ONLINE APPENDIX

A Model Derivations

A.1 Parameter Assumptions

In addition to the assumptions stated in the main text, we impose two further sets of assumptions that have straightforward economic intuitions. First, we impose restrictions on model parameters that ensure that for both domestic and foreign policies, the (equilibrium) efficiency losses under the risky policy are larger than the efficiency losses under the safe policy. Formally, define $z \equiv \frac{2\frac{s}{e}\log(2-d_w)}{1-d_w}$. As will be shown in Section A.2.2, z captures the share of cheaters in the domestic policy equilibrium. We state the following assumptions:

$$z(e-s) > c \tag{10}$$

$$ed_w/2 \geq c \tag{11}$$

In addition, we impose two restrictions on parameters to ensure that agents' beliefs about others' cheating are in $[0,1]$ in both the domestic and the foreign policy case:

$$\min\{2z, 2(1-z)\} \geq d_w \tag{12}$$

$$\gamma_f \in [d_w/2, 1-d_w/2] \tag{13}$$

A.2 Domestic Policy

In the model, altruism and trust decline linearly in social distance at rate θ_i and δ_i, respectively. Since distances are discrete, we can define altruism and beliefs about other agents in the same country as

$$a_0 = \tfrac{1+\theta_i}{2} \qquad a_1 = \tfrac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w$$

$$b_0 = \gamma + \tfrac{d_w}{2}\delta_i \qquad b_1 = \gamma - \tfrac{d_w}{2}\delta_i$$

where throughout these derivations, the 0 subscript refers to domestic in-group members, and the 1 subscript to domestic out-group members.

A.2.1 Cheating Decision

We solve the game by backward induction. Suppose the risky policy got implemented. We now ask under which conditions an agent cheats.

Suppose that some arbitrary fraction φ_i of the other $\frac{N}{2}-1$ domestic agents is perceived by agent i to be cheating on the policy. For every agent i, per-capita loss caused by all cheating agents *other* than i totals $\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2}-1\right)\frac{e}{\frac{N}{2}} = \varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e$. Thus:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&E_i[u_i(q_i=0)] = \\
&\underbrace{-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0\tilde{b}_0\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent } i\text{)} \\ \text{who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1\tilde{b}_1\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who do not cheat}}} \\
&+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(1-\tilde{b}_0)\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members} \\ \text{(other than agent } i\text{) who cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(1-\tilde{b}_1)\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group} \\ \text{members who cheat}}}\Bigg]
\end{aligned} \tag{14}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&E_i[u_i(q_i=1)] = \\
&\underbrace{-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}+s}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0\tilde{b}_0\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent } i\text{)} \\ \text{who do not cheat}}} \\
&+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1\tilde{b}_1\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group} \\ \text{members who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(1-\tilde{b}_0)\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group} \\ \text{members (other than agent } i\text{) who cheat}}} \\
&+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(1-\tilde{b}_1)\left(-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N-2}{N}\right)e-\frac{2e}{N}+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who cheat}}}\Bigg]
\end{aligned} \tag{15}
$$

An agent doesn't cheat iff $E_i[u_i(q_i=1)] \leq E_i[u_i(q_i=0)]$, i.e. an agent doesn't cheat iff their draw of β and θ satisfies the following no-cheat condition:

$$\frac{Ns}{2e} \leq 1+\beta_i\left[\frac{N}{4}(1+\theta_i(1-d_w))-\frac{1+\theta_i}{2}\right] \tag{16}$$

Under our maintained assumption that $N \to \infty$, this delivers

$$\frac{2s}{e} \leq \underbrace{\beta(1+\theta_i(1-d_w))}_{\equiv \Psi} \tag{17}$$

A.2.2 Equilibrium Fraction of Cheaters

The previous condition defines the equilibrium fraction of agents that don't cheat γ^*:

$$\gamma^* = \mathbb{P}\left(\Psi \geq \frac{2s}{e}\right) = 1 - \mathbb{P}\left(\Psi < \frac{2s}{e}\right) = 1 - \iint\limits_{Area} f_{\beta\theta}(\beta,\theta)d\beta d\theta$$

Where $Area = \left\{(\beta,\theta)|\Psi < \frac{2s}{e}\right\}$ and $f_{\beta\theta}(\beta,\theta)$ is the joint probability density function of β and θ. Note that since β and θ are i.i.d. $\mathcal{U}(0,1]$, $f_{\beta\theta}(\beta,\theta) = f_\beta \cdot f_\theta = 1 \cdot 1 = 1$ over $\beta \in (0,1], \theta \in (0,1]$.

Under the assumptions stated above (in particular that $2s < e$), we get that:

$Area = A + B$, where:

$$A \equiv \beta \in \left(0, \frac{2\frac{s}{e}}{2-d_w}\right] \times \theta \in (0,1] \tag{18}$$

$$B \equiv \beta \in \left[\frac{2\frac{s}{e}}{2-d_w}, 2\frac{s}{e}\right] \times \theta \in \left(0, \frac{2\frac{s}{e} - \beta}{\beta(1-d_w)}\right] \tag{19}$$

Integrating over $Area$ gives:

$$\gamma^*(e,s,d_w) = 1 - \frac{2\frac{s}{e} \cdot \log(2-d_w)}{1-d_w} \in [0,1] \tag{20}$$

A.2.3 Policy Views

Having derived the cheating decision and the equilibrium fraction of cheating, we now determine voting behavior (relative support for policies A and B). The utility from policy options A and B is given by:

$$\pi_A = \underbrace{-c}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members} \\ \text{(other than agent } i\text{)}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members}}} \Bigg] \tag{21}$$

$\pi_B(q_i^*(\beta,\theta)) =$

$$\underbrace{-(1-\gamma^*)e + s(q_i^*(\theta_i))}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0 b_0(-(1-\gamma^*)e)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent i)} \\ \text{who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1 b_1(-(1-\gamma^*)e)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who do not cheat}}}$$

$$+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(1-b_0)(-(1-\gamma^*)e+s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent i)} \\ \text{who cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(1-b_1)(-(1-\gamma^*)e+s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who cheat}}}\Bigg] \tag{22}$$

Given this, the relative support for policy A over policy B is given by:

$$\Pi_{A,B} \equiv E[u_i(A)] - E[u_i(B)] = (1-\gamma^*)e - s(q_i^*(\theta_i)) - c \tag{23}$$

$$+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0\,\{(1-\gamma^*)e-(1-b_0)s-c\}\right] \tag{24}$$

$$+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1\,\{(1-\gamma^*)e-(1-b_1)s-c\}\right] \tag{25}$$

We now investigate how the relative support for policies A and B depends on universalism in trust (δ_i) and universalism in altruism (θ_i).

A.2.4 Policy Views and Universalism in Trust

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \delta_i} = \beta_i s \frac{d_w}{4}\left[\theta_i\left(\frac{N d_w}{2}-1\right)-1\right] \tag{26}$$

which is greater than zero as $N \to \infty$.

