Appendix for

Racial Diversity and Racial Policy Preferences: The Great Migration and Civil Rights

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

Notes: The figure plots the Black emigration rate from the US South for each decade. *Source:* Adapted from Boustan (2016).

Figure A.2. Northern Legislators' Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills voted upon in Congress between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congress are listed in Table A.2.

Figure A.3. Overall Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of US Congress voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills voted upon between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congress are listed in Table A.2.

Figure A.4. Discharge Petitions on Civil Rights Signed by Northern Legislators



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US signing discharge petitions in favor of civil rights bills between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each of the two Congress periods separately.

Figure A.5. 1940 Black Share of the Population



Notes: The map plots the 1940 share of Black Americans (divided by county population) for the non-southern counties in our sample.

Figure A.6. Black Share in Northern Counties, 1940 vs 1970



Notes: Black share of the population for selected non-southern counties in 1940 (light blue) and in 1970 (black). *Source:* Authors' calculation from IPUMS data.

Figure A.7. Share of Southern Born Black Migrants in Northern Counties, 1940



Notes: Share of African Americans born in selected southern states living in non-southern counties in 1940. *Source:* Authors' calculation from IPUMS data.

Table A.1. List of Southern States

Alabama	North Carolina
Arkansas	Oklahoma
Florida	South Carolina
Georgia	Tennessee
Kentucky	Texas
Louisiana	Virginia
Mississippi	West Virginia

Notes: The table presents the list of southern states considered in our analysis. We follow the Census definition except for Delaware and Maryland: as Boustan (2010) we assign these to the North, as they were net recipient of Black migrants during this period.

Table A.2. Civil Rights Bills Voted in the House, 1943-1964

Congress	Year	Bill Number	Northern Democrats Voting Yes	Northern Republicans Voting Yes
78	1943	HR-7	0.830	0.795
79	1945	HR-7	0.842	0.697
80	1947	HR-29	0.913	0.982
81	1949	HR-3199	0.942	0.696
81	1950	HR-4453	0.790	0.720
84	1956	HR-627	0.914	0.875
85	1957	HR-6127	0.927	0.843
86	1960	HR-8601	0.843	0.813
88	1964	HR-7152	0.918	0.817

Notes: The table lists the bills voted upon in the House of Representatives between Congress 78 and Congress 88. The last two columns report the share of northern Democrats (resp. Republicans) who voted in favor of each bill relative to all northern Democrats (resp. Republicans).

Table A.3. Discharge Petitions, by Party

	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
Panel A: Congress period: $78^{th} - 82^{nd}$						
Share Democrats	0.564	0.552	0.500	0.138	-	0.422
Share Republicans	0.304	0.239	0.132	0.024	-	0.147
Panel B. Congress period: $83^{rd} - 88^{th}$						
Share Democrats	-	-	0.632	-	0.677	0.651
Share Republicans	-	-	0.043	-	0.175	0.154

Notes: The table presents the share of Democrats and Republicans signing discharge petitions on each topic reported in the top row for the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congresses in Panel A (resp. Panel B). When no discharge petition of a given type was filed in a congress period, the corresponding entry is left missing. Table A.4 reports additional summary statistics for signatures on discharge petitions. See Table C.1 for the complete list of discharge petitions (by date and by topic). *Source:* authors' calculation from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

Table A.4. Discharge Petitions: Summary Statistics

Panel A: Discharge Petitions by Issue - Congress Period

	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
78^{th} to 82^{nd}	4	3	5	2	0	14
83^{rd} to 88^{th}	0	0	2	1	5	8

Panel B: Discharge Petitions by Legislator – Summary Statistics

	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.
78^{th} to 82^{nd}	0.772	0.600	0.553	0	2.333	285
83^{rd} to 88^{th}	0.441	0.385	0.298	0	1.286	285

Notes: Panel A presents the number of discharge petitions filed in the two Congress periods (78-82 and 83-88) by type. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the number of petitions signed per legislator for the Congressional Districts in our sample, in either Congress period.

Table A.5. Whites' Voting Behavior (ANES)

Dependent Variable	1[Vote Democratic]			
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS
Panel A: Main Estimates				
Change Black	0.030***	0.080***	0.039***	0.080***
Share	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change			2.845***	2.490***
Black Share			(0.436)	(0.392)
F-Stat			42.63	40.28
Observations	1,648	402	1,648	402
Sample	All	1964	All	1964
Mean Dependent Variable	0.490	0.602	0.490	0.602

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North and residing in their state of birth during survey waves 1956 to 1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent voted (resp. intended to vote) for the Democratic Party in the previous (resp. upcoming) election. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include survey year and region fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). Columns 2 and 4 focus on survey wave 1964. Panel B reports the first stage. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.6. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics

Dependent Variable	Change in Pr.(Civil Rights Demonstration)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A:	*Above Median*				*Socially Progressive*		
Change Black Share	0.059***	0.061***	0.076***	0.169***	0.171***	0.084***	0.061***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.031)	(0.018)
F-Stat	12.75	16.05	17.94	10.98	27.13	4.945	19.33
Observations	1,893	1,848	1,908	1,894	1,869	2,322	1,896
Panel B:	*Below Median*				*Socially Conservative*		
Change Black Share	-0.020	0.038**	-0.004	-0.089**	0.042**	-0.008	-0.022
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.028)
F-Stat	11.40	6.760	6.382	12.80	11.04	2.410	2.410
Observations	1,896	1,941	1,881	1,895	1,866	1,467	1,893
1940 Characteristic	Share in Manufacturing	Share CIO Workers	Political Competition	Predicted Economic Growth	Discrimination Index	Miscegenation Laws	Distance 48ers City

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE. Columns 1 to 4 (resp. 5 to 7) split the sample according to values of county characteristics above and below the sample median (resp. classified as socially progressive and conservative). See the main text (Section 5.3.2) for more details. The table reports 2SLS results replicating the baseline specification, which includes interactions between period dummies and: *i*) 1940 Black share; *ii*) 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy; *iii*) state dummies. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.7. Summary Statistics for Newspapers and Baseline Samples

Sample	Newspapers Sample			Baseline Sample		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
1940 Total Population	113,680	327,882	492	65,400	215,158	1,263
1940 Black Share	0.043	0.042	492	0.036	0.043	1,263
1940 Urban Share	0.758	0.252	492	0.682	0.292	1,263
1940 Share in Manufacturing	0.281	0.110	492	0.264	0.120	1,263
1940 Congressional Democratic Vote Share	47.49	12.86	492	46.55	12.91	1,263
1940 Congressional Turnout	68.60	7.872	492	69.39	8.298	1,263
Avg. Decadal Change in Black Share	2.432	2.765	1,476	1.778	2.529	3,789
Avg. Decadal Predicted Change in Black Share	1.106	1.212	1,476	0.863	1.155	3,789
Avg. Decadal Change in Democratic Vote Share	1.578	10.66	1,476	1.528	11.12	3,789
Avg. Decadal Change in Turnout	-6.699	16.69	1,476	-6.485	17.07	3,789
1940-1970 Change in Black Share	7.295	7.512	492	5.334	6.949	1,263
1940-1970 Predicted Change in Black Share	3.319	3.587	492	2.589	3.423	1,263
1940-1970 Change in Democratic Vote Share	4.733	15.67	492	4.585	16.38	1,263
1940-1970 Change in Turnout	-20.10	9.661	492	-19.45	9.826	1,263

Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations of selected variables for the 492 counties for which newspapers data were available and for the 1,263 counties in the full sample.

