.S. state. The email below is for migrants moving to Northern California.

An invitation to get in touch with Filipino Association



Dear <<Salutation>> <<First Name>> <<Last Name>> ,

Greetings from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO)!

Kamusta na po kayo? We hope you are doing well. By now, you are most likely in the midst of preparing for your new life in the US. We recognize that post-arrival support for newly-settled migrants like you is very important to help you in your adjustment period – from learning about job opportunities, expanding social networks, accessing government services including social security benefits, to enrolling children in school.

The good news is that several Filipino associations in the US have long been providing such support by linking newly arrived Filipinos to other Filipinos in the area. These contacts open great opportunities in getting guidance on how to make the best of your new life in the US, find a job, locate the best schools in the area and available scholarships, or simply, discover new activities to try, places to explore, and make new friends!

We therefore strongly encourage you and your family to get in touch with Filipino associations to find out about their programs and advocacies that could potentially suit you.

To start your search, we invite you to browse and contact the following organizations in Northern California:

Transnational Institute for Grassroots Research and Action (TIGRA)
900 Alice Street #400, Oakland, CA 94607
Contact person: Francis Calpotura
Email: tigra@transnationalaction.org
Website – Facebook
Phone: (510) 338-4915

Filipina Women's Network
P.O Box 192143, San Francisco, CA 94119
Contact person: Marily Mondejar
Email: marilym@ffwn.org or filipina@ffwn.org
Website – Facebook
Phone: (415) 935-4396

Filipino American Development Development Foundation / Bayanihan Community Center
1010 Mission St Ste. B, San Francisco, CA 94103 Bernadette Sy
Contact person: MC Canlas
Email: b_sy@att.net or mccanlast@aol.com
Website
Phone: (415)348-8042 / (415) 974-0349

may still want to get in touch with them through email or phone. They have a large network and may recommend you to another association close to your place of residence. These associations are dedicated in helping migrants such as yourself and may help you a great deal in transitioning to your new home.

If you get to connect with a Filipino association in your area, please do tell us how it went and how else we can assist you. Feel free to reach us through Filsupport@cfo.gov.ph.

Hangad namin na maiayos sa madaling panahon ang inyong bagong buhay sa America. Sa pamamagitan ng mga grupong ito, maaari kang makatanggap ng suporta at tulong na iyong kinakailangan. Bukod dito, maaari ka ding makatulong sa ibang migranteng Pilipino na tulad mo.

Maraming salamat po!

Very truly yours,

Secretary Imelda M. Nicolas
Chairperson
Commission on Filipinos Overseas

Northern California
2195 Cobblehill Pl, San Mateo, CA 94402
Contact person: Marife Sevilla
Email: msevilla2195@hotmail.com
Website – Facebook
Phone: (650) 3020210 / 5788508

This map provides information on many more Filipino organizations in the US.

Treatment Implementation

Our protocols were designed to minimize spillover of information from treatment to control study participants. Scheduling the new and old PDOS on different dates minimizes the possibility of interaction between the two groups. The CFO leadership did not share the full schedule or email list with instructors or other implementation staff. Instructors were informed one week in advance of the PDOS version to be given on a particular day. Prospective PDOS participants were never informed that different PDOS versions were given on different dates, and would have had great difficulty discovering the schedule in advance.

To avoid control group contamination through instructors, different groups of instructors conducted the new and old PDOS. Instructors of the old PDOS were not informed about the content of the new PDOS and had no access to the new training materials, including the handbook. To assign instructors to the new or old PDOS and balance their characteristics, we ranked them by instruction quality and used paired random assignment. Distribution of the new, enhanced handbook was also tightly controlled. No new handbooks were available on "old PDOS" dates, and only the matching version (with and without employment module) for the corresponding new PDOS was available on each date. In addition, handbooks were not available for download on the internet during the randomized implementation period.

CFO instructors gave the old and new PDOS presentations at a central location in Manila. The delivery of both the new and the old PDOS was highly standardized. Written instructions specified the content to be delivered for each presentation slide, and we gave instructors substantial advance training prior to study initiation.

Survey Data Collection

Due to the complexity of data collection involving face-to-face interviews across the Philippines and phone interviews with migrants in the U.S., we hired the Philippine branch of TNS, a large international survey firm, to conduct the fieldwork of the project. TNS could provide field staff in all parts of the Philippines and the infrastructure needed for phone interviews.

Preparation for fieldwork followed standard practice including pre-tests of the survey instrument and extensive training of enumerators. In all survey rounds, training, data collection, and monitoring were the same across treatment and control groups. In addition, field staff was blind to both the treatment status of each respondent and the content of the interventions. All interviews were computer-assisted and administered on tablets. Computer assistance facilitated tracking individuals over time and improved data quality through au-

tomated routing and error checks. To further improve data quality, a supervisor monitored all phone interviews. Field supervisors audited ten percent of the interviews conducted with household members in the Philippines. In addition, backchecks, with a focus on non-changing information, were conducted on 20 percent of the interviews.

There was a modest compensation for participation in the survey. For completed baseline interviews, migrant respondents received PHP 200 gift certificates and household respondents bags worth PHP 110. For completed follow-up interviews, migrant respondents received phone credit worth PHP 100 to be sent to a person of their choice in the Philippines. Household respondents received phone credit worth PHP 200 and an additional PHP 100 for completed proxy interviews. To maximize response rate, we increased compensation for migrant interviews in the endline survey. In this final round, migrants received a gift certificate worth USD 10, which they could choose to keep or donate to the Red Cross. To further increase response rates, we also experimented with higher tokens. In the very last weeks of the endline survey, we offered PHP 1,000 for completed migrant and household interviews. This strategy led to the completion of about three dozen additional interviews.

C Construction of Indices

We use indices for different outcomes domains to reduce the number of outcomes to examine. Here we provide more details on how we construct the different indices (as pre-specified in the first PAP). We also reprint the exact survey questions and answer options in italics.

Travel-related problems – Average of having (i) missed a flight, (ii) had luggage problems, (iii) had customs problems, (iv) had problems with authorities in the Philippines, (v) had problems with authorities in the U.S.. Ranges from 0 to 1.

Please think back to your travel from the Philippines to the U.S.. Did you experience the following problems: (i) Missed flight from the Philippines or connecting flight, (ii) problems with airline because of too much luggage or prohibited items in luggage, (iii) problems with custom authorities because of prohibited items in luggage, (iv) problems with authorities in the Philippines because of wrong/missing documents, (v) problems with authorities in the U.S. because of wrong/missing documents? Yes / No

Settlement index – Average of having (i) a social security number, (ii) health insurance, (iii) a driver's license, (iv) a bank account. Ranges from 0 to 1.

Do you have a Social Security number in the United States? Yes / No, but I have already applied / No, I have not applied yet

Do you have health insurance in the United States? Yes / No, but I have already applied /

No, I have not applied yet

Do you have a U.S. driver's licence? Yes / No, but I am planning to get one / No, I am not planning to get one

Do you have a bank account in the United States? Yes, I have my own bank account / Yes, I have a joint account with my spouse/partner / No, but I am planning to get one / No, I am not planning to get one

Employment index – Standardized treatment effect[4] (STE) of (i) having a job, (ii) inverse hyberbolic sine of monthly earnings, (iii) perceived chance of having a job in the near future, (iv) perceived chance of having a job that matches the qualification in the future. We exclude (iii) and (iv) when estimating long-term effects as these outcomes were not collected in later interviews. We deviate from the PAP and do not include the number of invitations to a job interview since arrival in the U.S.. Due to a routing error in the script, this indicator was unfortunately not systematically collected.

Do you currently work or have a job or business? Yes / No

How much are your monthly earnings from that job? Please state the amount before tax.

What would you say is the probability that you will have a job half a year from now? Please give me a percentage number, 0 means you think it is impossible, 100 means you are sure that you will have a job.

And what would you say is the probability that you will have a job that corresponds to your qualification half a year from now? Please give me a percentage number, 0 means you think it is impossible, 100 means you are sure that you will have a job that corresponds to your qualification.

Network size index – STE of (i) having received support from an association in the U.S. and (ii) inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of friends and acquaintances made in the U.S. since arrival. We replace (i) with having had contact with an association in the U.S. when estimating long-term effects as this outcome was not collected in later interviews.

Have you received any support (information, help to find housing or work, etc.) from a Filipino community or diaspora association in the U.S.? Yes / No

How many new people in the U.S. have you got to know on a personal basis since your arrival in the U.S.?

[4] We normalize each outcome by subtracting the mean of the control group and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. Let Y_k be the k^{th} of K outcomes of a given outcome domain, μ_k be the control group mean and σ_k the control group standard deviation of Y_k. The normalized outcome is $Y_k^* = (Y_k - \mu_k)/\sigma_k$. The summary index is $Y^* = \sum_K Y_k^*/K$. We reverse the sign for adverse outcomes, so that higher values indicate more beneficial outcomes. Treatment effect estimates based on the STE quantify the difference between means in the treatment and control groups in standard deviation units.