A.2.5 Policy Views and Universalism in Altruism

Case 1: Agents that are not on the margin. Consider those agents that are not on the margin of cheating vs. not cheating ($\Psi \neq \frac{2s}{e}$). In other words, $q_i^*(\theta_i)$ is constant for marginal changes of θ_i, $\frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \theta_i} = 0$. Thus,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}\Big|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}} = \beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\frac{1}{2}\,\{(1-\gamma^*)e-(1-b_0)s-c\}\right] \tag{27}$$

$$+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\{(1-\gamma^*)e-(1-b_1)s-c\}\right] \tag{28}$$

This simplifies to:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}} = \beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\frac{1}{2}\left\{(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)+\delta_i\frac{d_w}{2}s-c\right\}\right] \tag{29}$$

$$+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\left\{(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-\delta_i\frac{d_w}{2}s-c\right\}\right] \tag{30}$$

The coefficient on δ_i in $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}}$ is:

$$\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\cdot\frac{1}{2}\cdot\frac{d_w s}{2} - \frac{N}{4}\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\cdot\frac{d_w s}{2}\right] = \beta_i\frac{d_w s}{4}\left(\frac{N d_w}{2}-1\right) \geq 0$$

This expression is non-negative as $N\to\infty$ and therefore $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}} \geq \frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e},\delta=0}$. In other words, for any value of β_i, $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}$ takes its smallest value when $\delta_i = 0$ since the coefficient on δ_i is non-negative.

We can therefore focus on evaluating:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e},\delta_i=0} = \beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\frac{1}{2}\{(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-c\}\right] \tag{31}$$

$$+\beta_i\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\{(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-c\}\right] \tag{32}$$

$$=\beta_i\left(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w)-\frac{1}{2}\right)((1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-c) \tag{33}$$

Notice that $(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w)-\frac{1}{2})>0$, and so $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e},\delta_i=0}>0$ (and by extension $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}}>0$) if $(1-\gamma^*)(e-s)-c>0$. This is ensured by the assumption in equation (10). We hence have that $\frac{\partial \Pi_{A,B}}{\partial \theta_i}|_{\Psi\neq\frac{2s}{e}}\geq 0$, meaning that support for the safe policy A increases in θ_i everywhere except at $\Psi=\frac{2s}{e}$, to which we now turn attention.

Case 2: Agents on the margin of cheating. Consider those agents for whom $\Psi=\frac{2s}{e}$, so that a marginal change in θ_i induces the agent to switch from cheating to not cheating (recall from equation (17) that cheating decreases in θ_i).

For a marginal change of θ_i, the utility derived from the safe policy option A does not change. For the risky policy option B, observed actions change from $q_i^*=1$ to $q_i^*=0$, yet utility varies smoothly. To see this, define $\Lambda_i(\beta_i,\theta_i)=u_B(q=0)-u_B(q=1)$, the difference between the utility from cheating and not cheating under policy option B. From equation (17):

$$\Lambda_i(\beta_i,\theta_i)=\beta_i\frac{e}{2}(1+\theta_i(1-d_w))-s \tag{34}$$

It is obvious that $\Lambda(\beta,\theta)$ is continuous at 0, i.e., at $\Psi=\frac{2s}{e}$. Intuitively, when the agent switches from $q_i^* = 1$ to $q_i^* = 0$, utility changes smoothly because – by assumption – the agent is indifferent at $\Psi = \frac{2s}{e}$, where $u_B(q=0) = u_B(q=1)$.

Therefore, even though $\Pi_{A,B}$ is composed of a piecewise function (q^*), $\Pi_{A,B}$ is continuous because Λ is continuous at 0:

$$\lim_{\Psi \to \frac{2s}{e}^-} u_A - u_B(q^* = 1) = \lim_{\Psi \to \frac{2s}{e}^+} u_A - u_B(q^* = 0) \tag{35}$$

$$\implies \lim_{\Psi \to \frac{2s}{e}^-} \Pi_{A,B} = \lim_{\Psi \to \frac{2s}{e}^+} \Pi_{A,B} = \lim_{\Psi = \frac{2s}{e}} \Pi_{A,B} \tag{36}$$

Since Π is continuous, and strictly increasing in θ_i on either side of the indifference boundary, Π increases in θ_i over all values of θ_i.

A.3 Foreign Policy

In the foreign policy context it is much simpler to derive the relationship between universalism and policy views. This is because in the context of foreign policies, only *foreign* agents are allowed to cheat on one's own country.

In order to evaluate each policy option, decision-makers must form beliefs about who cheats. As in the domestic case, we will take the stance that the subjective probability of not cheating declines linearly in social distance at a rate δ_i:

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \tag{37}$$

where decision-makers are again correct about the overall fraction of cheaters in the foreign country (γ_f), but may be incorrect in their beliefs about which foreigners cheat. Levels of altruism and beliefs by distance are given by the below:

$$\begin{array}{cccc} a_0 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} & a_1 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w & a_2 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_l & a_3 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i \\ b_0 = 1 & b_1 = 1 & b_2 = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - d_l \delta_i & b_3 = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i \end{array}$$

where, as above, the 0 subscript refers to domestic in-group members, the 1 subscript to domestic out-group members, the 2 subscript to foreign in-group members, and the 3 subscript to foreign out-group members.

We define L_f to be the total per capita cost of cheating imposed by foreigners. That is, $L_f = (1-\gamma_f)e$. For a domestic agent i, the relative value of Option A to Option B in the foreign policy domain is therefore:

$$\Pi \equiv \underbrace{(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility} \\ \text{under Policy A}}} + \beta_i \Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right) a_0(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members (other} \\ \text{than agent } i\text{) under Policy A}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_1(-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members} \\ \text{under Policy A}}} \Bigg]$$

$$- \underbrace{(-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility} \\ \text{under Policy B}}} - \beta_i \Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right) a_0(-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members (other} \\ \text{than agent } i\text{) under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_1(-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members} \\ \text{under Policy B}}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_2(1-b_2)s}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign in-group members} \\ \text{who cheat under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_3(1-b_3)s}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign out-group members} \\ \text{who cheat under Policy B}}} \Bigg]$$

$$= (L_f - c) + \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4}(a_0 + a_1) - a_0 \right)(L_f - c) - \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(a_2(1-b_2) + a_3(1-b_3))s \right]$$

$$= (L_f - c) + \beta_i \Bigg[\left(\frac{N}{4}(1+\theta_i(1-d_w)) - \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} \right)(L_f - c)$$

$$- \left(\frac{N}{4}\right) \left\{ \left(\frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_l \right)\left(1 - \left(\gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - d_l\delta_i\right)\right) + \left(\frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i\right)\left(1 - \left(\gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i\right)\right) \right\} s \Bigg] \tag{38}$$

We first take the comparative static of the relative valuation of Option A compared to Option B with respect to universalism in trust δ_i:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \delta_i} = \beta_i \left(\frac{N}{4}\right) s \left(\frac{1-d_l}{2}\right)(\theta_i(1-d_l)) > 0 \tag{39}$$

Next, we take the comparative static of the relative valuation of Option A relative to Option B with respect to universalism in altrusim θ_i:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \theta_i} = \beta_i \left[(L_f - c)\left(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w) - \frac{1}{2}\right) + \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(d_l - \frac{1}{2}\right)(1-b_2)s + \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)(1-b_3)s \right] \tag{40}$$

Note that $(L_f - c) = ((1-\gamma_f)e - c) \geq 0$ by the assumption in equation (11), so that the entire expression is positive. We hence see that the relative support for the "safe" policy option A increases as universalism in trust and universalism in altruism decrease.