Table A.8. Baseline Estimates in Counties with Newspapers

Dep. Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstrations]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.731***	0.756**	0.998*	0.057***	0.047*
	(0.439)	(0.639)	(0.348)	(0.536)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Panel B: First stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.700**	0.758***	0.700**	0.758***	0.700**
	(0.233)	(0.308)	(0.233)	(0.308)	(0.233)	(0.308)
F-stat	10.57	5.177	10.57	5.177	10.57	5.177
Observations	3,789	1,476	3,789	1,476	3,789	1,476
Sample	Baseline	Newspapers	Baseline	Newspapers	Baseline	Newspapers

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification (Tables 2 and 3, column 6) by restricting the sample to the counties for which local newspapers could be located in columns 2, 4, and 6 (columns 1, 3, and 5 report results in column 6 of Tables 2 and 3). All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.9. Evidence from Local Newspapers: Heterogeneous Effects

Dependent Variable	1[Any Mention]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change Black Share*	0.428***	0.210	1.346***	0.652*	1.087**	1.139
POST	(0.149)	(0.131)	(0.510)	(0.345)	(0.434)	(0.74)
F-stat	25.04	12.27	16.92	21.63	26.94	5.846
Observations	59,878	298,031	33,385	162,121	14,859	53,644
Change Black Share	1940-1960	1940-1960	1940-1950	1940-1950	1950-1960	1950-1960
Events	1940-1964	1940-1964	1945-1964	1945-1964	1955-1964	1955-1964
County FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Episode FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-week FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lynching in	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 492 counties in our sample for which newspapers' data were available. The table reports county-week-episode level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in the local newspapers of the county in each week from -4 to 26. Week 0 is defined as the week in which the lynching occurred. The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 (resp. 1940-1950 and 1950-1960) change in the Black share in columns 1 and 2 (resp. in columns 3-4 and 5-6) interacted with an indicator for weeks 0 and above (POST). The change in the Black share is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions include county, state by week, and episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Columns 1, 3, and 5 focus on episodes that occurred in the southern states that, according to the instrument, had sent more Black migrants to the county over the period. Columns 2, 4, and 6 restrict attention to episodes happening in any other (southern) state. The penultimate row of the table indicates the window over which lynchings occurred. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.10. Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions

Dependent Variable	Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions per Legislator (1940s)			
	Total	FEPC	Anti-Lynching	Poll-Tax
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	1.128***	0.668**	0.231*	0.182*
	(0.419)	(0.299)	(0.126)	(0.102)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change	1.054***	1.054***	1.054***	1.054***
Black Share	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.377)
F-stat	7.814	7.814	7.814	7.814
Observations	285	285	285	285
Baseline Dep. Variable Mean	1.752	0.744	0.194	-0.150

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in number of signatures on discharge petition per legislator between the beginning and the end of the 1940 decade (see the main text for more details). Column 1 considers all discharge petitions, while columns 2 to 4 focus on employment protection legislation (FEPC), Anti-Lynching legislation, and Poll Tax discharge petitions respectively. Data on discharge petitions were kindly shared by Kathryn Pearson and Eric Schickler (see also Pearson and Schickler, 2009). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, include state fixed effects, and control for: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78^{th} Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78^{th} Congress. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.11. Black in-Migration and Political Polarization

Dependent Variable	Change in Ideology Indicator of Elected Congress Members			
	Liberal Democrat (1)	Moderate Democrat (2)	Moderate Republican (3)	Conservative Republican (4)
Panel A: 78-82; 82-88 Congresses				
Change Black Share	0.065	-0.062	-0.024	0.024
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.029)	(0.033)
F-Stat	12.87	12.87	12.87	12.87
Observations	570	570	570	570
Panel B: 78-82 Congresses				
Change Black Share	0.322**	-0.298*	0.164	-0.176**
	(0.128)	(0.172)	(0.130)	(0.079)
F-Stat	7.814	7.814	7.814	7.814
Observations	285	285	285	285
Panel C: 82-88 Congresses				
Change Black Share	-0.036	0.030	-0.098*	0.103**
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.042)
F-Stat	12.19	12.19	12.19	12.19
Observations	285	285	285	285

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the ideology indicator of the Congress member in office. The ideology indicators are defined as: i) liberal (resp. moderate) Democrat if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Democratic Party members in the 78^{th} Congress; ii) moderate (resp. conservative) Republican if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Republican Party members in the 78^{th} Congress. Panel A refers to Congress periods 78-82 and 82-88; Panel B refers to Congress period 78-82; Panel C refers to Congress period 82-88. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78^{th} Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78^{th} Congress. K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

B Matching Counties to Time-Invariant Congressional Districts

When studying the effects of Black inflows on the behavior of northern legislators, we face two main difficulties. First, while the African American population and other demographic variables are measured at the county level, legislators' behavior is available at the CD level. Second, the boundaries of CDs change over time due to redistricting. We overcome both challenges by first matching counties to CDs, and then by constructing a time-invariant cross-walk to map CDs that get redistricted over time to their baseline geography.

B.1 County-CD Crosswalk

To overcome the first problem, and to assign to each CD the corresponding "Black in-migration shock" we perform a spatial merge of 1940 county maps with CDs, following the procedure used in Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).[45] Since there is no one-to-one mapping between counties and CDs, two cases can arise. First, some CDs are wholly contained within a single county; in this case, we directly assign county level variables to CDs, assuming that the effect of Black in-migration is uniform within the county. Second, some CDs straddle county boundaries. In such cases, we assign county level values to the CD, weighting them by a county's area share of the CD.[46] Figure B.1 displays the county (gray lines) to CD (Black lines) mapping just described for the 78^{th} Congress, restricting attention to non-southern states.

[45] The only difference with their procedure is that we use counties rather than CZs.