Subjective wellbeing index – STE of (i) mental wellbeing index and (ii) migrant wellbeing index. The mental wellbeing index is the sum of five five-point items. It measures how often during the past month the respondent (i) was happy, (ii) felt calm and peaceful, (iii) was not very nervous, (iv) did not feel downhearted and blue, (v) did not feel so down in the dumps that nothing could cheer her/him up. The migrant wellbeing index is the sum of two five-point items. It measures how often during the past month the respondent did not feel (i) homesick and (ii) overwhelmed by the challenges faced in the U.S..

During the past month, how much of the time (i) were you a happy person, (ii) did you feel calm and peaceful, (iii) were you a very nervous person, (iv) did you feel down-hearted and blue, (v) did you feel so down in the dumps that nothing could cheer you up, (vi) did you feel homesick, (vii) did you feel overwhelmed by the challenges you face in the U.S.? None of the time / A little of the time / Some of the time / Most of the time / All of the time

D Multiple Hypothesis Testing

We estimate treatment effects using variants of the following regression specification:

$$Y_{i,k} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_{i,1} + \ldots + \beta_L D_{i,L} + \mathbf{X_i'}\theta + u_{i,k}, \tag{D.4}$$

where $Y_{i,k}$ denotes the kth outcome of interest for the ith unit, $D_{i,1} \ldots D_{i,L}$ the independent variables of interest (treatments), $\beta_1 \ldots \beta_L$ the parameters of interest and X_i a set of further independent variables (baseline covariates). We might further estimate these parameters in subgroups formed by the values of variables Z_i. Note that the set of variables in X_i and Z_i might be overlapping. Testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously arises due to investigating the effects on multiple outcomes of interest, the effects of multiple independent variables of interest (in the same regression specification or in different ones), the effects in multiple subgroups, or any combination thereof. In other words, we make simultaneous inference on the elements of a parameter vector $\beta = (\beta_1, ..., \beta_S)$ with individual null hypothesis of the form $H_S : \beta_s = 0$. In these situations, we want to control for the familywise error rate (FWER) – the probability of one or more false rejections.

List, Shaikh and Xu (2019) provide a bootstrap-based stepwise procedure for simultaneously testing null hypotheses from settings with multiple outcomes, treatments, and subgroups. The procedure is based on the results in Romano and Wolf (2010). It asymptotically controls the FWER and is asymptotically balanced in that the marginal probabilities of rejecting true null hypotheses are approximately equal in large samples. Information about the dependence structure between hypotheses yields greater statistical power to reject truly false

null hypotheses compared to procedures such as the Bonferroni (1935) and Holm (1979) corrections that assume independence between hypotheses. However, the procedure and the Stata package introduced in List, Shaikh and Xu (2019) are designed for experimental data in which simple random sampling is used to assign a discrete treatment status to units. It is not designed for hypothesis testing of parameters from regressions with multiple independent variables.

We modify the procedure of List, Shaikh and Xu (2019) to make it suitable for regression analysis.[5] Below, we describe the procedure and indicate where we deviate from the setup of List, Shaikh and Xu (2019). Our key modification is how we define the "unbalanced" studentized test statistic for H_s. For samples of size n, the test statistic is

$$T_{s,n}^{stud} = \frac{|\hat{\beta}_{n,s}|}{se(\hat{\beta}_{n,s})}$$

and it's re-centered version is[6]

$$\tilde{T}_{s,n}^{stud}(P) = \frac{|\hat{\beta}_{n,s} - \beta_s|}{se(\hat{\beta}_{n,s})}.$$

The regression framework does not require D_i, X_i, and Z_i to be discrete as required by Assumption 2.3 in List, Shaikh and Xu (2019). We consider the observed data (Y_i, D_i, X_i, Z_i), $i = 1, ..., n$ i.i.d. but we discussion an extension that allows for deviations from the i.i.d. assumption below. Denote by $\hat{P}_n$ the empirical distribution of the observed data. The multiple testing procedure consists of the following steps (see Algorithm 3.1 in List, Shaikh and Xu, 2019):

Step 0. Set $S_1 = S$.

$\vdots$

Step j. If $S_j = \emptyset$ or

$$\max_{s \in S_j} J_n(T_{s,n}^{stud}, s, \hat{P}_n) \leq L_n^{-1}(1 - \alpha, S_j, \hat{P}_n),$$

[5] We implement this procedure in Stata. It can be applied to other regression based settings. The module can be installed by typing `net install mhtreg, from(https://sites.google.com/site/andreassteinmayr/mhtreg)` in the Stata prompt. The Stata procedure is based on modifications of the code provided by Joseph Seidel (https://github.com/seidelj/mht-source). We thank Azeem Shaikh for helpful suggestions for the modifications.

[6] The corresponding test statistics in List, Shaikh and Xu (2019) are in Equations (6) and (7) and Remark 3.4.

then stop. Otherwise reject any H_s with $J_n(T^{stud}_{s,n}, s, \hat{P}_n) > L_n^{-1}(1-\alpha, S_j, \hat{P}_n)$, set

$$S_{j+1} = \{s \in S_j : J_n(T^{stud}_{s,n}, s, \hat{P}_n) \leq L_n^{-1}(1-\alpha, S_j, \hat{P}_n)\},$$

and continue to the next step.

$\vdots$

The adjusted p-value for H_S, $\hat{p}^{adj}_{s,n}$ can be computed as the smallest value of α for which H_S is rejected in Algorithm 3.1. Furthermore, the procedure allows calculating an unadjusted bootstrap p-value for H_S, $\hat{p}_{s,n} = 1 - J_n(T_{s,n}, s, \hat{P}_n)$.

We use bootstrap resamples to approximate $\overset{s,n}{J}_n(x, s, \hat{P}_n)$ and $L_n(x, S', \hat{P}_n)$. For $b = 1, ..., B$ draw a sample of size n from $\hat{P}_n$ and denote by $\tilde{T}^{*,b,stud}_{s,n}(\hat{P}_n)$ the quantity $\tilde{T}^{stud}_{s,n}(P_n)$ using the bth resample and $\hat{P}_n$ as an estimate of P. In our modified version this is

$$\tilde{T}^{*,b,stud}_{s,n}(\hat{P}_n) = \frac{|\hat{\beta}^{*,b}_{n,s} - \hat{\beta}_{n,s}|}{se(\hat{\beta}^{*,b}_{n,s})}$$

We approximate $\overset{s,n}{J}_n(x, s, \hat{P}_n)$ as

$$\hat{J}_n(x, s, \hat{P}_n) = \frac{1}{B} \sum_{1 \leq b \leq B} I\{\tilde{T}^{*,b,stud}_{s,n}(\hat{P}_n) \leq x\}$$

and $L_n(x, S', \hat{P}_n)$ as

$$\hat{L}_n(x, S', \hat{P}_n) = \frac{1}{B} \sum_{1 \leq b \leq B} I\{\underset{s \in S'}{max} \hat{J}_n(\tilde{T}^{*,b,stud}_{s,n}(\hat{P}_n), s, \hat{P}_n) \leq x\}.$$

Simulations

To evaluate the algorithm in terms of correct rejection rates and statistical power, we run a set of simulations based on different data-generating processes (DGP).[7] Let μ be a ten-dimensional vector of zeros $(0, 0, ..., 0)'$. Let I be a 10×10 identity matrix. Let Σ be a 10×10 covariance matrix where all off-diagonal elements are equal to 0.9. Let $D = 1[\mathcal{N}(0, 1) > 0]$ be a binary indicator equal to one with probability 0.5 for all scenarios except scenario five. The data-generating processes for each simulations are:

1. Normal i.i.d errors (ten outcomes)

[7] We base the structure of these simulations on similar simulations for a multiple-hypothesis procedure based on Westfall and Young (1993) in the Appendix C of Jones, Molitor and Reif (2019).

$\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, I)$; $Y = \epsilon$

2. Uniform i.i.d errors (ten outcomes)

   $\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$; $Y = \epsilon$

3. Normal i.i.d errors (one outcome, ten subgroups)

   $\epsilon \sim \mathcal{U}(0, 1)$; $Y = \epsilon$

4. Lognormal i.i.d. errors with balanced treatment (ten outcomes)

   $\epsilon \sim e^{\mathcal{N}(\mu, I)}$; $Y = \epsilon$

5. Lognormal i.i.d. errors with unbalanced treatment (ten outcomes)

   $D = 1[\mathcal{N}(0, 1) > 1]$; $\epsilon \sim e^{\mathcal{N}(\mu, I)}$; $Y = \epsilon$

6. Correlated errors (ten outcomes)

   $\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \Sigma)$; $Y = 0.2D + \epsilon$

We run 2,000 simulations based on these data-generating processes. In each simulation, we estimate ten regressions of the form:

$$Y_k = \beta_{0,k} + \beta_{1,k} D_k + u_k, k = 1..10.$$

The ten null hypothesis that correspond to these ten regressions are: $\beta_{1,k} = 0, k = 1..10$. These null hypotheses are true in scenarios one to five and false in scenario six. We use samples of size 100 for each scenario, for scenario two that implies 10 subgroups with 100 observations each. For all scenarios, we estimate an unadjusted p-value, a p-value adjusted with the procedure above, and adjustments based on the Bonferroni and Holm procedures. We provide a comparison between the regression based version mhtreg and the original procedure mhtexp for the unadjusted p-values and the adjustments based on Theorem 3.1 in List, Shaikh and Xu (2019).

