ONLINE APPENDIX

for "Understanding Tax Policies: How Do People Reason?"

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OA-1 Correct Answers to Knowledge Questions

OA-1.1 Income Tax

Question	Correct Answer	Source
What is the threshold for the top tax bracket in the U.S. for a married household?	$600,000 in 2018	Tax Foundation.org
Out of 100 households in the U.S. households, how many are in the top tax bracket?	0.73 in 2017	Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
What is the top tax rate in the U.S.?	37% in 2018-19	Tax Foundation.org
What share of their total income do people in the top tax bracket pay in taxes?	32.7%	Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
What the top tax rate used to be in the 1950s in the U.S.?	91% in 1950	Tax Foundation.org
What is the top personal income tax rate in your state?	See table at the reported link	Tax Foundation.org
Out of 100 U.S. households, how many pay no federal personal income taxes?	44% in 2016	Tax Policy Center.org
What share of their income do you think the median income household pays in taxes?	13% in 2017	Tax Foundation.org
What share of total national income goes to the top 1% richest households?	20% in 2016	World Inequality Database (WID)
Distribution of the top 1% highest-earning taxpayers in the U.S. in various professions	See table at the reported link	Forbes

OA-1.2 Estate Tax

Question	Correct Answer	Source
Out of 1000 households, how many pay the federal estate tax?	~ 0.7 in 2019	Tax Policy Center
What is the current threshold for exemption per person?	$11,400,000 in 2019	Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
At what rate is each dollar of bequest above the exemption threshold taxed?	40%	Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.org (CBPP)
At what rate was each dollar of bequest above the threshold taxed in the 1950s?	77%	Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
What share of total U.S. wealth is currently owned by the he top 1% wealthiest households	42%	Zucman (2016)
What share of total U.S. wealth is currently owned by the bottom 50% least wealthy households	2.5%	Zucman (2016)
What share of total wealth owned by households in the U.S. today is inherited from their parents?	35%-45% 56%-64%	Kopczuk in Brookings.edu Alvaredo, Garbinty and Piketty (2017)
Out of all the large estates that will be subject to the federal estate tax, what share of those estates would you say is made up of unrealized capital gains that have never been taxed before?	55%	Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.org (CBPP)

OA-2 Text Analysis Methodology

OA-2.1 Preprocessing Steps

This section summarizes the preprocessing steps performed to carry out the text analysis.

OA-2.1.1 Word clouds and Keyness Graphs

Given an answer d_i :

1 Parse d_i : lower-case every word, remove punctuation, spaces in excess, numbers, misspelled words, very common words that carry no intrinsic meaning ("stopwords") such as "and", "the", "each", "then".

2 Lemmatizing remaining words, i.e. grouping together the inflected forms of a word so they can be analysed as a single item.

- Use the English lemmatization list available in the lexicon package.
- e.g. : "policies" becomes policy, "were" becomes "be" → reduces number of distinct textual elements

→ Output: $(\hat{d}_i)$

3 Remove words coming from the question as well as extra words related to the structure of answer.

- e.g. for the question, "what are your main considerations about trade policy?" : remove "main," "considerations," "trade," "policy" from the answers, as well as "think," "believe," "should," etc.

4 Transform $\hat{d}_i$ into numerical vector c_i in which each element is a 2-gram, i.e. a 2-component expression of two words which were separated by 0 or 1 word in the original text. Group together 2-grams which correspond to the same inverted two words. Manually remove 2-grams which have no grammatical foundation and duplicated 2-grams (e.g. "tax tax").

- e.g. take d_1 = "We should tax the wealthy more and tax the poor less." After steps 1-2-3 becomes: $\hat{d}_i$ = "tax wealthy more tax poor less". After step 4 becomes: ['tax wealthy' = 1, 'tax more' = 2, 'wealthy more' = 0 (because it is not grammatically coherent), 'tax poor' = 1, 'poor people' = 0, ...]

OA-2.1.2 Topic Analysis

Given an answer d_i :

1 Parse d_i : lower-case every word, remove punctuation, spaces in excess, numbers, misspelled words, very common words that carry no intrinsic meaning ("stopwords") such as "and", "the", "each", "then".

2 Reduce remaining words to common root (stemming)

- Use Snowball stemming algorithm
- *policies* and *policy* become *polic* → reduces number of distinct textual elements

→ Output: $(\hat{d}_i)$

3 Transform $\hat{d}_i$ into numerical vector $\mathbf{c}_i$ in which each element is the count of a distinct word

- e.g. take d_1 = *"We should tax the wealthy more and the poor less."*
  - After steps 1-2 becomes: $\hat{d}_1$ = *"tax wealthi more poor less"*
  - After step 3 becomes: ['tax' = 1, 'wealthi' = 1, 'more' = 1, 'poor' = 1, 'less' = 1 ...]

4 Generate topic dummy variables equal to 1 when an element of $\mathbf{c}_i$ matches that of a custom-made topic dictionary.

OA-2.2 Word clouds

The simplest text analysis consists in plotting "word clouds," based on a frequency analysis. The frequency of each identified n-gram is computed and the feature label is plotted proportionally to this frequency. The minimum number of occurrences of a n-gram is 5 and the maximum number of n-grams displayed on the plot is 500. The word clouds and keyness figures are based on the package by Benoit et al. (2018). The transparency and font size are proportional to the frequency of each group of words relative to the total.

The word clouds for the open-ended questions on the income tax are shown in Figure OA-10. Each subfigure corresponds to a different open-ended question, as indicated in the caption. The main considerations include both "lower tax" and "higher tax," suggesting split views and different concerns depending on whose taxes those refer to (higher versus lower income people). The term "middle class" is also very prevalent, implying that people express first and foremost some concern about the taxes of the middle class. When it comes to the perceived goal of a good income tax system, the views crystallize around either a "flat tax" or a "fair tax." The predominance of the former term is due in part to the fact that there is a non-ambiguous, single term to designate such a tax system, whereas there are many more ways to refer to a progressive tax system. Overall, a significant cluster of respondents are strong proponents of a flat tax (around 10% of the full sample). Finally, the shortcomings perceived by respondents center around the disadvantages faced by the "middle class" and – to a lesser extent– the "working class." Very preponderant are considerations about tax avoidance or evasion ("too many loopholes" and "too many breaks").

Figure OA-13 shows the word clouds for the estate tax open-ended questions. The words that appear for the main considerations are quite diverse, from "middle class" to "double tax" and "family." When it comes to the goals of a good estate tax system, people tend to mention "fair taxes" and give various thresholds above which the estate tax should kick in, but overwhelmingly mention the issue of double taxation that should be avoided ("already tax"). Similarly, on the shortcomings of the estate tax, the key consideration is by far double taxation.

OA-2.3 Keyness and keyword graphs

The keyness graphs are based on a relative frequency analysis that compares the use of n-grams identified in the corpus between two groups (a reference and a target group). To establish the keyness score of a given item, I establish its frequency relative to the number of words in the group corpus (i.e. the number of words in all the answers of a given group). Those frequencies are cross-tabulated and a χ^2 test is conducted to test the independence between the two groups' distribution. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) previously used this technique to identify keywords of congressional Republicans and congressional Democrats in order to measure media political slant.

Consider a given n-gram i. Let j be the group index, with $j = 0$ for the reference group and $j = 1$ for the target group. Let $A_{i,j}$ be the observed number of occurrences of the n-gram i in group j and $A_{-i,j}$ the observed number of occurrences of all other n-grams (except the one I consider) in this group. Let R_i be the total number of occurrences of n-gram i in both groups, C_j be the number of occurrences of all n-grams in group j, and N the overall number of occurrences of n-grams in both groups.
To perform the test, I first establish the theoretical distribution under the independence hypothesis by computing $E_{i,j}$, the expected frequency of a given n-gram i in group j :

$$E_{i,j} = \frac{R_i \times C_j}{N}$$

and the expected frequency of all other n-grams in group j:

$$E_{-i,j} = \frac{R_{-i} \times C_j}{N}$$

The χ^2 test statistic is:

$$\chi^2 = (-1)^{\mathbb{1}\{E_{-i,1} > A_{-i,1}\}} \sum_{k \in \{-i,i\}} \sum_{j=0}^{1} \frac{(A_{k,j} - E_{k,j})^2}{E_{k,j}}$$

I compare this statistic to the distribution of a χ^2 distribution law with one degree of freedom (i.e. number of groups -1). A given n-grams is significant when the independence hypothesis is rejected and the n-grams is then considered as a "keyword." A negative χ^2 indicates that the word is significantly more frequent in the reference group. In absolute value terms, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level when $|\chi^2| > 2.71$ (one significance star), at the 5% level when $|\chi^2| > 3.84$ (two significance stars) and at the 1% level when $|\chi^2| > 6.63$ (three significance stars).

Figures OA-12 and OA-14 show the keywords split by political affiliation, level of incomes, ages, and gender for the three main open-ended questions about the income and estate tax, respectively: i) the main considerations of the respondent when it comes to the income tax system; ii) what the goal of a good tax system should be; and iii) what the main perceived shortcomings of the income tax system are. Panel A of Figure OA-12 focuses on the distribution of keywords by political groups, with Republicans being the reference group and Democrats the target group. The keywords on the Democrat side center around issues of fairness ("fair share") and distribution ("rich," "lower class," "middle class," and "tax wealthy"). In the shortcomings, Democrats tend to mention "too many avoidance" opportunities, "loopholes" and "too many breaks" for the wealthy and high-income earners. Republicans tend to emphasize government spending, government waste, and the "hard work" of people (i.e., implying that income that is earned through hard work should not be confiscated through high taxes). The keyness graphs in Panel A of Figure OA-14 show that keywords on the Democrat side are again centered around distribution issues ("middle class," "rich") as well as particular numbers for the exemption threshold. On the Republican side, keywords mostly concern double taxation, the government, and the family.

OA-2.4 Topic analysis

The topic analysis is based on a simple keywords-count model. As a first preliminary step, I extract the document-term matrix (DTM). The DTM is a mathematical matrix that describes the frequency of terms that occur in a given set of documents (in our case a document coincides with the answer of a given respondent to a given question). The rows correspond to documents and columns correspond to terms. Hence, the element *(x,y)* in the DTM corresponds to the frequency of the term y in document x. Textual terms reported in the columns are only those that appear more than five times in the whole set of answers. Topics are then defined by sets of keywords that aim to capture the particular aspects of the policy with which the respondent is concerned when answering to the question. Operatively, the topic is an indicator variable equal to one if the document contains at least one of the keywords defining the topic. Documents can thus touch more than one topic if the respondent used keywords belonging to different topics.

OA-3 Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)

OA-3.1 Method

The basis of this method was put forward by Draca and Schwarz (2019) and draws from previous work from Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2012) on the use of Mixed-Membership models to analyse survey data and uncover latent political ideologies. It consists in applying Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an unsupervised machine learning algorithm, to a subset of survey responses to inductively build two profiles of respondents. I focus on the subset of survey questions which are relevant for such an analysis: the survey-specific closed-ended questions, which were not subject to randomization, and which do not include numbers (e.g. questions on thresholds). Overall, I have 12 questions for the income taxation survey and 16 questions for the estate taxation survey.

The data preparation consists of combining the answers of each respondent to the questions into a "sentence" where each "word" is the answer to a given question. For example, if the respondent answered "Very important" to the question "Do you feel that U.S. federal income tax policy has important direct effects on your own life?," then the sentence of this respondent would include the "word" *"veryimportant_directeffect."* Each respondent is thus assigned a corresponding "sentence," the length of which vary across surveys depending on the number of questions we consider. This length can also vary across respondents within a survey because of the survey design : certain questions are asked conditional on the answer to a previous question. On top of that, a few respondents skipped questions. Note however, that our results are robust to the exclusion of these embedded questions, and to that of respondents who skipped a question.