[46] Following Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), we test the robustness of our results using other weights, such as maximum area.

Figure B.1. CD-County Map

Notes: The figure presents a map of counties (gray lines) and Congressional Districts (black lines) for the non-South US during the 78^{th} Congress.

B.2 Time Invariant CD Crosswalk

Until the early 1960s, there was no pre-determined rule mandating states to redraw CD boundaries after each decennial Census. Moreover, especially in the North, gerrymandering was substantially less common than it is today (Snyder and Ansolabehere, 2008). Between 1900 and 1964, despite major demographic shifts induced by international and internal migration (Boustan et al., 2018), redistricting across non-southern districts was typically non-strategic (Engstrom, 2013). If anything, the lack of systematic redistricting rules likely introduced a pro-rural bias: more densely populated areas (i.e. urban areas) grew gradually under-represented at the CD level, likely diluting the effects of Black inflows, which were concentrated in urban centers (see Figure 1 in the main text).[47] However, even during the 1940-1965 period, the boundaries of many CDs were changed, often multiple times. To overcome this empirical challenge, we develop a procedure that allows us to match all CDs

[47]This observation suggests that our analysis should identify a lower bound for the effects of Black inflows on legislators' (pro-civil rights) behavior.

between 1930 and 1970 to a baseline Congress.[48]

We define the 78^{th} Congress (January 6, 1943 to December 19, 1944) as our baseline Congress year for two main reasons. First, although the 76^{th} Congress might have been a more natural choice (as it corresponds to the 1940 Census year), several CDs underwent redistricting between this Congress year and the 78^{th} Congress. In contrast, very few states redistricted between the 78^{th} and the 82^{nd} Congress. Second, Congress 78^{th} is the earliest Congress for which CD-level population estimates are available from Adler (2003), thus allowing us to benchmark the population figures estimated in our procedure with other measures. We thus rely on Congress 78 as our baseline year, and consider the following two Congress periods: 78 to 82, which we match to the 1940 to 1950 Census decade; and, 83 to 88, which we match to the 1950 to 1960 year.[49] We perform a number of robustness checks to show that our results do not depend on the choice of the baseline Congress year, and that they are qualitatively similar when restricting the sample to CDs that did not undergo redistricting over the 78 to 82 Congress period.

Using this timing convention, for every Congress between 71 and 91, we perform a spatial merge between CD maps and the map corresponding to the 78^{th} Congress. Then, political outcomes (e.g. ideology scores, number of discharge petitions signed by legislators, etc.) are collapsed to the 78^{th} Congress using a weighting procedure similar to that adopted when matching counties to CDs. The logic of our strategy is simple: we fix the 1944 (i.e. the 78^{th} Congress) geography of CDs, and we link them to CDs that represented the same geographic area in subsequent (or previous) Congress years.[50] Then, we calculate a weighed average of political outcomes that correspond to the area originally represented by CDs according to the 1944 map.

To illustrate this procedure, we ask how the 78^{th} Congress would have looked like, had its geography persisted until Congress 86. We now explain how we proceed to collapse the political outcomes corresponding to the geography of Congress 86 "back" to that of Congress 78. Suppose that the area represented by a single CD in Congress 78 gets split in two separate CDs by Congress 86. To assign political variables of new CDs back to the level of the original CD, we adopt a weighting procedure, based on

[48] While our analysis focuses on years after 1940, we also construct the cross-walk for the pre-1940 decade in order to perform several robustness and falsification checks.

[49] The reason to consider the 88^{th} Congress in the second decade is that this was the Congress that approved the CRA.

[50] When states have more than one district, we drop at-large Congressional seats from the spatial merge (e.g. at-large seats for the state of New York are dropped between 1933 and 1945).

weights constructed in four steps. First, we overlay the map of the initial CD to that of the two CDs in Congress 86, and divide the area in cells derived by this spatial merge. Second, we assign the 1940 county population to each cell in proportion to the area share of the cell that is included in the county. Third, we sum over all cells that compose the CD to obtain an estimate of CD population as of Congress 78. Finally, we divide the area of each cell by such estimated CD population.
Political variables corresponding to the geography of the 78^{th} Congress for subsequent Congress years are computed by taking the weighed average of the outcomes of the newly formed CDs, using the weights constructed as explained above. In Appendix D, we validate the accuracy of this approach by replicating our (baseline) county-level results for the Democratic vote share using CD level data from Swift et al. (2000). Reassuringly, when conducting the analysis at the CD level, results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the main text (see Table 2).

C Data Appendix

In what follows we first provide additional details about the data used in the paper (Appendix C.1), and then describe the survey data from the ANES and Gallup (Appendix C.2).

C.1 Additional Details

Black in-migration and demographic variables. Data on Black and total population as well as on other demographic variables for non-southern counties come from the County Databooks, from Haines et al. (2010), and from the 1940 full count Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2015). We also collected data on Black migration rates from Gardner and Cohen (1992) and Bowles et al. (1990) for 1940-1950 and for 1950 to 1970 respectively.

Electoral outcomes. As discussed in the main text, we focus on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. This choice is motivated by the fact that, since the New Deal, Democrats had become the pro-Black party outside the US South (Caughey et al., 2020; Moon, 1948). Such racial realignment was more likely to emerge in Congressional than in nation-wide Presidential elections (Schickler, 2016).[51] In addition to the Democratic vote share, we also consider voter turnout, defined as the share of votes cast in the election over the total number of eligible voters in the county. In Appendix E below, we provide additional results for Presidential elections. Data for both Congressional and Presidential elections are taken from Clubb et al. (1990). Since Census data are available at the decennial level, and because Congressional elections are held every two years, we focus on electoral returns for exact Census years from 1940 to 1970. In a number of instances, Congressional election results are not available at the county level. As described in the main text, our analysis is restricted to the 1,263 non-southern counties for which Congressional election data are available for all Census decades between 1940 and 1970 (and with at least one Black American in 1940). However, as documented in Appendix D, all results are unchanged when conducting the analysis with the unbalanced sample of counties. When considering Presidential elections, before taking the first difference with the baseline election decade, we assign the 1948 (resp. 1968) elections to Census

[51] See also the discussion conducted in Section 2.2 of the paper.

year 1950 (resp. 1970).[52]

Local support for civil rights. We obtain measures of local support for the civil rights movement from two sources. First, we use the dataset assembled by Gregory and Hermida (2019) combining a variety of sources that includes the number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the CORE – an inter-racial group of students from the University of Chicago that coordinated sit-ins and similar forms of civil disobedience mainly across northern cities to protest against segregation in the South. Second, we obtained data on the presence of NAACP chapters from Gregory and Estrada (2019). These data are available only for the early 1940s and the early 1960s. For both CORE and NAACP datasets, we match the geographic coordinates of an event or of a NAACP chapter to the centroid of each county in our sample.