Table D.1 present the results of this simulation. The first two rows of column (1) show the unadjusted familywise (FW) rejection rates using mhtreg (0.378) and mhtexp (0.382).[8] As a comparison, the FW rejection rate using Theorem 3.1 is 0.047 with mhtreg and 0.049 using mhtexp. Bonferroni and Holm adjustments result in a FW rejection rate of exactly 0.038.

Results are very similar in column (2), that uses a DGP with uniform errors. All methods are overly conservative in the case of lognormal errors with 50% treatment share (column 3).

[8]Remember that the probability of at least one false rejection at $\alpha = 0.05$ is $1 - (1 - 0.05)^{10} = 0.401$ for ten independent hypotheses.

Using mhtreg, the unadjusted FW rejection rate is 0.263 and the adjusted is 0.009. Results using mhtexp are almost identical. Bonferroni and Holm result in FW rejection rates of 0.009. In contrast, column (4) shows results for lognormal errors but with a share of treated of only 16%. In such a scenario standard inference methods tend reject too often. Indeed, we see unadjusted FW rejection rates to be 0.55 using mhtreg and 0.588 using mhtexp. The adjusted rate is 0.095 using mhtreg and 0.205 using mhtexp, which suggests that the type of test statistic matters in this scenario. Column (5) shows results for multiple subgroups. All results are very close to the theoretical predictions with little differences between methods.

Table D.1: Familywise rejection rate at $\alpha = 0.05$, $n = 100$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Adjustment method	Normal errors	Uniform errors	Lognormal errors (50% treat.)	Lognormal errors (16% treat.)	Multiple subgroups	Correlated errors
Unadjusted mhtreg	0.378	0.424	0.263	0.550	0.380	0.306
Unadjusted mhtexp	0.382	0.427	0.269	0.586	0.382	0.304
Thm. 3.1 mhtreg	0.047	0.062	0.009	0.095	0.057	0.178
Thm. 3.1 mhtexp	0.049	0.060	0.010	0.205	0.058	0.180
Bonferroni	0.038	0.051	0.009	0.083	0.049	0.090
Holm	0.038	0.051	0.009	0.083	0.049	0.096
Num. observations	100	100	100	100	100	100
Num. hypotheses	10	10	10	10	10	10
Hypotheses are true	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: Table reports the fraction of 2,000 simulations where at least one null hypothesis in a family of 10 hypotheses was rejected. All hypotheses are true for the simulations reported in columns (1) to (5), i.e., lower rejection rates are better. All hypotheses are false for the simulation reported in column (6), i.e., higher rejection rates are better. Bootstaps are performed with 2,000 replications.

Finally, column (6) shows results for the DGP with correlated errors when the null hypotheses are not true. Thus, in this scenario higher FW rejection rates are better. In the unadjusted case, the FW rejection rate is 0.306. Adjustment using Theorem 3.1 results in a FW rejection rate of 0.178, which is substantially higher than Bonferroni (0.09) and Holm (0.096). Again, results are similar for mhtreg and mhtexp.

Clustering

List, Shaikh and Xu (2019) do not take into account situations in which model errors are correlated within clusters. To capture the dependence structure, we follow Romano and Wolf

(2010) who suggest using a block bootstrap in such situations. In addition, we allow the test statistics to be computed with cluster-robust standard errors. We also allow using a combination of the two strategies. The option `cluster(cluster_id)` of the `mhtreg` command identifies the cluster variable. The option `cltype(t)` specifies the type of clustering. Value `t=0` specifies no clustering at all, `t=1` specifies the use of a clustered bootstrap, `t=2` specifies the use of cluster-robust standard errors for the model, and `t=3` specifies the use of both.

We run a simulation to evaluate the performance of the different types of clustering. Again, let μ be a ten-dimensional zero vector $(0, 0, ..., 0)'$, and let I be a 10×10 identity matrix. The data-generating process for this simulation scenario is

1. Errors correlated within clusters (ten outcomes)

   $c = 1...100$ clusters

   $i = 1...10$ observations within clusters

   $\eta_c \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, I)$

   $\epsilon_{ci} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, I)$

   $Y_{ci} = \eta_c + \epsilon_{ci}$

We again simulate 2,000 datasets. In each simulation, we estimated the following ten regressions:

$$Y_{k,ci} = \beta_{0,k} + \beta_{1,k} D_c + u_{k,ci}, k = 1..10.$$

where the dummy variable $D_c = 1[\mathcal{N}(\mu, I) > 0]$ varies only at the level of clusters.

Column (1) of Table D.2 shows the results without accounting for clustering. In the unadjusted case, at least one out of ten hypotheses is rejected almost every time (0.993). The adjustment methods also result in rejection proportions of more than 90%. Column (2) shows results when a clustered bootstrap is used but model standard errors are not adjusted. FW rejection rates are close to the theoretical predictions, 0.416 in the unadjusted case, 0.065 with Theorem 3.1 adjustment, and 0.058 using Bonferroni or Holm. Column (3) uses a non-clustered bootstrap but cluster-robust model standard errors. Again, results are close to the theoretical predictions with slightly smaller FW rejections rates. Finally, column (4) uses a clustered bootstrap and cluster-robust model standard errors, which again delivers results close to the theoretical predictions.

While it does not seem to make a difference, we use the double-clustering as presented in column (4) for results where clustering appears to be appropriate.

Table D.2: Familywise rejection rate at $\alpha = 0.05$, with clustered DGP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Unadjusted mhtreg	0.993	0.416	0.394	0.393
Thm. 3.1 mhtreg	0.933	0.065	0.054	0.054
Bonferroni	0.925	0.058	0.051	0.046
Holm	0.926	0.058	0.051	0.046
Num. observations	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Num. hypotheses	10	10	10	10
Model std. errors	Homoskedastic	Homoskedastic	Clustered	Clustered
Cluster bootstrap	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: Table reports the fraction of 2,000 simulations where at least one null hypothesis in a family of ten hypotheses was rejected. All hypotheses are true. Bootstaps are performed with 2,000 replications.

E Additional Figures and Tables

This section provides additional figures and tables that support our analysis. It also contains all analyses that we pre-specify in the different PAPs. We briefly summarize the results here.

Figures

Figure E.1 shows how migrants evaluate the old and the new PDOS. Immediately after each session, CFO asks migrants to complete a feedback form. All PDOS attendees, not only those who were part of our sample, received these feedback forms. Feedback is anonymous, so we cannot link it with survey responses. We analyze all feedback forms that CFO collected during the randomized implementation period. The new PDOS receives higher ratings on almost every aspect, in particular on the usefulness of various topics and the quality of the slides and the written material.

Summary Statistics and Balance Tests

Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3 provide summary statistics and balance tests of baseline characteristics and outcome variables by treatment status. They show that there are no major differences in baseline characteristics of study participants between different treatment conditions. Consistent with the main results, they also show that study participants in the treatment group have fewer travel-related problems and a lower value of the network size

index.

Short-term Effects

Tables E.4-E.13 present additional results using data from the short-term survey. Tables E.4, E.5 and E.6 examine a range of potential attrition problems. They show that treatment status does not predict a migrant's re-interview status in various ways.

Tables E.7 shows that our main results hold when we exclude proxy reports and restrict the analysis to directly reported data.

Tables E.8 and E.9 show short-term effects of the new PDOS on the component variables of the travel and network size index. The incidence of travel-related problems is lower for every single indicator in the treatment group, significantly so for having missed a flight and problems with authorities in the Philippines. The new PDOS significantly reduces the number of friends and also makes study participants less likely to have received support from an association.

Tables E.10, E.11 and E.12 test for effect heterogeneity by education (below college degree vs college degree or higher), gender, and baseline knowledge about the U.S. (share of correct answers on different aspects of the U.S., split at the median). To do so, we interact the treatment status with the respective variable of interest. We find limited evidence for effect heterogeneity along these dimensions. The new PDOS improves settlement and subjective wellbeing for study participants with a college degree. All other interaction coefficients do not point towards statistically significant differences.

Table E.13 examines a few mechanisms through which the new PDOS might affect our main outcomes. We first look at employment-related mechanisms. The employment module has a negative effect on the job-search behavior of study participants. This result is surprising because the employment module provides migrants with information on how to get their qualifications recognized and explicitly encourages migrants to do so. At the same time, the employment module improves the job-search knowledge of study participants. We also find that the new PDOS affects how migrants establish networks in the U.S. (the index summarizes whether a migrant has had contact with a Filipino or non-Filipino association in the U.S. since arrival and whether the migrant has enrolled in an English language class). There is no evidence that migrants attending the new PDOS are more likely to have discussed the amount of remittances with their family and agreed on an amount. The new PDOS explicitly encourages migrants to do so in order to manage financial expectations on both sides.