B Analysis of Ideological Clusters in the CSES and WVS

B.1 CSES

To assess whether the trends observed in our survey data extend to a broader set of countries, we use data from Module 4 of the CSES. Data collection for this module was conducted between 2011 and 2016 in 39 countries. These post-election surveys are nationally representative.

The variables of interest in our analysis are left-right leaning and support for various policy positions. The CSES survey asks respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale of 0 to 10, which aligns with the measure of left-right placement used in our survey. We quantify support for policy positions using CSES survey questions that ask respondents for their desired level of government spending in four policy domains that overlap with our survey: healthcare, defense, police, and welfare. Specifically, the CSES asks respondents whether public expenditure on each of these four domains should be "more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now," where these responses are ranked on a discrete scale from 1 to 5. We standardize these values within each country to account for broad cross-country differences in desired levels of spending.

We include all observations for which both left-right leaning and at least one of the four policy preferences are non-missing. Dropping the missing observations, our figures draw on 51,535 observations from 37 countries. We partition these into a set of sixteen "Western" countries—the Western European countries, along with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—and a set of twenty-one non-Western countries.

Figure 11 illustrates the correlations between policy views and left-right placement for Western and non-Western countries, respectively. As outlined in Section 2, these figures indicate that the trends we observe for the seven countries in our survey data extend to a broader range of countries: Western countries show a stronger correlation between political leaning and policy positions than do non-Western countries.

B.2 WVS

To document the persistence of the structure of ideology in the West, we turn to data from Waves 3, 4, and 5 of the World Values Survey (WVS). Data collection for these waves spanned the years 1995 to 2009, across a combined 100 countries.

We identified questionnare items that asked respondents across all three waves about their political attitudes with regards to: immigration policy ("border control")[14], for-

[14]The border control question was: "How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?" (Let anyone come who wants to;



Figure 11: Correlation between self-reported political leaning and policy preferences, as measured by the standardized (within each country) answer to the CSES survey questions about whether government expenditures in a category should go up or down. The left panel includes the Western countries and the right panel non-Western countries. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "All nonwestern countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

eign aid[15], the environment[16], and welfare[17]. We partition responses into Western and non-Western countries, and regress standardized responses (with respect to within-wave, within-country means) on respondents' left-right self-assessment (on a scale from 1 to 10) and country fixed effects.

We document that as far back as the mid-1990s, a left-leaning self-assessment is associated in the West with increased support for policy domains like foreign aid, the environment, and welfare. Left-leaning, Western respondents also indicate less support for a restrictive immigration policy. Meanwhile, these patterns are much weaker or non-existent in non-Western countries.[18]

Let people come as long as there are jobs available; Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here; Prohibit people coming here from other countries).

[15]The foreign aid questions were: "In some economically less developed countries, many people are living in poverty. Do you think that what the other countries of the world are doing to help them is about right, too much or too little?" in Wave 3, "Some people favor, and others are against, having this country provide economic aid to poorer countries. Do you think that this country should provide more or less economic aid to poorer countries? Would you say we should give ..." (A lot more than we do now; Somewhat more than we do now; Somewhat less than we do now; A lot less than we do now) in Wave 4, and "In 2003, this country's government allocated [a tenth of one percent] of the national income to foreign aid–that is [$U.S. 38.05] per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right?" in Wave 5.

[16]The environment question was: "I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental [damage (Wave 3) / pollution (Waves 4 and 5)]" (Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree)

[17]The welfare question was: "How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between." (1: Incomes should be made more equal; 10: We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort).

[18]Countries categorized as "Western" in this analysis are: Andorra, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.



Figure 12: Correlation between left-right self-assessment and political attitudes, as measured by the standardized (within each country and wave) response to the WVS question about the given policy domain, and pooled across Western and Nonwestern countries. Horizontal bars indicate the point estimate, while shaded areas the 95% confidence interval using robust standard errors. All regressions included country fixed effects.

C Additional Details and Analyses for Survey

C.1 Sample Characteristics

This section presents sample characteristics for all seven countries included in our survey. For reasons beyond our control and related to Dynata's reach in data collection, several of our samples are relatively too educated in comparison with a representative sample. This is specifically the case for Australia, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, and Sweden.

C.1.1 Australia

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	49	47.1	48.6
Female	51	52.9	51.4
Age			
18–29	24	14.5	14.9
30–39	17	19.2	19.2
40–49	17	19.3	19.1
50–59	16	19.4	18.3
60–69	13	14.1	14.6
≥ 70	13	13.5	13.9
Income (annual; AUD)			
Below 20,000	7	5.0	5.1
20,000–34,999	13	12.4	12.8
35,000–49,999	12	12.8	13.0
50,000–64,999	12	12.9	12.8
65,000–79,999	10	10.2	10.5
80,000–99,999	10	11.1	11.1
100,000–124,999	10	11.2	11.0
125,000–149,999	8	10.0	8.9
150,000–199,999	9	8.3	8.6
200,000 or more	8	6.0	6.2
Ancestry			
English	26	11.5	11.8
Australian	25	68.5	67.5

Other	49	20.1	20.7
Education			
No high school	28	7.5	7.7
High school	18	26.4	25.4
Vocational training	29	33.2	34.2
Bachelor's degree or higher	25	33.0	32.6
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	55	53.2	55.0
Not employed full-time	45	46.8	45.0

Note: We were advised by Dynata that it is not common practice to ask respondents in Australia about their race or ethnicity. Accordingly, we found data from the Australian census corresponding to ancestry, which we condensed into "Australian", "English", or "Other". Our final sample characteristics correspond closely to guidance from Dynata that 74% of Australian citizens are Australian-born, which leads us to believe respondents interpreted our ancestry question as eliciting their country of birth or nationality, as is more common practice in Australia.

C.1.2 Brazil

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	48	52.1	50.2
Female	52	47.9	49.8
Age			
18–29	30	36.7	36.9
30–39	22	30.3	28.8
40–49	19	18.6	19.3
50–59	14	11.0	11.4
≥60	15	3.5	3.6
Income (annual; Brazilian reals)			
Below 3,000	5	15.8	16.1
3,000–5,999	12	13.0	13.5
6,000–11,999	22	9.7	10.1
12,000–17,999	17	8.6	8.9
18,000–29,999	20	9.9	10.3
30,000–59,999	16	19.2	20.0
≥60,000	8	23.9	21.1
Ancestry			
White	49	61.3	59.8
Multi-racial	41	27.4	28.5
Other	10	11.3	11.8
Education			
No formal education	45	0.3	0.3
Elementary school	17	3.3	3.5
High school	28	48.1	50.0
Bachelor's degree or higher	10	48.3	46.2
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	41	67.8	66.5
Not employed full-time	59	32.2	33.5

Note: Our samples in Brazil are relatively educated, young, wealthy, and employed. We have reason to believe that some subsamples of the Brazilian population are inaccessible to *Dynata*. For example, the Brazilian census likely includes indigenous populations that likely make up a sizable portion of the "No formal education" bucket.