Whites' attitudes. We collect data on whites' racial attitudes and stance on civil rights from two, nationally representative surveys: the ANES and Gallup. Both are cross-sectional datasets that report individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as their political ideology. Starting from the mid to late 1950s, both surveys began to elicit respondents' views on racial equality and their support for civil rights. The ANES contains respondents' county of residence, while Gallup only records their state. However, even in the ANES, we are unable to exploit county-level information, due to the very limited number of counties (56) included in the survey. For this reason, as explained in the main text, we correlate the change in the Black share at the state level with attitudes of white respondents interviewed between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s (when the CRA was passed).[53] See Appendix C.2 below for more details.

Local newspapers. When examining the mechanisms (Section 5.3), we use data retrieved from the website Newspapers.com on the mention of lynchings against African Americans happening in the US South between 1940 and 1964. The list of lynchings was retrieved from the Monroe Work Today project.[54] To identify mentions of a lynching in a non-southern newspaper in our sample, we scrape the pages of newspapers available at Newspapers.com by searching for the joint appearance of the name and surname of the victim and the exact location where the lynching occurred.

[52] Results remain similar when using different timing conventions.

[53] Since a more comprehensive set of questions on racial attitudes was asked in the ANES relative to Gallup, we focus most of our analysis on the former, using the latter to validate results.

[54] See also https://plaintalkhistory.com/monroeandflorencework/explore/map2-credits.html.

Data used in our analysis come from 1,041 newspapers (only 5 of which were African American).[55] We restrict the search window to the 30 days before and the 180 days after the lynching, aggregating the data to the week level so as to reduce noise.

Legislators' ideology. As explained in the main text, we measure the ideology of northern legislators on civil rights using the scores constructed by Bateman et al. (2017). As for the commonly used DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), legislators are assigned a score that is a function of their past voting behavior and takes more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) positions. We rely on the Bateman et al. (2017) scores for two reasons. First, they are calculated by restricting attention solely to civil rights bills, as classified by Katznelson and Lapinski (2006). Second, they allow the policy content to be Congress specific and to vary over time. Bateman et al. (2017) develop two versions of the scores – one that assumes that the ideal points of legislators remain constant over time, and one that instead does not make such assumption. As shown in the paper, all results are robust to using either of the two versions.

Signatures on discharge petitions. During the historical period considered in our analysis, the prevailing seniority system gave southern committee chairs substantial control over the type of bills that were discussed in the House. In particular, since southern Democrats controlled key committees, such as the Rules Committee, they could block any proposed civil rights-related bill (Schickler, 2016). In most cases, civil rights bills reached the floor and were voted in the House only when a discharge petition was successful at collecting at least 218 signatures. A discharge petition can be filed if a bill or a resolution has remained stuck in the Rules Committee for at least seven days or in a legislative committee for at least twenty days. Once a petition is filed, it moves to the floor, where it can be voted on, if it is signed by at least 218 Congress members (Beth et al., 2003). We rely on the dataset assembled by Pearson and Schickler (2009), who were able to locate the names of legislators who signed any discharge petition between the 71^{st} and the 94^{th} Congress.[56] Following the

[55]To classify newspapers as "Black" and "non-Black", we manually searched for the name of the newspaper on the Library of Congress. We defined a newspaper as "Black" if, according to the Library of Congress, it included African American subjects. It is of course possible that a non-Black newspaper had African American subject, so our definition of Black newspapers might include some "false positive". Since we are interested in understanding whether non-Black newspapers were more vocal on civil rights, this type of bias would go against us. 58 newspapers retrieved on Newspapers.com were not found in the Library of Congress. In these instances, we manually searched for these newspapers – none of them was African American.

[56]Except for this recently assembled dataset, the names of congressmen who sign the discharge petitions are made public only when the petition is able to collect at least 218 signatures. We thank the authors for kindly agreeing to share their data with us.

definition used in Pearson and Schickler (2009) and Schickler (2016), we restrict attention to discharge petitions relating to racial issues filed between Congress 78 and Congress 88, and use signatures on such petitions as a proxy for a legislator's involvement with (and support for) civil rights. Table C.1 reports the list of discharge petitions on civil rights from Pearson and Schickler (2009) filed between Congress 73 and Congress 91, by Congress and topic. The last column presents the number of signatures on the corresponding petition.

Table C.1. Discharge Petitions by Type and Date

Congress	Number	Topic	Total Signatures
73	14	House Restaurant Desegregation	145
74	32	Lynching	218
75	1	Lynching	75
75	5	Lynching	218
76	10	Lynching	218
76	12	Lynching	59
76	34	Poll Tax	49
77	1	Poll Tax	218
77	3	Lynching	59
77	4	Poll Tax	31
77	15	Lynching	29
78	1	Poll Tax	10
78	3	Poll Tax	219
78	5	Lynching	82
78	18	FEPC	41
79	1	Poll Tax	218
79	3	Lynching	150
79	4	FEPC	187
79	24	Public Accommodation	6
80	2	Poll Tax	41
80	9	Lynching	80
81	7	Housing Discrimination	24
81	20	FEPC	110
81	21	FEPC	100
82	6	FEPC	16
83	4	Public Accommodation	71
83	5	FEPC	72
84	5	Civil Rights Act	148
85	1	Civil Rights Act	105
85	6	Civil Rights Act	3
86	3	Civil Rights Act	214
88	2	Anti-Discrimination	4
88	5	Civil Rights Act	174
91	11	Fair Employment	136

Notes: The table reports the list of all pro-civil rights discharge petitions filed between Congresses 73 and 91. Source: adapted from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

C.2 Survey Data

C.2.1 The American National Election Studies (ANES)

The American National Election Studies (ANES) is a cross-sectional, nationally representative survey conducted since 1948 by the University of Michigan every two or four years depending on the waves. As noted in Gentzkow (2016), the ANES is considered the "gold standard" when it comes to measure political ideology and cultural or social attitudes of Americans in the second part of the twentieth century. The ANES asks questions on demographics, party affiliation, political attitudes, and ideology. Moreover, and crucially for our purposes, since the mid-late 1950s, respondents are asked about their views on civil rights legislation and racial equality and, in some instances, about their attitudes towards integration.[57]

In each wave, between 1,500 and 2,000 respondents were interviewed. We restrict the sample to whites living in non-southern states and who did not move from their state of birth (to reduce concerns of endogenous migration response). This leaves us with an average of roughly 850-900 individuals for whom we can consistently include the following controls: marital status, gender, and fixed effects for education and age.[58] In principle, additional characteristics, such as union status, party affiliation and identification are available. Since these may be endogenous to Black migration, however, we do not control for them in our baseline specification. Most of our analysis uses data from the surveys of 1960 and 1964, but, in a few cases, we were able to obtain data also from other years. As noted above, the ANES reports also the county of respondents. However, due to the very limited number of counties (56), we cannot conduct the analysis at this level. We instead estimate state-level regressions, as explained in the main text.