Long-term Effects

Tables E.14-E.28 present additional results using data from the long-term survey. When the long-term datum is not available, we replace it with the mid-term or short-term value, in that order. Our presentation follows the same structure as the presentation of short-term effects. We start by examining potential attrition problems. As before, we do not find that treatment status predicts a migrant's re-interview status (Tables E.14, E.15 and E.16).

Tables E.17 shows that our main results hold when we exclude proxy reports and restrict the analysis to directly reported data.

Table E.18 shows long-term effects of the new PDOS on the component variables of the network size index. We still find that the new PDOS significantly reduces the number of friends. The effect on the rate of contacting an association remains negative but ceases to be statistically significant.

Tables E.19, E.20 and E.21 test for effect heterogeneity along education, gender, and baseline knowledge about the U.S.. Again, we find little effect heterogeneity. The only exception is that the new PDOS improves subjective wellbeing for study participants with a college degree.

Our main analysis is based on the first PAP of September 2014. We also registered subsequent PAPs to guide analysis of the mid-term survey data (submitted July 19, 2015) and final survey data (submitted July 28, 2016). These latter two PAPs add additional hypotheses related to employment and the characteristics of networks. For completeness, we show the main results from these two PAPs in this appendix. Our conclusions are robust to to estimating longer-run impacts using methods from longer-run PAPs. Most importantly, we also find that the new PDOS significantly reduces network size (column 3 of Table E.22). However, the effect ceases to be significant after adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing (adjusted p-value 0.21).

In the long-run PAP, we distinguish between Filipino and non-Filipino friends and acquaintances as well as close friends. Table E.23 shows long-term effects of the new PDOS on these components of the network size index. The treatment particularly reduces the number of Filipino friends and acquaintances and close friends. The effect is negative for non-Filipino friends, but not statistically significant. We do not find that the new PDOS affects the type of networks that migrants build in the U.S. (column 4 of Table E.22). The corresponding index is defined as a STE that summarizes whether the two closest new contacts in the U.S. have a college degree or higher and whether they are of non-Filipino ethnicity, whether the migrant has visited people of U.S. origin in their home, whether the migrant has received visitors of U.S. origin, and how often the migrant has received everyday favors from non-Filipino

individuals. Similarly, the new PDOS has no effect on any other outcome domain.

Table E.25 tests for spillover effects on family members in the Philippines. We look at a range of outcomes: (i) an index that summarizes the respondents' perceived situation of the migrant in the U.S. in terms of meeting new people, social life, language skills, employment, degree recognition, adjusting to culture in the U.S., adjusting to weather in the U.S., dealing with U.S. authorities, housing, and finances, (ii) family members' intention to travel to the U.S., (iii) family members' intention to emigrate to the U.S., (iv) respondents' perception that it would be good for young household members to live in the U.S., (v) respondents' perceived ease of living and finding a job in the U.S. her/himself, (vi) an index that summarizes respondents' perceived effect of migrant's emigration on the household in terms of financial security, standard of living, housing, health, education, family life, social life, and social status, (vii) the inverse hyperbolic sine amount of remittances received by the household. We find no evidence for spillover effects.

Table E.26 looks at secondary outcomes and mechanisms. It shows that the new PDOS, with or without employment module, does not affect the use of welfare programs in the U.S. or employment quality. There is also no evidence that the treatment helps migrants to initiate and complete the process of having their qualifications recognized.

Finally, we present results using data from the mid-term survey, following the short-term PAP (Table E.27) and the medium-term PAP (E.28). When the medium-term datum is not available, we replace it with the mid-term value. As before, we find that the new PDOS significantly reduces network size. However, the effect ceases to be significant after adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing.



Figure E.1: Share of migrants giving best possible feedback right after PDOS

Note: Based on administrative feedback forms that migrants complete immediately after each PDOS. All PDOS attendees, not only those who are part of our sample, receive these feedback forms. Migrants rate various aspects of the PDOS on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 5 (excellent). On average, both the old and new PDOS receive very positive feedback. The figure therefore focuses on the share of migrants who give the best possible rating.

Table E.1: Average baseline characteristics and main short- and long-term outcomes by treatment status (old PDOS vs new PDOS)

	Old PDOS	New PDOS	All migrants	p-value
Baseline characteristics				
Age	33.073	33.391	33.266	0.558
Male	0.415	0.478	0.453	0.027
Vocational degree	0.072	0.082	0.078	0.521
College degree	0.465	0.473	0.470	0.787
Migrates alone	0.511	0.491	0.499	0.485
Migrates to California	0.383	0.429	0.411	0.106
Migrates to Hawaii	0.186	0.154	0.167	0.147
Daily internet user	0.641	0.601	0.617	0.153
English skills (0-1)	0.728	0.728	0.728	0.971
Has job in the US	0.202	0.170	0.182	0.156
Outcomes at first follow-up interview (after about 7 months in the US)				
Reinterviewed1	0.866	0.868	0.867	0.934
Proxy interview	0.387	0.415	0.404	0.332
Log days in the US	5.210	5.222	5.217	0.601
Travel-related problems (0-1)	0.020	0.008	0.013	0.025
Settlement index (0-1)	0.590	0.611	0.603	0.314
Employment index (STE)	-0.000	-0.057	-0.035	0.468
Network size index (STE)	0.000	-0.175	-0.105	0.002
Subjective wellbeing index (STE)	0.000	-0.022	-0.013	0.769
Outcomes at endline interview (after about 30 months in the US)				
Reinterviewed2	0.625	0.605	0.613	0.477
Proxy interview	0.493	0.512	0.504	0.516
Log days in the US	6.429	6.455	6.445	0.440
Settlement index (0-1)	0.797	0.793	0.795	0.855
Employment index (STE)	-0.027	-0.119	-0.082	0.265
Network size index (STE)	-0.067	-0.188	-0.139	0.033
Subjective wellbeing index (STE)	-0.009	0.026	0.012	0.502

Note: The last column provides p-values from an F-test on equality of means of the respective variable between the two groups in columns 1 and 2.

Table E.2: Average baseline characteristics and main short-term and long-term outcomes by treatment status (old PDOS vs new PDOS with and without employment module)

	Old PDOS	New PDOS with emp module	New PDOS without emp module	All migrants	p-value
Baseline characteristics					
Age	33.073	33.193	33.620	33.266	0.704
Male	0.415	0.467	0.490	0.453	0.072
Vocational degree	0.072	0.070	0.095	0.078	0.408
College degree	0.465	0.504	0.437	0.470	0.177
Migrates alone	0.511	0.521	0.457	0.499	0.164
Migrates to California	0.383	0.424	0.435	0.411	0.258
Migrates to Hawaii	0.186	0.143	0.167	0.167	0.216
Daily internet user	0.641	0.603	0.599	0.617	0.359
English skills (0-1)	0.728	0.736	0.719	0.728	0.364
Has job in the US	0.202	0.174	0.164	0.182	0.339
Outcomes at first follow-up interview (after about 7 months in the US)					
Reinterviewed1	0.866	0.850	0.889	0.867	0.273
Proxy interview	0.387	0.397	0.435	0.404	0.362
Log days in the US	5.210	5.206	5.238	5.217	0.422
Travel-related problems (0-1)	0.020	0.007	0.010	0.013	0.073
Settlement index (0-1)	0.590	0.610	0.612	0.603	0.602
Employment index (STE)	-0.000	-0.096	-0.014	-0.035	0.527
Network size index (STE)	0.000	-0.150	-0.204	-0.105	0.004
Subjective wellbeing index (STE)	0.000	-0.058	0.019	-0.013	0.697
Outcomes at endline interview (after about 30 months in the US)					
Reinterviewed2	0.625	0.588	0.624	0.613	0.470
Proxy interview	0.493	0.508	0.515	0.504	0.796
Log days in the US	6.429	6.439	6.473	6.445	0.521
Settlement index (0-1)	0.797	0.803	0.782	0.795	0.654
Employment index (STE)	-0.027	-0.146	-0.090	-0.082	0.474
Network size index (STE)	-0.067	-0.162	-0.218	-0.139	0.063
Subjective wellbeing index (STE)	-0.009	0.030	0.022	0.012	0.788

Note: The last column provides p-values from an F-test on equality of means of the respective variable between the three groups in columns 1-3.

