

Online Appendix
(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

A1.1 Results on other candidates using different samples

In this section, we demonstrate that the main conclusion regarding other candidates is unchanged if we consider different samples. That is, other candidates did not have a significant impact on the intention to vote for the candidate, intention to turn out to vote and individual campaign contributions for the candidate following their rallies. We perform the same analysis as in Table 3 for other candidates. The results for Romney, McCain, Clinton, Obama in 2012 and Obama in 2008 are shown in Table A3, Table A4, Table A5, Table A6, and Table A7.

Table A3 shows the estimates for rallies held by Romney. In Panel 1, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Romney on the intention to vote for him. All the estimates are statistically insignificant and economically small in magnitude. In Panel 2, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Romney on the intention to vote. Most of the estimates are statistically insignificant. However, the magnitudes are large and range between 2.6 to 3.4 p.p. increase in the turnout. In Panel 3, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Romney on the individual campaign contributions for him. All the estimates are statistically insignificant and economically small in magnitude.

Table A4 shows the estimates for rallies held by McCain. In Panel 1, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by McCain on the intention to vote for him. All the estimates are statistically insignificant and economically small in magnitude. In Panel 2, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by McCain on the intention to vote. In Panel 3, we see that the impact varies from -43% to 25.6% depending on different samples, implying that results are not robust across different samples.

Table A5 shows the estimates for rallies held by Clinton. In Panel 1, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Clinton on the intention to vote for her. In Panel 1, we see that there is a negative impact of rallies held by Clinton on the intention to vote for her. Two out of the six samples yield statistically significant impact. The magnitudes are large and range between 1.3 to 4.7 p.p. decrease in the turnout. In Panel 2, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Clinton on the intention to vote. Most of the estimates are statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. In Panel 3, we see that there is a negative impact of rallies held by Clinton on the individual campaign contributions for her. Four of the six samples yield negative and statistically significant impact. The magnitudes range between 5.8% to 20% decrease in the individual campaign contributions for her. The magnitude is three times smaller than the estimates obtained for Trump.

Table A6 shows the estimates for rallies held by Obama in 2012. In Panel 1, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Obama on the intention to vote

for him. All the estimates are statistically insignificant and economically small in magnitude. In Panel 2, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Obama on the intention to vote. In Panel 3, we see that the impact varies from -27.6% to 36.2% depending on different samples, implying that results are not robust across different samples.

Table A7 shows the estimates for rallies held by Obama in 2008. In Panel 1, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Obama on the intention to vote for him. All the estimates are statistically insignificant and economically small in magnitude. In Panel 2, we see that there is little impact of rallies held by Obama on the intention to vote. In Panel 3, we see that there is a negative impact of rallies held by Obama on the individual campaign contributions for him. One of the six samples yield negative and statistically significant impact. The magnitudes range between 21.5% to 55.8% decrease in the individual campaign contributions for him.

A1.2 Dynamics of the Effect for other Candidates

In Figures A2 to A6, we analyze the dynamics of the impact of rallies by other candidates on the intention to vote for them. In Figure A2, we see that rallies by Romney have limited impact on the intention to vote for him in the days following the rally. In Figure A3, we see that rallies by McCain had a slight increase in the intention to vote for him in the days 3 to 5 after his rally. These results though should be taken with caution as we see a difference in voting intention for McCain prior to his rally. In Figures A4, A5, and A6, we see that rallies by Clinton and Obama have limited impact on the intention to vote for them in the days following the rally.

In Figures A7 to A11, we analyze the dynamics of the impact of rallies by other candidates on the intention to vote (turnout). In Figure A7, we see that rallies by Romney have limited impact on the intention to vote (turnout) in the days following the rally. In Figure A8, we see that rallies by McCain had a slight decrease in the intention to vote (turnout) in the days 6 to 8 after his rally. These results though should be taken with caution as we see a difference in turnout prior to his rally. In Figure A9, we see that rallies by Clinton have limited impact on the intention to vote (turnout) in the days following the rally. In Figure A10, we see that turnout decreases in the days 0 to 2 following a rally by Obama in 2012. In Figure A11, we see that rallies by Obama in 2008 had the opposite impact to his rallies in 2012, i.e., intention to turn out to vote increased in the days 0 to 2 following a rally by Obama in 2008.

In Figures A12 to A16, we analyze the dynamics of the impact of rallies by

other candidates on the individual campaign contributions for the candidate. In Figure A12, we see that the campaign contributions for Romney decreased in the days 3 to 8 following his rally. The effect is robust across different samples. In Figure A13, we see that rallies by McCain have limited impact on the campaign contributions for him in the days following the rally. In Figure A14, we see that the campaign contributions for Clinton decreased in the days 0 to 8 following her rally. The magnitude of the impact is low: campaign contributions for her decrease by around 20% following her rally. The effect is robust across different samples. In Figure A15, we see that rallies by Obama have limited impact on the campaign contributions for him in the days following the rally in 2012. In Figure A16, we see that the campaign contributions for Obama increased in the days 0 to 2 following his rallies in 2008. The effect is robust across different samples. These results though should be taken with caution as we see a difference in individual campaign contributions for Obama prior to his rally.

A1.3 Measuring Impact at different geographies

In Section 5, we established that there are important spillovers due to media coverage of rallies. Since, the local broadcasting changes at the media market level, we expect that results at the county and commuting zone level will be unable to capture the effect of the rallies. Nonetheless, we report these results here.

In Table A12 to Table A15, we estimate our main results by defining treatment at the county level. We see three main differences compared to the main results: (i) there is no effect of Trump rallies on the voting intention for Trump; (ii) a 10.5 p.p. reduction in the voting intention for Obama of rallies by Obama in 2012; (iii) a 6.5 p.p. increase in the turnout of rallies by Obama in 2008.

In Table A16 to Table A19, we estimate our main results by defining treatment at the commuting zone level. We see two main differences compared to the main results: (i) there is no effect of Trump rallies on the voting intention for Trump; (ii) a 4.2 p.p. reduction in the voting intention for Romney of rallies by Romney.

In Table A20 to Table A23 we estimate our main results by defining treatment at the state level. This analysis is important in gauging how the rallies relate to the electoral outcomes. In Columns 1 to 5, we use the sample of states where Trump held a rally, Trump or Clinton held a rally, any Republican candidate (Democratic for Democratic candidates) held a rally, any presidential candidate held a rally, and the entire sample. In Appendix Table A20, we see that rallies by Trump resulted in a 5.8 p.p. increase in the intention to vote for Trump in states with a Trump rally relative to other states (Panel 1, Column 5). In Panels 2 and 3, we see that rallies by Romney and McCain did not result in a statistically significant

or economically sizable change in the intention to vote for the candidates. In Appendix Table [A21](#), we see that rallies by Clinton and Obama in 2012 did not result in a statistically significant or economically sizable change in the intention to vote for the candidates (Panels 1 and 2). Finally, rallies by Obama in 2008 resulted in a 4.9 p.p. increase in the intention to vote for Obama in states with an Obama rally relative to other states (Panel 3, Column 5). In Appendix Table [A22](#) and Table [A23](#), we do not find evidence that rallies by presidential candidates result in a higher turnout at the state level.

A1.4 Impact by political leaning for other Candidates


In Appendix Table [A24](#), we analyze the heterogeneous impact of rallies by other candidates on voting intention for candidates. In Column 1, we analyze the effect of rallies by Romney. We see that intention to vote for Romney decreases by 3.5 p.p. and 9.5 p.p. among weak Democrats and independent voters following a rally by Romney. In Column 2, we see that there was no effect of rallies by McCain on any types of voters. In Column 3, we see that intention to vote for Clinton decreases by 2.6 p.p. among strong Republicans following a rally by Clinton. In Column 4, we see that intention to vote for Obama decreases by 4.3 p.p. among strong Republicans following a rally by Obama in 2012. In Column 5, we see that there was no effect of rallies by Obama in 2008 on any types of voters.

In Appendix Table [A25](#), we analyze the heterogeneous impact of rallies by other candidates on intention to turnout to vote. In Column 1, we see that intention to vote increases by 7.7 p.p. among strong Democrats following a rally by Romney. In Column 2, we see that intention to vote decreases by 5 p.p., 6.8 p.p. and 3.5 p.p. among strong Democrats, weak Republicans, and strong Republicans following a rally by McCain. In Column 3, we see that there was no effect of rallies by Clinton on any types of voters. In Column 4, we see that intention to vote decreases by 9.1 p.p. among strong Republicans following a rally by Obama in 2008. In Column 5, we see that intention to vote decreases by 5.5 p.p. among strong Democrats and increases by 5.7 p.p. among weak Democrats following a rally by Obama in 2008.