Draca and Schwarz (2019) provide details for the mathematical foundation of the LDA algorithm. The LDA topic models approach is usually applied to text data to uncover latent topics underpinning the generation of texts. Each topic is modeled as a probability distribution over all words : a high probability for a given word within a profile indicates that this word is very salient for this topic. It is at its core a clustering algorithm that brings together words that often appear together into topics.

The approach of Draca and Schwarz (2019) is novel in that it applies the LDA topic model approach to discrete, non-text data. In this case, it is applied to the "sentences" as described above, and the "words" are all the corresponding answers to the selected set of questions. While Draca and Schwarz (2019) interpret the latent topics uncovered by the LDA algorithm as ideologies, we interpret them as political profiles instead. This discrepancy is due to the difference in the kind of questions examined.

Similarly, to explore the topics (here, political profiles) created, we look at the list of answers with the highest probabilities (denoted "top answers per profile"). They correspond to the answers that frequently appear together for a given profile.

I opt to create, for each survey, two profiles of respondents. Since the LDA algorithm does not provide any label for the profiles it creates, we make them up by looking at the top answers per profile.

Each respondent is then modeled by the LDA algorithm as a mixture of both profiles, where each profile weights a given share - say, 60% and 40% - in the respondent's answers, in a probabilistic manner (see Draca and Schwarz (2019) for mathematical details). Although Draca and Schwarz (2019) look directly at the shares created by the algorithm, we decided to focus on which share is the bigger. We assign each respondent to the profile whose share is bigger. This way, we divide our sample into two roughly equal shares.
Figure OA-26 presents the main results from the LDA analysis.

OA-3.2 Robustness check

We perform a robustness check by including into our subset of analysed questions the ones which are subject to a randomization. We do so by disregarding the exact formulation of the question. For instance, a respondent subject to the *Gender* randomization path who answers *Yes* at the question *"Do you think that a progressive federal income tax system, in which women with higher incomes pay a higher share of their income in taxes than women with lower incomes, is an important tool to reduce inequality?"* will be treated similarly to another respondent subject to the control randomization path who answered *Yes* to the same question with the general formulation *"Do you think that a progressive federal income taxation system, in which people with higher incomes pay a higher share of income in taxes than people with lower incomes, is an important tool to reduce inequality?"*. This is possible because, in most cases, the randomization only leads to minor changes in the wording of the question and of the answer.

For instance, including these extra questions to the analysis of the income taxation survey leads to highly similar results : the same two profiles come out. In particular, the top 6 answers per profile of the former profiles now appear in the top 20 of the new profiles. There is also a strong correlation between the two

profiles : 73% of respondents belong to the same profile when we include randomized questions or not. The slight difference in profile assignment does not affect our regression output either.

OA-4 Survey Respondents

This section presents figures detailing the perceived social class of the survey respondents and the distribution of time spent on the online survey.

Figure OA-1: Self-reported Social Class

(a) We are all "middle class"



(b) Social Class and Income Groups by Political Affiliation



Notes: The figures present the perceived social class of survey respondents. Panel A shows the distribution for the full survey sample, and panel B for three income groups by political affiliation (Republicans in red, Democrats in blue). Labels for categories below 2% omitted.

Figure OA-2: Distribution of Time Spent on the Surveys

(a) Income Taxation



(b) Estate Tax



Notes: The figures show the distribution of the time (in minutes) spent by respondents to complete the survey. The mean is represented by a vertical blue line, and the median by a vertical red line. Respondents above two hours are excluded from the figures.

OA-5 Tables and Figures

OA-5.1 General Questions

The figures in this Section show the average share of respondents in each of the listed groups (sex, race, political affiliation, age, income, education, etc) who feel personally affected by, don't know about, or are willing to pay for accurate information about the given tax policy. These questions are common across surveys. The dots represent the mean in each group and the lines depict the 90% confidence interval around the mean. The "average" dotted line (in orange) shows the sample average. The coefficients listed next to the characteristics represent the partial correlations with that characteristic and the outcome variable. These coefficients originate from a regression of the outcome variable on all personal characteristics included jointly. Their standard errors are in parentheses.

Figure OA-3: Share of Respondents who Feel Personally Affected by the Policy

(a) Income Taxation



(b) Estate Tax



Notes: The figure shows, for each survey, the share of respondents who feels personally affected by the policy, with a confidence interval of 90%. Panel A: *Do you feel that U.S. federal income tax policy has important direct effects on your own life?*; Panel B: *Do you feel personally affected by the federal estate tax?*. Coefficients are based on a linear regression that controls for sex, age, race, income, children, education, economics major, self-reported policy knowledge, employment status, political affiliation and perceived social class. Omitted categories: Low income, Age 18-29, Democrat, Student, Less than high school. Standard errors in parenthesis. Table OA-1 presents the regression analysis.

Figure OA-4: Share of Respondents who Don't Know about the Policy

(a) Income Taxation



(b) Estate Tax



Notes: The figure presents, for each survey, the share of respondents who report to not know the answer to at least one of the open-ended policy questions. Relevant responses are identified through keyword-based topic analysis (see Section OA-2). *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollar. *Knowledgeable* (*Little Knowledgeable*) corresponds to respondents who consider themselves *highly knowledgeable* or *somewhat knowledgeable* (*not very knowledgeable* or *not knowledgeable at all*) on economic policies and issues. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. Coefficients originate from a linear regression that controls for a set of other characteristics. Omitted categories in the regression: White, Low income, Age 18-29, Democrat, Student, Less than high school. Standard errors in parenthesis. Table OA-2 presents the regression analysis.

Figure OA-5: Share of Respondents who are Willing to Pay for Information about the Policy

(a) Income Taxation



(b) Estate Tax



Notes: The figure presents, for each survey, the share of respondents willing to pay the requested amount (randomized between \$1, \$2, \$5 or \$10) for access to the correct answers at the end of the survey. The amount is only due if the respondent wins a lottery price (\$1,000), which is randomly assigned to one participant. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollar. *Knowledgeable* (*Little Knowledgeable*) corresponds to respondents who consider themselves *highly knowledgeable* or *somewhat knowledgeable* (*not very knowledgeable* or *not knowledgeable at all*) on economic policies and issues. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. Coefficients originate from a linear regression that controls for a set of other characteristics. Omitted categories in the regression: White, Low income, Age 18-29, Democrat, Student, Less than high school, No video treatment, Cost of information (\$1), Neutral question. Standard errors in parenthesis. Table OA-3 presents the regression analysis.

Table OA-1: Share of People Who Feel Personally Affected by the Policy

	Income Tax	Estate Tax	Health Insurance	Trade
Female	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
kids	0.06***	0.04*	0.06***	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Black	-0.07*	-0.00	-0.04	-0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.00	0.04	-0.06**	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other	-0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.09***	-0.01	0.04**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.05*	-0.00	0.10***	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Less than 4-year college	-0.02	-0.06	0.23***	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
4-year college/Master's	0.02	-0.06	0.27***	0.12*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Professional degree	-0.05	-0.02	0.25***	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Economics related major	-0.04	0.03	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Working	0.04	0.01	0.04	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Not working	-0.06	-0.04	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Retiree	-0.06	-0.09	0.07	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Policy knowledge	0.16***	0.09***	-0.00	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Republican	0.02	0.10***	-0.04**	-0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.04	0.06**	0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	0.34***	0.26***	0.58***	0.63***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Control Group Mean	0.52	0.32	0.91	0.77
Observations	2783	2358	1825	1771

Notes: See the notes to Figure OA-3 for details on the question formulation and outcome variable definition. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-2: Share of People Who Say They Don't Know about the Policy

	Income	Estate	Health	Trade
Accuracy Index	-0.23***	0.06	-0.31***	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Female	0.12***	0.14***	0.10***	0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
kids	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.03	0.06	0.06	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.00	-0.06	-0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	0.04*	0.05*	0.05*	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Less than 4-year college	0.07	-0.05	0.09	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
4-year college/Master's	0.03	-0.10*	0.07	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Professional degree	-0.01	-0.16**	0.03	-0.07
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Economics related major	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	0.05	-0.03	-0.08	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Not working	0.11**	0.06	-0.13**	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Retiree	0.05	-0.05	-0.07	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Policy knowledge	-0.20***	-0.17***	-0.12***	-0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican	0.01	-0.06**	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.00	-0.06**	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.34***	0.47***	0.36***	0.36***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Observations	2783	2360	1825	1771

Notes: See the notes to Figure OA-4 for details on the question formulation and outcome variable definition. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-3: Willingness to Pay

	Income	Estate	Health	Trade
Accuracy Index	0.22***	0.03	0.18**	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.04)
Redistribution T	0.00	-0.04	0.00	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.00	-0.05	0.04	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Me	0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Women	0.00	-0.08**	0.04	
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
Female	-0.06***	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
kids	0.00	0.07***	-0.00	0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Black	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hispanic	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Other	-0.02	0.06*	-0.02	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.03	0.04	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.00	-0.01	0.08***	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	0.02	0.03	0.13*	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Not working	-0.02	0.00	0.11	-0.12
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Retiree	0.03	0.05	0.11	-0.13
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Less than 4-year college	-0.11*	-0.04	0.03	0.13
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
4-year college/Master's	-0.07	0.02	0.06	0.18**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Professional degree	0.03	0.14*	-0.02	0.16
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Economics related major	-0.03	-0.08**	-0.10**	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Policy knowledge	0.07***	0.10***	0.10***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Republican	-0.08***	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.04	-0.02	-0.05*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cost of information: 2 dollars	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cost of information: 5 dollars	-0.04	-0.08***	-0.00	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cost of information: 10 dollars	-0.09***	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T - US				-0.04
				(0.04)
Constant	0.36***	0.36***	0.08	0.34***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Control Group Mean	0.37	0.40	0.34	0.43
Observations	2783	2360	1825	1771

Notes: See the notes to Figure OA-5 for details on the question formulation and outcome variable definition. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA-5.2 Knowledge About Income and Estate Taxes

Figure OA-6: Knowledge About the Income Tax



Notes: The figure presents, for nine income tax knowledge questions, the average (blue bar) and median (dotted line) response of survey participants. The actual values are represented by the orange bar. A comprehensive list of sources used to determine the correct responses is provided in Section OA-1.

Figure OA-7: Knowledge About the Estate Tax



Notes: The figure presents, for nine estate tax knowledge questions, the average and median (dotted line) response of survey participants (in blue). Correct answers are depicted in orange. A comprehensive list of sources used to determine the correct responses is provided in Section OA-1.

Figure OA-8: Income Taxation Perceptions by Groups

(a) By Political Affiliation



(b) By Political Ideology



(c) By Income Group



(d) By Age Group



(e) By Education Level



Notes: The figures show the mean perception by group, with 90% confidence intervals. Panel A reports mean responses by political affiliation, Panel B by political ideology, Panel C by income group, Panel D by age group, and Panel E by level of education. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollar. Correct values are reported in orange on the right side of the figure. A comprehensive list of sources used to determine the correct responses is provided in Section OA-1.

Figure OA-9: Estate Taxation Perceptions by Groups

(a) By Political Affiliation



(b) By Political Ideology



(c) By Income Group



(d) By Age Group



(e) By Education Level



Notes: The figures show the mean perception by group, with 90% confidence intervals. Panel A reports mean responses by political affiliation, Panel B by political ideology, Panel C by income group, Panel D by age group, and Panel (E) by level of education. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollar. Correct values are reported in orange on the right side of the figure. A comprehensive list of sources used to determine the correct responses is provided in Section OA-1.