Table E.3: Average baseline characteristics and main short-term and long-term outcomes by treatment status (old PDOS vs new PDOS with and without association email)

	Old PDOS	New PDOS with ass email	New PDOS without ass email	All migrants	p-value
Baseline characteristics					
Age	33.073	31.598	33.062	32.659	0.085
Male	0.415	0.474	0.478	0.447	0.140
Vocational degree	0.072	0.100	0.063	0.078	0.269
College degree	0.465	0.488	0.530	0.487	0.246
Migrates alone	0.511	0.467	0.498	0.496	0.495
Migrates to California	0.383	0.557	0.498	0.459	0.000
Migrates to Hawaii	0.186	0.137	0.190	0.173	0.134
Daily internet user	0.641	0.698	0.648	0.658	0.235
English skills (0-1)	0.728	0.735	0.758	0.737	0.061
Has job in the US	0.202	0.179	0.138	0.180	0.081
Outcomes at first follow-up interview (after about 7 months in the US)					
Reinterviewed1	0.866	0.876	0.838	0.862	0.431
Proxy interview	0.387	0.395	0.415	0.396	0.764
Log days in the US	5.210	5.225	5.232	5.219	0.725
Travel-related problems (0-1)	0.020	0.005	0.012	0.014	0.010
Settlement index (0-1)	0.590	0.596	0.656	0.607	0.067
Employment index (STE)	-0.000	-0.118	0.022	-0.027	0.403
Network size index (STE)	0.000	-0.136	-0.184	-0.080	0.034
Subjective wellbeing index (STE)	0.000	0.040	-0.133	-0.018	0.327
Outcomes at endline interview (after about 30 months in the US)					
Reinterviewed2	0.625	0.608	0.569	0.607	0.342
Proxy interview	0.493	0.464	0.502	0.487	0.631
Log days in the US	6.429	6.428	6.439	6.431	0.974
Settlement index (0-1)	0.797	0.796	0.813	0.800	0.752
Employment index (STE)	-0.027	0.003	-0.090	-0.032	0.755
Network size index (STE)	-0.067	-0.145	-0.196	-0.119	0.236
Subjective wellbeing index (STE)	-0.009	-0.027	0.057	0.002	0.515

Note: The last column provides p-values from an F-test on equality of means of the respective variable between the three groups in columns 1-3.

Table E.4: First follow-up interview: Attrition and mode of re-interview

	(1) Successful re-interview	(2) Successful re-interview	(3) Successful re-interview	(4) Direct re-interview	(5) Direct re-interview	(6) Direct re-interview	(7) Proxy re-interview	(8) Proxy re-interview	(9) Proxy re-interview
New PDOS (either version)	0.001	0.019	-0.030	-0.025	-0.047	-0.034	0.025	0.047	0.034
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.041)
New PDOS with emp. module		-0.034			0.042			-0.042	
		(0.029)			(0.039)			(0.039)	
New PDOS with ass. email			0.033			0.028			-0.028
			(0.027)			(0.037)			(0.037)
Age	-0.004	-0.004	-0.015	0.009	0.009	0.008	-0.009	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	0.001	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002	0.000
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)
Vocational education	0.061**	0.060**	0.119***	-0.023	-0.021	-0.047	0.023	0.021	0.047
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.061)
College education	0.006	0.007	0.019	-0.008	-0.009	0.008	0.008	0.009	-0.008
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Migrates alone	-0.015	-0.014	-0.022	-0.015	-0.016	-0.023	0.015	0.016	0.023
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.031)
California	0.002	0.002	0.019	0.011	0.012	0.016	-0.011	-0.012	-0.016
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Hawaii	0.010	0.009	0.024	0.118***	0.120***	0.097**	-0.118***	-0.120***	-0.097**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.043)
Daily internet use	-0.000	-0.001	-0.004	0.013	0.013	0.028	-0.013	-0.013	-0.028
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.042)
English skills	-0.010*	-0.010*	-0.010	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Has job in US	0.033	0.033	0.037	-0.078*	-0.079*	-0.060	0.078*	0.079*	0.060
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.050)
Constant	1.026***	1.025***	1.176***	0.467**	0.468**	0.454*	0.533**	0.532**	0.546**
	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.193)	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.253)	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.253)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.001	0.758	0.942	0.754	0.963	0.396	0.754	0.963	0.396
p-value	0.975	0.471	0.393	0.387	0.385	0.674	0.387	0.385	0.674
R2	0.011	0.012	0.024	0.014	0.015	0.011	0.014	0.015	0.011
Observations	1273	1273	902	1273	1273	902	1273	1273	902

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.

Table E.5: First follow-up interview: Attrition by outcome domain

	(1) Successful re-interview	(2) Travel-related problems observed	(3) Settlement observed	(4) Employment observed	(5) Networks observed	(6) Wellbeing observed
PANEL A						
New PDOS (either version)	0.001	0.002	-0.033	-0.010	-0.018	-0.035
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.030)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.001	0.030	1.687	0.170	0.391	1.395
p-value	0.975	0.862	0.197	0.681	0.533	0.240
R2	0.011	0.014	0.017	0.121	0.017	0.019
Observations	1273	1104	1104	1104	1104	1104
PANEL B						
New PDOS (either version)	0.019	0.003	-0.044	-0.017	-0.039	-0.046
	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.036)
New PDOS with emp. module	-0.034	-0.003	0.020	0.013	0.041	0.021
	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.042)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.758	0.040	0.901	0.159	0.635	0.841
p-value	0.471	0.961	0.409	0.853	0.532	0.434
R2	0.012	0.014	0.017	0.121	0.018	0.019
Observations	1273	1104	1104	1104	1104	1104
PANEL C						
New PDOS (either version)	-0.030	-0.010	-0.079*	-0.011	-0.038	-0.056
	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.045)
New PDOS with ass. email	0.033	0.012	0.050	-0.019	0.045	0.049
	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.044)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.942	0.321	1.465	0.388	0.572	0.840
p-value	0.393	0.726	0.236	0.680	0.566	0.435
R2	0.024	0.016	0.020	0.121	0.014	0.018
Observations	902	777	777	777	777	777

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach.

Table E.6: First follow-up interview: Direct interview for observed outcome domain

	(1) Direct re-interview among re-interviewed	(2) Direct re-interview among travel-related problems observed	(3) Direct re-interview among settlement observed	(4) Direct re-interview among employment observed	(5) Direct re-interview among network observed	(6) Direct re-interview among wellbeing observed
PANEL A						
New PDOS (either version)	-0.029	-0.035	0.000	0.000	-0.028	0.000
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(.)	(0.021)	(.)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.893	1.355	0.000	.	1.771	.
p-value	0.347	0.247	0.996	.	0.186	.
R2	0.018	0.019	0.013	.	0.032	.
Observations	1104	1077	728	362	614	578
PANEL B						
New PDOS (either version)	-0.044	-0.049	-0.008	0.000	-0.006	0.000
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(.)	(0.021)	(.)
New PDOS with emp. module	0.028	0.026	0.016	0.000	-0.039	0.000
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(.)	(0.029)	(.)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.716	0.903	0.081	.	1.360	.
p-value	0.491	0.408	0.922	.	0.261	.
R2	0.019	0.019	0.013	.	0.035	.
Observations	1104	1077	728	362	614	578
PANEL C						
New PDOS (either version)	-0.054	-0.050	0.001	0.000	-0.031	0.000
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(.)	(0.029)	(.)
New PDOS with ass. email	0.048	0.042	0.044	0.000	0.004	0.000
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(.)	(0.033)	(.)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.792	0.655	0.780	.	0.921	.
p-value	0.456	0.521	0.461	.	0.401	.
R2	0.018	0.017	0.009	.	0.053	.
Observations	777	755	515	263	436	411

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. Employment and wellbeing outcomes were only collected in direct interviews. Hence, we cannot report results for column 4 and 6.

Table E.7: Short-term effects (after about seven months in the U.S.), direct interviews only

	(1) Travel-related problems (0-1)	(2) Settlement index (0-1)	(3) Employment index (STE)	(4) Network index (STE)	(5) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.010	0.038*	-0.012	-0.181***	-0.020
	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.076)
MHT-adjusted p-value	0.632	0.302	0.965	0.027	0.981
Mean outcome control group	0.021	0.535	-0.000	0.053	0.000
R2	0.021	0.144	0.130	0.083	0.072
Observations	579	565	362	570	578
PANEL B					
New PDOS (either version)			0.016		
			(0.090)		
New PDOS with emp. module			-0.053		
			(0.095)		
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment			0.868		
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment			0.927		
R2			0.130		
Observations			362		
PANEL C					
New PDOS (either version)				-0.232***	
				(0.081)	
New PDOS with ass. email				0.076	
				(0.081)	
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment				0.033	
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment				0.844	
R2				0.091	
Observations				406	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.8: Short-term effects (after about 7 months in the U.S.): Components of travel-related-problems index

	Index	Index components				
	(1) Travel-related problems (0-1)	(2) Missed flight	(3) Luggage problem	(4) Customs problem	(5) PH authorities problem	(6) US authorities problem
PANEL A						
New PDOS (either version)	-0.012**	-0.020*	-0.015	-0.009	-0.009*	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
MHT-adjusted p-value		0.283	0.336	0.316	0.286	0.364
Mean outcome control group	0.020	0.038	0.024	0.019	0.012	0.009
R2	0.021	0.024	0.017	0.014	0.017	0.020
Observations	1077	1077	1077	1077	1077	1077

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.9: Short-term effects (after about 7 months in the U.S.): Components of the network size index and alternative network measures

	Index	Index components		Alternative network measures			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Network size index (STE)	IHS nr of friends and acquaintances	Received support from association	Logged nr of friends and acquaintances	Nr of friends and acquaintances	Nr of friends and acquaintances winsored at p90	Contacted association
PANEL A							
New PDOS (either version)	-0.169***	-0.295**	-0.032**	-0.256**	-3.437***	-2.417***	-0.050**
	(0.056)	(0.124)	(0.014)	(0.102)	(1.035)	(0.757)	(0.025)
MHT-adjusted p-value		0.104	0.123				
Mean outcome control group	0.000	2.424	0.049	1.976	12.988	11.348	0.123
R2	0.166	0.203	0.053	0.199	0.124	0.147	0.056
Observations	614	614	614	614	614	614	608
PANEL C							
New PDOS (either version)	-0.223***	-0.444**	-0.035	-0.375**	-3.677***	-2.973***	-0.106***
	(0.078)	(0.181)	(0.021)	(0.149)	(1.286)	(0.991)	(0.029)
New PDOS with ass. email	0.092	0.256	0.004	0.210	1.219	1.360	0.062**
	(0.077)	(0.170)	(0.021)	(0.141)	(1.370)	(1.080)	(0.029)
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment		0.093	0.256				
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment		0.233	0.848				
R2	0.165	0.206	0.064	0.202	0.134	0.156	0.102
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436	431

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D. IHS is short for inverse hyperbolic sine.