Together, these results show that no other candidates had a positive effect on any sub-group of voters. Romney rallies harmed the intention to vote for him among weak Democrats and independents, Clinton rallies hurt the intention to vote for her among strong Republicans, and rallies by Obama in 2012 had a negative impact on the intention to vote for him among strong Republicans. In terms of turnout, Romney rallies among strong Republicans and rallies by Obama in 2008 among weak Democrats had a positive effect on the turnout. These results suggest that effective rallies are ones that lead the voters leaning in favor of the

candidate to change their voting intention and motivate them to turn out.


Figure A1: Presidential rallies 2008 to 2016



(a) Rallies in 2016




(b) Rallies in 2012



(c) Rallies in 2008


Notes: The Figure shows the location of presidential rallies by each presidential candidate in the days leading up to the elections. In Panel (a) the rallies by Trump and Clinton are shown. In Panel (b) the rallies by Romney and Obama are shown. In Panel (c) the rallies by McCain and Obama are shown. In Panel (a) the rallies from September 22nd, 2016 to November 7th, 2016 are shown. In Panel (b) the rallies from September 26th, 2012 to November 5th, 2012 are shown. In Panel (c) the rallies from October 1st, 2008 to November, 3rd 2008 are shown.

Figure A2: Impact of Romney rally on Intention to Vote for Romney




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Romney rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with a Romney rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with a Romney or Obama rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Romney held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Romney or Obama held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention for Romney in media markets with a Romney rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2012 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Romney or Obama; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A3: Impact of McCain rally on Intention to Vote for McCain




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for McCain rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with a McCain rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with a McCain or Obama rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where McCain held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where McCain or Obama held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention for McCain in media markets with a McCain rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2008 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either McCain or Obama; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A4: Impact of Clinton rally on Intention to Vote for Clinton




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Clinton rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with a Clinton rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with a Clinton or Trump rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Clinton held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Clinton or Trump held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention for Clinton in media markets with a Clinton rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2016 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Clinton or Trump; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A5: Impact of Obama rally on Intention to Vote for Obama in 2012




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Obama rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with an Obama rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with an Obama or Romney rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama or Romney held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention for Obama in media markets with an Obama rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2012 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Obama or Romney; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A6: Impact of Obama rally on Intention to Vote for Obama in 2008




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Obama rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with an Obama rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with an Obama or McCain rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama or McCain held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention for Obama in media markets with an Obama rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2008 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Obama or McCain; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A7: Impact of Romney rally on Intention to Vote (Turn Out)




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Romney rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with a Romney rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with a Romney or Obama rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Romney held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Romney or Obama held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention (turnout) in media markets with a Romney rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2012 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Romney or Obama; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A8: Impact of McCain rally on Intention to Vote (Turn Out)




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for McCain rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with a McCain rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with a McCain or Obama rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where McCain held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where McCain or Obama held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention (turnout) in media markets with a McCain rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2008 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either McCain or Obama; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A9: Impact of Clinton rally on Intention to Vote (Turn Out)




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Clinton rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with a Clinton rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with a Clinton or Trump rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Clinton held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Clinton or Trump held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention (turnout) in media markets with a Clinton rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2016 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Clinton or Trump; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A10: Impact of Obama rally on Intention to Vote (Turn Out) in 2012




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Obama rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with an Obama rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with an Obama or Romney rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama or Romney held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention (turnout) in media markets with an Obama rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2012 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Obama or Romney; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A11: Impact of Obama rally on Intention to Vote (Turn Out) in 2008




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Obama rallies. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with an Obama rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with an Obama or McCain rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama or McCain held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the voting intention (turnout) in media markets with an Obama rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using 2008 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Obama or McCain; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) 12 days around the rally for media markets with a rally, and all other observations for other media markets.

Figure A12: Impact of Romney rally on campaign contributions




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Romney rallies. The unit of observation is media market-day. In Panels (a) to (f), the main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Romney. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with a Romney rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with a Romney or Obama rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Romney held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Romney or Obama held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Romney in the media market with a Romney rally relative to other media markets in the swing states. The data is constructed using individual campaign contributions files from the FEC. All estimates include media market and day fixed effects.

Figure A13: Impact of McCain rally on campaign contributions




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Figure A14: Impact of Clinton rally on campaign contributions




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Clinton rallies. The unit of observation is media market-day. In Panels (a) to (f), the main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Clinton. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with a Clinton rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with a Clinton or Trump rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Clinton held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Clinton or Trump held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Clinton in the media market with a Clinton rally relative to other media markets in the swing states. The data is constructed using individual campaign contributions files from the FEC. All estimates include media market and day fixed effects.

Figure A15: Impact of Obama rally on campaign contributions in 2012




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Obama rallies. The unit of observation is media market-day. In Panels (a) to (f), the main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Obama. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with an Obama rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with an Obama or Romney rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama or Romney held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Obama in the media market with an Obama rally relative to other media markets in the swing states. The data is constructed using individual campaign contributions files from the FEC. All estimates include media market and day fixed effects.

Figure A16: Impact of Obama rally on campaign contributions in 2008




Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for Obama rallies. The unit of observation is media market-day. In Panels (a) to (f), the main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Obama. In Panel (a) the sample consists of all media markets in the swing states. In Panel (b) the sample is restricted to media markets with an Obama rally. In Panel (c) the sample consists of all media markets with an Obama or McCain rally. In Panel (d) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama held a rally. In Panel (e) the sample consists of all media markets in the states where Obama or McCain held a rally. In Panel (f) the sample consists of all media markets. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Obama in the media market with an Obama rally relative to other media markets in the swing states. The data is constructed using individual campaign contributions files from the FEC. All estimates include media market and day fixed effects.

Figure A17: TV Advertisement by opponents around rally




(a) Trump Rally on Clinton Ads

(b) Romney Rally on Obama Ads



(c) McCain Rally on Obama Ads

(d) Clinton Rally on Trump Ads




(e) Obama Rally on Romney Ads

(f) Obama Rally on McCain Ads


Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for presidential rallies. In Panels (a) to (f), the main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of number of TV advertisements by Clinton, Obama in 2012, Obama in 2008, Trump, Romney, and McCain, respectively. In Panels (a) to (f), the main independent variable is the days around a rally by Trump, Romney, McCain, Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the natural logarithm of number of TV advertisements by each candidate's opponent in the media market with the candidate rally relative to other media markets in the swing states. The data in Panel (a) and (d) is constructed using scrapped data of TV clips from three major television networks. The data in Panels (b) and (e) is constructed using Wisconsin Advertising Project. The data in Panels (c) and (f) is constructed using Wesleyan Media Project. All estimates include media market and day fixed effects.

Figure A18: Amount of Campaign Contributions to opponent around rally



Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for presidential rallies. The unit of observation is media market-day. In Panels (a) to (f), the main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to Clinton, Obama in 2012, Obama in 2008, Trump, Romney, and McCain, respectively. In Panels (a) to (f), the main independent variable is the days around a rally by Trump, Romney, McCain, Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the natural logarithm of individual campaign contributions to the opponent of each candidate in the media market with the candidate rally relative to other media markets in the swing states. The data is constructed using individual campaign contributions files from the FEC. All estimates include media market and day fixed effects.

Figure A19: TV coverage of opponents around rally in 2016



Notes: The Figure shows the result from OLS estimation of Equation 2 for presidential rallies. In Panels (a) and (b), the main dependent variables are the natural logarithm of number of TV clips about Clinton’s rally and Trump’s rally, respectively. The main independent variables are days since Trump’s rally (Panel (a)) and days since Clinton’s rally (Panel (b)). The figure plots the estimated coefficient and standard error of the difference in the natural logarithm of number of TV clips about the candidate’s opponent in the media market with the candidate rally relative to other media markets. The data is constructed using scrapped close captioned TV scripts. All estimates include media market and day fixed effects.