OA-5.3 Textual Analysis of Open-Ended Questions of Income and Estate Tax

Figure OA-10: Word clouds for Income Tax

(a) What are your Main Considerations about the Income Tax?



(b) What would be the Goal of a Good Income Tax System?



(c) What are the Shortcomings of the Income Tax System?



(d) Which important aspects of the U.S. federal income tax system would you say are not discussed enoughin the current policy debate?

(e) What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if the federal personal income taxes were increased?



Notes: The figure shows word clouds based on the text analysis of the open-ended income tax questions. Each panel refers to the open-ended question indicated in the caption. Raw answers are processed by removing *stop* words and the words explicitly used in the text of the questions and all *don't know* answers. The largest label, *flat tax*, appears in 8.9% of the responses. See Section OA-2 for details about the methodology.

Figure OA-11: Distributional effects of Income Tax Increase

(a) Who Gains if Taxes on High Earners were Increased?



(b) Who Loses if Taxes on High Earners were Increased?



Notes: The figure reports raw frequencies of the groups mentioned by the respondents when asked which groups of people would win A or lose B, if any, if the income tax in high earners were to be increased.

Figure OA-12: Keywords of Income Taxation by Groups

(a) By Political Affiliation



(b) By Age Group



(c) By Perceived Social Class

(d) By Education Level



Notes: The figure presents four keyness graphs which show the differential associations of keywords by political affiliation (A), age group (B), perceived social class (C), and level of education (D). The three income tax questions are: *Considerations:* When you think about federal personal income taxation and whether the U.S. should have higher or lower federal personal income, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?; *Goals:* What would be the goal of a good tax system?; *Shortcomings:* What do you think are the issues with or shortcomings of the U.S. federal income tax system?; The score reported for a set of n words is χ^2-test statistic, testing the null hypothesis that the occurrence of the given set of n words is equal across groups. See Section OA-2.3 for a more detailed description of the methodology.

Figure OA-13: Word clouds for Estate Tax

(a) What are your Main Considerations about the Estate Tax?

(b) What would be the Goal of a Good Estate Tax System?

(c) What are the Shortcomings of the Estate Tax System?



(d) What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if the federal estate tax were increased?

Notes: The figure shows word clouds based on the text analysis of the open-ended estate tax questions in the survey. The largest label, *already tax*, appears in 4.6% of responses. See the notes of Figure OA-10 and Section OA-2 for more details.

Figure OA-14: Keywords of Estate Tax by Groups

(a) By Political Affiliation



(b) By Age Group



(c) By Perceived Social Class



(d) By Educational Level



Notes: The figure presents four keyness graphs which show the differential associations of keywords by political affiliation (A), age group (B), perceived social class (C), and level of education (D). The three estate tax questions are: *Considerations:* When you think about the federal estate tax and whether the U.S. should have a higher or a lower federal estate tax, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?; *Goals:* What would be the goal of a good estate tax system?; *Shortcomings:* What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal estate tax? The score reported for a set of n words is χ^2-test statistic, testing the null hypothesis that the occurrence of the given set of n words is equal across groups. See Section OA-2.3 for a more detailed description of the methodology.

Figure OA-15: Distributional effects of Estate Tax Increase

(a) Who Gains if the Estate Tax were Increased?



(b) Who Loses if the Estate Tax were Increased?



Notes: The figure reports raw frequencies of the groups mentioned by the respondents when asked which groups of people would win (A) or lose (B), if any, if the estate tax were to be increased.

Figure OA-16: Probability of Mentioning Topics

(a) Income Tax



Keywords

Distribution:	*Middle class; working class; low income; wealthy; millionaire; rich; billionaire; corporations & pay/tax*
Fairness:	*Fair; unfair*
Government spending:	*Government spending & high; government spending & cut; deficit; debt; government & waste; balance & budget; government & budget; government & control & spend*
Social insurance:	*Social services; governmental services; governmental program & fund; governmental program & cover; help & poor; pay & poor; social program; poor work; live & paycheck; provide & family*
Efficiency:	*Hurt & economy; work hard; work less; work more; create & job; depress; trickle down; negative/detrimental/destroy/damage & economy; competition; innovation; create & business; boost & economy; discourage; spend less*
Flat tax:	*Flat tax*
Loopholes:	*Loopholes; lawyer; account; tax evasion; evade; avoid taxes*
Public goods:	*Infrastucture; education; healthcare*
Don't know:	*Not know; knowledgeable enough; idk; not sure; know enough; unsure*

(b) Estate Tax



Keywords

Distribution:	*Middle class; working class; low income; wealthy; millionaire; rich; billionaire; corporations & pay/tax; poor; inequality*
Fairness:	*Fair; unfair*
Government spending:	*Government spending & high; government spending & cut; deficit; debt; government & waste; balance & budget; government & budget; government & control & spend*
Efficiency:	*Hurt economy; work hard; flat*
Loopholes:	*Loopholes; lawyer; account; tax evasion; evade; avoid taxes*
Double tax:	*Already taxed/paid; twice & tax/pay*
Grieve:	*Grieve; bury; funeral*
Public goods:	*Infrastructure; education; health care*
Don't know:	*not know; knowledgeable enough; idk; not sure; know enough; unsure*

Notes: The figure presents, based on the keyword-based topic analysis, the probability of mentioning topics for three open-ended income and estate tax questions. Each reported topic corresponds to an indicator variable in the keyword-count model, which equals 1 if the respondent mentions in their response at least one of the topic-defining keywords. Panel A: *Considerations*: When you think about federal personal income taxation and whether the U.S. should have higher or lower federal personal income taxes, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?; *Goals*: What would be the goal of a good tax system?; *Shortcomings*: What do you think are the issues with or shortcomings of the U.S. federal income tax system? Panel B: *Considerations*: When you think about the federal estate tax and whether the U.S. should have a higher or a lower federal estate tax, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?; *Goals*: What would be the goal of a good estate tax system?; *Shortcomings*: What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal estate tax? For details on the text analysis methodology, see Section OA-2.4.

Figure OA-17: Topic Distribution by Political Affiliation for the Income Tax

(a) What are your Main Considerations about the U.S. federal income tax system?



(b) What would be the goal of a good income tax system?



(c) What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal income tax system?



Notes: The figure presents, based on the keyword-based topic analysis, the within-group distribution of topics for three open-ended income tax questions, by political affiliation. For the list of keywords and details on the text analysis methodology, see the notes to Figure OA-16 and Section OA-2.4.

Figure OA-18: Topic Distribution by Income Groups for the Income Tax

(a) What are your Main Considerations about the U.S. federal income tax system?



(b) What would be the goal of a good income tax system?



(c) What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal income tax system?



Notes: The figure presents, based on the keyword-based topic analysis, the within-group distribution of topics for three open-ended income tax questions, by income group. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollars; *Medium income* corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income between 40,000 and 69,000 U.S. dollars. For the list of keywords and details on the text analysis methodology, see the notes to Figure OA-16 and Section OA-2.4.

Figure OA-19: Topic Distribution by Age Group for the Income Tax

(a) What are your Main Considerations about the U.S. federal income tax system?



(b) What would be the goal of a good income tax system?



(c) What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal income tax system?



Notes: The figure presents, based on the keyword-based topic analysis, the within-group distribution of topics for three open-ended income tax questions, by age group. For the list of keywords and details on the text analysis methodology, see the notes to Figure OA-16 and Section OA-2.4.

Figure OA-20: Topic Distribution by Political Affiliation of the Estate Tax

(a) What are your Main Considerations about the U.S. federal estate tax system?



(b) What would be the goal of a good estate tax system?



(c) What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal estate tax system?



Notes: The figure presents, based on the keyword-based topic analysis, the within-group distribution of topics for three open-ended estate tax questions, by political affiliation. For the list of keywords and details on the text analysis methodology, see the notes to Figure OA-16 and Section OA-2.4.

Figure OA-21: Topic Distribution by Income Groups of the Estate Tax

(a) What are your Main Considerations about the U.S. federal estate tax system?



(b) What would be the goal of a good estate tax system?



(c) What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal estate tax system?



Notes: The figure presents, based on the keyword-based topic analysis, the within-group distribution topics for three open-ended estate tax questions, by income group. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollars; *Medium income* corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income between 40,000 and 69,000 U.S. dollars. For the list of keywords and details on the text analysis methodology, see the notes to Figure OA-16 and Section OA-2.4.

Figure OA-22: Topic Distribution by Age Group of the Estate Tax

(a) What are your Main Considerations about the U.S. federal estate tax system?



(b) What would be the goal of a good estate tax system?



(c) What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal estate tax system?



Notes: The figure presents, based on the keyword-based topic analysis, the within-group distribution of topics for three open-ended estate tax questions, by age group. For the list of keywords and details on the text analysis methodology, see the notes to Figure OA-16 and Section OA-2.4.

OA-5.4 Reasoning about Taxes: Efficiency, Distribution, and Fairness

Table OA-4: Perceived Behavioral Response to Income Taxation

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial	
	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Personal characteristics												
Republican	-0.04*	0.08***	0.14***	0.14***	0.09***	0.11***	0.13***	0.13***	0.10***	0.17***	0.18***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.00	0.08***	0.06***	0.05**	0.03	0.03	0.05**	0.07***	0.07***	0.09***	0.09***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.05***	-0.09***	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.05***	0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.04	0.06	0.17***	0.11***	0.20***	0.09**	0.11***	0.11***	0.09**	0.11***	0.10**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.04	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.02	-0.02	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.08***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.06**	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.02	-0.00	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.00	-0.04*	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College Degree	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.05**	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.02	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.08***	-0.08**	-0.03	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.09***	0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	0.06***	0.05**	0.05**	0.02	0.07***	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.04**	0.03*	0.04**	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation												
Me	-0.52***	-0.32***	-0.14***	-0.06*	-0.09***	-0.05	-0.17***	-0.07**	-0.23***	-0.09***	-0.11***	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Women	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.03	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.02	-0.06*	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Video treatment effects												
Redistribution T	0.00	0.04	-0.02	0.06*	-0.01	0.06**	-0.04	0.07**	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.08***	0.07**	0.16***	0.27***	0.08**	0.17***	0.14***	0.20***	0.04	0.12***	0.14***	0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.06***	0.05*	0.17***	0.28***	0.04	0.17***	0.12***	0.22***	0.04*	0.11***	0.15***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics												
Control mean	0.80	0.60	0.48	0.39	0.33	0.28	0.43	0.32	0.78	0.64	0.50	0.45
Observations	2782	2782	2783	2781	2781	2781	2783	2781	2783	2782	2782	2782