Table E.10: Short-term effects (after about 7 months in the U.S.): Impact heterogeneity by college degree

	(1) Travel-related problems (0-1)	(2) Settlement index (0-1)	(3) Employment index (STE)	(4) Network index (STE)	(5) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.012*	-0.010	-0.086	-0.116*	-0.186*
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.099)	(0.066)	(0.094)
New PDOS x college degree	0.002	0.082**	0.166	-0.122	0.379**
	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.155)	(0.099)	(0.147)
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction	0.892	0.216	0.710	0.682	0.097
Mean outcome control group	0.020	0.590	-0.000	0.000	0.000
R2	0.021	0.228	0.133	0.168	0.083
Observations	1077	728	362	614	578
PANEL B					
New PDOS (either version)			-0.123		
			(0.130)		
New PDOS with emp. module			0.076		
			(0.126)		
New PDOS x college degree			0.303		
			(0.204)		
New PDOS with emp. module x college degree			-0.267		
			(0.180)		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1			0.523		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2			0.570		
R2			0.138		
Observations			362		
PANEL C					
New PDOS (either version)				-0.143	
				(0.111)	
New PDOS with ass. email				0.053	
				(0.094)	
New PDOS x college degree				-0.163	
				(0.157)	
New PDOS with ass. email x college degree				0.076	
				(0.144)	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1				0.626	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2				0.851	
R2				0.167	
Observations				436	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.11: Short-term effects (after about 7 months in the U.S.): Impact heterogeneity by gender

	(1) Travel-related problems (0-1)	(2) Settlement index (0-1)	(3) Employment index (STE)	(4) Network index (STE)	(5) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.007	0.043*	-0.004	-0.155**	-0.054
	(0.008)	(0.024)	(0.088)	(0.069)	(0.101)
New PDOS x male	-0.010	-0.034	-0.022	-0.032	0.079
	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.133)	(0.102)	(0.155)
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction	0.961	0.973	0.877	0.985	0.994
Mean outcome control group	0.020	0.590	-0.000	0.000	0.000
R2	0.022	0.224	0.130	0.166	0.072
Observations	1077	728	362	614	578
PANEL B					
New PDOS (either version)			-0.007		
			(0.116)		
New PDOS with emp. module			0.006		
			(0.111)		
New PDOS x male			0.047		
			(0.142)		
New PDOS with emp. module x male			-0.132		
			(0.157)		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1			0.992		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2			0.945		
R2			0.132		
Observations			362		
PANEL C					
New PDOS (either version)				-0.255**	
				(0.118)	
New PDOS with ass. email				0.109	
				(0.116)	
New PDOS x male				0.073	
				(0.165)	
New PDOS with ass. email x male				-0.034	
				(0.155)	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1				0.990	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2				0.970	
R2				0.166	
Observations				436	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.12: Short-term effects (after about 7 months in the U.S.): Impact heterogeneity by baseline knowledge

	(1) Travel-related problems (0-1)	(2) Settlement index (0-1)	(3) Employment index (STE)	(4) Network index (STE)	(5) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A					
New PDOS (either	-0.011	0.056*	0.002	-0.268***	-0.015
version)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.114)	(0.092)	(0.115)
New PDOS x	-0.000	-0.049	-0.025	0.171	-0.010
below-median baseline knowledge	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.161)	(0.107)	(0.143)
MHT-adjusted p-value					
interaction	0.980	0.683	0.998	0.605	0.996
Mean outcome control group	0.020	0.590	-0.000	0.000	0.000
R2	0.021	0.226	0.135	0.174	0.075
Observations	1077	728	362	614	578
PANEL B					
New PDOS (either			0.056		
version)			(0.141)		
New PDOS with emp.			-0.100		
module			(0.145)		
New PDOS x			-0.067		
below-median baseline knowledge			(0.190)		
New PDOS with emp.			0.078		
module x below-median baseline knowledge			(0.193)		
MHT-adjusted p-value					
interaction 1			0.990		
MHT-adjusted p-value					
interaction 2			0.998		
R2			0.136		
Observations			362		
PANEL C					
New PDOS (either				-0.263**	
version)				(0.129)	
New PDOS with ass.				-0.023	
email				(0.113)	
New PDOS x				0.064	
below-median baseline knowledge				(0.173)	
New PDOS with ass.				0.203	
email x below-median baseline knowledge				(0.144)	
MHT-adjusted p-value					
interaction 1				0.996	
MHT-adjusted p-value					
interaction 2				0.683	
R2				0.178	
Observations				436	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.13: Short-term effects (after about 7 months in the U.S.): Mechanisms

	(1) Job search index (STE)	(2) Job search knowledge index (STE)	(3) Network establishment index (STE)	(4) Agreed with hh on amount of remittances
PANEL A				
New PDOS (either version)	-0.133	-0.029	-0.082*	-0.023
	(0.103)	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.028)
Mean outcome control group	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.213
R2	0.163	0.156	0.064	0.036
Observations	280	579	788	1077
PANEL B				
New PDOS (either version)	-0.033	-0.125*		
	(0.127)	(0.070)		
New PDOS with emp. module	-0.184*	0.179**		
	(0.110)	(0.071)		
R2	0.172	0.163		
Observations	280	579		
PANEL C				
New PDOS (either version)			-0.081	
			(0.064)	
New PDOS with ass. email			-0.003	
			(0.055)	
R2			0.077	
Observations			552	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach.

Table E.14: Endline interview: Attrition and mode of re-interview

	(1) Successful re-interview	(2) Successful re-interview	(3) Successful re-interview	(4) Direct re-interview	(5) Direct re-interview	(6) Direct re-interview	(7) Proxy re-interview	(8) Proxy re-interview	(9) Proxy re-interview
New PDOS (either version)	-0.017	-0.010	-0.031	-0.036	-0.037	-0.025	0.022	0.025	0.027
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.044)
New PDOS with emp. module		-0.013			0.003			-0.005	
		(0.022)			(0.036)			(0.037)	
New PDOS with ass. email			0.015			0.004			-0.041
			(0.024)			(0.035)			(0.040)
Age	0.013*	0.013*	0.004	0.011	0.011	0.008	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Age squared	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.020	-0.021	-0.017	0.004	0.004	0.003	-0.052*	-0.052*	-0.048
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.035)
Vocational degree	0.019	0.019	0.044*	-0.007	-0.007	-0.018	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.067)
College degree	-0.017	-0.016	-0.016	0.008	0.008	0.015	-0.066**	-0.066**	-0.055
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.037)
Migrates alone	-0.004	-0.003	-0.017	-0.026	-0.026	-0.028	0.034	0.034	0.031
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)
California	0.019	0.019	0.032	0.027	0.027	0.026	-0.010	-0.010	-0.016
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.037)
Hawaii	0.038*	0.038*	0.055*	0.095***	0.095***	0.076*	-0.049	-0.049	-0.025
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.054)
Daily internet use	-0.021	-0.021	-0.019	-0.021	-0.021	-0.020	-0.036	-0.036	-0.023
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.043)
English skills	-0.097*	-0.096*	-0.093	-0.007	-0.007	-0.054	-0.095	-0.095	-0.058
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.124)
Has job in US	0.040**	0.040**	0.044*	-0.043	-0.043	-0.019	0.037	0.037	0.034
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Constant	0.798***	0.798***	0.911***	0.557***	0.557***	0.598**	0.525***	0.525***	0.503**
	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.164)	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.239)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.240)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	1.249	0.709	0.961	2.105	1.053	0.310	0.530	0.283	0.531
p-value	0.266	0.495	0.386	0.150	0.352	0.734	0.468	0.754	0.590
R2	0.024	0.025	0.027	0.011	0.011	0.008	0.013	0.013	0.008
Observations	1273	1273	902	1273	1273	902	1273	1273	902

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.