Table A1: Media markets with and without presidential rallies

| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| | Trump | Romney | McCain | Clinton | Obama 2012 | Obama 2008 | Mean (2008) |
| Pres. Rep. share (lagged) | -0.005 (0.025) | -0.033 (0.024) | -0.048** (0.022) | -0.060** (0.023) | -0.088*** (0.025) | -0.014 (0.023) | 0.566 |
| Pres. Rep. margin (lagged) | -0.010 (0.050) | -0.066 (0.047) | -0.096** (0.045) | -0.120** (0.046) | -0.176*** (0.051) | -0.027 (0.046) | 0.133 |
| Pres. Turnout (lagged) | -0.013 (0.013) | 0.006 (0.018) | 0.005 (0.015) | -0.008 (0.013) | 0.017 (0.016) | -0.005 (0.015) | 0.417 |
| Log(population) | 1.432*** (0.228) | 1.257*** (0.232) | 1.099*** (0.277) | 1.560*** (0.245) | 1.254*** (0.300) | 1.323*** (0.250) | 13.522 |
| Population density | 0.172*** (0.048) | 0.099 (0.061) | 0.165*** (0.056) | 0.277*** (0.083) | 0.205*** (0.072) | 0.134** (0.056) | 0.164 |
| Prop. Urban Pop. | 0.174*** (0.037) | 0.182*** (0.043) | 0.148*** (0.039) | 0.193*** (0.039) | 0.194*** (0.042) | 0.137*** (0.041) | 0.679 |
| Prop. Male | -0.002 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.005** (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) | 0.493 |
| Median Age | -1.031 (0.911) | -0.296 (0.922) | 0.280 (0.985) | -1.452* (0.865) | -0.852 (0.936) | -0.954 (0.974) | 37.114 |
| Prop. Whites | -0.091*** (0.024) | -0.048 (0.031) | -0.029 (0.029) | -0.091*** (0.027) | -0.045 (0.032) | -0.077*** (0.027) | 0.807 |
| Prop. Blacks | 0.071*** (0.021) | 0.030 (0.029) | 0.015 (0.026) | 0.063*** (0.024) | 0.033 (0.029) | 0.057** (0.025) | 0.105 |
| Prop. Hispanics | 0.070*** (0.019) | 0.034 (0.026) | 0.046* (0.028) | 0.067*** (0.023) | 0.052 (0.034) | 0.049* (0.026) | 0.106 |
| Prop. With High School | -0.034** (0.015) | -0.032** (0.014) | -0.016 (0.019) | -0.039*** (0.014) | -0.028* (0.016) | -0.052*** (0.016) | 0.322 |
| Prop. College Dropouts | 0.001 (0.008) | 0.015** (0.007) | 0.007 (0.008) | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.002 (0.007) | 0.013 (0.008) | 0.211 |
| Prop. College or above | 0.022 (0.016) | 0.034** (0.016) | 0.017 (0.017) | 0.032** (0.015) | 0.040** (0.018) | 0.038** (0.016) | 0.232 |
| Prop. Work in Mining | -0.008** (0.003) | -0.005* (0.003) | -0.005* (0.003) | -0.007*** (0.002) | -0.007** (0.003) | -0.007** (0.003) | 0.009 |
| Prop. Work in Construction | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.000 (0.006) | -0.003 (0.006) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.007* (0.003) | 0.001 (0.005) | 0.076 |
| Prop. Work in Manufacturing | -0.007 (0.014) | -0.017 (0.016) | -0.005 (0.017) | -0.003 (0.016) | 0.003 (0.017) | -0.014 (0.017) | 0.117 |
| Prop. Veterans | 0.001 (0.005) | 0.009 (0.006) | 0.001 (0.006) | -0.008 (0.006) | 0.012 (0.010) | -0.001 (0.006) | 0.107 |
| Prop. Married | -0.012 (0.009) | -0.009 (0.009) | -0.003 (0.009) | -0.014 (0.009) | -0.019* (0.010) | -0.010 (0.010) | 0.514 |
| Log(Median Household Income) | 0.060* (0.035) | 0.135*** (0.035) | 0.088** (0.036) | 0.058* (0.033) | 0.121*** (0.034) | 0.113*** (0.034) | 10.726 |
| Prop. Living in Poverty | -0.006 (0.008) | -0.014** (0.006) | -0.007 (0.006) | -0.005 (0.007) | -0.018** (0.008) | -0.008 (0.006) | 0.110 |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.007 (0.005) | 0.001 (0.004) | 0.005 (0.003) | 0.009* (0.005) | 0.005 (0.007) | -0.002 (0.003) | 0.071 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of media market level observation on presidential rallies. The main dependent variables are mentioned under the column variables. In Columns 1 to 6, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the media market has a rally by Trump, Romney, McCain, Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. The sample is restricted to media markets in swing states. Columns 1 to 6 report the difference between media markets with a candidate's rally relative to media markets without that candidate's rally in the swing state (standard errors in parentheses). The data is constructed using 2009, 2012, and 2016 American Community Survey 5 year estimates. The electoral outcomes (rows 1 to 3) are constructed using David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.

Table A2: Media markets with and without presidential rallies (controlling for pop.)

| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | Trump | Romney | McCain | Clinton | Obama 2012 | Obama 2008 | Mean (2008) |
| Pres. Rep. share (lagged) | 0.054 (0.045) | -0.018 (0.040) | -0.042 (0.030) | -0.024 (0.032) | -0.080** (0.031) | 0.021 (0.035) | 0.566 |
| Pres. Rep. margin (lagged) | 0.109 (0.090) | -0.035 (0.079) | -0.084 (0.059) | -0.047 (0.065) | -0.159** (0.062) | 0.041 (0.070) | 0.133 |
| Pres. Turnout (lagged) | -0.001 (0.021) | 0.041** (0.019) | 0.022 (0.015) | 0.004 (0.019) | 0.038** (0.015) | 0.009 (0.017) | 0.417 |
| Population density | 0.006 (0.050) | -0.076 (0.102) | 0.064 (0.042) | 0.094 (0.066) | 0.079 (0.058) | 0.017 (0.047) | 0.164 |
| Prop. Male | 0.001 (0.003) | -0.001 (0.003) | -0.005** (0.002) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.000 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.002) | 0.493 |
| Median Age | 0.762 (1.275) | 0.650 (1.368) | 0.867 (1.485) | 0.143 (1.395) | -0.106 (1.435) | -1.137 (1.500) | 37.114 |
| Prop. Whites | -0.031 (0.036) | 0.020 (0.037) | 0.018 (0.031) | -0.011 (0.036) | 0.022 (0.037) | -0.043 (0.034) | 0.807 |
| Prop. Blacks | 0.039 (0.035) | -0.015 (0.037) | -0.013 (0.029) | 0.006 (0.035) | -0.005 (0.036) | 0.039 (0.032) | 0.105 |
| Prop. Hispanics | 0.013 (0.012) | -0.050 (0.037) | -0.014 (0.015) | 0.010 (0.017) | -0.035* (0.018) | -0.004 (0.015) | 0.106 |
| Prop. With High School | 0.006 (0.018) | 0.012 (0.013) | 0.024 (0.019) | 0.003 (0.017) | 0.020 (0.015) | -0.029* (0.017) | 0.322 |
| Prop. College Dropouts | -0.001 (0.011) | 0.006 (0.011) | -0.006 (0.009) | 0.003 (0.011) | -0.014* (0.007) | 0.004 (0.012) | 0.211 |
| Prop. College or above | -0.025 (0.015) | 0.001 (0.013) | -0.012 (0.014) | -0.016 (0.016) | 0.010 (0.017) | 0.022* (0.013) | 0.232 |
| Prop. Work in Mining | -0.006* (0.003) | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.003 (0.002) | -0.004 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | 0.009 |
| Prop. Work in Construction | 0.005 (0.003) | -0.008 (0.007) | -0.009 (0.007) | -0.004 (0.004) | -0.011** (0.004) | -0.004 (0.007) | 0.076 |
| Prop. Work in Manufacturing | 0.003 (0.016) | 0.004 (0.014) | 0.011 (0.017) | 0.014 (0.017) | 0.038** (0.018) | -0.004 (0.019) | 0.117 |
| Prop. Veterans | 0.014** (0.005) | 0.016* (0.009) | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.000 (0.008) | 0.018 (0.011) | 0.002 (0.007) | 0.107 |
| Prop. Married | 0.000 (0.015) | -0.002 (0.014) | -0.005 (0.010) | 0.001 (0.011) | -0.009 (0.012) | -0.015 (0.011) | 0.514 |
| Log(Median Household Income) | -0.050 (0.040) | 0.051 (0.037) | -0.008 (0.025) | -0.059 (0.040) | 0.061 (0.039) | 0.032 (0.032) | 10.726 |
| Prop. Living in Poverty | 0.005 (0.011) | -0.010 (0.008) | 0.003 (0.005) | 0.007 (0.009) | -0.015* (0.009) | 0.000 (0.008) | 0.110 |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.006 (0.008) | -0.003 (0.005) | 0.006 (0.005) | 0.009 (0.007) | -0.011 (0.008) | -0.004 (0.006) | 0.071 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of media market level observation on presidential rallies controlling for natural logarithm of population. The main dependent variables are mentioned under the column variables. In Columns 1 to 6, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the media market has a rally by Trump, Romney, McCain, Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. The sample is restricted to media markets in swing states. Columns 1 to 6 report the difference between media markets with a candidate's rally relative to media markets without that candidate's rally in the swing state (standard errors in parentheses). The data is constructed using 2009, 2012, and 2016 American Community Survey 5 year estimates. The electoral outcomes (rows 1 to 3) are constructed using David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.