Table C.2 presents the questions considered to measure racial attitudes and views towards civil rights. The first column presents the name of the variable; the second one includes the exact wording of the question; the last column lists the years for which the question was available. The first variable listed, "Most Important Problem" refers to an open-ended question in which respondents were asked what they considered (up to) the three most important problems for the US in the year of the

[57] More details on ANES sampling methodology and data are available at http://www.electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/nes012492.pdf

[58] We create dummies for: high school dropouts; high school graduates; having at least some college; having at least a college degree.

survey. From such open-ended question the ANES created one specific category that includes racial and public order related issues. For 1960 and 1964, the ANES coded respondents' answers in categories that reflected their attitudes towards civil rights and integration.[59] We use the ANES pre-classified category "Pro integration - anti discrimination in schools, employment, etc." to create a dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that promoting integration in schools, employment, etc. is one of the top three problems facing the country in that survey year. This is the variable *1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]* considered in Table 5 in the main text. Table 5 verifies that the variable *1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]* is negatively correlated with opposition to school and housing or work integration.
Again for 1960 and 1964, from the ANES survey, we created dummies (reported in the second and third row of Table C.2) equal to one if the respondent, respectively, agreed that the federal government should not intervene to promote racial integration in schools and disagreed with the idea that the government should promote racial integration in housing and labor markets.
As discussed in the main text, we exploit ANES questions concerning political preferences in surveys in years between 1956 and 1964. In particular, individuals were asked to indicate the party they had voted (resp. intended to vote) in the previous (resp. upcoming) elections. From this variable, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents answered that they voted or intended to vote for the Democratic Party (*Vote Democratic*).
Finally, for 1964 only, ANES respondents were asked about their feeling thermometers towards different political and socio-demographic groups, including the Democratic Party, labor unions, Blacks and the NAACP. Thermometer values are such that higher values refer to warmer feelings towards members of the group.[60] We use the answers given by respondents in Appendix Table E.5.

C.2.2 Gallup

We validate the results obtained using the ANES with Gallup, which elicited respondents' views about salient political and social issues since 1935.[61] As for the

[59] Unfortunately, for other years, it was not possible to tell whether the respondent identified civil rights as something to promote or instead as an issue that was undesirable to her.

[60] The ANES asked respondents about their feeling thermometers towards the two parties also in years other than 1964. However, since we are interested in studying whites' racial attitudes, we limit our analysis to 1964, i.e. the only year for which both political and racial groups or organizations were included.

[61] See also https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/featured-collections/gallup-data-collection.

ANES, also Gallup is a repeated cross-sectional dataset from which individual level characteristics are available.[62] Starting from the mid-1950s, Gallup asked questions about racial attitudes. As discussed extensively in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), Gallup data have been only recently made available due to the efforts of the Roper Center, which digitized hundreds of historical surveys.[63] As for the ANES, we restricted attention to white respondents living in non-southern states in years before 1965.[64] In practice, so as to keep the sample consistent across questions, we focused on years 1963 and 1964, when different questions, comparable to those from the ANES, were asked. We report the wording and the survey years for which these two questions are available in Panel B of Table C.2.

Starting from the top of Panel B, Gallup respondents who had at least one child in school were asked whether they would object to send their kids to a school with few, half, and more than half Black pupils. Parents who responded that they would not object to sending their kids to a school with few Black students were subsequently asked if they would object to a situation with half Black pupils in the school. If they had no objections to such question, they were asked about a situation in which the school was more than half Black. Most parents (90%) did not object to send their kids to schools with only a few Black pupils. Instead, more heterogeneity existed when parents were asked about a situation in which half or more than half of the school were racially mixed. Specifically, 30% of parents who did not object to send a kid to a school that had few Black pupils were against sending their kid to a school where half of the pupils were Black. Of those that did not object to send their kid to a school where half of the pupils were Black 38% were against a situation in which more than half of the pupils in the school were Black.

Given these patterns, we decided to focus on the answer to the scenario in which half of the pupils in the school were Black. In our view, and consistent with existing evidence (Sugrue, 2008, 2014), racial mixing was not perceived as a threat when (school or neighborhood) integration entailed only a limited number of Black migrants. Instead, racial animosity and whites' backlash was more likely to emerge as the share of Black Americans in the local (white) community increased. The variable

[62] With the exception of union membership, marital status, and state of birth, all individual characteristics available in the ANES (see Appendix C.2.1) are available for Gallup as well.

[63] More information about Roper Center data can be found here: https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/. We thank Kathleen Joyce Weldon for invaluable help in the data collection and data cleaning process.

[64] Since state of birth was not consistently asked, we cannot restrict attention to non-movers when using Gallup data.

1[Object to Half Black Pupils in School] at the top of column 1 in Table E.3 is thus a dummy equal to 1 if parents did object to sending their kids to a school with at least half of students being Black.[65]

The second question used in our analysis is meant to capture whites respondents' acceptance of racial diversity in politics. Specifically, as in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), we consider whether respondents would vote for a Black candidate had their party nominated the individual for the Presidential race (see second row in Panel B of Table C.2).[66] In column 2 of Table E.3, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents answered that they would vote for a Black candidate, *1[Vote for Black Candidate]*.[67]

In 1964, given the prominence of the issue, Gallup questionnaires included a question about the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Among the about 1,000 respondents, approximately 70% of them did approve the law just passed by Congress. We create a dummy equal to one if a respondent supported the CRA (*Approve Civil Rights Act* in Panel B of Table C.2). This variable is considered as outcome in column 3 of Table E.3.

Finally, we consider a question that elicits respondents' view on how the Kennedy Administration was handling the process of racial integration. Specifically, we create a dummy equal to one if an individual stated that in her view, racial integration was proceeding "at the right pace or not fast enough" (see the last row in Table C.2, Panel B). This variable is used as outcome in column 4 of Table E.3.[68]

[65] The sample size is relatively small – 851 respondents – since only parents with kids in school were asked this question.

[66] In 1963 this question was asked to around 2,000 respondents.

[67] Kuziemko and Washington (2018) investigate whites' respondents to this question also for years after 1965. Instead, in order not to confound our results with potential whites' backlash we stop in 1963 – the last year before the passage of the CRA.

