

ONLINE APPENDIX

A Appendix Tables: OPM

Table A1: Political Cycles Among Political Appointees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Employee is Democrat	Employee is Democrat	Employee is Republican	Employee is Republican	Hire is Democrat	Hire is Democrat	Hire is Republican	Hire is Republican
<i>Panel A: Presidential Appointments</i>								
President Democrat	0.278*** (0.021)	0.258*** (0.020)			0.457*** (0.027)	0.483*** (0.030)		
President Republican			0.267*** (0.020)	0.246*** (0.019)			0.452*** (0.026)	0.459*** (0.029)
Observations	19,484	19,483	19,484	19,483	1,160	1,097	1,160	1,097
Effect size	+63%	+58%	+155%	+143%	+137%	+141%	+395%	+408%
<i>Panel B: Senior Executive Noncareer</i>								
President Democrat	0.568*** (0.020)	0.570*** (0.020)			0.544*** (0.019)	0.561*** (0.019)		
President Republican			0.531*** (0.020)	0.541*** (0.020)			0.508*** (0.019)	0.525*** (0.019)
Observations	22,499	22,494	22,499	22,494	2,259	2,206	2,259	2,206
Effect size	+186%	+186%	+889%	+906%	+175%	+182%	+672%	+736%
<i>Panel C: Schedule C Appointees</i>								
President Democrat	0.565*** (0.015)	0.559*** (0.015)			0.594*** (0.014)	0.587*** (0.014)		
President Republican			0.516*** (0.016)	0.510*** (0.015)			0.542*** (0.014)	0.535*** (0.014)
Observations	40,788	40,786	40,788	40,786	4,039	3,991	4,039	3,991
Effect size	+203%	+201%	+714%	+706%	+230%	+227%	+901%	+898%
Bureau FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Regression estimates of the party alignment effect. The unit of observation is the individual-quarter. The sample covers all political appointments between 1997-2019. Panel A restricts the sample to presidential appointments. Panel B restricts the sample to non-career senior executive service officers. Panel C restricts the sample to all Schedule C appointees. All regressions include a linear time trend. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the civil servant is a Democrat. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the civil servant is a Republican. Columns 5-8 restrict the sample to new civil service entrants. New entrants are defined as individuals we observe in that quarter in the OPM data, but not in the previous quarter. In columns 5-6, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the new entrant is a Democrat. In columns 7-8, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the new entrant is a Republican. *President Democrat* is a dummy that is 1 if the president is a Democrat, and 0 otherwise. *President Republican* is a dummy that is 1 if the president is a Republican, and 0 otherwise. Bureau FEs are fixed effects for departmental sub-units (agency/subelement). The effect size is defined as the estimated coefficient divided by the mean of the dependent variable when the president is Republican (columns 1, 2, 5, and 6) or Democrat (columns 3, 4, 7, and 8). The standard errors are clustered at the individual-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A2: Political Cycles Among Civil Servants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Employee is Democrat	Employee is Democrat	Employee is Republican	Employee is Republican	Hire is Democrat	Hire is Democrat	Hire is Republican	Hire is Republican
<i>Panel A: Competitive Career Service</i>								
President Democrat	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)			0.010*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)		
President Republican			0.000 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)			0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Observations	24,800,987	24,800,985	24,800,987	24,800,985	678,223	678,216	678,223	678,216
Effect size	-0.4%	-0.7%	+0.0%	-0.2%	+2.2%	+0.7%	+0.1%	-0.5%
<i>Panel B: Senior Executive Career</i>								
President Democrat	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)			0.050*** (0.014)	0.037*** (0.014)		
President Republican			0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)			0.039*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Observations	186,118	186,116	186,118	186,116	5,754	5,718	5,754	5,718
Effect size	-0.2%	-0.5%	+0.6%	-0.4%	+8.6%	+6.4%	+18.5%	+11.6%
<i>Panel C: Excepted Service - Nonpolitical</i>								
President Democrat	0.001*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)			0.014*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)		
President Republican			0.002*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)			0.009*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Observations	13,705,391	13,705,382	13,705,391	13,705,382	743,673	743,651	743,673	743,651
Effect size	+0.3%	+0.4%	+0.8%	+1.1%	+3.1%	+2.0%	+3.7%	+2.0%
Bureau FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Regression estimates of the party alignment effect. The unit of observation is the individual-quarter. The sample covers all (non-political) civil servants between 1997-2019. Panel A restricts the sample to the competitive career service. Panel B restricts the sample to career senior executive service officers. Panel C restricts the sample to all employees in the non-political excepted service. All regressions include a linear time trend. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the civil servant is a Democrat. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the civil servant is a Republican. Columns 5-8 restrict the sample to new civil service entrants. New entrants are defined as individuals we observe in that quarter in the OPM data, but not in the previous quarter. In columns 5-6, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the new entrant is a Democrat. In columns 7-8, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the new entrant is a Republican. *President Democrat* is a dummy that is 1 if the president is a Democrat, and 0 otherwise. *President Republican* is a dummy that is 1 if the president is a Republican, and 0 otherwise. Bureau FEs are fixed effects for departmental sub-units (agency/subelement). The effect size is defined as the estimated coefficient divided by the mean of the dependent variable when the president is Republican (columns 1, 2, 5, and 6) or Democrat (columns 3, 4, 7, and 8). The standard errors are clustered at the individual-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A3: Democrats are relatively more likely to enter at higher levels of the hierarchy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Is a Democrat					
Hires as SES	0.107*** (0.013)	0.038*** (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)	0.062*** (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	-0.039*** (0.014)
Hires as top GS	0.083*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.059*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.035*** (0.002)
Observations	872,500	868,981	726,582	635,655	632,069	533,666
Effect size SES	23%	8%	1%	10%	0%	6%
Effect size top GS	18%	3%	-2%	9%	-1%	-5%
Year-Quarter FEs	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Year-Quarter-Bureau FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Education FEs	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample	Including Independents			Only Democrats and Republicans		