Table A3: Impact of Romney rallies on voting intention, turnout, and campaign contributions

| Sample Variable | (1) Swing St | (2) Cand DMA | (3) Year DMA | (4) Cand St | (5) Year St | (6) All |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Romney | | | | | |
| Post-Romney | -0.032 (0.022) | -0.006 (0.020) | -0.009 (0.020) | -0.019 (0.024) | -0.019 (0.024) | -0.010 (0.024) |
| Observations | 6,884 | 5,581 | 6,179 | 8,521 | 8,521 | 38,995 |
| Clusters | 65 | 29 | 32 | 82 | 82 | 209 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Romney | 0.034 (0.027) | 0.028 (0.017) | 0.036* (0.019) | 0.026 (0.025) | 0.026 (0.025) | 0.027 (0.020) |
| Observations | 6,883 | 5,580 | 6,178 | 8,520 | 8,520 | 38,993 |
| Clusters | 65 | 29 | 32 | 82 | 82 | 209 |
| Variable | Log(Campaign Contributions to Romney) | | | | | |
| Post-Romney | -0.723 (0.463) | -0.184 (0.283) | -0.200 (0.277) | -0.680 (0.418) | -0.680 (0.418) | -0.267 (0.285) |
| Observations | 378 | 458 | 487 | 552 | 552 | 8,304 |
| Clusters | 25 | 29 | 31 | 36 | 36 | 209 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Romney presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are: the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Romney, the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to turn out to vote, and natural logarithm of campaign contributions received by Romney, respectively. The main independent variable is the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by Romney. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; media markets where the candidate had a rally; media markets where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. In Panels 1 and 2, data is constructed using 2012 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents interviewed 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panel 3, data is constructed using 2010 and 2012 individual campaign contributions files from FEC. The unit of observation is day by media market. Estimations include sample 5 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panels 1 to 3, (i) sample is restricted to media markets in swing states for that election year; (ii) all estimations include media market and date fixed effects.

Table A4: Impact of McCain rallies on voting intention, turnout, and campaign contributions

| Sample Variable | (1) Swing St | (2) Cand DMA | (3) Year DMA | (4) Cand St | (5) Year St | (6) All |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for McCain | | | | | |
| Post-McCain | -0.004 (0.023) | -0.008 (0.021) | -0.012 (0.019) | -0.006 (0.021) | -0.012 (0.020) | -0.007 (0.016) |
| Observations | 6,762 | 7,048 | 9,143 | 9,613 | 10,445 | 24,676 |
| Clusters | 76 | 36 | 49 | 106 | 113 | 209 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-McCain | -0.004 (0.014) | 0.006 (0.015) | 0.012 (0.015) | 0.000 (0.014) | 0.000 (0.014) | 0.008 (0.014) |
| Observations | 6,762 | 7,047 | 9,142 | 9,612 | 10,444 | 24,675 |
| Clusters | 76 | 36 | 49 | 106 | 113 | 209 |
| Variable | Log(Campaign Contributions to McCain) | | | | | |
| Post-McCain | 0.242 (0.531) | -0.352 (0.324) | -0.427* (0.237) | 0.256 (0.312) | 0.089 (0.363) | -0.430* (0.222) |
| Observations | 324 | 358 | 579 | 438 | 754 | 5,427 |
| Clusters | 27 | 33 | 46 | 41 | 51 | 207 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for McCain presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are: the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for McCain, the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to turn out to vote, and natural logarithm of campaign contributions received by McCain, respectively. The main independent variable is the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by McCain. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; media markets where the candidate had a rally; media markets where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. In Panels 1 and 2, data is constructed using 2008 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents interviewed 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panel 3, data is constructed using 2006 and 2008 individual campaign contributions files from FEC. The unit of observation is day by media market. Estimations include sample 5 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panels 1 to 3, (i) sample is restricted to media markets in swing states for that election year; (ii) all estimations include media market and date fixed effects.

Table A5: Impact of Clinton rallies on voting intention, turnout, and campaign contributions

| Sample Variable | (1) Swing St | (2) Cand DMA | (3) Year DMA | (4) Cand St | (5) Year St | (6) All |
|-----------------|--|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Clinton | | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | -0.013 (0.024) | -0.032 (0.021) | -0.031 (0.019) | -0.042** (0.020) | -0.047** (0.021) | -0.019 (0.021) |
| Observations | 12,122 | 9,498 | 15,765 | 13,736 | 17,151 | 37,470 |
| Clusters | 72 | 25 | 48 | 76 | 88 | 148 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | -0.024 (0.040) | -0.019 (0.030) | -0.015 (0.028) | -0.007 (0.035) | -0.005 (0.031) | -0.012 (0.026) |
| Observations | 12,122 | 9,498 | 15,765 | 13,736 | 17,151 | 37,470 |
| Clusters | 72 | 25 | 48 | 76 | 88 | 148 |
| Variable | Log(Campaign Contributions to Clinton) | | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | -0.191** (0.083) | -0.068 (0.054) | -0.058 (0.047) | -0.192** (0.078) | -0.175*** (0.063) | -0.154*** (0.050) |
| Observations | 1,625 | 472 | 1,867 | 1,879 | 2,958 | 11,031 |
| Clusters | 38 | 27 | 51 | 44 | 64 | 209 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Clinton presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are: the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Clinton, the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to turn out to vote, and natural logarithm of campaign contributions received by Clinton, respectively. The main independent variable is the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by Clinton. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; media markets where the candidate had a rally; media markets where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. In Panels 1 and 2, data is constructed using 2016 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents interviewed 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panel 3, data is constructed using 2014 and 2016 individual campaign contributions files from FEC. The unit of observation is day by media market. Estimations include sample 5 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panels 1 to 3, (i) sample is restricted to media markets in swing states for that election year; (ii) all estimations include media market and date fixed effects.

Table A6: Impact of Obama rallies on voting intention, turnout, and campaign contributions in 2012

| Sample Variable | (1) Swing St | (2) Cand DMA | (3) Year DMA | (4) Cand St | (5) Year St | (6) All |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Obama | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.027 (0.030) | -0.023 (0.025) | -0.023 (0.025) | -0.027 (0.030) | -0.027 (0.030) | -0.013 (0.031) |
| Observations | 7,577 | 5,059 | 5,059 | 7,577 | 7,577 | 41,820 |
| Clusters | 64 | 21 | 21 | 64 | 64 | 208 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.028 (0.033) | -0.022 (0.026) | -0.022 (0.026) | -0.028 (0.033) | -0.028 (0.033) | -0.014 (0.025) |
| Observations | 7,577 | 5,059 | 5,059 | 7,577 | 7,577 | 41,819 |
| Clusters | 64 | 21 | 21 | 64 | 64 | 208 |
| Variable | Log(Campaign Contributions to Obama) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.109 (0.392) | 0.092 (0.318) | 0.362 (0.279) | -0.172 (0.398) | 0.180 (0.348) | -0.276 (0.255) |
| Observations | 588 | 392 | 752 | 420 | 1,006 | 9,504 |
| Clusters | 25 | 21 | 31 | 22 | 36 | 209 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Obama presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are: the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Obama, the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to turn out to vote, and natural logarithm of campaign contributions received by Obama, respectively. The main independent variable is the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by Obama. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; media markets where the candidate had a rally; media markets where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. In Panels 1 and 2, data is constructed using 2012 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents interviewed 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panel 3, data is constructed using 2010 and 2012 individual campaign contributions files from FEC. The unit of observation is day by media market. Estimations include sample 5 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panels 1 to 3, (i) sample is restricted to media markets in swing states for that election year; (ii) all estimations include media market and date fixed effects.