Table E.15: Endline interview: Attrition by outcome domain

	(1) Successful re-interview	(2) Settlement observed	(3) Employment observed	(4) Network size observed	(5) Wellbeing observed
PANEL A					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.017	-0.019	-0.021	-0.015	-0.005
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.024)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	1.249	0.851	0.785	0.325	0.037
p-value	0.266	0.358	0.378	0.570	0.848
R2	0.024	0.008	0.249	0.010	0.021
Observations	1273	1176	1176	1176	1176
PANEL B					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.010	-0.038	-0.019	-0.016	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.027)
New PDOS with emp. module	-0.013	0.035	-0.003	0.003	-0.020
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.027)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.709	1.045	0.399	0.163	0.276
p-value	0.495	0.355	0.672	0.850	0.759
R2	0.025	0.009	0.249	0.010	0.021
Observations	1273	1176	1176	1176	1176
PANEL C					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.031	0.001	-0.056	-0.031	-0.011
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.033)
New PDOS with ass. email	0.015	-0.040	0.074**	0.035	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.034)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.961	0.996	2.397	0.429	0.050
p-value	0.386	0.373	0.096	0.652	0.951
R2	0.027	0.009	0.235	0.013	0.023
Observations	902	823	823	823	823

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach.

Table E.16: Endline interview: Direct interview for observed outcome domain

	(1) Direct re-interview among re-interviewed	(2) Direct re-interview among settlement observed	(3) Direct re-interview among employment observed	(4) Direct re-interview among network size observed	(5) Direct re-interview among wellbeing observed
PANEL A					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.046*	-0.023	-0.031	-0.018	-0.040*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.024)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	3.193	0.859	1.513	1.621	2.775
p-value	0.077	0.356	0.221	0.206	0.099
R2	0.017	0.012	0.020	0.016	0.010
Observations	1176	989	601	751	917
PANEL B					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.045	0.003	-0.011	-0.000	-0.042
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.031)
New PDOS with emp. module	-0.002	-0.048	-0.038	-0.033*	0.005
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.036)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	1.616	1.618	1.309	2.049	1.390
p-value	0.203	0.203	0.274	0.134	0.253
R2	0.017	0.014	0.022	0.019	0.010
Observations	1176	989	601	751	917
PANEL C					
New PDOS (either version)	-0.039	-0.039	-0.008	-0.006	-0.028
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.035)
New PDOS with ass. email	0.010	0.055	-0.024	-0.012	-0.007
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.026)	(0.040)
F-statistic treatment variables=0	0.639	1.010	0.433	0.434	0.719
p-value	0.530	0.368	0.650	0.649	0.490
R2	0.015	0.018	0.018	0.027	0.010
Observations	823	696	428	533	637

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach.

Table E.17: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.), direct interviews only

	(1) Settlement index (0-1)	(2) Employment index (STE)	(3) Network size index (STE)	(4) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A				
New PDOS (either version)	0.018	0.050	-0.134**	0.051
	(0.021)	(0.094)	(0.065)	(0.062)
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment	0.877	0.844	0.264	0.805
Mean outcome control group	0.750	0.031	-0.021	0.005
R2	0.337	0.113	0.092	0.044
Observations	527	399	526	527
PANEL B				
New PDOS (either version)		0.057		
		(0.107)		
New PDOS with emp. module		-0.015		
		(0.098)		
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment		0.847		
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment		0.876		
R2		0.113		
Observations		399		
PANEL C				
New PDOS (either version)			-0.252**	
			(0.103)	
New PDOS with ass. email			0.139	
			(0.105)	
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment			0.105	
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment			0.669	
R2			0.121	
Observations			381	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.18: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.): Components of the network size index and alternative network measures

	Index	Index components		Alternative network measures		
	(1) Network size index (STE)	(2) IHS nr of friends and acquaintances	(3) Contacted association	(4) Logged nr of friends and acquaintances	(5) Nr of friends and acquaintances	(6) Nr of friends and acquaintances winsored at p90
PANEL A						
New PDOS (either version)	-0.136**	-0.176*	-0.015	-0.160*	0.373	-4.377*
	(0.053)	(0.097)	(0.036)	(0.086)	(9.081)	(2.554)
MHT-adjusted p-value		0.336	0.892			
Mean outcome control group	-0.067	4.001	0.657	3.398	55.350	46.238
R2	0.108	0.383	0.192	0.383	0.089	0.280
Observations	751	751	751	751	751	751
PANEL C						
New PDOS (either version)	-0.238***	-0.206*	-0.038	-0.193*	12.190	-7.468**
	(0.080)	(0.122)	(0.050)	(0.110)	(21.668)	(3.401)
New PDOS with ass. email	0.095	-0.079	0.014	-0.053	-15.175	4.254
	(0.079)	(0.137)	(0.056)	(0.122)	(17.220)	(3.114)
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment		0.368	0.857			
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment		0.925	0.813			
R2	0.139	0.405	0.221	0.405	0.105	0.303
Observations	533	533	533	533	533	533

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.19: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.): Impact heterogeneity by college degree

	(1) Settlement index (0-1)	(2) Employment index (STE)	(3) Network size index (STE)	(4) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A				
New PDOS (either version)	0.002	-0.128	-0.067	-0.074
	(0.024)	(0.106)	(0.069)	(0.061)
New PDOS x college degree	-0.023	0.148	-0.154	0.247**
	(0.029)	(0.146)	(0.113)	(0.105)
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction	0.669	0.683	0.644	0.139
Mean outcome control group	0.797	-0.027	-0.067	-0.009
R2	0.235	0.136	0.110	0.038
Observations	989	601	751	917
PANEL B				
New PDOS (either version)		-0.113		
		(0.123)		
New PDOS with emp. module		-0.030		
		(0.123)		
New PDOS x college degree		0.149		
		(0.171)		
New PDOS with emp. module x college degree		-0.000		
		(0.158)		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1		0.750		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2		0.997		
R2		0.136		
Observations		601		
PANEL C				
New PDOS (either version)			-0.103	
			(0.113)	
New PDOS with ass. email			-0.015	
			(0.114)	
New PDOS x college degree			-0.278	
			(0.169)	
New PDOS with ass. email x college degree			0.225	
			(0.176)	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1			0.472	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2			0.610	
R2			0.144	
Observations			533	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.20: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.): Impact heterogeneity by gender

	(1) Settlement index (0-1)	(2) Employment index (STE)	(3) Network size index (STE)	(4) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A				
New PDOS (either version)	0.014	-0.152	-0.209***	0.075
	(0.021)	(0.113)	(0.076)	(0.070)
New PDOS x male	-0.051	0.228	0.172	-0.092
	(0.032)	(0.160)	(0.114)	(0.107)
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction	0.535	0.510	0.562	0.770
Mean outcome control group	0.797	-0.027	-0.067	-0.009
R2	0.236	0.137	0.111	0.033
Observations	989	601	751	917
PANEL B				
New PDOS (either version)		-0.128		
		(0.131)		
New PDOS with emp. module		-0.044		
		(0.134)		
New PDOS x male		0.200		
		(0.203)		
New PDOS with emp. module x male		0.051		
		(0.204)		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1		0.773		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2		0.808		
R2		0.137		
Observations		601		
PANEL C				
New PDOS (either version)			-0.360***	
			(0.119)	
New PDOS with ass. email			0.129	
			(0.111)	
New PDOS x male			0.267	
			(0.176)	
New PDOS with ass. email x male			-0.054	
			(0.140)	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1			0.529	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2			0.912	
R2			0.144	
Observations			533	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.21: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.): Impact heterogeneity by baseline knowledge

	(1) Settlement index (0-1)	(2) Employment index (STE)	(3) Network size index (STE)	(4) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A				
New PDOS (either version)	0.019	0.005	-0.118	0.080
	(0.021)	(0.136)	(0.093)	(0.083)
New PDOS x below-median baseline knowledge	-0.048*	-0.121	-0.033	-0.081
	(0.028)	(0.169)	(0.111)	(0.109)
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction	0.483	0.929	0.764	0.958
Mean outcome control group	0.797	-0.027	-0.067	-0.009
R2	0.239	0.135	0.111	0.036
Observations	989	601	751	917
PANEL B				
New PDOS (either version)		-0.010		
		(0.149)		
New PDOS with emp. module		0.031		
		(0.131)		
New PDOS x below-median baseline knowledge		-0.066		
		(0.195)		
New PDOS with emp. module x below-median baseline knowledge		-0.107		
		(0.204)		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1		0.934		
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2		0.974		
R2		0.136		
Observations		601		
PANEL C				
New PDOS (either version)			-0.160	
			(0.137)	
New PDOS with ass. email			0.054	
			(0.118)	
New PDOS x below-median baseline knowledge			-0.144	
			(0.171)	
New PDOS with ass. email x below-median baseline knowledge			0.075	
			(0.147)	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 1			0.937	
MHT-adjusted p-value interaction 2			0.938	
R2			0.144	
Observations			533	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.22: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.) following long-term PAP