Notes: Sample is restricted to civil service entrants between 1997-2019. New entrants are defined as individuals we observe in that quarter in the OPM data, but not in the previous quarter. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the individual is a Democrat. *Hired as SES* is a dummy that is 1 if the individual was hired as a senior executive service officer and 0 otherwise. *Hired as top GS* is a dummy that is 1 if the individual was hired at a top general schedule level (grade 13 or above). The omitted category are all other general schedule positions. In columns 4-6, the sample excludes Independents.

B Appendix Tables: Procurement

Table B4: Sample restrictions for procurement contracts

Sample	Contracts left
<u>Sample restrictions</u>	
All service & works contracts (excluding R&D) 2004-2019	7,755,085
Drop Department of Defense	5,015,529
Drop Indefinite Vehicle Contracts (IDV) [3]	4,757,985
Drop lease and rental contracts [1]	3,939,099
Drop contracts performed outside the US [1] [2]	3,709,519
Drop already initialized contracts [3]	3,646,840
<u>Matching</u>	
Drop contracts with anonymous creator	2,845,525
Drop those unmatched to OPM (personnel data)	1,650,297
Drop those unmatched to L2 (voter registration data)	784,282
Drop missing/inconsistent data [1][2][3]	718,362

Notes: Table documents the sample restrictions moving from the full sample to the final analysis sample, reporting the number of remaining contracts after each stage. Sample restrictions follow the standard procurement literature. [1] denotes restrictions from [Decarolis et al. \(2020b\)](#), [2] are restrictions from [Kang and Miller \(2020\)](#), and [3] are restrictions from [Carril et al. \(2021\)](#).

Table B5: Descriptive statistics of matched vs. unmatched contracts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mean	SD	Mean difference matched vs unmatched sample		
			No L2 match	No OPM match	No email
Expected contract size	9.716	2.137	-0.014 (0.067)	-0.120** (0.046)	-2.172*** (0.773)
Expected duration	4.710	1.476	-0.007 (0.053)	-0.135*** (0.038)	-1.001*** (0.418)
Construction	0.210	0.407	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.007)	0.157 (0.115)
Year created	2012.48	4.062	-0.229 (0.158)	-0.648*** (0.122)	-3.304*** (1.266)
Observations	718,362		1,650,297	2,845,525	3,646,840

Notes: Reporting descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation) for contract characteristics of the final sample (columns 1-2). Columns 3-5 show the difference in means between the final sample and different unmatched samples (see [Table B4](#)). In column 3, the comparison is between the final sample and the sample for which party affiliation was missing. In column 4, the comparison is between the matched OPM sample and the sample for which officers could not be linked to the OPM personnel records. In column 5, the comparison is between the sample with email identifiers and the sample for which email identifiers were unavailable.