Table A7: Impact of Obama rallies on voting intention, turnout, and campaign contributions in 2008

| Sample Variable | (1) Swing St | (2) Cand DMA | (3) Year DMA | (4) Cand St | (5) Year St | (6) All |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Obama | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.012 (0.027) | -0.011 (0.020) | -0.011 (0.020) | -0.019 (0.027) | -0.019 (0.027) | -0.022 (0.020) |
| Observations | 6,059 | 5,765 | 5,765 | 7,508 | 7,508 | 23,429 |
| Clusters | 75 | 36 | 36 | 94 | 94 | 208 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.023 (0.026) | -0.015 (0.022) | -0.015 (0.022) | -0.016 (0.026) | -0.016 (0.026) | -0.007 (0.022) |
| Observations | 6,059 | 5,765 | 5,765 | 7,508 | 7,508 | 23,428 |
| Clusters | 75 | 36 | 36 | 94 | 94 | 208 |
| Variable | Log(Campaign Contributions to Obama) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.558 (0.370) | -0.400* (0.215) | -0.287 (0.210) | -0.215 (0.393) | -0.349 (0.377) | -0.261 (0.222) |
| Observations | 450 | 545 | 784 | 687 | 835 | 6,644 |
| Clusters | 27 | 36 | 48 | 48 | 52 | 209 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Obama presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are: the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Obama, the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to turn out to vote, and natural logarithm of campaign contributions received by Obama, respectively. The main independent variable is the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by Obama. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; media markets where the candidate had a rally; media markets where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. In Panels 1 and 2, data is constructed using 2008 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents interviewed 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panel 3, data is constructed using 2006 and 2008 individual campaign contributions files from FEC. The unit of observation is day by media market. Estimations include sample 5 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panels 1 to 3, (i) sample is restricted to media markets in swing states for that election year; (ii) all estimations include media market and date fixed effects.

Table A8: Impact of Trump rallies on voting intention and turnout (with individual controls)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Trump | | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.042** (0.018) | 0.049*** (0.016) | 0.043** (0.018) | 0.043** (0.018) | 0.036* (0.018) | 0.031 (0.020) |
| Observations | 9,506 | 8,769 | 13,817 | 9,643 | 15,410 | 35,522 |
| Clusters | 67 | 42 | 45 | 71 | 85 | 145 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.038** (0.016) | 0.016 (0.020) | 0.013 (0.019) | 0.037** (0.016) | 0.036** (0.016) | 0.014 (0.017) |
| Observations | 9,506 | 8,769 | 13,817 | 9,643 | 15,410 | 35,522 |
| Clusters | 67 | 42 | 45 | 71 | 85 | 145 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand DMA | Year DMA | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Trump presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 2, the dependent variables are: the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Trump, and the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to turn out to vote. The main independent variable is the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by Trump. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; media markets where the candidate had a rally; media markets where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2016 wave of CCES survey. All estimates control for individual controls: binary indicators equal to one if the respondent is male, white, black, has completed high school, is a college dropout, is unemployed, has income below median, says that religion is important, and is a homeowner; along with age of the respondent. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents interviewed 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panel 3, data is constructed using 2014 and 2016 individual campaign contributions file from FEC. The unit of observation is day by media market. Estimations include sample 5 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panels 1 to 2, (i) sample is restricted to media markets in swing states for that election year; (ii) all estimations include media market and date fixed effects.

Table A9: Impact of Trump rallies on voting intention and turnout (dropping overlapping rallies)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Trump | | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.045** (0.018) | 0.052*** (0.018) | 0.047** (0.019) | 0.046** (0.018) | 0.037* (0.019) | 0.035* (0.021) |
| Observations | 9,503 | 8,766 | 13,814 | 9,640 | 15,407 | 35,519 |
| Clusters | 67 | 42 | 45 | 71 | 85 | 145 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.051*** (0.017) | 0.026 (0.020) | 0.022 (0.018) | 0.051*** (0.017) | 0.047*** (0.016) | 0.023 (0.017) |
| Observations | 9,503 | 8,766 | 13,814 | 9,640 | 15,407 | 35,519 |
| Clusters | 67 | 42 | 45 | 71 | 85 | 145 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand DMA | Year DMA | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Trump presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 2, the dependent variables are: the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Trump, and the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to turn out to vote. The main independent variable is the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by Trump. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; media markets where the candidate had a rally; media markets where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2016 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents interviewed 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panel 3, data is constructed using 2014 and 2016 individual campaign contributions file from FEC. The unit of observation is day by media market. Estimations include sample 5 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. In Panels 1 to 2, (i) sample is restricted to media markets in swing states for that election year; (ii) all estimations include media market and date fixed effects; (iii) dropping respondents that were interviewed within 10 days of two rallies by Trump in the same media market.

Table A10: Comparing respondents around Republican rallies

| Variable | (1) Post Romney Rally | (2) Post McCain Rally |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Strong Democrat | -0.016 (0.014) | -0.029* (0.015) |
| Weak Democrat | -0.024 (0.016) | -0.032** (0.013) |
| Independents | -0.005 (0.015) | 0.011 (0.007) |
| Weak Republican | 0.040** (0.017) | 0.036*** (0.013) |
| Strong Republican | 0.005 (0.019) | 0.015 (0.022) |
| Voted in prev. election | -0.035 (0.043) | |
| Male | -0.029 (0.020) | 0.020 (0.017) |
| White | -0.033 (0.042) | -0.064* (0.034) |
| Black | -0.002 (0.037) | 0.046** (0.022) |
| Age | -1.259 (1.180) | -2.526*** (0.875) |
| Completed High School | -0.001 (0.042) | 0.015 (0.020) |
| College dropout | -0.012 (0.022) | 0.001 (0.016) |
| Married | -0.061** (0.030) | -0.035* (0.020) |
| Unemployed | 0.014 (0.019) | 0.021** (0.009) |
| Income < Median | -0.021 (0.039) | -0.012 (0.032) |
| Religion Important | -0.059* (0.031) | -0.054*** (0.018) |
| Owns a home | -0.029 (0.030) | -0.015 (0.017) |

Notes: The Table shows estimates of Equation 3 for Republican presidential candidate rallies. Column 1 shows the coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of γ_1 for Romney rallies, and Column 2 shows the coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of γ_1 for McCain rallies, respectively. Column 1 (2) uses 2012 (2008) wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample consists of respondents in a media market interviewed 10 days around the candidate's rally for media markets with a rally, and all observations for media market without a rally. We further restrict attention to (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; and (iii) respondents from the battleground states.

Table A11: Comparing respondents around Democratic rallies

| Variable | (1) Post Clinton Rally | (2) Post Obama Rally (2012) | (3) Post Obama Rally (2008) |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Strong Democrat | -0.009 (0.018) | 0.004 (0.019) | -0.029** (0.014) |
| Weak Democrat | -0.047*** (0.016) | -0.045** (0.019) | -0.012 (0.014) |
| Independents | -0.015 (0.012) | -0.003 (0.018) | -0.014 (0.010) |
| Weak Republican | 0.010 (0.014) | 0.010 (0.026) | -0.006 (0.020) |
| Strong Republican | 0.061** (0.030) | 0.034* (0.017) | 0.061*** (0.018) |
| Voted in prev. election | -0.003 (0.031) | 0.032 (0.056) | |
| Male | 0.009 (0.020) | -0.015 (0.026) | 0.030 (0.027) |
| White | -0.079 (0.059) | -0.062 (0.066) | -0.048* (0.026) |
| Black | 0.062** (0.024) | -0.028 (0.034) | 0.051** (0.020) |
| Age | 0.712 (0.974) | -0.575 (1.808) | -1.307 (0.897) |
| Completed High School | 0.003 (0.023) | -0.085*** (0.028) | 0.002 (0.029) |
| College dropout | -0.016 (0.011) | 0.030 (0.030) | 0.007 (0.023) |
| Married | -0.054** (0.022) | -0.024 (0.052) | -0.039* (0.021) |
| Unemployed | 0.014 (0.012) | 0.013 (0.022) | 0.014 (0.010) |
| Income < Median | 0.012 (0.028) | -0.138** (0.058) | -0.031 (0.047) |
| Religion Important | -0.016 (0.014) | -0.023 (0.040) | -0.056** (0.024) |
| Owns a home | 0.011 (0.020) | -0.133*** (0.022) | 0.012 (0.028) |

Notes: The Table shows estimates of Equation 3 for Democratic presidential candidate rallies. Columns 1 to 3 show the coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of γ_1 for Clinton rallies, Obama rallies in 2012 and Obama rallies in 2008, respectively. Columns 1 to 3 use 2016, 2012, and 2008 waves of CCES survey, respectively. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample consists of respondents in a media market interviewed 10 days around the candidate's rally for media markets with a rally, and all observations for media market without a rally. We further restrict attention to (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for either Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; and (iii) respondents from the battleground states.