[68] As it appears from Table E.3, this question is available for a significantly larger number of respondents (more than 17,000) relative to all other questions. This is because the question was asked repeatedly in 1963.

Table C.2. Questions from Survey Data

Variable Name	**Wording**	**Years**
	Panel A. ANES	
Most Important Problem	What would you personally feel are the most important problems the government should try to take care of when the new president and congress take office in January. (Do you think of any other problems important to you)	1960 and 1964
Against School Integration	The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and [Black] children go to the same school.	1960 and 1964
Against Work and Residential Integration	If [Blacks] are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do.	1960 and 1964
Vote Democratic	1 if voted/intend to vote for the Democratic Party in the last/upcoming Presidential Elections	1956-1964
Feeling Thermometer Towards [Group]	There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these groups... Where would you put (group) on the thermometer?	1964
	Panel B. Gallup	
Object to Half Black Pupils in School	Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where half of the children are [Black]	1963
Black Candidate	There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a [Black] would you vote for him	1963
Approve Civil Rights Act	As you know, a civil rights law was recently passed by Congress and signed by the President. In general, do you approve or disapprove this law?	1964
Racial Integration at the Right Pace/Not Fast Enough	Do you think the Kennedy Administration is pushing racial integration too fast or not fast enough?	1963

Notes: Panel A (resp. B) lists variables and questions taken from the ANES (resp. Gallup). The wording reported for variables *Most Important Problem*, *Against School Integration*, and *Against Work and Residential Integration* in Panel A is taken from the 1960 survey, but remains almost identical in all other years considered.

D Robustness Checks

In this section, we present a variety of robustness checks. First, we show that Black in-migration did not systematically trigger white out-migration in the counties in our sample, and that there was no change either in the characteristics of white residents or in their labor market outcomes. Second, we construct alternative versions of the instrument that predict Black out-migration from each southern state exploiting only variation across local push factors and that rely on a county-to-county (instead of state-to-county) migration matrix. The latter exercise allows us to invoke the result obtained in Borusyak et al. (2021) for the validity of shift-share instruments in the presence of a high number of plausibly exogenous "shifts".
Third, we document that the instrument is uncorrelated with county-specific pull factors that might have influenced pre-1940 Black settlements, and that results are unchanged when simultaneously controlling for local economic growth, predicted using a Bartik methodology. Fourth, we verify that our findings are not driven either by pre-existing trends or by the simultaneous inflow of southern born white migrants. Fifth, we show that results are robust to *i*) interacting period dummies with a variety of 1940 county characteristics; *ii*) extending the analysis to the unbalanced sample of counties for which electoral outcomes were not consistently available; *iii*) omitting potential outliers; *iv*) considering alternative proxies for support for the Democratic Party; *v*) estimating different specifications (including stacked panel regressions in "levels" rather than a model in stacked first differences); and, *vi*) clustering standard errors at the CZ level or applying the correction procedure in Adao et al. (2019). Finally, we document that CD-level results: *i*) are not influenced by pre-existing trends; *ii*) are robust to using different timing conventions to map Black inflows to Congress periods; *iii*) are unchanged when restricting the sample to CDs that span only the counties included in our balanced sample; and, *iv*) are unlikely to be driven by strategic gerrymandering.

D.1 Addressing White Flight

As discussed in the main text, a potential concern with our findings is that Black in-migration triggered white flight among northern residents (Boustan, 2010). This scenario would be problematic because our estimates would conflate the causal effect of the Great Migration with compositional changes in the county electorate due to

whites' out-migration. In what follows, we provide different pieces of evidence that, in our sample, the Great Migration was not associated with white departures at the county level.

We begin by replicating the analysis conducted in the main text by focusing on a larger geographic unit, the commuting zone (CZ), which contains both central cities and the neighboring suburbs.[69] Table D.1 replicates Table 2, documenting that the effects of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share remain statistically significant and become, if anything, larger in magnitude.[70] In Table D.2, we conduct a similar exercise for CORE demonstrations. As for the Democratic vote share, 2SLS coefficients remain statistically significant, albeit somewhat less precisely estimated, and quantitatively close to those reported in the county-level specification of Table 3. Tables D.1 and D.2 suggest that our main results are unlikely to be driven by white out-migration systematically triggered by Black in-migration.

Next, to more directly inspect the presence of white flight, we replicate the analysis conducted in Boustan (2010) for the counties in our sample. We regress the decadal change in white population against the corresponding change in Black population. We consider the number of white and Black residents both to make our analysis directly comparable to that in Boustan (2010) and because this is the most appropriate specification to examine the migration response of northern residents (see also Peri and Sparber, 2011, and Shertzer and Walsh, 2019). We report 2SLS results in Panel A of Table D.3, presenting the associated first stage in Panel B.

We start from a parsimonious specification, which only includes interactions between state and period dummies (column 1). Panel B verifies that the instrument is strong, and the F-stat is well above conventional levels.[71] Turning to Panel A, 2SLS coefficients are positive, quantitatively small, and imprecisely estimated. In column 2, we include the same set of controls as in our preferred specification (see Section 5.1 in the paper). Also in this case, Black in-migration is associated with a small, positive, and imprecisely estimated effect on white population.

The bottom rows of Table D.3 report the average 1940 white population and the

[69] CZs have become the standard measure of "labor markets" in the US since the work by Autor and Dorn (2013). CZs were developed by Tolbert and Sizer (1996) using commuting patterns to create clusters of counties characterized by strong commuting ties within CZs and weak commuting ties across CZs.

[70] Panels B and C report, respectively, results for turnout and the first stage. Coefficients for turnout are no longer statistically significant, but the point estimate remains close to that reported in the main text.

[71] The point estimate in Panel B indicates that one additional predicted Black migrant is associated with 2.5 more Black residents in the county. The magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than, but in line with, that reported in Boustan (2010).

average change in Black and white population during the period for the counties in our sample. The coefficient in column 2 (Panel A) implies that 1,000 more Black residents in a county – or, half of the average change in Black population over the period – were associated with around 300 more white residents. Considering that, on average, the 1940 white population was 62,760, this represents a negligible change (0.4% relative to the baseline white population). Columns 3 and 4 show that results are robust to including only counties with baseline urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320), and to interacting the 1940 urban share of the population with period dummies. Results are also unchanged when estimating long-difference regressions (Table D.4).