Table B6: Balance of contract characteristics by political alignment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	No. contracts	Exp. contract size	Exp. duration
Mean of dep. var	4.899	9.716	4.710
Politically aligned	0.164	0.013	-0.024
	(0.195)	(0.027)	(0.022)
Year \times Quarter FEs	Y	Y	Y
Individual FEs	Y	Y	Y
Observations	335,422	774,111	735,881

Notes: Unit of observation in column 1 is the balanced individual-quarter level. Unit of observation in columns 2-3 is the contract-level. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party. *No. contracts* is the number of contracts a procurement officer created in a given quarter. *Exp. contract size* is the (log) expected size (in USD) of the contract at time of award. *Exp. duration* is the (log) expected contract length (in days) at time of award. Standard errors clustered at the individual-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table B7: Alternative measure of procurement performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Cost performance (Decarolis et al. 2020)				
Mean of dep. var	0.918	0.918	0.918	0.918	0.918
Politically aligned	0.005**	0.005***	0.005**		
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Share politically aligned				0.008***	0.007***
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Year x Quarter FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department x Year FEs			Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	702,080	702,080	701,908	702,080	701,908

Notes: Controls comprise: Log(Contract size), Log expected duration, Log total contracts created, NAICs FEs, Product service code FEs and the log initial contract size (expected cost) and expected duration. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Sample includes independents. Standard errors clustered at the individual-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table B8: Broken down by subsamples

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Relative cost overrun		
Mean of dep. var	0.127	0.0737	0.203	0.120
<i>Panel A: Political alignment at time of award</i>				
Politically aligned	-0.010** (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.013*** (0.005)
Observations	718,182	420,539	296,516	673,752
<i>Panel B: Share of contract duration politically aligned</i>				
Share politically aligned	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-
Observations	718,182	420,539	296,516	
Year x Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	<\$25k	≥25k	No overlap
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bureau x Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: No overlap is the sample of contracts where the duration does not span two presidents. Controls comprise: Log(Contract size), Log expected duration, Log total contracts created, NAICs FEs, Product service code FEs and the log initial contract size (expected cost) and expected duration. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Sample includes independents. Standard errors clustered at the individual-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table B9: Alternative thresholds for Winsorizing

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Relative cost overrun				
Mean of dep. var	0.277	0.242	0.187	0.127	0.0966
<i>Panel A: Political alignment at time of award</i>					
Politically aligned	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.007** (0.003)
Observations	718,182	718,182	718,182	718,182	718,182
<i>Panel B: Share of contract duration politically aligned</i>					
Share politically aligned	-0.039*** (0.012)	-0.035*** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.011*** (0.003)
Observations	718,182	718,182	718,182	718,182	718,182
Winsorizing fraction in each tail	0.005	0.01	0.025	0.05	0.075
Year x Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	All	All	All
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bureau x Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Controls comprise: Log(Contract size), Log expected duration, Log total contracts created, NAICs FEs, Product service code FEs and the log initial contract size (expected cost) and expected duration. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Sample includes independents. Standard errors clustered at the individual-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table B10: Alignment effects by presidential transition

	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Relative cost overrun	
Mean of dep. var	0.127	0.127	0.134
<i>Panel A: Political alignment at time of award</i>			
Politically aligned	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)
Observations	718,182	618,737	589,183
<i>Panel B: Share of contract duration politically aligned</i>			
Share politically aligned	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.006)
Observations	718,182	618,737	589,183
Year x Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Full sample	2001-2017	2009-2019
		Bush-Obama	Obama-Trump
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department x Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Controls comprise: Log(Contract size), Log expected duration, Log total contracts created, NAICs FEs, Product service code FEs and the log initial contract size (expected cost) and expected duration. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Sample includes independents. Standard errors clustered at the individual-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