C.1.3 France

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%) *Full*	Study Sample (%) *Representative*
Gender			
Male	48	47.9	47.7
Female	52	52.1	52.3
Age			
18–29	18	12.9	17.4
30–39	16	20.7	18.0
40–49	16	23.0	18.0
50–59	17	23.3	19.6
≥60	33	20.0	27.0
Income (annual, EUR)			
Below 10,000	7	9.3	9.5
10,000–14,999	6	7.5	7.3
15,000–19,999	13	11.0	12.4
20,000–24,999	12	13.5	13.1
25,000–29,999	11	11.1	10.6
30,000–34,999	10	10.9	10.2
35,000–39,999	8	8.1	7.2
40,000–49,999	13	13.1	12.1
50,000–64,999	10	8.7	8.6
65,000 or more	10	6.9	9.0
Ancestry			
French or other European	85	96.8	95.6
Other	15	3.2	4.4
Education			
No high school	22	17.9	21.4
High school	43	30.9	41.5
Some college	14	20.8	14.8
Bachelor’s degree or higher	21	30.4	22.3
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	56	65.6	56.5
Not employed full-time	44	34.4	43.5

Note: “High school” corresponded to “Baccalauréat”, “Some college” to “Enseignement supérieur, niveau Bac+2 max”, and “Bachelor’s degree or higher” to “Enseignement supérieur, niveau Bac+3 et plus”.

C.1.4 Germany

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	49	51.0	50.3
Female	51	49.0	49.7
Age			
18–29	21	13.5	13.7
30–39	14	19.4	19.7
40–49	19	21.0	21.3
50–59	17	26.0	25.0
60–69	13	16.0	16.2
≥70	17	4.0	4.1
Income (monthly; EUR)			
Below 1,300	19	15.1	15.3
1,300–2,599	33	33.6	34.0
2,600–3,599	19	22.1	22.4
3,600–5,000	15	21.8	20.7
More than 5,000	14	7.5	7.6
Ancestry			
German	79	96.6	96.6
European (not German)	15	2.3	2.3
Other	6	1.1	1.1
Education			
No vocational training	27	5.6	5.7
Vocational training	57	58.3	59.1
University degree	16	36.1	35.2
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	59	64.3	63.8
Not employed full-time	41	35.7	36.2

Note: The option included in the survey equivalent to vocational training was "Lehre oder Berufsausbildung im dualen System". For "University degree", the option provided was "Hochschulabschluss".

C.1.5 South Korea

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	50	49.3	48.3
Female	50	50.7	51.7
Age			
18–29	19	19.6	23.0
30–39	18	30.8	26.2
40–49	20	27.3	24.7
50–59	20	16.3	19.1
60–69	13	5.5	6.4
≥70	10	0.5	0.6
Income (annual; ten-thousand Won)			
Below 200 ten-thousand Won	19	9.7	11.4
200–350 ten-thousand Won	23	27.4	27.7
350–500 ten-thousand Won	21	26.3	23.4
500–750 ten-thousand Won	17	22.0	20.5
More than 750 ten-thousand Won	20	14.5	17.1
Ancestry			
Korean	96	99.8	99.8
Other	4	0.2	0.2
Education			
No high school	13	1.0	1.2
High school	40	26.9	31.6
Some college	13	7.4	8.6
Bachelor's degree or higher	34	64.8	58.7
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	59	85.3	82.7
Not employed full-time	41	14.7	17.3

Note: Our samples in Korea are relatively too educated, too young, and too employed.

C.1.6 Sweden

Category	Population (%)	Study Sample (%)	
		Full	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	50	58.1	50.3
Female	50	41.9	49.7
Age			
18–29	24	12.5	17.8
30–39	15	10.5	14.8
40–49	15	13.8	16.7
50–59	15	19.2	16.2
60–69	13	20.0	14.8
≥70	18	24.0	19.8
Income (annual; Swedish kronor)			
Below 100,000 kr	14	6.9	9.8
100,000–200,000 kr	13	16.0	13.9
200,000–299,999 kr	18	20.8	18.3
300,000–399,999 kr	25	22.7	25.7
400,000–499,999 kr	16	16.8	16.1
500,000–599,999 kr	7	7.8	7.2
600,000–749,999 kr	4	4.6	4.8
750,000–999,999 kr	2	2.6	2.7
1,000,000 kr or more	1	1.8	1.6
Ancestry			
Swedish	82	92.8	89.7
Other	18	7.3	10.3
Education			
No high school	40	8.1	11.5
High school	22	32.3	31.8
Some college	15	30.1	24.7
Bachelor's degree or higher	23	29.6	32.0
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	67	63.3	66.9
Not employed full-time	33	36.7	33.1

Note: "High school" corresponded to "Gymnasieexamen", while "Some college" to "Viss universitets-/högskoleutbildning". The option equivalent to a university degree or higher was "Kandidatexamen."

C.1.7 United States

		Study Sample (%)	
Category	Population (%)	*Full*	*Representative*
Gender			
Male	49	36.4	48.9
Female	51	63.6	51.1
Age			
18–29	21	12.6	19.1
30–39	16	11.3	14.4
40–49	16	14.1	15.2
50–59	17	24.5	19.4
60–69	14	25.8	15.5
≥70	16	11.6	16.5
Income (annual; USD)			
Below 15,000	11	14.3	13.9
15,000–24,999	9	14.3	9.2
25,000–34,999	9	14.7	9.8
35,000–49,999	12	14.6	11.7
50,000–74,999	17	14.8	17.3
75,000–99,999	13	10.4	13.0
100,000–149,999	15	9.9	14.4
150,000–199,999	7	3.9	6.0
200,000 or more	7	3.1	4.7
Ancestry			
White	63	81.9	69.1
African-American	17	8.1	13.6
Hispanic	12	4.7	7.9
Asian	5	3.3	5.9
Other	3	2.0	3.5
Education			
No high school	11	3.9	6.4
High school	29	41.8	30.2
Some college	29	29.7	30.6
Bachelor's degree or higher	31	24.6	32.8
Employment Status (for those at most 65)			
Employed full-time	67	37.3	63.4
Not employed full-time	33	62.7	36.6

C.2 Screenshots

C.2.1 Universalism tasks

Domestic universalism in altruism.



In each row below, how would you split $100 between a randomly-selected person who lives in the United States and the individual displayed on the right (who is part of a particular social group)?

The closer you drag the slider to one individual, the more money you allocate to that individual. Please assume all individuals below have the same income, **all live in the United States**, and would not find out that it was you who sent them the money.

How would I split the money?

$0	Randomly-Selected Person A who lives in the United States	A friend of a family member (e.g., your sibling's closest friend)	$0
$0	Randomly-Selected Person B who lives in the United States	A member of your extended family (e.g., your cousin)	$0
$0	Randomly-Selected Person C who lives in the United States	A former or current colleague at work or school	$0
$0	Randomly-Selected Person D who lives in the United States	Someone who shares your religious beliefs (e.g., a fellow Christian)	$0
$0	Randomly-Selected Person E who lives in the United States	A member of one of your past or current organizations (local church, leisure club or association, etc.)	$0

Figure 13: Screenshot of decision screen for money allocation tasks meant to elicit domestic universalism in altruism. Subjects would see two of these screens consecutively, where five of the ten groups would be presented on each screen. Note that across all subjects, the order of the ten social groups was randomized, and whether all social groups appeared on the left or all appeared on the right was also randomized for any given choice domain. The layout for tasks eliciting global universalism in altruism is identical to that of domestic groups.

Foreign universalism in altruism.