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-12 are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent thinks that the extent to which an increase in the federal personal income tax would encourage the middle class/themselves/middle class women or the richest people/themselves/richest women in the economy towards the listed behavior ranges from *a moderate amount* to *a great deal*. All questions are asked randomly with one of the three formulations described in the text: the generic, the "me" or the "women" formulation. Regressions in all panels include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, political affiliation, and dummies for all treatments (question formulations and video courses). Panel A reports the effects of various socio-demographic covariates. Panel B reports the effects of the "me" and "women" question formulation relative to the generic formulation. Panel C reports the treatment effects of the video courses relative to the omitted category (*no video*). The row "Control mean" reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who saw the generic question formulation and no video. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-5: Perceived Behavioral Response to Income Taxation: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial	
	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Question formulation												
Me	-0.48***	-0.30***	-0.09**	0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.11***	-0.01	-0.21***	-0.03	-0.05	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Women	-0.18***	-0.10**	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.07*	-0.04	-0.02	-0.09**	0.04	-0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.03*	-0.07***	0.03	0.04*	0.00	0.02	0.04*	0.03	-0.04**	0.05**	0.02	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Female	-0.08*	-0.05	-0.10*	-0.13**	-0.08	-0.11**	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.04	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.13**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Women × Female	-0.03	-0.14**	-0.09	-0.13**	-0.06	-0.08	-0.11**	-0.12**	-0.01	-0.12**	-0.10*	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects												
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.02	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.06	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.08*	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.05	0.06	0.13***	0.23***	0.08**	0.12***	0.11**	0.18***	0.04	0.10**	0.11**	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.02	-0.02	0.10***	0.19***	-0.01	0.08**	0.08**	0.14***	0.03	0.07**	0.10***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.08***	-0.13***	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.09	-0.01	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.11**	0.11*	0.14**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.09	-0.01	0.10*	0.07	0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.07	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.09**	0.14***	0.13***	0.17***	0.10**	0.18***	0.09**	0.16***	0.01	0.07*	0.09**	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.84	0.66	0.50	0.40	0.33	0.31	0.42	0.32	0.80	0.63	0.52	0.46
Observations	2782	2782	2783	2781	2781	2781	2783	2781	2783	2782	2782	2782

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-4. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-6: Perceived Behavioral Response to Income Taxation: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial	
	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Question formulation												
Me	-0.54***	-0.26***	-0.11**	-0.02	-0.06	0.00	-0.12**	-0.02	-0.28***	-0.11**	-0.05	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	-0.05**	0.10***	0.16***	0.14***	0.10***	0.12***	0.15***	0.14***	0.08***	0.15***	0.20***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.01	0.09***	0.06**	0.06**	0.04	0.05*	0.07***	0.08***	0.05**	0.08***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Me × Republican	0.09	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.02	0.10	0.03	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Me × Independent and others	-0.03	-0.13*	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07	-0.10	-0.11*	-0.13*	0.06	0.02	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Panel B: Video treatment effects												
Redistribution T	-0.00	0.10*	-0.12**	0.06	-0.09*	0.03	-0.16***	0.03	-0.01	0.07	-0.03	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.01	-0.03	0.10*	0.22***	-0.00	0.14***	0.08	0.11**	0.06	0.08	0.10*	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.07**	0.02	0.16***	0.27***	0.03	0.15***	0.09**	0.19***	0.08**	0.12***	0.14***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	-0.05*	0.06*	0.11***	0.13***	0.06*	0.09***	0.08**	0.09***	0.12***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.01	0.08**	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.09***	0.09***	0.08**	0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.05	-0.13*	0.13*	-0.02	0.11	0.03	0.17**	0.00	-0.04	-0.09	0.01	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.06	-0.05	0.18***	0.02	0.14**	0.07	0.19***	0.10	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.11*	0.16**	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.17**	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.20***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.08	0.12*	0.02	0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.05	0.06	0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	0.00	0.10*	0.02	-0.00	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.06	-0.06	0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.02	-0.06	-0.02	0.04	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Democrat control mean	0.84	0.53	0.45	0.34	0.33	0.25	0.41	0.29	0.75	0.59	0.41	0.39
Observations	2782	2782	2783	2781	2781	2781	2783	2781	2783	2782	2782	2782

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-4. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-7: Perceived Behavioral Response to Estate Tax

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial		Save Less	
	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Personal characteristics														
Republican	-0.01	0.01	0.06**	0.08***	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.09***	0.04**	0.07***	0.06**	0.14***	0.05*	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.04*	0.05**	0.01	0.06**	-0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.04**	-0.06***	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.02	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.09**	0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.07*	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.09***	-0.01	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.02	-0.00	-0.11***	-0.14***	-0.07**	-0.14***	-0.09***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.05	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.04	-0.06**	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04*	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College Degree	0.00	0.00	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.03	0.02	0.08**	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.10***	0.04	-0.00	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	0.01	0.04*	0.04	0.08***	0.05**	0.06***	0.02	0.05**	0.08***	0.06***	0.04*	0.06***	0.02	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation														
Me	-0.50***	-0.41***	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.32***	-0.21***	-0.34***	-0.24***	-0.15***	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Women	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.02	-0.10***	-0.03	-0.02	-0.17***	-0.09**	-0.09***	-0.08**	-0.00	-0.03	-0.05	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel C: Video treatment effects														
Redistribution T	0.05*	-0.04	0.06	0.01	0.08**	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.11***	0.03	0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.04*	-0.00	0.26***	0.04	0.08**	0.03	0.06*	0.03	-0.05*	-0.04	0.24***	0.09**	0.22***	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.03	-0.03	0.27***	0.07**	0.13***	0.07**	0.10***	0.07**	-0.02	-0.02	0.23***	0.07**	0.20***	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics														
Control mean	0.88	0.78	0.50	0.53	0.39	0.37	0.57	0.46	0.83	0.73	0.50	0.52	0.59	0.61
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2357	2355	2355	2355	2356	2357	2356	2356	2356	2356

The dependent variables in columns 1-14 are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent thinks that the extent to which an increase in the federal estate tax would encourage the very wealthy individuals/themselves/women among the richest in the economy or young and not yet rich people/themselves/young and not yet rich women towards the listed behaviors ranges from "a moderate amount" to a "great deal." See the notes to Table OA-4. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-8: Perceived Behavioral Response to Estate Tax: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial		Save Less	
	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Question Formulation														
Me	-0.39***	-0.30***	-0.05	-0.08*	-0.09*	-0.05	-0.24***	-0.12**	-0.29***	-0.15***	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09**	-0.11**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Women	-0.10***	-0.09**	0.06	-0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.10**	-0.02	-0.07*	-0.05	0.06	0.04	-0.03	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.05**	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.05**	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Female	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.14**	-0.18***	-0.14**	-0.16***	-0.10**	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.19***	-0.16***	-0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Women × Female	-0.16***	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.09	-0.02	-0.05	-0.14**	-0.14**	-0.03	-0.06	-0.12**	-0.13**	-0.05	-0.09
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects														
Redistribution T	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04	-0.09*	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.14***	-0.02	-0.07	0.03	-0.07	-0.04	-0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.03	-0.08*	0.17***	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.01	-0.04	-0.07	0.16***	0.03	0.19***	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.04	-0.08**	0.20***	0.01	0.10**	0.03	0.04	0.02	-0.05	-0.07*	0.17***	0.04	0.16***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.10***	-0.07**	-0.12***	-0.07**	-0.12***	-0.09***	-0.12***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.05*	-0.10***	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	0.13***	0.02	0.18***	0.17***	0.11*	0.12**	0.12**	0.23***	0.01	0.12**	0.16***	0.18***	0.12**	0.14**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	0.15***	0.14***	0.18***	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.04	-0.04	0.06	0.15**	0.10	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.14***	0.09**	0.13***	0.10**	0.05	0.07	0.11**	0.08*	0.04	0.09*	0.11**	0.06	0.07	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.88	0.74	0.52	0.51	0.44	0.39	0.58	0.47	0.85	0.74	0.53	0.51	0.60	0.59
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2357	2355	2355	2355	2356	2357	2356	2356	2356	2356

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-7. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-9: Perceived Behavioral Response to Estate Tax: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial		Save Less	
	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Question Formulation														
Me	-0.52***	-0.42***	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.15***	-0.11**	-0.32***	-0.16***	-0.40***	-0.29***	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	-0.04*	-0.02	0.03	0.07**	-0.00	0.04	0.01	0.08***	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.13***	0.01	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.03	0.06**	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.07**	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Me × Republican	0.14***	0.13*	0.07	0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.05	-0.01	0.20***	0.18***	0.15**	0.06	0.15**	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Me × Independent and others	-0.04	-0.05	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.04	-0.13*	0.01	-0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Panel B: Video treatment effects														
Redistribution T	0.06	-0.00	0.07	-0.00	0.11**	0.02	0.04	-0.04	0.07	0.07	0.17***	0.05	0.04	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.08**	0.03	0.28***	0.04	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.24***	0.13**	0.21***	0.10*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T	0.08**	0.01	0.32***	0.06	0.12**	0.10**	0.15***	0.08*	0.04	0.03	0.29***	0.10**	0.25***	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Republican	0.02	0.05	0.09**	0.08**	-0.01	0.04	0.07*	0.11***	0.12***	0.16***	0.12***	0.17***	0.09***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.05	-0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.06**	0.05	0.02	0.07**	-0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06	0.04	-0.06	0.02	-0.07	0.08	-0.20***	-0.16**	-0.14*	-0.04	-0.05	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.04	-0.07	-0.03	0.04	0.16**	0.11	0.00	0.04	-0.10	-0.14**	-0.01	-0.06	-0.04	-0.11
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.06	-0.05	-0.00	-0.04	0.12	-0.00	0.11	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.09	0.06	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	-0.07*	-0.08	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.12**	-0.13**	-0.17***	-0.14**	-0.08	-0.13**	-0.12**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.05	-0.01	-0.06	0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.04	0.08	-0.07	0.01	-0.06	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Democrat control mean	0.89	0.76	0.51	0.53	0.43	0.34	0.57	0.41	0.80	0.68	0.48	0.41	0.59	0.56
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2357	2355	2355	2355	2356	2357	2356	2356	2356	2356

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-7. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-10: Efficiency Costs of the Income Tax

	↑ Taxes high-inc. hurt economy. (1)	Laffer effect high-incomes (2)	Laffer effect middle class (3)	Efficiency index (4)
Panel A: Personal characteristics				
Republican	0.35***	0.18***	0.02	0.33***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.16***	0.08***	0.01	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female	-0.04**	0.06***	0.05***	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.05	0.07	-0.01	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Hispanic	0.00	0.01	-0.08**	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.04*	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
College Degree	0.02	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Economics related major	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Knowledgeable	0.06***	-0.00	0.04**	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation				
Me	0.01	0.20***	0.04	-0.29***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Women	0.02	-0.06*	-0.06**	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Panel C: Video treatment effects				
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.14***	0.03	0.01	0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.06***	-0.03	0.00	0.26***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics				
Control mean	0.31	0.48	0.65	0.00
Observations	2782	2780	2781	2783

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: ↑ *Taxes on high-incomes hurt economy:* the respondent believes that increasing income taxes on high-income households/women would hurt economic activity in the U.S.; *Laffer effect high-incomes/middle-class:* the respondent believes that tax cuts on high-income households/women or on middle class/women from the middle class would decrease the deficit in the long run because they would stimulate the economy and bring in more money for the government. The dependent variables in column 4 is a summary index, constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007), that combines the efficiency costs variables in this table with all variables from Table OA-4, with the sign oriented so that a higher index means a stronger belief in the distortionary nature of taxation. The questions in columns 2-3 are asked with three different formulations: "Me," "women," and the generic formulation; in column 1 the question is asked with the "women" and the generic formulation. See the notes to Table OA-4. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-11: Efficiency Costs of the Income Tax: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	↑ Taxes high-inc. hurt economy.	Laffer effect high-incomes	Laffer effect middle class	Efficiency index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Question Formulation				
Me	-0.03	0.19***	0.01	-0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Women	0.02	-0.03	-0.10**	-0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Female	-0.05**	0.06***	0.04*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Me × Female	0.07	0.02	0.05	-0.15**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Women × Female	0.00	-0.05	0.06	-0.12*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Panel B: Video treatment effects				
Redistribution T	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.14***	0.00	0.01	0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.04	-0.04	0.02	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Female	-0.04	0.04	0.07**	-0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	-0.07	0.06	-0.06	0.12*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.00	0.05	-0.01	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Economist T × Female	0.05	0.03	-0.03	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.35	0.46	0.63	0.04
Observations	2782	2780	2781	2783