C Appendix Tables: FEVS

Table C11: Morale and mission increase with political alignment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Likely Dem × Dem pres		
	Coeff.	Std. err.	Obs.
<i>Panel A: General morale</i>			
The work I do is important	0.019**	(0.008)	4,075,397
Employees have a feeling of personal empowerment	0.032**	(0.014)	4,025,301
Work gives feeling of personal accomplishment	0.019	(0.011)	4,107,374
Willing to put in the extra effort to get a job done	0.018*	(0.009)	3,959,941
Constantly looking for ways to do my job better	0.024**	(0.009)	3,964,771
I like the kind of work I do	0.006	(0.007)	4,088,489
Morale index	0.027**	(0.013)	3,749,545
<i>Panel B: Identification with mission</i>			
My work relates to the agency's goals and priorities	0.041***	(0.012)	4,091,384
Satisfied with information from organization	0.027**	(0.013)	4,112,801
I know what is expected of me on the job	0.027**	(0.011)	3,947,595
Agency is successful at accomplishing its mission	0.023	(0.018)	3,895,005
Mission index	0.040**	(0.017)	3,819,245
Year FEs	Y		
Sex × Minority × Bureau FEs	Y		

Notes: Each row reports the regression coefficient of *Likely Democrat* × *Democrat President* from Equation 4 for different dependent variables. All dependent variables are on the Likert scale (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree) and standardized to have a mean 0 and SD 1. Column 1 reports the estimated interaction effect of *Likely Democrat* × *Democrat President*. Column 2 reports the associated standard error and Column 3 reports the total number of observations corresponding to the regression. *Morale index* and *Mission index* are averages of all measures in their respective panel. Standard errors are clustered at the Sex × Minority × Department-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$


Table C12: Morale and mission and continuous measure of Democrat leaning

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	$\Delta \text{Pr}(\text{Dem}) \times \text{Dem pres}$		
	Coeff.	Std. err.	Obs.
<i>Panel A: General morale</i>			
The work I do is important	0.039***	(0.014)	4,075,397
Employees have a feeling of personal empowerment	0.060**	(0.028)	4,025,301
Work gives feeling of personal accomplishment	0.036	(0.024)	4,107,374
Willing to put in the extra effort to get a job done	0.035**	(0.017)	3,959,941
Constantly looking for ways to do my job better	0.047***	(0.016)	3,964,771
I like the kind of work I do	0.008	(0.013)	4,088,489
Morale index	0.051**	(0.032)	3,819,245
<i>Panel B: Identification with mission</i>			
My work relates to the agency's goals and priorities	0.080***	(0.023)	4,091,384
Satisfied with information from organization	0.045*	(0.027)	4,112,801
I know what is expected of me on the job	0.053**	(0.021)	3,947,595
Agency is successful at accomplishing its mission	0.049	(0.036)	3,895,005
Mission index	0.079**	(0.032)	3,819,245
Year FEs	Y		
Sex \times Minority \times Bureau FEs	Y		

Notes: Each row reports the regression coefficient of *Likely Democrat* \times *Democrat President* from Equation 4 for different dependent variables. All dependent variables are on the Likert scale (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree) and standardized to have a mean 0 and SD 1. Column 1 reports the estimated interaction effect of $\Delta \text{Pr}(\text{Dem}) \times \text{Democrat President}$. Column 2 reports the associated standard error and Column 3 reports the total number of observations corresponding to the regression. *Morale index* and *Mission index* are averages of all measures in their respective panel. Standard errors are clustered at the Sex \times Minority \times Department-level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$


D Appendix Figures: OPM

Figure D1: Number of employees in the OPM over time




Notes: Showing the number of OPM individuals over time (in 1,000). Black line denotes all employees and the gray line denotes employees for whom names were not redacted. Note that since the OPM does not provide unique identifiers after 2014, we cannot compute the number of unique employees among those with redacted names.

Figure D2: Share of Federal Employees Matched to Partisan Affiliation Data




Notes: Share of OPM individuals with non-redacted names who could be matched to the L2 voter registration data over time.


Figure D3: Partisan Affiliation of Political Appointees – By Type



(a) Presidential Appointments




(b) Senior Executive Service - Noncareer




(c) Schedule C

Notes: Party shares for different types of political appointments over time. Panel A shows presidential appointments. Panel B shows non-career senior executive service. Panel C shows Schedule C appointments. Dashed vertical lines mark presidential terms.