Figure 14: Screenshot of decision screen for money allocation task meant to elicit foreign universalism in altruism. Across subjects, it was randomized whether the domestic social group appeared on the left or on the right. The layout for the task eliciting foreign universalism in *trust* is identical to this layout, with the exception of necessary changes to the instructions and to graphics, as consistent with the layout for trust tasks presented in Figure 15.

Domestic universalism in trust.



Figure 15: Screenshot of decision screen for tasks meant to elicit domestic universalism in trust. Subjects would see two of these screens consecutively, where five of the ten groups would be presented on each screen. Note that across all subjects, the order of the ten social groups was randomized, and whether all social groups appeared on the left or all appeared on the right was also randomized for any given choice domain. The layout for tasks eliciting global universalism in trust is identical to that of domestic groups.

C.2.2 Policy preferences

Desired government spending.

Suppose that you could determine how the United States government spends money on various different categories of the federal budget, such as the military or redistribution.

Specifically, imagine you could decide the **average amount of money that the federal government collects per year from each American to spend on each of the eight categories below**. For the purposes of this question, you should assume that all dollar amounts collected for a category are spent only on this particular category, without any waste.

How much money would you have the federal government collect on average from each American, in order to spend on each of the following eight categories of expenditure in the federal budget?

To provide a reference, it is estimated that altogether, all levels of government in the United States spend a combined average amount of $2,750 per American every year for the purposes of education.

	Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on category, per year
Police and law enforcement	$
Foreign aid	$
Universal healthcare	$
Environmental protection	$
Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage	$
Military and counterintelligence	$
Welfare payments	$
Effective border control	$

Figure 16: Screenshot of decision screen eliciting subjects' policy preferences through the means of desired per-capita spending on categories of the federal/national government's budget. Across subjects, the order of categories was randomized.

Support for Specific Policy Implementations.

You just indicated your preferences over several broad categories of expenditure. We will now ask you to indicate how much money you would like to collect and spend on **specific projects or policy proposals**. After all, even within broad categories such as military or redistribution, **you may like some policies and projects more than others. We are now interested in which specific projects or policies you favor.**

Please consider the policy proposals presented in the table below. Note that the table will expand with additional rows as you fill in your answers and until you see **eight** rows in total. Again assume that all money collected for the purposes of a policy are spent only on implementing that particular policy, without waste.

How much money would you have the federal government collect on average from each American, in order to spend on each of the **specific projects or policies** presented?

Policy	**Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on policy, per year**	**Policy**	**Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on policy, per year**
Sensitivity training for the police to **ensure justice and equal treatment of all**	$	Increasing the capabilities of the police to **prevent and prosecute criminal or suspicious behavior**	$

Figure 17: Screenshot of decision screen eliciting subjects' preferences towards particular policy implementations of national government expenditure. Across subjects, the order of categories was randomized, and it was randomized whether all more universalist policies appeared on the left or on the right. Additional policies continued to fill the screen as the subject filled in desired spending levels for each category of policies.

C.3 Histograms of Composite Universalism



Figure 18: This figure plots a comparative set of distributions of our composite measure of moral universalism. All individual plots are scaled to the same x-axis and y-axis.

C.4 Analysis of Ideological Clusters



Figure 19: Factor loadings of the first principal component of desired expenditure shares, all countries. Sign convention: the loading on "Border" is always non-positive, and the other signs are determined accordingly.



Figure 20: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). The dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

C.4.1 Separate Allocation Decisions and Universalism Measures



Figure 21: This figure plots OLS coefficients from regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on each separate allocation decision at a time, for all Western countries and including country-fixed effects. A positive regression coefficient indicates that a higher allocation to the more distant individual (i.e. a more "universalist" allocation) is positively correlated with "left-leaning" policy preferences. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors.



Figure 22: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of desired expenditure shares on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” and “Non-Western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.



Figure 23: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

C.4.2 Results for Non-Western Countries

Baseline results. Figure 24 replicates Figure 5 but additionally shows the results for Brazil and South Korea. The results are visibly different from those in the Western countries, with both the magnitude and the sign of the relationship between universalism and policy views usually different.



Figure 24: This figure plots OLS coefficients from regressions of desired expenditure shares on universalism. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

Income, wealth, and education index. We examine the role that income, wealth and education play in modulating the relationship between universalism and the structure of policy views outside of the West. To do so, we construct a composite index of income, wealth and education through a principal component analysis of the following variables in our survey: (i) income bucket, (ii) the log of respondents' continuous estimate of household income, (iii) the log of respondents' estimated net worth, (iv) stock ownership indicator, (v) homeownership indicator, and (vi) education bucket. The resulting index is standardized into z-scores within each country.

In Figure 25, we restrict attention to the top 25% of respondents by the income, wealth, and education index within each country. Here, we see that the relationship



Figure 25: This figure plots OLS coefficients from regressions of desired expenditure shares on universalism, for the sample of respondents in the top 25% of the income, wealth, and education composite index within their respective countries. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

between universalism and policy views among non-Western elites is fairly similar to that in the Western populations.

Table 13 presents corresponding results from OLS regressions of policy views on universalism, our income, wealth, and education index, and an interaction variable between universalism and the same index. We find that, corresponding to the results of Figure 25, the relationship between universalism and policy views is substantially more pronounced among rich and well-educated elites.

Table 13: Non-Western countries: Interaction between universalism and income / education

	Dependent variable:																	
	Summary statistic		Border control		Military		Police		Foreign aid		Aff. action		Environment		Health care		Welfare	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Composite universalism	0.12	0.048	0.32^{**}	0.28^{**}	-0.22	-0.029	-0.24	-0.092	0.72^{***}	0.49^{***}	0.12	0.20	0.27^{**}	0.23^{*}	-0.39^{***}	-0.31^{**}	-0.25^{*}	-0.15
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Income, wealth, and educ. index (z-score)	-0.18^{***}	0.012	0.00065	-0.077	0.12^{*}	0.078	0.22^{***}	-0.017	-0.020	-0.14	-0.12^{**}	-0.041	-0.051	-0.21	0.019	0.30^{**}	-0.11^{**}	-0.054
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.17)
Composite universalism × Income, wealth, and educ. index (z-score)	0.44^{***}	0.45^{***}	-0.13	-0.12	-0.29^{**}	-0.25^{*}	-0.41^{***}	-0.36^{***}	-0.22	-0.24	0.27^{**}	0.27^{**}	0.071	0.088	0.099	0.11	0.34^{***}	0.37^{***}
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls for belief in personal benefit	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3644	3644	3644	3643	3644	3643	3644	3643	3644	3643	3644	3643	3644	3643	3644	3643	3644	3643
R^2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the summary statistic of policy views. In columns 3–18, the dependent variables are, for each policy domain, respondents' desired expenditure share on that domain, standardized into z-scores within each country. We regress on our composite universalism measure (in 0 to 1), our index of income, wealth, and education, and an interaction of the two variables. Construction of the composite universalism measure (in 0 to 1) is outlined in Section 4.2. Coefficients reflect the standard-deviation change in the summary statistic of policy views or the support for the given policy associated with an increase from no universalism to full universalism, conditional on income, wealth, and education. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.5 Analysis of Specific Policy Proposals

C.5.1 Tables

Table 14: All western countries, specific policy questions

	Dependent variable: Difference in desired log expenditure levels More - Less Universalist Policy Proposal							
	Border control	Military	Police	Foreign aid	Aff. action	Environment	Health care	Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Composite universalism	0.019***	0.019***	0.019***	0.013***	0.0079***	0.014***	0.0093***	0.010***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11063	11063	11063	11063	11063	11063	11063	11063
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the standardized difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Prior to taking the difference and log, desired spending on each policy proposal is winsorized at 3 standard deviations and standardized within-country. The framed policy proposals are detailed in Section 4.3. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.5.2 All Countries



Figure 26: This figure plots the OLS coefficients when the difference in desired log expenditure levels on the two specific policy proposals is estimated by universalism. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” and “Non-Western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.