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-10. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-12: Efficiency Costs of the Income Tax: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	↑ Taxes high-inc. hurt economy.	Laffer effect high-incomes	Laffer effect middle class	Efficiency index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Question Formulation				
Me	-0.03	0.29***	0.07	-0.27***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Republican	0.35***	0.19***	0.02	0.33***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.15***	0.06**	0.00	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Me × Republican	0.02	-0.19***	-0.05	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Me × Independent and others	0.09	-0.08	-0.04	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Panel B: Video treatment effects				
Redistribution T	-0.05	0.05	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.14***	0.01	0.02	0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T	0.08**	-0.01	0.04	0.27***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Republican	0.36***	0.18***	0.05	0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.15***	0.11***	0.03	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.06	-0.14**	-0.06	0.11
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.00	0.06	0.03	0.18**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.00	-0.01	-0.07	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Economist T × Republican	-0.05	-0.01	-0.12**	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.00	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Democrat control mean	0.15	0.39	0.61	-0.11
Observations	2782	2780	2781	2783

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-10. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-13: Efficiency Costs of the Estate Tax

	↑ Tax hurt economy	Laffer effect	Efficiency index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Personal characteristics			
Republican	0.15***	0.16***	0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.08***	0.11***	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female	-0.03	0.05**	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Black	-0.02	-0.07	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Hispanic	0.04	-0.01	0.12**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	0.04	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	0.03	0.04	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	-0.05*	-0.00	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.07***	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College Degree	0.01	-0.08***	-0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Economics related major	0.05*	0.09***	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Knowledgeable	0.08***	-0.02	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.07**	0.00	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Panel B: Question formulation			
Me	0.16***	0.11***	-0.54***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Women	0.04	0.02	-0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Panel C: Video treatment effects			
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.00	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.05	0.05	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.07**	-0.00	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics			
Control mean	0.28	0.46	-0.00
Observations	2358	2356	2360

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: ↑ *Estate tax hurt economy:* the respondent believes that increasing the federal estate tax on wealthy households/households similar to the one of the respondent themselves/on wealthy women would hurt economic activity; *Laffer effect:* the respondent believes that cuts to the estate tax of wealthy households/households similar to that of the respondent themselves/households of wealthy women would decrease the deficit in the long run because they would stimulate the economy and bring in more money for the government. The dependent variables in column 3 is a summary index, constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007), that combines the efficiency costs variables in this table with all variables from Table OA-7, with the sign oriented so that a higher index means a stronger belief in the distortionary nature of taxation. The questions in column 1-2 questions are asked with the three different formulations "Me," "women" and the generic formulation. See the notes to Table OA-4 and Table OA-10. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-14: Efficiency Costs of the Estate Tax: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	↑ Tax hurt economy	Laffer effect	Efficiency index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Question Formulation			
Me	0.13***	0.10**	-0.34***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Women	-0.02	0.03	-0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Female	-0.05**	0.05**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Me × Female	0.06	0.02	-0.38***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Women × Female	0.11**	-0.03	-0.17**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Panel B: Video treatment effects			
Redistribution T	-0.01	-0.01	-0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.11**	0.07	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T	0.10**	-0.02	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Female	0.00	0.04	-0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Female	-0.00	0.03	0.24***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.11**	-0.03	0.14*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Economist T × Female	-0.05	0.04	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Male control mean	0.31	0.43	0.02
Observations	2358	2356	2360

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-13. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-15: Efficiency Costs of the Estate Tax: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	↑ Tax hurt economy	Laffer effect	Efficiency index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Question Formulation			
Me	0.21***	0.12**	-0.53***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Republican	0.17***	0.14***	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.08***	0.09***	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Me × Republican	-0.07	-0.02	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Me × Independent and others	-0.07	-0.01	-0.11
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Panel B: Video treatment effects			
Redistribution T	0.02	0.13**	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Efficiency T	-0.03	0.04	0.17**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Economist T	0.03	0.05	0.23***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Republican	0.12***	0.21***	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Independent and others	0.05	0.15***	0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.06	-0.24***	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.05	-0.15**	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.13*	0.05	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.13*	-0.00	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Economist T × Republican	0.07	-0.09	-0.15**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.04	-0.07	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Democrat control mean	0.23	0.33	-0.09
Observations	2358	2356	2360

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-13. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-16: Which Groups Mostly Win from the Following Changes in Income Taxation?

	Taxes on high-earners were cut					Overall taxes were increased					
	Poor households (1)	Working class (2)	Middle class (3)	Upper-middle class (4)	Upper class (5)	Poor households (6)	Working class (7)	Middle class (8)	Upper-middle class (9)	Upper class (10)	Trickle down (11)
Panel A: Personal characteristics											
Republican	0.23***	0.22***	0.24***	0.08***	0.01	-0.12***	-0.21***	-0.25***	-0.14***	-0.13***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.05**	0.03	-0.09***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.09***	-0.06**	0.22***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.03	0.08**	0.08**	0.01	-0.07**	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.06	0.12***	0.11***	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.07*	0.09**	0.08**	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.06	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.04*	-0.07***	-0.08***	0.01	0.06***	-0.00	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.01	0.04	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	0.02	-0.06**	-0.10***	-0.04	0.08***	0.03	-0.04	-0.15***	-0.11***	-0.07**	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.05**	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.04	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.07***	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.04**	0.06**	-0.00	-0.06**	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
College Degree	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03*	0.02	0.03*	0.04*	0.05**	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.06*	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.08**	0.01	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.08***	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	0.05**	0.08***	0.05**	0.06***	0.04**	-0.02	0.03	0.05**	0.02	0.02	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.02	0.05**	0.06**	-0.05*	-0.02	0.01	0.08***	0.10***	0.03	0.04	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation											
Me	0.13***	0.13***	0.10***	-0.27***	-0.39***	-0.17***	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Me × 70k+	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.11*	0.09*	-0.13**	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Women	-0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.06**	0.05	0.01	-0.05*	-0.04	0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Video treatment effects											
Redistribution T	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.02	0.06*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	-0.05	-0.06**	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.02	-0.04	0.05**	0.05*	0.01	-0.08***	-0.10***	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics											
Control mean	0.32	0.32	0.33	0.69	0.82	0.65	0.49	0.40	0.39	0.41	0.32
Observations	2762	2756	2746	2743	2765	2774	2757	2759	2757	2762	2781

Notes: The dependent variables in column 1-10 are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent believes that the listed group/the respondent themselves/a women from the listed group would *mostly* win if the top federal income tax rate on high earners were cut, in columns 1-5, or if overall taxes were raised and the extra revenues were spent on government programs, in columns 6-10. The dependent variable in column 11 is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks that lowering taxes on wealthy people/women, and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth would ultimately do more to reduce the income differences between poor and rich families/women. See the notes to Table OA-4. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-17: Which Groups Mostly Win from the Following Changes in Income Taxation?: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	Taxes on high-earners were cut					Overall taxes were increased					
	Poor households (1)	Working class (2)	Middle class (3)	Upper-middle class (4)	Upper class (5)	Poor households (6)	Working class (7)	Middle class (8)	Upper-middle class (9)	Upper class (10)	Trickle down (11)
Panel A: Question Formulation											
Me	0.15***	0.12***	0.11***	-0.22***	-0.33***	-0.22***	-0.11**	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Women	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.06	-0.02	-0.07*	-0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.06***	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Female	-0.00	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Women × Female	0.01	0.11**	0.06	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.07	0.03	-0.01	0.10**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Panel B: Video treatment effects											
Redistribution T	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.05	0.07*	0.07*	-0.03	-0.09**	0.00	0.01	0.05	-0.02	-0.03	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.00	0.04	0.06	-0.00	-0.02	0.06*	0.05	0.01	-0.04	-0.09**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Redistribution T × Female	0.05	-0.03	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09*	-0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Efficiency T × Female	0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.05	-0.00	-0.01	-0.16***	-0.05	-0.04	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economist T × Female	0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male control mean	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.67	0.81	0.62	0.51	0.42	0.39	0.39	0.36
Observations	2762	2756	2746	2743	2765	2774	2757	2759	2757	2762	2781

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-16. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-18: Which Groups Mostly Win from the Following Changes in Income Taxation?: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	Taxes on high-earners were cut					Overall taxes were increased					
	Poor households (1)	Working class (2)	Middle class (3)	Upper-middle class (4)	Upper class (5)	Poor households (6)	Working class (7)	Middle class (8)	Upper-middle class (9)	Upper class (10)	Redistribution index (11)
Panel A: Question Formulation											
Me	0.08*	0.08	0.07	-0.35***	-0.49***	-0.05	0.03	0.09*	0.16***	0.16***	-0.32***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Republican	0.21***	0.22***	0.24***	0.05*	-0.02	-0.08***	-0.19***	-0.24***	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.04*	0.05**	0.06**	0.03	0.02	-0.06**	-0.15***	-0.17***	-0.07***	-0.04	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Me × Republican	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.24***	0.30***	-0.30***	-0.18**	-0.12*	-0.20***	-0.23***	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Me × Independent and others	0.11*	0.11*	0.10	0.12*	0.12**	-0.23***	-0.13*	-0.11	-0.20***	-0.23***	-0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Panel B: Video treatment effects											
Redistribution T	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.08*	0.01	-0.02	0.07	0.04	0.02	-0.00	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.02	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.09	-0.06	-0.10*	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T	0.08**	0.07*	0.08*	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.15***	-0.17***	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***	0.11***	0.07**	-0.14***	-0.24***	-0.26***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.11***	0.10***	0.10***	0.06**	0.04	-0.11***	-0.17***	-0.18***	-0.10***	-0.08**	-0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.06	-0.11	-0.03	0.05	-0.10	-0.00	0.02	-0.10	-0.08	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.06	-0.12*	-0.06	-0.03	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.01	0.08	0.08	-0.13*	-0.13**	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.03	-0.00	0.01	-0.07	-0.05	0.02	-0.03	0.09	0.02	0.06	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Economist T × Republican	-0.08	-0.07	-0.06	-0.08	-0.13***	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.12**	0.14**	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.10*	-0.06	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.09*	0.07	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Democrat control mean	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.67	0.80	0.67	0.59	0.54	0.48	0.47	
Observations	2762	2756	2746	2743	2765	2774	2757	2759	2757	2762	

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-16. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-19: Which of the Following Groups Mostly Win If the Estate Tax were Cut?