	(1) Settlement index (0-1)	(2) Employment index (STE)	(3) Network size index (STE)	(4) Network type index (STE)	(5) Diaspora engagement index (STE)	(6) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)	(7) Financial decision-making index (STE)
PANEL A							
New PDOS (either version)	-0.003	-0.059	-0.154**	-0.031	0.019	0.030	0.009
	(0.019)	(0.087)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.058)
MHT-adjusted p-value	0.983	0.991	0.209	0.998	1.000	0.990	0.881
Mean outcome control group	0.765	-0.038	-0.072	0.013	-0.033	-0.014	-0.022
R2	0.266	0.121	0.083	0.108	0.069	0.036	0.072
Observations	965	705	751	692	585	881	464
PANEL B							
New PDOS (either version)		-0.048					
		(0.101)					
New PDOS with emp. module		-0.021					
		(0.093)					
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment		0.996					
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment		1.000					
R2		0.121					
Observations		705					
PANEL C							
New PDOS (either version)			-0.267***	-0.052	0.016		
			(0.094)	(0.069)	(0.078)		
New PDOS with ass. email			0.142*	-0.043	-0.119		
			(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.091)		
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment			0.072	0.997	0.996		
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment			0.615	0.995	0.888		
R2			0.119	0.091	0.084		
Observations			533	494	412		

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D. See long-term PAP for definition of indices.

Table E.23: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.): Components of the network size index following long-term PAP

	Index	Index components		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Network size index (STE)	IHS nr of Filipino friends and acquaintances	IHS nr of non-Filipino friends and acquaintances	IHS nr of close friends
PANEL A				
New PDOS (either version)	-0.154**	-0.168**	-0.110	-0.182**
	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.102)	(0.090)
MHT-adjusted p-value		0.199	0.295	0.224
Mean outcome control group	-0.072	3.903	3.453	2.951
R2	0.083	0.109	0.123	0.113
Observations	751	591	590	474
PANEL C				
New PDOS (either version)	-0.267***	-0.257**	-0.263*	-0.315**
	(0.094)	(0.124)	(0.135)	(0.153)
New PDOS with ass. email	0.142*	0.160	0.195	0.301**
	(0.083)	(0.121)	(0.145)	(0.135)
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment		0.201	0.199	0.187
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment		0.351	0.460	0.209
R2	0.119	0.132	0.156	0.130
Observations	533	419	417	341

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D. IHS is short for inverse hyperbolic sine.

Table E.24: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.): Components of the network type index following long-term PAP

	Index	Index components				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Network type index (STE)	College degree two closest contacts in US	Non-Filipino ethnicity two closest contacts in US	Visited people of US origin at home	Received visitors of US origin at home	Frequency of favours received from non-Filipinos
PANEL A						
New PDOS (either version)	0.012	0.022	-0.003	0.006	-0.032	-0.068
	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.068)
MHT-adjusted p-value		0.997	1.000	1.000	0.997	0.979
Mean outcome control group	-0.012	0.767	0.134	0.549	0.539	1.455
R2	0.115	0.099	0.067	0.081	0.050	0.033
Observations	584	604	672	668	666	522
PANEL C						
New PDOS (either version)	-0.018	-0.017	-0.004	-0.004	-0.048	-0.144
	(0.071)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.101)
New PDOS with ass. email	-0.038	-0.001	-0.018	-0.003	-0.059	0.047
	(0.063)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.097)
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment		0.998	1.000	0.667	0.750	0.995
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment		0.989	0.997	0.961	0.979	0.959
R2	0.105	0.088	0.050	0.078	0.052	0.048
Observations	423	433	470	471	471	370

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.25: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.): Spillovers on household members in the Philippines following long-term PAP

	(1) Perception of how well migrant does in US (0-1)	(2) Share of hh members intending to travel to US	(3) Share of hh members intending to migrate to US	(4) Intends to migrate to US (main respondent)	(5) Young hh members should live in US	(6) Perceived ease of making the transition to US oneself (0-1)	(7) Perceived benefits of migration for HH (0-1)	(8) IHS amount of remittances received by migrant
PANEL A								
New PDOS (either version)	-0.013	0.000	-0.001	-0.004	0.028	-0.024	-0.012	-0.160
	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.104)
MHT-adjusted p-value	0.924	0.995	1.000	0.998	0.967	0.972	0.992	0.645
Mean outcome control group	0.857	0.240	0.331	0.270	0.785	0.719	0.435	6.204
R2	0.098	0.111	0.239	0.222	0.144	0.375	0.128	0.143
Observations	838	733	712	834	898	167	730	535

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables as well as household-specific control variables as specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. P-values are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing within each panel. They are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D. IHS is short for inverse hyperbolic sine.

Table E.26: Long-term effects (after about 30 months in the U.S.): Secondary outcomes and mechanisms following long-term PAP

	(1) Use of any type of public welfare	(2) Employment quality index (STE)	(3) IHS reservation wage	(4) Initiated the process of having qualifications recognized	(5) Qualifications successfully recognized	(6) Has had contact with a US association	(7) Has had contact with a Filipino association
PANEL A							
New PDOS (either version)	0.048	-0.008	0.332	0.025	0.022	0.062	-0.017
	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.233)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.066)	(0.031)
Mean outcome control group	0.674	-0.025	8.289	0.454	0.374	0.642	0.313
R2	0.061	0.066	0.590	0.128	0.131	0.092	0.103
Observations	660	476	35	925	917	855	864
PANEL B							
New PDOS (either version)	0.017	-0.028	0.146	0.008	0.007		
	(0.048)	(0.068)	(0.251)	(0.031)	(0.031)		
New PDOS with emp. module	0.057	0.040	0.357	0.032	0.029		
	(0.046)	(0.071)	(0.266)	(0.031)	(0.026)		
R2	0.063	0.066	0.637	0.128	0.131		
Observations	660	476	35	925	917		
PANEL C							
New PDOS (either version)						0.075	-0.055
						(0.095)	(0.048)
New PDOS with ass. email						-0.058	0.058
						(0.109)	(0.045)
R2						0.105	0.127
Observations						590	592

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. IHS is short for inverse hyperbolic sine.

Table E.27: Medium-term effects (after about 15 months in the U.S.)

	(1) Settlement index (0-1)	(2) Employment index (STE)	(3) Network size index (STE)	(4) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)
PANEL A				
New PDOS (either version)	-0.001	-0.082	-0.090*	0.132**
	(0.016)	(0.087)	(0.052)	(0.065)
MHT-adjusted p-value	0.997	0.646	0.401	0.266
Mean outcome control group	0.774	-0.037	-0.031	-0.028
R2	0.190	0.106	0.119	0.052
Observations	899	525	697	660
PANEL B				
New PDOS (either version)		-0.005		
		(0.096)		
New PDOS with emp. module		-0.147		
		(0.106)		
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment		0.958		
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment		0.547		
R2		0.110		
Observations		525		
PANEL C				
New PDOS (either version)			-0.142*	
			(0.084)	
New PDOS with ass. email			0.100	
			(0.085)	
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment			0.403	
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment			0.615	
R2			0.143	
Observations			490	

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D.

Table E.28: Medium-term effects (after about 15 months in the U.S.): Main outcomes following medium-term PAP

	(1) Settlement index (0-1)	(2) Employment index (STE)	(3) Network size index (STE)	(4) Network type index (STE)	(5) Diaspora engagement index (STE)	(6) Subjective wellbeing index (STE)	(7) Financial decision-making index (STE)
PANEL A							
New PDOS (either version)	0.004	-0.087	-0.147**	-0.032	-0.035	0.088	-0.107
	(0.018)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.055)	(0.131)
MHT-adjusted p-value	0.969	0.930	0.307	0.988	0.994	0.676	0.994
Mean outcome control group	0.719	-0.031	-0.031	-0.000	-0.000	-0.027	-0.000
R2	0.221	0.117	0.101	0.088	0.096	0.047	0.052
Observations	875	607	697	550	496	660	335
PANEL B							
New PDOS (either version)		0.007					
		(0.095)					
New PDOS with emp. module		-0.179*					
		(0.106)					
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment		0.942					
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment		0.679					
R2		0.121					
Observations		607					
PANEL C							
New PDOS (either version)			-0.163	-0.046	-0.060		
			(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.087)		
New PDOS with ass. email			0.037	0.055	0.140*		
			(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.083)		
MHT-adjusted p-value treatment			0.697	0.979	0.988		
MHT-adjusted p-value interacted treatment			0.976	0.994	0.705		
R2			0.133	0.088	0.104		
Observations			490	390	346		

Note: The table reports OLS estimates. The column title shows the dependent variable. All regressions include the standard set of baseline control variables. Additional outcome-specific control variables are specified in the PAP. Standard errors clustered at the PDOS session level in parentheses. Panel A/B/C refer to specifications based on equations 1/2/3, which we present in our empirical approach. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are computed using the procedure described in Appendix D. See mid-term PAP for definition of indices.