Figure D4: Partisan Affiliation of Civil Servants – By Type



(a) Competitive Career Service




(b) Senior Executive Service - Career



(c) Excepted Service - Nonpolitical


Notes: Party shares for different types of (non-political) civil servants over time. Panel A shows the competitive career service. Panel B shows the career senior executive service. Panel C shows the non-political excepted service. Dashed vertical lines mark presidential terms.

Figure D5: Hiring in the Career Senior Executive Service By Partisan Affiliation




Notes: Share of new entrants by party affiliation over time for the career senior executive service. New entrants are defined by the first quarter they are observed in the OPM data. Vertical dashed lines mark presidential terms.


Figure D6: Share of Presidential Appointees Leaving Around Presidential Transitions



(a) Obama-Trump Transition




(b) Bush-Obama Transition




(c) Clinton-Bush Transition

Notes: Share of exits among presidential appointees around presidential transitions. Exit at t takes place if an individual is present in quarter t and not in $t + 1$. Dashed vertical line marks the first quarter in the year of the transition.


Figure D7: Share of Senior Executive Service Noncareer Leaving Around Presidential Transitions



(a) Obama-Trump Transition




(b) Bush-Obama Transition




(c) Clinton-Bush Transition

Notes: Share of exits among (non-career) senior executive service officers around presidential transitions. Exit at t takes place if an individual is present in quarter t and not in $t + 1$. Dashed vertical line marks the first quarter in the year of the transition.


Figure D8: Share of Schedule C Appointees Leaving Around Presidential Transitions



(a) Obama-Trump Transition




(b) Bush-Obama Transition




(c) Clinton-Bush Transition

Notes: Share of exits among Schedule C appointees around presidential transitions. Exit at t takes place if an individual is present in quarter t and not in $t + 1$. Dashed vertical line marks the first quarter in the year of the transition.


Figure D9: Share of Competitive Career Civil Servants Leaving Around Presidential Transitions



(a) Obama-Trump Transition




(b) Bush-Obama Transition




(c) Clinton-Bush Transition

Notes: Share of exits among competitive career civil servants around presidential transitions. Exit at t takes place if an individual is present in quarter t and not in $t + 1$. Dashed vertical line marks the first quarter in the year of the transition.


Figure D10: Share of Senior Executive Service Career Leaving Around Presidential Transitions



(a) Obama-Trump Transition




(b) Bush-Obama Transition




(c) Clinton-Bush Transition

Notes: Share of exits among career senior executive service officers around presidential transitions. Exit at t takes place if an individual is present in quarter t and not in $t + 1$. Dashed vertical line marks the first quarter in the year of the transition.


Figure D11: Share of Excepted Service (non political) Civil Servants Leaving Around Presidential Transitions



(a) Obama-Trump Transition




(b) Bush-Obama Transition




(c) Clinton-Bush Transition

Notes: Share of exits among (non political) excepted service appointees around presidential transitions. Exit at t takes place if an individual is present in quarter t and not in $t + 1$. Dashed vertical line marks the first quarter in the year of the transition.


Figure D12: Share of EPA Employees Leaving Around Presidential Transitions



(a) Obama-Trump Transition




(b) Bush-Obama Transition



(c) Clinton-Bush Transition


Notes: Share of exits among EPA employees around presidential transitions. Exit at t takes place if an individual is present in quarter t and not in $t + 1$. Dashed vertical line marks the first quarter in the year of the transition.

Figure D13: Partisan Affiliation in the L2 population, weighted by state of employment of civil servants




Notes: Share of L2 population by party, weighted by state of employment of civil servants.


Figure D14: Partisan Affiliation – By Department and Major Agency




(a) Agriculture




(b) Commerce




(c) Education




(d) Energy




(e) EPA



(f) Health and Human Services




(g) Homeland Security




(h) Housing and Urban Development

Notes: Share of civil servants by party (Democrat=blue, Republican=red, Independent=black), department and major agency.


Figure D15: Partisan Affiliation – By Department and Major Agency (Continued)




(a) Justice




(b) Labor




(c) Social Security Administration




(d) State




(e) Interior



(f) Treasury




(g) Transportation



(h) Veteran Affairs


Figure D16: Share of Democratic Employees Increases Along the Hierarchy - Evolution over the sample period



Notes: Figure shows the percent increase in the share of Democrat civil servants for the top level general schedule (grade 13 and above) and the senior executive level, relative to the lower general schedule level (below grade 13) over time. Democrats are overrepresented at the higher levels of the bureaucracy and this gap remains largely constant throughout the sample period.