	Poor households (1)	Working Class (2)	Middle Class (3)	Upper-middle Class (4)	Upper Class (5)
Panel A: Personal characteristics					
Republican	0.10***	0.10***	0.13***	0.06**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.04*	0.03	0.04*	0.04*	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.11**	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.05*	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.08**	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College Degree	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	0.01	0.03	0.05*	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation					
Me	0.22***	0.18***	0.11**	-0.07	-0.10**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Me × 70k+	0.10*	0.08	0.09	0.10*	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Women	0.05	0.04	0.05	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel C: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.15***	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	-0.10***	-0.08**	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Economist T	-0.09***	-0.12***	-0.15***	-0.06*	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics					
Control mean	0.42	0.47	0.53	0.70	0.75
Observations	2329	2314	2306	2312	2304

Notes: The dependent variables in each column are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent believes that the listed group/the respondent themselves/a women from the listed group would *mostly* win if the federal estate tax rate were cut. See the notes to Table OA-4. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-20: Which Groups Mostly Win If the Estate Tax were Cut?: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	Poor households (1)	Working Class (2)	Middle Class (3)	Upper-middle Class (4)	Upper Class (5)
Panel A: Question Formulation					
Me	0.33***	0.25***	0.20***	0.02	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Women	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.00	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female	0.04	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Female	-0.15**	-0.09	-0.11*	-0.09*	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Women × Female	-0.04	-0.03	-0.05	-0.10*	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	-0.18***	-0.15***	-0.19***	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.09*	-0.04	-0.07	-0.11**	-0.13***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.10**	-0.12***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	0.11*	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.09*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.03	-0.07	0.02	0.14**	0.18***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.12**	0.10**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.37	0.43	0.50	0.75	0.82
Observations	2329	2314	2306	2312	2304

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-19. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-21: Which Groups Mostly Win If the Estate Tax were Cut?: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	Poor households (1)	Working Class (2)	Middle Class (3)	Upper-middle Class (4)	Upper Class (5)
Panel A: Question Formulation					
Me	0.21***	0.16***	0.11**	-0.08	-0.14***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	0.08***	0.09***	0.12***	0.04	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.02	-0.00	0.02	0.03	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Me × Republican	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.16**	0.21***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Me × Independent and others	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.09*	-0.04	-0.06	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.09*	-0.10**	-0.17***	-0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Republican	0.13***	0.12***	0.13***	0.06	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.06*	0.09**	0.06	0.05	0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.12	-0.07	-0.11	0.01	-0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.19***	-0.15**	-0.16**	0.01	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.01	-0.10	0.02	-0.05	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	-0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.04	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.00	-0.07	0.02	-0.00	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Democrat control mean	0.39	0.42	0.50	0.69	0.74
Observations	2329	2314	2306	2312	2304

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-19. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-22: Fairness Considerations about the Income Tax

	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	High incomes entitled to keep	Hard workers should pay less taxes	Redistribution index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Personal characteristics					
Republican	-0.42***	-0.38***	0.36***	0.01	-0.44***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.18***	-0.18***	0.19***	0.04*	-0.25***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.04**	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.06	-0.05	0.02	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.01	0.05*	-0.02	-0.07***	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	0.00	0.01	-0.05**	-0.13***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.03	-0.06**	0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.04**	-0.06**	0.05**	-0.02	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College Degree	-0.02	0.06***	0.02	-0.00	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	-0.06***	-0.00	0.03	0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.09***	-0.06**	0.05*	0.02	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation					
Me	-0.02	-0.02	0.23***	-0.06**	-0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Women	-0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.06**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	0.05	0.10***	-0.01	-0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.02	0.06**	0.00	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics					
Control mean	0.70	0.48	0.30	0.25	0.00
Observations	2781	2781	2780	2781	2783

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Wealth distribution unfair:* the respondent thinks that money and wealth in the US should be more evenly distributed; *Inequality serious issue:* the respondent believes that income inequality is a serious or very serious issue; *High-incomes entitled to keep:* the respondent believes that high-income individuals/individuals with a similar income to that of the respondent/high-income women are entitled to keep a very large share of their income and should not have to pay high taxes, even if that means less government revenue is available to help low-income families make ends meet; *Hard workers should pay less taxes:* the respondent believes that people/women who have worked hard for their income should be taxed less than those who have not worked hard for it, even if that means that people with the same income/with the same income as the respondent will end up paying different taxes. The dependent variable in column 5 is a summary index that aggregates variables in this table with all variables on the distributional impacts of taxes in Table OA-16; the sign is oriented so that a higher index means that the respondent perceives inequality as less fair, more progressive taxes as fair, and tax reforms that cut top tax rates or decrease overall taxes as hurting lower incomes and benefiting higher incomes. The questions in columns 3, 4 are asked with the three different formulations: "Me," "women," and the neutral formulation. See the notes to Table OA-4. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-23: Fairness Considerations about the Income Tax: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	High incomes entitled to keep	Hard workers should pay less taxes	Redistribution index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Question Formulation					
Me	-0.02	-0.00	0.23***	-0.02	-0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Women	0.01	0.07	-0.03	-0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	0.04**	0.01	-0.03	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Female	0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.07	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Women × Female	-0.07	-0.06	0.05	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel B: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	0.04	0.06	0.01	-0.01	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.01	0.05	0.00	-0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Redistribution T × Female	0.02	0.07	-0.03	-0.08	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T × Female	0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T × Female	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.05	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male control mean	0.68	0.49	0.32	0.25	-0.02
Observations	2781	2781	2780	2781	2783

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-22. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-24: Fairness Considerations about the Income Tax: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	High incomes entitled to keep	Hard workers should pay less taxes	Redistribution index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Question Formulation					
Me	0.00	-0.01	0.22***	-0.01	-0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Republican	-0.41***	-0.39***	0.36***	0.02	-0.45***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.18***	-0.18***	0.17***	0.04*	-0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Republican	-0.04	-0.00	-0.01	-0.10*	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Me × Independent and others	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	0.00	0.14***	0.04	-0.03	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T	-0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.00	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Republican	-0.47***	-0.38***	0.41***	0.01	-0.70***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	-0.19***	-0.18***	0.20***	0.05*	-0.35***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.10	-0.09	-0.06	-0.01	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.03	-0.03	-0.09	-0.04	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.06	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.05	-0.04	0.02	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Economist T × Republican	0.14***	0.06	-0.12**	0.03	0.19***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.06	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Democrat control mean	0.92	0.69	0.10	0.22	0.23
Observations	2781	2781	2780	2781	2783

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-22. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-25: Fairness Considerations about the Estate Tax

	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	Unfair tax estates of: hard workers	wealthy heirs	Fair that wealthy children: access better amenities	inherit more	Support wealth transmission	Redistribution index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Personal characteristics								
Republican	-0.39***	-0.45***	0.25***	0.25***	0.20***	0.24***	0.27***	-0.42***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.14***	-0.19***	0.16***	0.11***	0.11***	0.16***	0.14***	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.06***	-0.01	0.04*	0.03	-0.09***	-0.03	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.07*	0.15***	0.12***	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.07**	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.11***	0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.06**	0.04	0.04	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College Degree	0.02	0.04	-0.07***	-0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.03	-0.03	0.06*	0.09***	0.08**	0.04	0.01	-0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	-0.08***	0.01	-0.06***	-0.03	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.09***	-0.07**	0.02	0.03	0.07**	0.06*	0.09***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation								
Me	-0.02	-0.07*	0.13***	0.17***	0.04	0.12***	0.14***	-0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Women	0.00	-0.02	0.05	0.05	0.14***	0.03	0.05	-0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel C: Video treatment effects								
Redistribution T	0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.05	0.03	-0.09**	-0.06*	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	-0.06*	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.05	-0.08**	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.64	0.46	0.61	0.47	0.32	0.53	0.58	0.00
Observations	2358	2358	2358	2358	2357	2357	2356	2360

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Wealth distribution unfair:* the respondent believes that money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the population; *Inequality serious issue:* the respondent believes that wealth inequality in the U.S. is a serious or very serious problem; *Unfair tax estates of hard workers:* the respondent believes that it is somewhat unfair or very unfair to tax the estate of wealthy people/the estate of the respondent themselves/the estate of wealthy women who have worked hard and saved a lot in order to pass on wealth to their/her children; *Unfair tax estates of wealthy heirs:* the respondent believes that it is somewhat unfair or very unfair to tax the estate of people who are wealthy because they have inherited a lot/ the estate of people who are wealthier than the respondent themselves because they have inherited a lot more from their own parents /the estate of a wealthy woman who is wealthy because she has herself inherited a lot from her parents; *Fair that wealthy children access better amenities:* the respondent believes that it is somewhat fair or very fair that children born in very wealthy families/that people born in wealthier families than that of the respondent themselves/that a girl born to a very wealthy mother have access to better amenities; *Fair that wealthy children inherit more:* the respondent believes that it is somewhat fair or very fair that children born in very wealthy families inherit much more than children born in less wealthy families/that people born in wealthier families than that of the respondent themselves inherit much more than the respondent themselves/that a girl born to a very wealthy mother inherits much more than a girl born to a less wealthy mother; *Support wealth transmission:* the respondent believes that wealthy parents/individuals with similar levels of wealth to that of the respondent themselves/a wealthy mother should be able to pass on all of her wealth to her children; as a result, some children will start their own life with much larger wealth just by virtue of being born in a richer family/mother. The dependent variable in column 8 is a summary index that aggregates the variables in this table with all variables on the distributional impacts of estate taxes in Table OA-19; the sign is oriented so that a higher index means that the respondent believes that it is fair to limit the intergenerational transmission of wealth, that lower-income households would mostly lose from a tax cut, while upper class households would mostly benefit from it. Questions in columns 3-7 are asked with the three different formulations. See the notes to Table OA-4. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-26: Fairness Considerations about the Estate Tax: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	Unfair tax estates of: hard workers	wealthy heirs	Fair that wealthy children: access better amenities	inherit more	Support wealth transmission	Redistribution index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Question Formulation								
Me	-0.07	-0.12**	0.14***	0.18***	0.05	0.11**	0.16***	-0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Women	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.15***	0.04	0.06	-0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female	0.05**	-0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.09***	-0.03	-0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Female	0.08	0.09*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Women × Female	0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects								
Redistribution T	0.06	0.06	-0.06	-0.10**	0.04	-0.10**	-0.12**	0.14***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.06	-0.02	0.02	0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.04	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.05	-0.02	-0.06	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	0.07**	-0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.09***	-0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	-0.03	-0.05	0.12**	0.10	-0.02	0.03	0.10*	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.06	0.00	-0.05	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	-0.01	0.06	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.62	0.50	0.60	0.45	0.36	0.53	0.55	
Observations	2358	2358	2358	2358	2357	2357	2356	

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-25. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-27: Fairness Considerations about the Estate Tax: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	Unfair tax estates of: hard workers	wealthy heirs	Fair that wealthy children: access better amenities	inherit more	Support wealth transmission	Redistribution index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Question Formulation								
Me	-0.04	-0.13**	0.13**	0.23***	0.08	0.18***	0.17***	-0.26***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Women	0.03	-0.01	0.07	0.07	0.15***	0.04	0.04	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	-0.39***	-0.46***	0.27***	0.26***	0.22***	0.27***	0.29***	-0.43***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.14***	-0.21***	0.15***	0.13***	0.12***	0.16***	0.14***	-0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Me × Republican	0.02	0.08	-0.00	-0.07	-0.05	-0.15**	-0.07	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Me × Independent and others	0.03	0.11*	0.01	-0.10	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Women × Republican	-0.03	-0.04	-0.10	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.01	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Women × Independent and others	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Panel B: Video treatment effects								
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.06	-0.02	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	-0.07	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	-0.05	0.02	-0.05	-0.09*	0.01	-0.02	-0.08	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T	0.00	0.06	-0.03	-0.06	-0.01	-0.09*	-0.11**	0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	-0.42***	-0.45***	0.22***	0.19***	0.19***	0.22***	0.23***	-0.40***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent and others	-0.15***	-0.13***	0.14***	0.08**	0.12***	0.16***	0.11***	-0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.14*	0.03	0.05	0.04	-0.14*	-0.10	-0.03	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.03	-0.11	0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.04	-0.03	0.15**	0.24***	0.03	0.05	0.18**	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.01	-0.12*	0.10	0.13*	-0.01	-0.06	0.11	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	0.07	-0.03	0.03	0.05	0.11*	0.09	0.07	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.00	-0.12**	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Male control mean	0.85	0.64	0.51	0.38	0.19	0.36	0.49	0.19
Observations	2358	2358	2358	2358	2357	2357	2356	2360

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-25. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE OA-23: WOULD A HIGHER INCOME TAX ENCOURAGE THE FOLLOWING?