Two observations help reconcile our findings with those in Boustan (2010). First, Boustan (2010) focuses on central city to suburb migration, fixing city boundaries to 1940, whereas we consider counties. Second, the (historical) central city-suburb divide does not overlap with county boundaries; hence, the reallocation of white population *between* central cities and suburbs was likely absorbed *within* counties. Table D.5 provides evidence consistent with this conjecture. Specifically, in columns 1 and 2, we restrict attention to the 110 counties that are included in the MSAs considered in Boustan (2010), and replicate our previous analysis. Also in this sample, the Great Migration had no effect on changes in white population. In columns 3 and 4, we instead focus on central cities, and define the dependent variable as the change in white population living there. Now, as in Boustan (2010), Black in-migration becomes strongly associated with white out-migration.[72]

This analysis indicates that, at the county level, Black in-migration did not trigger white out-migration. However, one may still be concerned that the Great Migration led to selective white departures, which altered the composition of white residents. To address this possibility we proceed as follows. First, we collect data from the 5% sample of the 1960 Census of Population and from the full count Census of 1940.[73] Given the limited sample size and geographic coverage of the 1960 Census, we aggregate the data to the CZ and conduct the analysis at this level.[74] Next, restricting attention to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school, we

[72]Results are unchanged when estimating long difference regressions (Table D.6).

[73]For 1950 and 1970, only a 1% sample is available, limiting substantially the geographic coverage of the datasets.

[74]Not all CZs spanning the counties in our sample can be identified in the 1960 Census. Table D.7 shows that restricting attention to the sample of CZs that can be identified in the 1960 Census leaves our political results unchanged.

create the share of residents in this group who were: *i*) high skilled; *ii*) employed in manufacturing; *iii*) in the labor force; and, *iv*) above the age of 65. Finally, we estimate long difference regressions, where the 1940 to 1960 change in each of the variables above is regressed against the corresponding (instrumented) change in the Black share, including our preferred set of controls. 2SLS and first stage results are reported, respectively, in Panels A and B of Table D.8. The coefficient on the change in the Black share is always imprecisely estimated, quantitatively small, and does not display any consistent pattern across outcomes.

Using the approach just described, in columns 5 to 7 of Table D.8, we also show that Black inflows did not increase labor market competition for white residents.[75] This confirms existing evidence that northern labor markets were highly segmented along racial lines, and African Americans rarely – if at all – directly competed for jobs with whites (Boustan, 2009).

[75] As before, we restrict attention to men of age 18 or more who were not in school. Since data on employment, occupation, or wages are separately available by race (and gender or age) only from micro-censuses, we focus on years 1940 and 1960, and conduct the analysis at the CZ level.

Table D.1. Congressional Elections (CZ)

Dependent Variable	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS
Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share							
Change Black Share	0.689***	0.801**	0.820**	0.787***	1.549***	2.015***	2.166***
	(0.172)	(0.319)	(0.346)	(0.162)	(0.486)	(0.626)	(0.702)
Panel B: Change in Turnout							
Change Black Share	-0.307***	-0.295**	-0.273**	-0.246*	0.435	0.665	0.732
	(0.107)	(0.136)	(0.128)	(0.132)	(0.344)	(0.459)	(0.470)
Panel C: First Stage							
Predicted Change Black Share				1.486***	1.001***	0.859***	0.883***
				(0.186)	(0.300)	(0.283)	(0.296)
Specification	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	LD
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
F-stat				63.89	11.16	9.209	8.912
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	400

Notes: The table replicates Table 2 by aggregating the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ). The dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (resp. turnout) in Panel A (resp. in Panel B). Panel C reports first stage coefficients. Columns 1 to 3 estimate OLS regressions, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp. 1940 Dem Incumbent) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.2. CORE Demonstrations (CZ)

Dependent Variable	Change in Pr.(Pro-Civil Rights Demonstration)						
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS
Panel A: 2SLS							
Change Black Share	0.035**	-0.010	0.000	0.072***	0.047*	0.054*	0.055**
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.022)
Panel B: First Stage							
Predicted Change Black Share				1.486***	1.001***	0.859***	0.859***
				(0.186)	(0.300)	(0.283)	(0.283)
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
White Participants							X
F-stat				63.89	11.16	9.209	9.209
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200

Notes: This table replicates Table 3 by aggregating the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ). The dependent variable is the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE. Columns 1 to 3 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp 1940 Dem dummy) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 7 includes only those demonstrations that were joined by at least some white participants. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.3. Black in-Migration and Change in White Population

Dependent Variable	Change White Population			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black	0.349	0.339	0.307	0.270
Population	(0.349)	(0.349)	(0.347)	(0.365)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black	2.436***	2.459***	2.475***	2.436***
Population	(0.352)	(0.341)	(0.330)	(0.344)
F-Stat	47.87	51.88	56.26	50.15
Observations	3,789	3,789	1,896	3,789
Baseline Controls		X	X	X
High Urban			X	
Urban Share				X
Avg. Change Black Pop.	1,942	1,942	3,750	1,942
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	62,760	62,760	107,291	62,760
Avg. Change White Pop.	9,362	9,362	15,951	9,362

Notes: The sample is a panel of the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table estimates stacked first difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B respectively. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county, instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects. Columns 2 to 4 further include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 3 restricts attention to counties with 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320). Column 4 replicates column 2 by including interactions between period dummies and the 1940 urban share of the population. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.4. Black in-Migration and Change in White Population (Long Differences)

Dependent Variable	Change White Population			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. 2SLS				
Change Black population	0.364	0.353	0.321	0.286
	(0.326)	(0.325)	(0.324)	(0.341)
Panel B. First Stage				
Predicted Change Black population	2.460***	2.484***	2.501***	2.461***
	(0.340)	(0.330)	(0.319)	(0.332)
F-Stat	52.30	56.76	61.50	55.06
Observations	1,263	1,263	632	1,263
Baseline controls		X	X	X
High urban			X	
Urban share				X
Avg. Change Black Pop.	5,828	5,828	11,251	5,828
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	62,760	62,760	107,291	62,760
Avg. Change White Pop.	28,086	28,086	47,853	28,086

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table estimates long difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B respectively. The dependent variable is the 1940-1970 change in the white population in the county. The main regressor of interest is the corresponding change in the Black population, instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions control for state fixed effects. Columns 2 to 4 further include i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 3 restricts attention to counties with 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320). Column 4 replicates column 2 by including the 1940 urban share of the population. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.5. Black in-Migration and White Flight

Dependent Variable	Change White Population in the County		Change White Population in Central Cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Population	0.238	0.342	-2.103***	-2.161***
	(0.324)	(0.305)	(0.413)	(0.431)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black	2.821***	2.753***	1.432***	1.443***
Population	(0.280)	(0.295)	(0.150)	(0.174)
F-stat	101.4	87.18	91.27	68.81
Observations	330	330	153	153
Baseline Controls		X		X
Geography	County	County	MSA	MSA
Avg. Change Black Pop.	18,554	18,554	23,745	23,745
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	368,851	368,851	584,749	584,749
Avg. Change White Pop.	55,003	55,003	-21,961	-21,961