E Appendix Figures: Procurement

Figure E17: Number of identifiable procurement officers over time




Notes: Number of individually identifiable procurement officers for contracts created in a given year. Contracts to services and works contracts in our analysis sample (see [Table B4](#)).

Figure E18: Share of Procurement Officers matched to Partisan Affiliation Data



Notes: Share of active procurement officers who could be matched to the party affiliation data. The match rate is conditional on being matched to the personnel (OPM) data.

Figure E19: Share of procurement officers by party affiliation



Notes: Share of active procurement officer by party affiliation over time. The party shares for procurement officers closely track the shares for the entire bureaucracy (see Figure 4).

F Appendix Documentation: OPM

In this section, we provide additional details on the OPM data, and on the process of matching the data to the L2 party registration data. Specifically, we describe *(i)* two limitations of the OPM data, and how we deal with them, *(ii)* the mapping between “type of appointment” codes in the OPM and our categorization of employees into “political appointees” and “civil servants,” and *(iii)* the matching between the OPM and L2.

F.1 Data limitations in the OPM

The OPM data come with two caveats. The first caveat is that the data do not include information on employees in a number of departments and bureaus. These are: employees in defense and security (Air Force, Army, Navy, Defense, Defense Consolidated Metropolitan Technical Personnel Center, Defense Career Management and Support Agency, FBI, Secret Service, DEA, ATF, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence), the U.S. Mint, Foreign Service personnel of the State Department, IRS, U.S. Postal Service, Postal Regulatory Commission, White House Office, Office of the Vice President, Office of Policy Development, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Tennessee Valley Authority, Panama Canal Commission, a number of legislative branch bureaus (Members or employees of Congress, Architect of the Capitol, Botanic Garden, Library of Congress, General Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, Stennis Center for Public Service, Office of Compliance), Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Foreign Nationals Overseas, Public Health Service’s Commissioned Officer Corps, and Non-appropriated fund employees. Furthermore, employees in a few occupations (mostly law enforcement officers and nuclear engineers) are excluded, independently of the department where they are employed.

The second caveat of the OPM data is that, starting in the third quarter of 2014, the data do not include employee identifiers, which allow to easily track over time employees with similar names. For this reason, we created employee identifiers for employees appearing in the 2014q3-2019q1 period. We do so on the basis of information on the employee’s full name and education level, which are the two demographics which are included in the data for the full sample period (since we do not have information on age for 2017, 2018, and 2019). Specifically, for each year, we assign the same employee identifier to all observations with the same employee’s full name and education. We can use data for the 1997-2014q2 (which contain identifiers provided by the OPM) period to validate our approach to the creation of identifiers: reassuringly, in the 1997-2014q2 period, around 99% of observations with the

same employee name and education level in a year are assigned the same identifier; similarly, around 99% of identifiers in a year have no variation in employee name and education level (which can theoretically be possible, if an employee changes name or obtains additional training). We then match employees in the 2014q3-2019q1 (for which we created personal identifiers) with those in the 1997-2014q2 period (for which we have OPM identifiers) based on full name and education. Specifically, we start by matching employees in the 2014 (for quarters 3 and 4) to 2014 (for quarters 1 and 2); for those employees not found, we match them to employees in 2013; for those employees not found, we match them to employees in 2012; we continue with this procedure up until 1997. We then repeat the same procedure for employees in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 (namely, employees in each of these years are matched to employees in the previous years).