(A) ME VS. EVERYONE ELSE



(B) WOMEN VS. EVERYONE ELSE



(c) Republicans vs. Democrats



Notes: Panels A, B, and C present the share of respondents who believe a given behavioral response by a certain group would be encouraged (either a *great deal*, *a lot*, or *a moderate amount*) if the federal personal income tax rate for said group were to increase. Panel A asks about tax increases for the respondents themselves (Me), the middle class (Middle Class) or the richest people in the economy (Top Earners). Panel C asks about tax increases for the richest people in the economy in the top panel (Top Earners) or the middle class in the bottom panel (Middle Class), but displays the responses of Republicans and Democrats separately. Panel B asks about tax increases for the richest people in the economy (Top Earners; Baseline) versus a woman among the richest people in the economy (Top Earners; Women) in the top panel and about tax increases for the middle class (Middle class; Baseline) versus a woman in the middle class (Middle class; Women) in the bottom panel. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. Only respondents who saw no video treatment are included.

FIGURE OA-24: WOULD A HIGHER ESTATE TAX ENCOURAGE THE FOLLOWING?

(A) ME VS. EVERYONE ELSE



(B) WOMEN VS. EVERYONE ELSE



(c) Republicans vs. Democrats



Notes: Panel A and B present the share of respondents who believe a given behavioral response by a certain group would be encouraged (either a *great deal*, *a lot*, or *a moderate amount*) if the federal estate tax rate for said group were to increase. Panel A asks about tax increases for the respondents themselves (Me), the currently young and not yet rich (Young), or very wealthy individuals (Wealthy). Panel B asks about tax increases for the currently young and not yet rich (Young; lower panel) and very wealthy individuals (Wealthy; upper panel), but displays the responses of Republicans and Democrats separately. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. Only respondents who saw no video treatment are included.

Figure OA-25: Reasoning about Taxes: Efficiency Costs, and Fairness Considerations

(a) Efficiency Costs of the Income Tax



(b) Efficiency Costs of the Estate Tax

(c) Fairness Considerations on the Income Tax



(d) Fairness Considerations on the Estate Tax



Notes: The graph shows, for the different subgroups indicated in the legends, the share of respondents who agree with the statement reported on the y-axis in the income and estate tax survey. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. Democrats and Republicans refers to the political affiliation of the respondent. "People with similar income to mine" refers to respondents who were randomly assigned to the "Me" question formulation, Families with similar income to mine, and Families wealthier than mine refers, if applicable, to respondents who were randomly assigned to the "Me" question formulation. The graph includes only respondents who were not assigned to any of the video courses. See Tables OA-10, OA-13, OA-22, and OA-25 for regression analysis of the variables on the y-axis; the notes to these Tables report a more precise definition of the variables on the y-axis.

OA-5.5 Policy Outcomes of Income and Estate Tax

TABLE OA-28: POLICY VIEWS OF THE INCOME TAX

	Income tax fair	Satisfied income tax	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment	Government responsible to ↓ inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Personal characteristics						
Republican	0.22***	0.22***	-0.32***	-0.41***	-0.11***	-0.35***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.06***	0.09***	-0.18***	-0.27***	-0.07***	-0.23***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.06***	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.09***	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.08**	0.05	-0.02	-0.04	-0.08*	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.11***	0.08**	-0.03	-0.06	-0.09**	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.14***	-0.17***	-0.06**	-0.11***	-0.03	-0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.05**	0.00	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
High-Income	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.08***	0.06**	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College Degree	-0.03	-0.03*	0.01	0.03	0.04*	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.04	0.04	0.02	-0.04	0.04	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	0.03*	0.03	0.02	0.07***	0.11***	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.05**	0.07***	0.03	-0.00	0.03	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation						
Me	0.01	0.04	-0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Women	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.09***	-0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	0.01	0.02	0.11***	0.04	0.05*	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	-0.02	-0.04*	0.06**	0.05**	0.07**	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics						
Control mean	0.31	0.30	0.67	0.57	0.55	0.43
Observations	2782	2781	2783	2782	2782	2779

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Income tax fair:* the respondent believes that the current U.S. federal income tax system is somewhat fair or very fair; *Satisfied income tax:* the respondent is somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the current U.S. federal income tax system; *Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality:* the respondent believes that a progressive tax system in which people/women with higher incomes pay a higher share of income in taxes than people/women with lower incomes is an important tool to reduce income inequality; *Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes:* the respondent supports or strongly supports raising federal income taxes on higher income households to expand programs that support lower-income individuals/lower-income women; *Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment:* the respondent supports or strongly supports raising federal income taxes on higher income households to increase investment in the U.S. *Government responsible to ↓ inequality:* the respondent thinks the government has a responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor. See the notes to Table OA-4. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-29: Policy Views of the Income Tax: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	Income tax fair (1)	Satisfied income tax (2)	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality (3)	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes (4)	increase investment (5)	Government responsible to ↓ inequality (6)
Panel A: Question Formulation						
Me	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.02	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Women	-0.04	-0.04	-0.10***	-0.00	0.08*	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.06***	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Female	-0.00	0.02	-0.05	-0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Women × Female	0.00	-0.04	0.02	-0.01	-0.13**	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	0.01	0.01	0.13***	0.05	0.03	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.03	-0.04	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.00	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.05	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.04	-0.06	-0.09*	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Male control mean	0.34	0.32	0.66	0.57	0.58	0.44
Observations	2782	2781	2783	2782	2782	2779

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-28. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-30: Policy Views of the Income Tax: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	Income tax fair (1)	Satisfied income tax (2)	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality (3)	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes (4)	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment (5)	Government responsible to ↓ inequality (6)
Panel A: Question Formulation						
Me	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.05	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	0.22***	0.23***	-0.32***	-0.40***	-0.09***	-0.36***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.07***	0.10***	-0.16***	-0.24***	-0.03	-0.22***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Me × Republican	-0.01	-0.00	-0.09	-0.07	-0.04	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Me × Independent and others	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	-0.03	-0.01	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.11**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.00	0.06	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	0.24***	0.23***	-0.34***	-0.43***	-0.10***	-0.36***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.08***	0.08***	-0.21***	-0.29***	-0.11***	-0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.07	0.04	0.06	-0.03	0.02	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.05	0.05	0.12*	0.06	0.14**	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.09	-0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.02	0.10	-0.00	0.03	0.15**	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	-0.07	-0.00	0.06	0.09*	-0.03	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.07	-0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Democrat control mean	0.21	0.20	0.84	0.80	0.59	0.63
Observations	2782	2781	2783	2782	2782	2779

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-28. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-31: Policy Views of the Estate Tax

	Estate tax system fair (1)	Satisfied with estate tax (2)	Estate tax should exist (3)	Estate tax should be increased (4)	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality (5)	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm. (6)
Panel A: Personal characteristics						
Republican	0.06**	0.07***	-0.29***	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.01	-0.01	-0.18***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.02	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.03	0.10**	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.04	-0.09***	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.12***	-0.16***	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.13***	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
College Degree	0.02	0.02	0.09***	0.11***	0.01	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.05	-0.00	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.06*	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	0.02	0.01	0.04*	0.05**	0.02	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.07**	0.10***	-0.00	0.04	0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Underlying mechanisms						
Me	-0.01	0.01	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.17***	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Women	-0.08**	-0.04	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.07*	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Panel C: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	-0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.07**	0.14***	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.08**	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.07**	0.12***	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics						
Control mean	0.40	0.36	0.56	0.31	0.53	0.28
Observations	2358	2356	2359	2359	2357	2355

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Estate tax system fair:* the respondent believes that the current U.S. federal estate tax system is somewhat fair or very fair; *Satisfied with estate tax:* the respondent is somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the current U.S. federal estate tax system; *Estate tax should exist:* the respondent believes that there should be a federal estate tax in the U.S.; *Estate tax should be increased:* conditional on believing that there should be a federal estate tax (see previous variable), the respondent thinks that the federal estate tax should be increased; ↑ *Estate tax good way to* ↓ *inequality:* the respondent believes that increasing the estate tax/increasing the estate tax on the estates of households similar to that of the respondent themselves/increasing the estate tax on the estates of wealthy women is a good way or it is one of the best ways to reduce wealth inequality; *Government responsible to* ↓ *wealth transm:* the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in reducing inter-generational wealth transmission. See the notes to Table OA-4. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-32: Policy Views of the Estate Tax: Gender Heterogeneous Effects

	Estate tax system fair (1)	Satisfied with estate tax (2)	Estate tax should exist (3)	Estate tax should be increased (4)	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality (5)	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm. (6)
Panel A: Question Formulation						
Me	-0.02	0.02	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.16***	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Women	-0.07	-0.02	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Female	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.08***	-0.01	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Me × Female	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Women × Female	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.10*	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	-0.05	-0.08	0.10**	0.16***	0.13***	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.04	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.06*	0.08**	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06**	-0.05	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	0.01	0.07	-0.09	-0.16***	0.01	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.07	0.02	0.09	0.05	0.02	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Male control mean	0.43	0.41	0.62	0.36	0.54	0.30
Observations	2358	2356	2359	2359	2357	2355

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-31. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-33: Policy Views of the Estate Tax: Political Heterogeneous Effects

	Estate tax system fair (1)	Satisfied with estate tax (2)	Estate tax should exist (3)	Estate tax should be increased (4)	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality (5)	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm. (6)
Panel A: Question Formulation						
Me	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.08*	-0.18***	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	0.08**	0.08**	-0.28***	-0.30***	-0.29***	-0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.00	-0.02	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Me × Republican	-0.05	-0.06	-0.12*	-0.02	0.00	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Me × Independent and others	-0.03	0.06	-0.07	-0.03	0.01	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	-0.07	-0.02	0.08	0.09*	0.17***	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.01	0.02	0.10*	0.09*	0.12**	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.12***	0.18***	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Republican	0.05	0.07*	-0.27***	-0.24***	-0.25***	-0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent and others	-0.04	-0.03	-0.17***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.06	0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.00	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.03	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	-0.10	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.02	-0.01	-0.15**	-0.13*	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.04	-0.03	-0.10	-0.13*	-0.06	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	0.00	0.03	0.04	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.08	0.10*	0.02	-0.08	-0.12**	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Democrat control mean	0.40	0.38	0.67	0.43	0.65	0.39
Observations	2358	2356	2359	2359	2357	2355

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-31. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-34: General Policy Views [Income Tax]

	Pay less than fair share		Support higher taxation to fund				
	High Incomes	Middle Class	Transfers to people out of work	Better Schools	Retraining Programs	Healthcare Subsidies	Wage Subsidies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	-0.20***	-0.01	-0.19***	-0.33***	-0.18***	-0.37***	-0.31***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.05***	0.01	-0.14***	-0.20***	-0.09***	-0.25***	-0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.03*	-0.03*	-0.06***	0.02	-0.03*	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.06*	0.07*	0.15***	-0.04	-0.00	0.06	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.02	-0.04*	0.00	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.08***	-0.09***	-0.07**	-0.09***	0.02	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.07***	0.02	-0.02	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.11***	-0.01	-0.02	-0.11***	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College Degree	-0.04**	-0.04**	0.05***	0.06***	0.04**	0.04*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.05*	0.04	-0.05*	0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	-0.06***	-0.07***	0.08***	0.02	0.06***	0.04**	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.09***	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation							
Me	-0.17***	0.24***	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Women	0.01	0.13***	0.03	-0.06*	0.04	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	0.03	0.06*	0.03	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.05*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	-0.00	0.04*	0.04	-0.02	0.04*	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.78	0.36	0.26	0.62	0.33	0.42	0.42
Male Control mean	0.76	0.36	0.31	0.59	0.33	0.41	0.40
Democrat Control mean	0.91	0.36	0.38	0.76	0.42	0.62	0.61
Observations	2782	2781	2780	2779	2780	2780	2779