Figure 27: This figure replicates Figure 26 by plotting the OLS coefficients when the difference in desired log expenditure levels on the two specific policy proposals is estimated by universalism, for the subset of each country in the top 25% of the income, wealth, and education index. The figure indicates that among the rich and well-educated inBrazil and Korea, the structure of ideology more closely resembles that of the West and can be rationalized by universalism. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.



Figure 28: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.





Figure 29: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10), separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

C.5.3 Separate Measures of Universalism



Figure 30: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism in altruism, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.





Figure 31: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism in trust, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

C.6 Representative Sample



Figure 32: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on composite universalism, without and with controls, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Covariates include age, gender, income, wealth, college, neighborhood size, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.



Figure 33: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired expenditure shares for each policy domain on universalism, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.



Figure 34: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on universalism, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

C.6.1 Analysis of Specific Policy Proposals



Figure 35: This figure plots the OLS coefficients when the difference in desired log expenditure levels on the two framed policy proposals is estimated by universalism, using only the representative subsample described in Section 4.1. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

D Measurement Error and ORIV Analyses

Measurement error is ubiquitous in lab and survey settings. To ensure that the estimates presented in this paper are neither artefacts of nor attenuated by the presence of measurement error in our elicitations of outcome and explanatory variables, we make use of the instrumentation strategies laid out in Gillen et al. (2019).

That is, we employ the obviously-related instrumental variables (ORIV) technique by eliciting quasi-duplicate measurements of: (i) the set of specific policy views, (ii) the corresponding summary statistic, and (iii) our measures of universalism. This analysis was pre-registered and detailed the formulation of instruments for our variables of interest as follows.

Choice of instruments. In Section 4.3, we document how we elicited support for our eight broad policy categories (affirmative action, border control, environment, foreign aid, health, military, police, and welfare) with two complementary strategies. The first elicited respondents' desired, per capita annual spending by their national government on each of these categories. The second strategy elicited respondents' support for government spending in each of these categories on an 11-point Likert scale. These two elicitations were separated by a series of tasks, including elicitations of support for specific, framed policies, and a sociodemographic questionnaire. From these two proxies for each one of the respondents' policy views on the eight broad categories, we also constructed a summary statistic as described in Section 4.3. This leaves us with duplicate measurements (in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), Y^a and Y^b) of both support for the eight individual policies and of a summary statistic for respondents' ideology.

For the set of predictors (our measures of universalism), we leverage the fact that the order of social groups presented in our survey is randomized within the domestic and global categories. As such, the first measure of universalism (in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), X^a) is constructed just like the main measure described in Section 4.2, except that it only uses the five domestic groups that (randomly) appear first and the three global groups that (randomly) appear first in the survey for each subject. We do not include the foreign decision as there was only *one* of these elicitations.

Analogously, the second measure of universalism (X^b) is constructed just like the main measure described in Section 4.2, except that it only uses the five domestic groups that (randomly) appear last and the two global groups that (randomly) appear last in the survey. We construct these two proxies for both universalism in altruism and universalism in trust separately, and for the composite measure of universalism that averages the two.



Figure 36: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of the summary statistic of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our measures of moral universalism. As recommended by Gillen et al. (2019), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Results. With this set of instruments in hand, we replicated our analysis of the relationships between universalism and the structure of ideology with the stacked ORIV regressions described in Gillen et al. (2019). We were interested in ensuring that measurement error neither attenuates nor artifically produces the relationship between views regarding each of our eight individual policies and universalism, and between the summary statistic of these policy views and universalism. We thus examine nine different outcome variables. Moreover, in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), we examine the relationship between these nine Y^*'s and our three X^*'s individually, i.e. the measures of universalism in the choice domains of altruism and trust, and the corresponding composite measure.

We follow the recommendations in Gillen et al. (2019) and use standardized versions of both our universalism measures and policy views. Moreover, since each subject appears twice when implementing ORIV, standard errors are clustered at the subject level. In all cases the results with the ORIV estimator are very similar to those presented in the main text with OLS.



Figure 37: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our summary measure of moral universalism. As recommended by Gillen et al. (2019), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The "All western countries" and "Non-Western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

E Definition of Main Survey Variables

Left vs. right. Respondent's self-positioning on the left-right political spectrum in response to the following prompt: "Oftentimes, people speak of relatively left-wing and relatively right-wing political views. On a scale from 0 (very left-wing) to 10 (very right-wing), where would you place yourself on this scale?"

Summary statistic of policy views. Summary statistic of policy views, given by

$$\begin{aligned}&\text{Left vs. right summary statistic } = \\ &\frac{\text{Foreign aid} + \text{Environment} + \text{Aff. action} + \text{Welfare} + \text{Health care}}{5} - \\ &- \frac{\text{Military} + \text{Police} + \text{Border control}}{3}\end{aligned} \tag{41}$$

Each policy denotes the desire expenditure share for the given policy, defined also in this section. The summary statistic generally increases with attitudes towards left-wing views, and correlates with self-positioning on a 0 to 10 scale. This summary statistic is standardized into z-scores within countries.

Domestic universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical \$100, between a domestic member of one's in-groups relative to a domestic stranger. The measure averages the ten corresponding money allocation decisions.

Foreign universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through a bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical \$100 between a domestic stranger and a global stranger.

Global universalism in altruism. Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical \$100, between a global member of one's in-groups relative to a global stranger. The measure averages the five corresponding money allocation decisions.

Summary measure of universalism in altruism. Unweighted average of domestic universalism in altruism, foreign universalism in altruism, and global universalism in altruism. Because these three individual components correlate highly with each other, the summary measure reduces the dimensionality of the data and describes a respondent's broad universalism in altruism as a general type.

Domestic universalism in trust. Trust analogue of domestic universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Foreign universalism in trust. Trust analogue of foreign universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Global universalism in trust. Trust analogue of global universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

Summary measure of universalism in trust. Trust analogue of the summary measure of universalism in altruism. That is, unweighted average of domestic universalism in trust, foreign universalism in trust, and global universalism in trust.

Composite measure of universalism. Unweighted average of (i) summary measure of universalism in altruism and (ii) summary measure of universalism in trust. Reduces the dimensionality of the data.

Revealed altruism. Altruism as elicited through a standard dictator game over $100 between the self and a domestic stranger.

Residual altruism. Residuals from within-country regressiosn of dictator game behavior (revealed altruism) on the summary statistic of universalism in altruism. Because the dictator game is framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger, the raw measure of altruism partly includes universalism; residualizing of universalism measures that portion of revealed altruism that cannot be explained by behavior in our universalism decisions.