F.2 Type of appointment codes

Throughout the paper, we differentiate employees between those who are in a position filled by a political appointees, and those in which appointments and removals are formally insulated from political influence. We do so on the basis of the OPM variable “type of appointment”. The mapping between “type of appointment” codes and our categories is as following:

- Presidential appointments in top executive position: code 36 (Executive - Excepted Service Permanent), and code 46 (Executive - Excepted Service Nonpermanent)
- Politically appointed members of the Senior Executive Service (SES): code 55 (Non-career SES permanent), code 60 (Limited Term SES - Nonpermanent), and code 65 (Limited Emergency SES - Nonpermanent).
- Schedule C appointees: code 44 (Schedule C - Excepted Service Nonpermanent).
- Competitive service: code 10 (Career - Competitive Service Permanent), code 15 (Career-Conditional - Competitive Service Permanent), and code 20 (Competitive Service Nonpermanent).
- Career members of the Senior Executive Service (SES): code 50 (Career SES permanent).
- Excepted service: code 30 (Schedule A - Excepted Service Permanent), code 32 (Schedule B - Excepted Service Permanent), code 35 (Schedule D - Excepted Service Permanent), code 38 (Other - Excepted Service Permanent), code 40 (Schedule A - Excepted

Service Nonpermanent), code 42 (Schedule B - Excepted Service Nonpermanent), code 45 (Schedule D - Excepted Service Nonpermanent), and code 48 (Other - Excepted Service Nonpermanent).

F.3 Matching

We match federal government employees to the L2 voter registration data using a combination of name, state of residence, and age (as of the last quarter in which the employee is observed in the data). We consider the state of employment as an employee’s state of residence. We allow for multiple states of residence for the small minority of employees employed in multiple states. We assign Virginia and Maryland, in addition to DC, as possible states of residence for individuals employed in DC.⁵⁰ We implement the following six rounds of matching:

- Step 1: first name + midname + last name + state + age range. Only for employees with a midname.
- Step 2: first name + last name + state + age range.
- Step 3: first name + midname + last name + age range. Only for employees with a midname.
- Step 4: first name + last name + age range.
- Step 5: first name + midname + last name + state. Only for employees with a midname.
- Step 6: first name + last name + state.

Since the data report only the initials for the first name and/or midname of some federal employees (and some individuals in the L2 voter registration data), within each step, we first perform the matching using the full first name and midname, and we then repeat the matching using only the initials. Since the OPM reports information on employees’ age using a 5 years age window (starting from 15-19 to 70-74). For employees over 74 (or 64, for some years), the OPM only reports the age window as “75 or more” (or “65 or more”). Therefore, we implement our matching by age by specifying that the year of birth of the individual in the L2 data must be in the 5 years window implied by the employee’s age range window (while for employees older than 65 or older than 75, we only specified an upper bound to the

⁵⁰In our matching procedure, successful matches on state are those in which the state of residence in the L2 voter registration data is among the employee’s possible states of residence inferred from the OPM data.

year of birth of the individual in the OPM data). Importantly, at each step of the matching, we consider as unmatched cases in which a federal employee is matched to multiple records in the L2 voter registration data, or cases in which an individual in the L2 voter registration data is matched to multiple employees.

We are able to match 1,263,181 out of the 2,809,907 federal employees in our sample, for a 45% matching rate. Specifically, we match 603,526 employees (or 47.78% of all the matched employees) in step 1, 368,832 (or 29.2% of all the matched employees) in step 2, 75,547 (or 5.98% of all the matched employees) in step 3, 94,826 (or 7.51% of all the matched employees) in step 4, 75,033 (or 5.94% of all the matched employees) in step 5, and 45,417 (or 3.60% of all the matched employees) in step 6.

G Appendix Documentation: Procurement

G.1 Sample selection

Appendix [Table B4](#) summarizes the steps we take to get from the raw data to the final analysis sample. We start with the set of procurement contracts classified as service and works. In contrast to products, these are contract types where the vendor’s effort can influence the outcome post-award, allowing us to construct cost overrun and delay measures ([Decarolis et al., 2020b](#)). These contracts can be identified using product service codes. We follow [Carril et al. \(2021\)](#) and also exclude R&D contracts since they are subject to a unique set of acquisition rules (FAR Part 35). This yields a total number of initial procurement contracts of 7,755,085.

Unfortunately, the OPM data does not provide the names of Department of Defense (DoD) employees. We therefore exclude from the analysis all DoD contracts. This reduces the sample of contracts to 5,015,529. In the next step, we drop indefinite vehicle contracts (IDV). These are contracts where the quantity of the supplies and services is not explicitly defined ex-ante, making it difficult to compute reliable measures of overrun and delays. This reduces the number of contracts to 4,757,985.