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Pay less than fair share - High Incomes (Middle Class):* the respondent believes that high income, upper-class (middle class) households in the U.S. today pay *less* or *much less* than their fair share in income taxes; *Support higher taxation to fund:* the respondent would like the service to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas); *Transfers to people out of work:* transfers and income support programs for those out of work; *Better schools: better schools for children from low-income families*; *Retraining programs:* income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade; *Healthcare subsidies:* subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care; *Wage subsidies:* wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages. The questions in columns 1-2 are asked with the three different formulations: "Me", "women," and the generic formulation. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-35: General Policy Views [Estate Tax]

	Pay less than fair share		Support higher taxation to fund				
	High Incomes	Middle Class	Transfers to people out of work	Better Schools	Retraining Programs	Healthcare Subsidies	Wage Subsidies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	-0.35***	-0.03	-0.20***	-0.29***	-0.22***	-0.31***	-0.27***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.17***	0.00	-0.13***	-0.17***	-0.13***	-0.19***	-0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.03	-0.03	-0.06***	0.05**	-0.03	0.04**	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.07*	0.08*	0.04	-0.03	-0.04	0.04	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.09**	0.08*	0.06*	-0.03	0.03	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.07**	-0.08**	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.12***	-0.11***	-0.06**	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.03	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.10***	-0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.02	-0.09***	-0.07***	-0.02	-0.04	-0.09***	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College Degree	0.00	-0.02	0.06***	0.08***	0.10***	0.04	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.05	-0.00	-0.05*	-0.00	-0.06*	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	-0.06***	-0.05**	0.07***	-0.03	0.06***	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.16***	0.08**	-0.01	-0.04	-0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation							
Me	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Women	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.05	0.00	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel B: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.06*	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	-0.06*	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.02	0.06*	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.57	0.47	0.25	0.56	0.34	0.36	0.36
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2355	2356	2356

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-34. All the questions are asked with the neutral formulation. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA-5.6 Views on Government for Income and Estate Tax

Table OA-36: Views on Government [Income Tax Survey]

	Trust	Purposes	Involvment	Cents wasted	Satisfaction	Government trust index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics						
Republican	0.08***	-0.48***	-0.36***	3.16*	0.27***	-0.56***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.65)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.01	-0.31***	-0.32***	1.55	0.10***	-0.42***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.61)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Female	-0.04***	0.03*	-0.05***	2.54***	-0.03*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.97)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Black	0.02	0.01	0.07*	1.97	0.04	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.11)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Hispanic	0.07**	0.03	0.08**	0.88	0.09***	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.01)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.01	0.04*	0.04*	2.44*	-0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.34)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	-0.11***	0.05*	-0.04	3.21**	-0.14***	-0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.46)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.03	-0.05**	-1.26	0.01	-0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.29)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.01	-0.05**	-0.04*	-3.21**	0.00	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.26)	(0.02)	(0.03)
College Degree	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-1.86*	-0.04**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.10)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Economics related major	-0.07**	-0.02	-0.03	-3.80**	-0.05*	-0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.62)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Knowledgeable	0.08***	0.01	0.06***	-0.11	0.07***	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.07)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.07***	-0.03	0.02	-1.93	0.05**	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.43)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	0.07	0.04	0.10**	-5.00*	-0.00	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.59)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Efficiency T	0.04	-0.07	-0.01	0.37	0.00	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.80)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.20	-0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.00	-0.04	-0.11	5.48	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.62)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.00	-0.02	-0.06	5.62	0.01	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.56)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.03	0.09	0.05	1.89	-0.04	0.14
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.69)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.06	0.07	0.03	3.77	0.00	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.65)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Economist T × Republican	-0.00	0.05	0.05	-1.06	-0.02	0.11
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.87)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.06	0.10**	0.10*	4.08	-0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.73)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Control mean	0.21	0.43	0.43	53.39	0.23	0.00
Observations	2782	2782	2779	2779	2781	2783

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Trust:* respondent believes they can trust the government doing the right thing almost always or a lot of the time; *Purposes:* respondent thinks the government should do more to solve the country's problems; *Involvement:* respondent thinks the government should take active steps to improve the lives of its citizens (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means the government should take active steps); *Cents Wasted:* cents wasted of every tax dollar that goes to the federal government in Washington, D.C.; *Satisfaction:* respondent is very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the way the federal government in Washington is dealing with the country's problems. Questions are asked with the generic formulation. The dependent variables in column 6 is a summary index, constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007), that combines the variables in columns 1-3, with the sign oriented so that a higher index means more trust in government and a stronger belief that the scope of government should be broad. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-37: Views on Government [Income Tax Survey]: Should the Government be Responsible in the Following Areas?

	Reducing income inequality	Reducing wealth transmission	Health Care	Reducing opportunity differential	Regulating trade	Financial system stability	Dollar stability	Minimum living standard
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics								
Me	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.05	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Women	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects								
Redistribution T	0.11**	0.12***	-0.04	0.00	-0.07	0.01	-0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.09*	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.06	0.06*	-0.06	0.01	-0.04	-0.07*	-0.06*	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.02	-0.12*	0.01	-0.04	0.08	-0.09	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.06	-0.11*	0.09	0.01	0.03	-0.07	-0.02	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.05	-0.01	0.09	0.07	0.01	-0.04	-0.07	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	0.02	-0.05	0.06	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.00	-0.07	0.07	-0.02	0.06	0.05	0.08*	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Control mean	0.43	0.25	0.66	0.49	0.68	0.72	0.78	0.56
Observations	2779	2779	2779	2778	2779	2779	2778	2779

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent believes the government should have responsibility in the given area, defined as answering either 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 means "no responsibility at all", 5 means "total responsibility"). Areas: *Reducing income inequality:* responsibility to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor; *Reducing wealth transmission:* responsibility to reduce inter-generational wealth transmission; *Health care:* responsibility to make sure Americans have adequate health care;*Reducing opportunity diff.:* responsibility to reduce the differences in opportunity between children from wealthy and poor families;*Regulating Trade:* responsibility to regulate trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers; *Financial System Stability:* responsibility to maintain a stable financial system and ensure that credit markets work; *Dollar stability:* responsibility to ensure a stable dollar; *Minimum living standard:* responsibility to provide a minimum standard of living for all. Questions are asked with the generic formulation. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-38: Views on Government [Estate Tax Survey]

	Trust	Purposes	Involvment	Cents wasted	Satisfaction	Government trust index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Personal characteristics						
Republican	0.03	-0.44***	-0.38***	5.63***	0.25***	-0.57***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(1.87)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Independent and others	-0.05	-0.26***	-0.26***	6.58***	0.03	-0.44***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.78)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Female	-0.04**	0.03	-0.06***	2.90***	-0.03*	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Black	0.15***	0.03	0.04	-1.55	0.08**	0.18***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.15)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Hispanic	0.03	0.00	0.07*	1.16	0.07*	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.00)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.06**	0.04	0.01	2.74*	-0.10***	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.44)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	-0.14***	0.04	-0.06*	3.99**	-0.17***	-0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.56)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04*	-1.26	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.33)	(0.02)	(0.04)
High-Income	-0.03	-0.02	-0.07***	-1.85	-0.03	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.33)	(0.02)	(0.04)
College Degree	0.03	0.00	0.03	-3.16***	-0.02	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.20)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Economics related major	-0.01	-0.03	-0.08***	-2.05	-0.01	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.66)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Knowledgeable	0.09***	-0.03	0.07***	0.06	0.06***	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.14)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.08***	-0.06**	0.02	-1.30	0.09***	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.56)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	-0.08*	0.03	0.03	2.63	0.04	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.71)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Efficiency T	-0.04	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.71)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T	-0.05	0.03	-0.00	2.03	0.00	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(2.31)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.16**	0.01	0.09	-6.53*	0.00	0.22**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.79)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.06	0.00	-0.04	-6.21*	0.01	0.12
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.55)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.03	0.02	0.02	-1.82	0.01	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.62)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.05	-0.07	-0.01	-2.03	0.01	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.56)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Economist T × Republican	0.03	-0.01	0.04	-1.17	0.03	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(2.95)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.07	-0.07	-0.04	-4.42	0.11**	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(2.86)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Control mean	0.25	0.44	0.41	58.78	0.21	0.00
Observations	2358	2357	2356	2354	2357	2360

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-36. Questions are asked with the generic formulation. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-39: Views on Government [Estate Tax Survey]: Should the Government be Responsible in the Following Areas?

	Reducing income inequality	Reducing wealth transmission	Health Care	Reducing opportunity differential	Regulating trade	Financial system stability	Dollar stability	Minimum living standard
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Personal characteristics								
Republican	-0.27***	-0.17***	-0.37***	-0.32***	-0.00	-0.12***	-0.04	-0.37***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	-0.10***	-0.13***	-0.21***	-0.20***	-0.06	-0.09**	-0.07**	-0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Female	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.06***	0.02	0.04**	-0.00	0.05**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.05	0.03	-0.04	0.10**	-0.01	-0.08*	-0.06*	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.06	-0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.00	-0.03	0.06**	0.00	0.10***	0.07**	0.08***	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.10***	-0.12***	0.01	-0.08***	0.09***	0.07**	0.08***	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
College Degree	0.02	0.04*	0.03	0.03	-0.04	0.05**	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06**	-0.07**	0.04	-0.00	-0.04	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Knowledgeable	0.04*	0.07***	-0.03	0.06***	0.05*	0.04	0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.05	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects								
Redistribution T	0.05	-0.01	-0.07	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.05	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.06	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.07	-0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.03	0.08	0.18**	0.11	-0.00	-0.01	-0.05	0.15*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.16**	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.06	-0.07	-0.02	0.03	-0.06	-0.03	0.03	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.07	0.07	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.08	-0.05	-0.09*	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.13**	0.02	0.01	-0.06	-0.10*	-0.09*	-0.04	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Control mean	0.43	0.28	0.66	0.47	0.63	0.74	0.76	0.55
Observations	2357	2355	2355	2356	2353	2356	2355	2354

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables. See the notes to Table OA-37. Questions are asked with the generic formulation. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure OA-26: Respondent Profile Clustering - Share of Profile-II Respondents

(a) Income Tax



Profile I: Unfair system; highlight inequalities; pro-redistribution

Profile II: Fair system; downplay inequalities

(b) Estate Tax



Profile I: Not concerned by estate tax system; highlight inequalities

Profile II: Concerned by estate tax system; unfair system

Notes: The figure presents, for each survey, the share of respondents categorized as *Profile-II-respondents* by the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) machine learning algorithm. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollar. *Knowledgeable* (*Little Knowledgeable*) corresponds to respondents who consider themselves *highly knowledgeable* or *somewhat knowledgeable* (*not very knowledgeable* or *not knowledgeable at all*) on economic policies and issues. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. The algorithmic process draws upon 12 (income taxation)/16 (estate tax)/35 (health insurance)/ 32 (trade) survey-specific, closed-ended questions. Coefficients originate from a linear regression that controls for a set of other characteristics. Omitted categories in the regression: White, Low income, Age 18-29, Democrat, Student, Less than high school. Standard errors in parenthesis. A detailed explanation of the algorithmic process is presented in Section OA-3 of this document.

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