Table A12: Impact of Republican rallies on Intention to Vote for Republican Candidates (at County level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Trump | | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.031 (0.025) | 0.020 (0.031) | 0.011 (0.023) | 0.032 (0.025) | 0.014 (0.026) | 0.006 (0.028) |
| Observations | 9,506 | 3,830 | 6,159 | 9,643 | 15,410 | 35,522 |
| Clusters | 552 | 60 | 76 | 585 | 726 | 1953 |
| | Intention to Vote for Romney | | | | | |
| Post-Romney | -0.039 (0.059) | 0.011 (0.054) | 0.013 (0.059) | 0.006 (0.066) | 0.006 (0.066) | 0.000 (0.065) |
| Observations | 6,884 | 2,298 | 2,776 | 8,521 | 8,521 | 38,995 |
| Clusters | 507 | 52 | 65 | 646 | 646 | 2464 |
| | Intention to Vote for McCain | | | | | |
| Post-McCain | 0.033 (0.049) | 0.016 (0.048) | 0.007 (0.047) | 0.028 (0.049) | 0.023 (0.049) | 0.023 (0.046) |
| Observations | 6,762 | 1,961 | 3,102 | 9,613 | 10,445 | 24,676 |
| Clusters | 598 | 54 | 86 | 998 | 1075 | 2366 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand Cnty | Year Cnty | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Republican presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Trump, Romney, and McCain, respectively. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Trump, Romney, and McCain rally, respectively. All estimations include county and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; counties where the candidate had a rally; counties where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A13: Impact of Democratic rallies on Intention to Vote for Democratic Candidates (at County level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Clinton | | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | 0.027 (0.040) | 0.005 (0.034) | 0.006 (0.031) | 0.035 (0.039) | 0.034 (0.041) | 0.040 (0.042) |
| Observations | 12,122 | 4,418 | 6,758 | 13,736 | 17,151 | 37,470 |
| Clusters | 653 | 35 | 79 | 610 | 879 | 2124 |
| | Intention to Vote for Obama (2012) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.105*** (0.030) | -0.115*** (0.030) | -0.111*** (0.029) | -0.105*** (0.030) | -0.103*** (0.032) | -0.110*** (0.027) |
| Observations | 7,577 | 1,924 | 3,518 | 7,577 | 10,256 | 41,820 |
| Clusters | 518 | 30 | 64 | 518 | 667 | 2493 |
| | Intention to Vote for Obama (2008) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.008 (0.051) | 0.019 (0.051) | 0.008 (0.050) | -0.018 (0.049) | -0.029 (0.052) | -0.022 (0.047) |
| Observations | 6,059 | 1,969 | 2,699 | 7,508 | 9,572 | 23,429 |
| Clusters | 576 | 52 | 86 | 787 | 1038 | 2324 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand Cnty | Year Cnty | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Democratic presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama rally in 2008, respectively. All estimations include county and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; counties where the candidate had a rally; counties where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A14: Impact of Republican rallies on Intention to Vote (Turn Out) (at County level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.057* (0.029) | 0.052 (0.032) | 0.043* (0.025) | 0.040 (0.024) | 0.044* (0.024) | 0.032 (0.027) |
| Observations | 3,830 | 6,159 | 9,643 | 15,410 | 9,506 | 35,522 |
| Clusters | 60 | 76 | 585 | 726 | 552 | 1953 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Romney | 0.027 (0.073) | 0.043 (0.072) | 0.035 (0.079) | 0.035 (0.079) | 0.049 (0.091) | 0.037 (0.079) |
| Observations | 2,298 | 2,776 | 8,520 | 8,520 | 6,883 | 38,993 |
| Clusters | 52 | 65 | 646 | 646 | 507 | 2464 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-McCain | 0.016 (0.024) | -0.003 (0.019) | 0.014 (0.020) | 0.013 (0.020) | 0.012 (0.020) | 0.011 (0.017) |
| Observations | 1,961 | 3,102 | 9,612 | 10,444 | 6,762 | 24,675 |
| Clusters | 54 | 86 | 998 | 1075 | 598 | 2366 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand Cnty | Year Cnty | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Republican presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for a presidential candidate. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Trump, Romney, and McCain rally, respectively. All estimations include county and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; counties where the candidate had a rally; counties where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A15: Impact of Democratic rallies on Intention to Vote (Turn Out) (at County level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | 0.029 (0.044) | 0.016 (0.047) | 0.014 (0.047) | 0.016 (0.045) | 0.042 (0.044) | 0.031 (0.046) |
| Observations | 4,418 | 6,758 | 13,736 | 17,151 | 12,122 | 37,470 |
| Clusters | 35 | 79 | 610 | 879 | 653 | 2124 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.010 (0.050) | -0.005 (0.052) | -0.019 (0.050) | -0.020 (0.049) | -0.019 (0.050) | -0.008 (0.049) |
| Observations | 1,924 | 3,518 | 7,577 | 10,256 | 7,577 | 41,819 |
| Clusters | 30 | 64 | 518 | 667 | 518 | 2493 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | 0.025 (0.030) | 0.048 (0.032) | 0.056 (0.036) | 0.054 (0.038) | 0.065* (0.038) | 0.056 (0.036) |
| Observations | 1,969 | 2,699 | 7,508 | 9,571 | 6,059 | 23,428 |
| Clusters | 52 | 86 | 787 | 1038 | 576 | 2324 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand Cnty | Year Cnty | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Democratic presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for a presidential candidate. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama rally in 2008, respectively. All estimations include county and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; counties where the candidate had a rally; counties where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A16: Impact of Republican rallies on Intention to Vote for Republican Candidates (at Commuting Zone level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Trump | | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.001 (0.026) | 0.030 (0.026) | 0.020 (0.024) | 0.003 (0.027) | -0.007 (0.024) | 0.015 (0.025) |
| Observations | 9,506 | 7,228 | 11,436 | 9,643 | 15,410 | 35,522 |
| Clusters | 167 | 52 | 58 | 185 | 220 | 561 |
| | Intention to Vote for Romney | | | | | |
| Post-Romney | -0.042** (0.018) | -0.022 (0.019) | -0.030 (0.020) | -0.035* (0.021) | -0.035* (0.021) | -0.042* (0.024) |
| Observations | 6,884 | 4,357 | 4,784 | 8,521 | 8,521 | 38,995 |
| Clusters | 140 | 38 | 42 | 174 | 174 | 680 |
| | Intention to Vote for McCain | | | | | |
| Post-McCain | 0.021 (0.025) | -0.017 (0.023) | -0.020 (0.024) | 0.020 (0.024) | 0.019 (0.024) | 0.004 (0.021) |
| Observations | 6,762 | 4,509 | 5,757 | 9,613 | 10,445 | 24,676 |
| Clusters | 158 | 45 | 64 | 276 | 293 | 672 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand CZ | Year CZ | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Republican presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Trump, Romney, and McCain, respectively. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Trump, Romney, and McCain rally, respectively. All estimations include commuting zone and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; commuting zone where the candidate had a rally; commuting zone where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A17: Impact of Democratic rallies on Intention to Vote for Democratic Candidates (at Commuting Zone level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Clinton | | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | -0.000 (0.024) | -0.031 (0.030) | -0.028 (0.027) | -0.029 (0.025) | -0.027 (0.027) | -0.013 (0.025) |
| Observations | 12,122 | 7,687 | 12,660 | 13,736 | 17,151 | 37,470 |
| Clusters | 178 | 28 | 61 | 176 | 244 | 585 |
| | Intention to Vote for Obama (2012) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.033 (0.032) | -0.024 (0.030) | -0.008 (0.037) | -0.033 (0.032) | -0.024 (0.039) | -0.005 (0.040) |
| Observations | 7,577 | 3,663 | 6,414 | 7,577 | 10,256 | 41,820 |
| Clusters | 145 | 24 | 42 | 145 | 179 | 684 |
| | Intention to Vote for Obama (2008) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.026 (0.022) | -0.037* (0.020) | -0.027 (0.019) | -0.032 (0.021) | -0.043* (0.023) | -0.034** (0.015) |
| Observations | 6,059 | 4,155 | 5,155 | 7,508 | 9,572 | 23,429 |
| Clusters | 156 | 42 | 64 | 221 | 290 | 671 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand CZ | Year CZ | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Republican presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama rally in 2008, respectively. All estimations include commuting zone and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; commuting zone where the candidate had a rally; commuting zone where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A18: Impact of Republican rallies on Intention to Vote (Turn Out) (at Commuting Zone level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.041* (0.024) | 0.054** (0.023) | 0.067*** (0.020) | 0.063*** (0.018) | 0.068*** (0.020) | 0.043* (0.023) |
| Observations | 7,228 | 11,436 | 9,643 | 15,410 | 9,506 | 35,522 |
| Clusters | 52 | 58 | 185 | 220 | 167 | 561 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Romney | 0.014 (0.022) | 0.018 (0.023) | 0.031 (0.031) | 0.031 (0.031) | 0.036 (0.033) | 0.029 (0.024) |
| Observations | 4,357 | 4,784 | 8,520 | 8,520 | 6,883 | 38,993 |
| Clusters | 38 | 42 | 174 | 174 | 140 | 680 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-McCain | -0.002 (0.012) | 0.002 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.015) | 0.006 (0.014) | 0.005 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.013) |
| Observations | 4,509 | 5,757 | 9,612 | 10,444 | 6,762 | 24,675 |
| Clusters | 45 | 64 | 276 | 293 | 158 | 672 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand CZ | Year CZ | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Republican presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for a presidential candidate. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Trump, Romney, and McCain rally, respectively. All estimations include commuting zone and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; commuting zone where the candidate had a rally; commuting zone where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A19: Impact of Democratic rallies on Intention to Vote (Turn Out) (at Commuting Zone level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | -0.004 (0.033) | -0.005 (0.036) | -0.015 (0.033) | 0.001 (0.035) | 0.005 (0.046) | -0.003 (0.032) |
| Observations | 7,687 | 12,660 | 13,736 | 17,151 | 12,122 | 37,470 |
| Clusters | 28 | 61 | 176 | 244 | 178 | 585 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.020 (0.027) | -0.027 (0.032) | -0.032 (0.036) | -0.033 (0.035) | -0.032 (0.036) | -0.022 (0.030) |
| Observations | 3,663 | 6,414 | 7,577 | 10,256 | 7,577 | 41,819 |
| Clusters | 24 | 42 | 145 | 179 | 145 | 684 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | | |
| Post-Obama | -0.004 (0.022) | 0.008 (0.021) | 0.018 (0.025) | 0.017 (0.025) | 0.019 (0.025) | 0.018 (0.022) |
| Observations | 4,155 | 5,155 | 7,508 | 9,571 | 6,059 | 23,428 |
| Clusters | 42 | 64 | 221 | 290 | 156 | 671 |
| Sample | Swing St | Cand CZ | Year CZ | Cand St | Year St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Democratic presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for a presidential candidate. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama rally in 2008, respectively. All estimations include commuting zone and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 6 consider the following samples: swing states for that election; commuting zone where the candidate had a rally; commuting zone where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A20: Impact of Republican rallies on voting intention (at State level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Intention to Vote for Trump | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.050* | 0.050** | 0.056** | 0.055** | 0.058** |
| | (0.028) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Observations | 9,643 | 15,410 | 22,271 | 29,707 | 35,522 |
| Clusters | 15 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| | Intention to Vote for Romney | | | | |
| Post-Romney | 0.019 | 0.019 | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.013 |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Observations | 8,521 | 8,521 | 23,718 | 30,508 | 38,995 |
| Clusters | 11 | 11 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| | Intention to Vote for McCain | | | | |
| Post-McCain | -0.012 | -0.013 | -0.014 | -0.013 | -0.008 |
| | (0.029) | (0.028) | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.022) |
| Observations | 9,613 | 10,445 | 15,908 | 19,733 | 24,676 |
| Clusters | 17 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| Sample | Cand St | Year St | R St | R/D St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Republican presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Trump, Romney, and McCain, respectively. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Trump, Romney, and McCain rally, respectively. All estimations include state and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 5 consider the following samples: states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states with a Republican rally since 2008; states with a presidential rally since 2008; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A21: Impact of Democratic rallies on voting intention (at State level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|--------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Intention to Vote for Clinton | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | -0.001 (0.022) | -0.005 (0.021) | 0.003 (0.019) | 0.001 (0.019) | 0.002 (0.018) |
| Observations | 13,736 | 17,151 | 24,697 | 30,896 | 37,470 |
| Clusters | 13 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote for Obama (2012) | | | | |
| Post-Obama | 0.001 (0.025) | 0.012 (0.033) | 0.010 (0.029) | 0.009 (0.029) | 0.011 (0.028) |
| Observations | 10,373 | 13,065 | 28,979 | 36,170 | 45,116 |
| Clusters | 9 | 11 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote for Obama (2008) | | | | |
| Post-Obama | 0.067* (0.031) | 0.058** (0.026) | 0.056** (0.026) | 0.053** (0.025) | 0.049* (0.025) |
| Observations | 7,508 | 9,572 | 15,071 | 18,482 | 23,429 |
| Clusters | 13 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| Sample | Cand St | Year St | D St | R/D St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Democratic presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variables are the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. All estimations include state and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 5 consider the following samples: states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states with a Democratic rally since 2008; states with a presidential rally since 2008; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A22: Impact of Republican rallies on turnout (at State level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | |
| Post-Trump | 0.027* | 0.031** | 0.019 | 0.018 | 0.020 |
| | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.019) | (0.023) | (0.021) |
| Observations | 9,643 | 15,410 | 22,271 | 29,707 | 35,522 |
| Clusters | 15 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | |
| Post-Romney | -0.015 | -0.015 | 0.002 | 0.010 | 0.008 |
| | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.030) | (0.029) | (0.028) |
| Observations | 8,520 | 8,520 | 23,716 | 30,506 | 38,993 |
| Clusters | 11 | 11 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| Variable | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | |
| Post-McCain | 0.006 | 0.009 | 0.012 | 0.013 | 0.011 |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| Observations | 9,612 | 10,444 | 15,907 | 19,732 | 24,675 |
| Clusters | 17 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| Sample | Cand St | Year St | R St | R/D St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Republican presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for a presidential candidate. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a Trump, Romney, and McCain rally, respectively. All estimations include state and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 5 consider the following samples: states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states with a Republican rally since 2008; states with a presidential rally since 2008; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A23: Impact of Democratic rallies on turnout (at State level)