Revealed generalized trust. Generalized trust in others as elicited through an allocation of trust points on a scale from 0 to 100. Respondents were prompted to consider their trust in a domestic stranger, where 0 meant that they believe they "cannot trust a randomly-selected person very much", and 100 meant they believe "a randomly-selected person can in general be trusted a great deal."

Residual trust. Residuals from within-country regressions of revealed generalized trust on the summary statistic of universalism in trust. Because generalized trust is framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger, the raw measure of trust partly includes universalism; residualizing of universalism measures that portion of generalized trust that cannot be explained by behavior in our universalism decisions.

Equity-efficiency preferences. Elicitation of preferences for efficiency over equity, as given by a bystander dictator game between two "randomly-selected people" who live in the subject's country, in which the most unequal split of money maximizes total payoffs. The measure captures how much a subject deviates from an equal, 50:50 split of the money.

Desired government spending on policy categories. Measure of support for eight distinct policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

Subjects were prompted to respond in free-form text entry with their desired level of annual, per-capita spending (in local currency) by their corresponding national level of government on each of the eight domains. They were provided a reference value of the annual per capita spending amount on education by their national level of government.

These dollar amounts were then translated into desired shares, out of a total amount of per capita spending by the national government. Both desired expenditure shares and expenditure levels were standardized into z-scores within-country.

Support for policy categories. Measure of support for eight distinct policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

Subjects were prompted to respond on a 0 (strongly oppose) to 10 (strongly support) Likert scale with their level of support for national government spending on each of the eight domains.

Desired government spending on individual policies. Measure of support for sixteen distinct policies, two per each of the eight broad policy domains. Per each of these policy domains, one specific policy had a less universalist implementation, while the other a more universalist one. See Table 3.

Subjects were prompted to respond with their desired level of annual, per-capita spending (in local currency) by their corresponding national level of government on each of these sixteen policies. Both ensuing desired expenditure shares and expenditure levels were standardized into z-scores within-country.

Religiosity. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) self-described religiosity on a scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious); (ii) church attendance on a scale from 0 to 5; and an indicator for atheism, agnosticism, or no religion.

Income Index. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) log income (from free-form text entry), and (ii) income on a scale from 0 to 4 (roughly corresponding to income quintiles in each country).

Wealth Index. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) an indicator for stock ownership, (ii) an indicator for home ownership, and (iii) log net worth (from free-form text entry).

Index of income, wealth and education. Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) income bucket, (ii) the log of respondents' continuous estimate of household income, (iii) the log of respondents' estimated net worth, (iv) stock ownership indicator, (v) homeownership indicator, and (vi) education bucket.

Urbanicity. Respondent's neighborhood size on a 10-step variable: > 1 million, 200k-1m, 50k-200k, 20k-50k and close to metro, 20k-50k and not close to metro, 3k-20k and close to metro, 3k-20k and not close to metro, 500-300k and close to metro, 500-3k and not close to metro, <500.

Educational attainment. Respondent's educational attainment. Across all countries but Brazil and Germany, the four educational categories were the local equivalents of: (i) no high school, (ii) high school, (iii) some college or vocational training, (iv) bachelor's degree or higher. In Brazil, the four educational categories were: (i) no formal education, (ii) elementary school, (iii) high school, and (iv) bachelor's degree or higher. In Germany, the three educational categories were: (i) no vocational training, (ii) vocational training, and (iii) university degree.

Beliefs in the efficiency of government. Respondent's rating on a scale from 0 (the government is wasteful) to 10 (the government is generally efficient) on the efficiency of the government in implementing policies and providing for public services.

Belief in personal benefit from government expenditure on policy categories. Respondent's report on the probability (0%-100%) that they would personally benefit over the twelve months following the survey from the corresponding services of the eight broad policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

F Additional Details and Analyses for Field Evidence

F.1 Summary Statistics for DonorsChoose Data

F.1.1 Aggregate Statistics

Category	Statistic
Number of donations (overall)	4,050,872
Number of donors (overall)	1,265,592
Number of projects (overall)	896,294
Average donation amount (overall)	\$76.25
Median donation amount (overall)	\$25.00
Average number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	20.82
Median number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	3.83
Max number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	9,918
Min number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD	0
Average donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	\$1,602.55
Median donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	\$146.70
Max donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	\$909,664.20
Min donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD	\$0
Average total number of donations by a CD	9,080
Median total number of donations by a CD	6,003
Max total number of donations by a CD	192,473
Min total number of donations by a CD	1,350
Average total donation amount by a CD	\$698,709.80
Median total donation amount by a CD	\$332,959.40
Max total donation amount by a CD	\$18,782,564.00
Min total donation amount by a CD	\$59,579.35

F.2 Additional Notes on Methodology

Data Cleaning. Our raw data consists of 6,211,940 individual donations made between March 2000 and October 2016. Beginning in 2007, donations are made to projects in all states in the United States plus the District of Columbia.

In addition to dropping observations with missing geographic or donation data, we exclude donations either (i) made by donors, or (ii) directed to schools that are located outside of the 50 states and the District of Columbia.

Aggregation to Congressional District level. Projects were mapped to Congressional Districts through the exact coordinates of their schools, as provided by DonorsChoose. ZIP codes provided in the DonorsChoose data were used to map donors to their respective Congressional Districts.

Note that for reasons of anonymity, donor ZIP codes were truncated at the first three digits, which added a layer of uncertainty to CD mappings beyond the fuzziness of ZIP-to-CD mappings. Thus, through data provided by the United States Census Bureau, every donation was first mapped to all possible *full* ZIP codes corresponding to the truncated ZIP code from DonorsChoose, and then in turn, to a given CD based on all possible Congressional Districts that each one of these possible full ZIP codes could map to. Because this mapping is not 1:1, when aggregating donations to relevant source CDs, all observations were weighted by the degree of a fuzzy match to relevant CDs. For example, if based on the provided ZIP code a donation could have originated from either MA-5 or MA-7, this donation would appear twice in our merged data once all donations were mapped to donor Congressional Districts. In turn, each of these two observations would then be weighted by one-half when aggregating donation statistics by pairs of donor and recipient CDs.

F.2.1 Bayesian Shrinkage

Our raw regression coefficients θ_i form unbiased but imprecise estimates of universalism. To reduce measurement error and generate more precise estimates of this parameter, we "shrink" our estimates toward the mean $\overline{\theta}$ of the average across CDs, producing a shrunk coefficient θ_i^s that is a weighted average of θ_i and $\overline{\theta}$:

$$\theta_i^s = w_i \theta_i + (1 - w_i)\overline{\theta}. \tag{42}$$

As in Chetty and Hendren (2018) and Enke (forthcoming), the weights w_i are selected to minimize the mean-squared prediction error, so that

$$w_i = \frac{Var(\theta_i) - E[se_i^2]}{Var(\theta_i) - E[se_i^2] + se_i^2}.$$

$Var(\theta_i)$ represents the variance of the raw coefficients across CDs and se_i the standard error of the coefficient for CD i. See Chetty and Hendren (2018) for a derivation.

F.2.2 Social Distance Data

Data on the social connectedness and the "relative probability of friendship" between pairs of counties in the United States was obtained from Facebook. The construction of this data is covered in Bailey et al. (2018). The Social Connectedness Index (SCI) reflects the aggregate number of Facebook friendship links within or between counties. The "relative probability of friendship" normalizes for county populations by dividing the SCI by the product of the number of Facebook users in each of the two counties.