Following [Decarolis et al. \(2020b\)](#), we exclude lease and rental contracts from the analysis. These are contracts where ex-post effort and thus cost-overrun and delays are limited. This reduces our sample to 3,939,099 contracts. We then drop all contracts performed outside of the U.S., leaving us with a sample of 3,709,519. This is another standard assumption that is followed in the literature ([Decarolis et al., 2020b](#); [Kang and Miller, 2020](#)) as the cost structure and contracting rules for non-U.S. contracts differ significantly. Finally, we drop the small number of contracts that were already in process (and for which we thus

cannot measure the initial contract size and expected duration). This reduces the sample to 3,646,840 contracts.

G.2 Matching

To link the 3,646,840 contracts to the personnel data and party affiliation, we use individual identifiers of procurement officers based on their email addresses. Each contract in the federal procurement database contains the email identifier for the individual who created the procurement contract (e.g. JOHN.SMITH@dept.gov). We can thus match the officer based on the email address and the corresponding bureau to the personnel data.

A limitation in this setting is that not all email addresses contain names of procurement officers, but instead only list a code or generic function (e.g. terminal1@dept.gov, admin@dept.gov). Since these contracts cannot be linked to individuals, we omit them from our analysis, reducing our sample to 2,845,525 (see Appendix [Table B4](#)). As Appendix [Table B5](#) shows, these contracts with anonymous email addresses tend to be smaller contracts in terms of initial contract size and duration. They also happen to be created earlier in our sample period of 2004-2019. Appendix [Figure E17](#) shows the total number of procurement officers over time. Since contracts are less likely to have anonymous email addresses in the later years, we see a gradual increase in the number of identifiable procurement officers over time. After 2010, the total number of procurement officers at around 11,000.

While all email addresses list a full surname, we often only have the initial of the first name (e.g. JSMITH@dept.gov). Furthermore, middle names are often omitted, making it difficult to uniquely identify individuals with common last names and first name initials. We therefore use information from the [Govtribe.com](#) database, which includes the full names of officers corresponding to a given email address.

We match in multiple steps. In the first step, we match individuals uniquely to those in the personnel dataset based on their exact full name and bureau. As with the matching of the OPM and L2 data, we proceed by using different combinations of the first name, middle name and last name:

- Step 1: first name + midname + last name + bureau
- Step 2: first name + midname initial + last name + bureau
- Step 3: first name + last name + bureau
- Step 4: last name + first name + bureau
- Step 5: last name + first name + midname + bureau

- Step 6: last name + first name + midname initial + bureau
- Step 7: last name + first name initial + bureau
- Step 8: last name + first name initial + midname initial + bureau
- Step 9: first name initial + last name + bureau
- Step 10: first name initial + mid name initial + last name + bureau

In the second step, for those with multiple matches, we disambiguate when possible by matching to the individual whose occupation is explicitly classified as a procurement officer.⁵¹ In the final step, when multiple matches based on exact full name and bureau existed, we break the tie by matching at random. Overall, we are able to match 48% of the procurement officers, or 57% of all contracts for which name data is available. As Appendix [Table B5](#) shows, the contracts that could not be matched to the personnel records tend to be smaller (both in contract size and duration), less likely to be construction contracts and created earlier. The match rate also remains constant over time (see Appendix [Figure E18](#)).

Finally, we restrict the sample to the 44% of procurement officers who have party affiliation from the L2 dataset. This reduces the sample of contracts to 784,282. In terms of contract characteristics, however, the contracts with party affiliation are comparable to those without party affiliation (Appendix [Table B5](#)). In the last step, we drop observation for which data is missing or inconsistent, resulting in a final analysis sample of 718,362. Appendix [Figure E19](#) shows the share of procurement officer broken down by party over time. The pattern closely resemble the results using the full sample of civil servants (see [Figure 4](#)). The share of Democrat procurement officers remains around 50% throughout the sample period. At the same time, there is a gradual monotonic decline in the share of Republican officers, which is offset by an increase in independents.

⁵¹Although the OPM explicitly provides procurement-specific occupation codes, there are also a series of generic clerical occupation codes under which procurement officers are classified. We use the explicit occupation codes of 1102 (Contracting series), 1105 (Purchasing series), 1106 (Procurement clerical and technician series).