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|--------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | |
| Post-Clinton | 0.002 (0.022) | 0.004 (0.018) | 0.014 (0.020) | 0.017 (0.022) | 0.016 (0.021) |
| Observations | 13,736 | 17,151 | 24,697 | 30,896 | 37,470 |
| Clusters | 13 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | |
| Post-Obama | 0.006 (0.023) | 0.010 (0.022) | 0.008 (0.019) | 0.010 (0.018) | 0.010 (0.018) |
| Observations | 10,372 | 13,064 | 28,977 | 36,168 | 45,114 |
| Clusters | 9 | 11 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | |
| Post-Obama | 0.007 (0.024) | 0.005 (0.023) | 0.004 (0.023) | 0.007 (0.022) | 0.004 (0.023) |
| Observations | 7,508 | 9,571 | 15,070 | 18,481 | 23,428 |
| Clusters | 13 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 51 |
| Sample | Cand St | Year St | D St | R/D St | All |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for Democratic presidential rallies. In Panels 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for a presidential candidate. In Panels 1 to 3, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a rally by Clinton, Obama in 2012, and Obama in 2008, respectively. All estimations include state and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. Columns 1 to 5 consider the following samples: states where the candidate had a rally; states where the candidate or opponent had a rally; states with a Democratic rally since 2008; states with a presidential rally since 2008; all respondents, respectively. The data is constructed using 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews.