We aggregate this "relative probability of friendship" data to the Congressional District level by taking the average of the relative probabilities of all possible county-to-county pairings between two given Congressional Districts. Since mappings from county to Congressional District are not 1:1, the aggregation from county to this geographic level accounts for the potential of a fuzzy match, by weighting observations by the number of different possible Congressional Districts every given county could map to.

This aggregation from county-pair SCIs and relative probabilities of friendship forms our measure of "friendship distance". Specifically, we define the social distance between a donor in geographic entity i and a recipient in a geographic entity j of the same level as $-\ln(1 + \text{rel. prob. of friendship}_{i,j})$.

F.3 Robustness Checks

Differing geographic distributions of CDs by party. Democratic CDs are more likely than Republican CDs to be found along the coasts, producing disparities in the distributions of distances to other CDs from a typical Democratic and a typical Republican CD. Though our baseline analysis already takes measures to address this concern, we also re-run the analysis using a binary geographic distance measure. We set distance equal to 0 for "local" CD-to-CD pairs i and j for which $d_{i,j} < 50$ miles and 1 otherwise, repeating the analysis for cutoffs of 10 and 100 miles. We also repeat our baseline analysis with an additional control for state-pair fixed-effects, which accounts for broad locational differences between the two political parties. As we report in Table 16, the strong positive relationship between universalism in altruism and Democratic vote share persists.

Table 16: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable:									
	Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Universalism in altruism (wrt number of donations)	12.8^{***}	6.78^{***}								
	(1.52)	(1.40)								
Universalism in altruism (wrt composite social distance)			10.5^{***}	6.09^{***}						
			(1.02)	(1.34)						
Universalism in altruism (controlling for state-pair fixed effects)					9.50^{***}	6.46^{***}				
					(0.89)	(1.08)				
Universalism in altruism (wrt binarized distance variable)							9.81^{***}	9.90^{***}		
							(0.96)	(1.22)		
Universalism in altruism (wrt geographic distance)									10.5^{***}	5.64^{***}
									(1.51)	(1.37)
Log [1 + Total donations]		5.04^{***}		2.04^{*}		2.19^{**}		-0.023		2.75^{***}
		(1.05)		(1.15)		(1.01)		(1.02)		(0.99)
Log [Median household income]		-42.6^{***}		-45.1^{***}		-45.9^{***}		-51.9^{***}		-46.7^{***}
		(5.55)		(5.46)		(5.37)		(5.21)		(5.19)
Fraction of population with college degree		80.1^{***}		86.9^{***}		82.6^{***}		91.5^{***}		75.3^{***}
		(13.25)		(13.06)		(12.94)		(12.39)		(12.24)
Latitude		0.53		0.82		1.20^{**}		0.83		1.81^{***}
		(0.53)		(0.58)		(0.55)		(0.52)		(0.54)
Log [Distance to coast]		-1.83^{***}		-1.98^{***}		-2.09^{***}		-0.68		-2.01^{***}
		(0.66)		(0.65)		(0.59)		(0.57)		(0.57)
Racial fractionalization		19.9^{***}		19.7^{***}		18.6^{***}		19.4^{***}		20.2^{***}
		(5.88)		(5.97)		(5.91)		(5.53)		(5.59)
Log [Average distance to all projects]		68.5^{***}		69.1^{***}		70.7^{***}		93.6^{***}		80.0^{***}
		(15.83)		(16.71)		(15.89)		(15.77)		(15.73)
Log[1 + Education spending per capita]									4.01^{***}	5.49^{***}
									(0.98)	(0.73)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	430	430
R^2	0.42	0.62	0.46	0.62	0.47	0.63	0.47	0.66	0.51	0.68

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). Universalism in altruism (wrt number of donations) in columns (1)–(2) corresponds to our estimate of θ_i for each Congressional District, as per equation 9, based on geographic distance and *number* of donations as opposed to donation amounts. Universalism in altruism (wrt composite social distance) in columns (3)–(4) refers to a composite measure formed from a principal component analysis of geographic and friendship distances between CD pairs. In columns (5)–(6), we residualize both donation amounts and distances of state-pair fixed effects, and in columns (7)–(8), we estimate universalism in altruism based on a binarized rather than continuous geographic distance measure. In columns (9)–(10), we return to our baseline specification in Table 5, but introduce the log per capita spending on primary and secondary education from *local* sources of funding as controls, as covered in Section 6.4.

Table 17: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

	Dependent variable:					
	Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Universalism in altruism (excluding same states)	8.87***	6.92***	5.58***	9.00***	6.29***	4.79***
	(0.76)	(0.66)	(0.71)	(1.30)	(1.20)	(1.12)
Log [1 + Total donations]		6.76***	4.33***		6.19***	4.53***
		(0.88)	(0.98)		(0.95)	(1.00)
Log [Median household income]			-36.7***			-47.0***
			(4.90)			(5.50)
Fraction of population with college degree			81.3***			88.7***
			(12.20)			(13.09)
Latitude			0.42***			0.64
			(0.14)			(0.58)
Log [Distance to coast]			-1.76***			-2.50***
			(0.42)			(0.66)
Racial fractionalization			20.2***			18.5***
			(4.83)			(6.16)
Log [Average distance to all projects]			13.4***			61.5***
			(3.60)			(16.81)
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	436	436	436	436	436	436
R^2	0.25	0.35	0.50	0.39	0.45	0.61

Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). In each regression specification, we exclude all CD-to-CD pairs in which the donor state equals the recipient state; that is, we exclude all within-state donations, in order to estimate the gradient parameter of interest only when it comes to states other than a donor's own.

F.4 Visual layout and functionality of the DonorsChoose platform

We ensure our results are not artefacts of the layout or functionality of the DonorsChoose website when a potential donor accesses the platform. To do so, we examined all available screenshots of the platform's layout and functionality since its inception.

Throughout the relevant time period, it is not the case that projects are sorted by closest proximity to each donor on the website. Instead, for a significant portion of the time period, the default sort for projects on the platform was by urgency, which DonorsChoose defines as a combination of the lowest cost to complete, highest economic need, and fewest days left to expiration of the project.

It is also not the case that the website's layout varies across space. That is, to the best of our knowledge, at any given time all donors observe the same platform layout regardless of location, and given the default sort, the same exact projects when they first arrive at the platform. As such, it is not the case that donors in Republican CDs are systematically nudged towards donating locally more often or in larger amounts through the website's layout or functionality. Below, we present a screenshot of the DonorsChoose platform as accessible in June 2019.

Throughout our time period of interest, we can confirm that the options available to each donor with which to filter and sort projects were constant. Most importantly, the ability to search through and filter projects based on location was and continues to be a salient (usually, the highest) option available on the screen. This makes a donor's selection of a project based on geography particularly straightforward, and potentially enhances the case for our claim that geographic distance is a relevant metric employed by donors in selecting projects.



Figure 38: Screenshot of DonorsChoose platform in June 2019. Note the ability to search for projects near any given geographical location at the top of the page, the options available to the donor with which to filter projects, and the "Double Your Impact" promotion applied to the topmost project presented. Additional options available with which to filter projects included the project's target age group, request type (e.g., art supplies, books, classroom basics, etc.), project type (classroom projects, or professional development), and buckets for amount needed ($50 and under, $100 and under, etc.).