Table A24: Heterogeneous Impact of Presidential rallies on Voting Intention for Candidates

| Candidate Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | Romney | McCain | Clinton | Obama'12 | Obama'08 |
| | Voting Intention for Candidate | | | | |
| Post-Candidate * Strong DEM | -0.005 (0.011) | -0.011 (0.012) | -0.019 (0.018) | -0.030** (0.015) | 0.018 (0.019) |
| Post-Candidate * Weak DEM | -0.035** (0.013) | 0.039 (0.025) | 0.030 (0.028) | -0.013 (0.024) | -0.044 (0.043) |
| Post-Candidate * Independent | -0.095** (0.040) | -0.021 (0.046) | -0.031 (0.038) | 0.068 (0.082) | -0.082 (0.072) |
| Post-Candidate * Weak REP | 0.016 (0.015) | -0.019 (0.024) | -0.023 (0.019) | 0.004 (0.025) | 0.043 (0.029) |
| Post-Candidate * Strong REP | 0.005 (0.012) | -0.001 (0.017) | -0.026* (0.015) | -0.043*** (0.014) | -0.001 (0.010) |
| Observations | 10,595 | 8,000 | 11,964 | 11,989 | 7,172 |
| R-squared | 0.765 | 0.702 | 0.699 | 0.757 | 0.700 |
| Clusters | 86 | 87 | 72 | 85 | 86 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for presidential rallies for voters with different political ideology. The dependent variable is the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to vote for the candidate. The main independent variables are the interactions of binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a candidate's rally with (i) respondents who categorize themselves as Strong Democrats, (ii) respondents who categorize themselves either as weak or leaning Democrats, (iii) respondents who categorize themselves as independents, (iv) respondents who categorize themselves either as weak or leaning Republicans, and (v) respondents who categorize themselves as Strong Republicans. All estimations include media market and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. The data is constructed using 2016 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents in the swing states.

Table A25: Heterogeneous Impact of Presidential rallies on Intention to Vote (Turn Out)

| Candidate Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Romney | McCain | Clinton | Obama'12 | Obama'08 |
| | Intention to Vote (Turn Out) | | | | |
| Post-Candidate * Strong DEM | 0.008 (0.038) | -0.050** (0.024) | 0.010 (0.027) | -0.029 (0.041) | -0.055* (0.033) |
| Post-Candidate * Weak DEM | 0.008 (0.041) | -0.032 (0.024) | -0.051 (0.048) | -0.014 (0.037) | 0.057* (0.032) |
| Post-Candidate * Independent | -0.031 (0.118) | 0.051 (0.054) | -0.039 (0.083) | 0.007 (0.106) | -0.010 (0.061) |
| Post-Candidate * Weak REP | 0.022 (0.029) | -0.068*** (0.023) | -0.024 (0.056) | -0.022 (0.027) | -0.022 (0.025) |
| Post-Candidate * Strong REP | 0.077** (0.032) | -0.035* (0.018) | 0.004 (0.044) | -0.091** (0.040) | -0.037 (0.026) |
| Observations | 10,595 | 8,000 | 11,964 | 11,989 | 7,172 |
| R-squared | 0.765 | 0.702 | 0.699 | 0.757 | 0.700 |
| Clusters | 86 | 87 | 72 | 85 | 86 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for presidential rallies for voters with different political ideology. The dependent variable is the binary indicator equal to one if the respondent intends to turnout to vote. The main independent variables are the interactions of binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a candidate's rally with (i) respondents who categorize themselves as Strong Democrats, (ii) respondents who categorize themselves either as weak or lean Democrats, (iii) respondents who categorize themselves as independents, (iv) respondents who categorize themselves either as weak or lean Republicans, and (v) respondents who categorize themselves as Strong Republicans. All estimations include media market and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. The data is constructed using 2016 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents in the swing states.

Table A26: Impact of rallies in 2008 on the valence of candidate and opponent

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | McCain is: | | | Obama is: | | |
| | Honest | Knowledgeable | Experienced | Honest | Knowledgeable | Experienced |
| Post-McCain | 0.007 (0.028) | 0.066** (0.027) | 0.021 (0.024) | 0.027 (0.028) | 0.032 (0.024) | -0.019 (0.024) |
| Observations | 6,292 | 6,526 | 6,578 | 6,473 | 6,526 | 6,535 |
| Mean | 0.522 | 0.685 | 0.884 | 0.558 | 0.685 | 0.487 |
| Clusters | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 |

| Variable | Obama is: | | | McCain is: | | |
|--------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| | Honest | Knowledgeable | Experienced | Honest | Knowledgeable | Experienced |
| Post-Obama | -0.005 (0.021) | 0.013 (0.036) | -0.037 (0.034) | 0.016 (0.037) | 0.002 (0.019) | -0.031* (0.018) |
| Observations | 5,801 | 5,840 | 5,842 | 5,641 | 5,840 | 5,882 |
| Mean | 0.559 | 0.684 | 0.488 | 0.521 | 0.682 | 0.882 |
| Clusters | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of Equation 1 for presidential rallies in 2008. In Panel 1, the main dependent variables are binary indicators equal to one if the respondent thinks that McCain is honest, McCain is knowledgeable, McCain is experienced, Obama is honest, Obama is knowledgeable, and Obama is experienced, respectively. In Panel 2, the main dependent variables are binary indicators equal to one if the respondent thinks that Obama is honest, Obama is knowledgeable, Obama is experienced, McCain is honest, McCain is knowledgeable, and McCain is experienced, respectively. In Panels 1 and 2, the main independent variables are the binary indicator equal to one for respondents interviewed after a McCain, and Obama rally, respectively. All estimations include media market and date fixed effects. All estimations include sample 10 days around the rally for media markets with a rally. The data is constructed using 2008 wave of CCES survey. All estimates are weighted by the common content weight variable. The sample is further restricted to: (i) observations where respondent intends to vote for one of the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates; (ii) media markets with more than 50 interviews; (iii) respondents in the swing states.

Table A27: Impact of Trump rallies on DMA electoral outcomes

| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Log(Votes for REP) | | | | | |
| Trump Rally $\leq X$ days ago | 0.088 (0.055) | 0.077* (0.039) | 0.068** (0.032) | 0.066** (0.030) | 0.065** (0.030) | 0.069** (0.030) |
| Trump Rally $> X$ days ago | 0.039* (0.023) | 0.037 (0.023) | 0.035 (0.024) | 0.035 (0.024) | 0.034 (0.024) | 0.033 (0.024) |
| Lagged Log(Votes for REP) | 0.961*** (0.010) | 0.961*** (0.010) | 0.961*** (0.010) | 0.961*** (0.010) | 0.960*** (0.010) | 0.958*** (0.010) |
| Observations | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| X | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Difference | 0.049 (0.051) | 0.040 (0.031) | 0.034 (0.024) | 0.031 (0.022) | 0.031 (0.020) | 0.036* (0.020) |
| VARIABLES | | | | | | |
| | Log(Total Votes) | | | | | |
| Trump Rally $\leq X$ days ago | 0.066** (0.030) | 0.038 (0.027) | 0.049** (0.021) | 0.048** (0.020) | 0.049** (0.019) | 0.060*** (0.019) |
| Trump Rally $> X$ days ago | 0.021 (0.015) | 0.023 (0.015) | 0.017 (0.015) | 0.016 (0.015) | 0.014 (0.015) | 0.010 (0.015) |
| Lagged Log(Total Votes) | 0.996*** (0.007) | 0.996*** (0.007) | 0.996*** (0.007) | 0.995*** (0.007) | 0.995*** (0.007) | 0.992*** (0.007) |
| Observations | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| X | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Difference | 0.044 (0.028) | 0.015 (0.023) | 0.032* (0.018) | 0.031* (0.017) | 0.035** (0.017) | 0.050*** (0.016) |

Notes: The Table shows OLS estimation of effect of Trump rallies on general election outcomes. The unit of observation is media market. In Panel 1, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total votes for Trump in the 2016 presidential elections. In Panel 2, the dependent variable is the total votes in the media market. The variable $Trump\ Rally \leq X\ days\ ago$ is equal to one if Trump held a rally in the media area less than (or equal to) X days before the general elections, and is zero otherwise. The variable $Trump\ Rally > X\ days\ ago$ is equal to one if Trump held a rally in the media area more than X days before the general elections, and is zero otherwise. X takes on values in the increment of one from 2 to 7 in Columns 2 to 6. The sample is restricted to media markets within swing states.