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes a panel of the 110 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) contained in the 52 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in Boustan (2010), for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the 51 central cities contained in the 52 MSAs included in Boustan (2010). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4). The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4), instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The table estimates stacked first difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B, respectively. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level (resp. MSA level), in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table D.6. Black in-Migration and White Flight (Long Differences)

Dependent Variable	Change White Population in the County		Change White Population in Central Cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Population	0.247	0.347	-1.784***	-1.682***
	(0.307)	(0.288)	(0.295)	(0.279)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change	2.828***	2.762***	1.584***	1.748***
Population	(0.294)	(0.312)	(0.151)	(0.181)
F-stat	92.81	78.30	109.4	93.66
Observations	110	110	51	51
Baseline Controls		X		X
Geography	County	County	MSA	MSA
Avg. Change Black Pop.	55,662	55,662	120,055	120,055
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	368,851	368,851	584,749	584,749
Avg. Change White Pop.	165,009	165,009	-65,884	-65,884

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes a panel of the 110 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of Southern states) contained in the 52 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in Boustan (2010), for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the 51 central cities contained in the 52 MSAs included in Boustan (2010). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4). The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4), instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The table estimates long difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A, and B, respectively. All regressions control for state fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level (resp. MSA level), in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.7. Congressional Elections (CZ), Restricted Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	2.015***	2.083***	0.665	0.901*
	(0.626)	(0.620)	(0.459)	(0.492)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change	0.859***	0.996***	0.859***	0.996***
Black Share	(0.283)	(0.319)	(0.283)	(0.319)
Sample	Baseline	Restricted (1960 Census)	Baseline	Restricted (1960 Census)
F-Stat	9.209	9.765	9.209	9.765
Observations	1,200	351	1,200	351

Notes: The table replicates the CZ level results reported in Table D.1 by restricting the sample to CZs for which 1960 US Census data are available. Columns 2 and 4 report the results for the restricted sample while columns 1 and 3 show results in column 6 of Table D.1. The dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (resp. turnout) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. in columns 3 and 4). Panel B reports first stage coefficients. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented in columns 2 and 4 with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.8. Black in-Migration and Changes in Whites' Characteristics

	(1) High Skilled	(2) In Manufacture	(3) In Labor Force	(4) 65+	(5) Employed	(6) Log Occupational Scores	(7) Log Wages
Panel A: 2SLS							
Change Black Share	0.466	0.213	0.116	-0.027	0.081	0.001	0.019
	(0.380)	(0.584)	(0.297)	(0.243)	(0.348)	(0.006)	(0.056)
Panel B: First Stage							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***
	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)
F-stat	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42
Observations	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
1940 Mean Dep. Variable	13.48	21.38	85.80	10.25	78.33	3.113	6.045
Avg. Change Black Share	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895

Notes: In columns 1 to 5 the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the share of white men above 18 not enrolled in school who are: i) high skilled (column 1); ii) employed in manufacturing (column 2); iii) in the labor force (column 3); iv) above the age of 65 (column 4); and v) employed (column 5). In columns 6 and 7, the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the log occupational score and in log wages for white men above 18 not enrolled in school. The table reports 2SLS results for the 1940-1960 change in the Black share, instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The analysis is restricted to the 117 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population, control for state fixed effects, and include i) the 1940 Black share, and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.2 Push Factors Instrument

D.2.1 Instrument Construction and Zeroth Stage

Borusyak et al. (2021) note that the validity of shift-share designs can be guaranteed if the "shifts" – in our case, decadal Black migration from each southern state – are exogenous to local conditions. They propose a correction method, where the "shift-share" instrument is expressed in terms of the "shift" components. This method, however, can be implemented only when the number of "shifts" is large. Unfortunately, in our setting, we can only rely on 14 southern states, and so we cannot directly implement the transformation proposed in Borusyak et al. (2021). Nevertheless, we provide evidence that southern (state) migration flows are orthogonal to northern (county) conditions. We construct a modified version of the instrument that, rather than using actual Black out-migration, estimates it exploiting variation solely induced by local push factors. Following Boustan (2010, 2016) and Derenoncourt (2018), we model emigration from each southern county for each decade between 1940 and 1970 as a function of local push factors. In particular, we estimate an equation of the form

$$mig_{kj\tau} = \alpha_j + \beta_\tau Push_{kjt_0} + u_{kj\tau} \tag{3}$$

where $mig_{kj\tau}$ is the Black net migration rate in county k of southern state j during decade τ, and $Push_{kjt_0}$ is a vector of economic and political conditions at baseline, which we allow to have a time-varying effect across decades. These include the 1940: share of land cultivated in cotton; share of farms operated by tenants; share of the labor force in, respectively, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. As in Boustan (2016), we also include WWII spending per capita and the 1948 vote share of Strom Thurmond in Presidential elections.[76]

Our most preferred specification includes state fixed effects, α_j, but results are unchanged when omitting them (see also Boustan, 2016). Finally, in contrast with Boustan (2010, 2016), we fix the characteristics of southern counties to 1940 (or, for Thurmond vote share, 1948) rather than using the beginning of each decade to reduce concerns of correlated shocks between northern and southern counties.[77] As an

[76] Data on the cotton share comes from the Census of Agriculture, the vote share of Thurmond was taken from David Leip's Atlas, while all remaining variables were collected from the County Databooks.

[77] Following Boustan (2016), in counties where the Black migration rate was above 100, we replace it with the latter value. We also exclude counties with less than 30 Black residents in 1940. All results are robust to

additional robustness check, we also selected the southern county characteristics to predict Black out-migration using the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator ("LASSO"), as done in Derenoncourt (2018). Below, we report results obtained using this alternative procedure to construct the push version of the instrument.

Results from equation (3) are reported in Table D.9. Columns 1 to 3 refer to, respectively, the 1940-1950, the 1950-1960, and the 1960-1970 decade. All coefficients have the expected sign. A higher share of land in cotton in 1940 is associated with subsequent emigration. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 1940-1950 decade, possibly because cotton mechanization was more prevalent in the 1950s (Grove and Heinicke, 2003). As in Boustan (2016), a higher share of the labor force in mining and agriculture is associated with a larger emigration rate in all decades. Similarly, reflecting a more hostile political environment, counties with a higher vote share for Thurmond in 1948 are predicted to have a higher emigration rate, even though the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 1950s. Finally, consistent with WWII spending increasing labor demand, the Black in-migration rate is higher in counties with more WWII contracts during the 1940s (but, as expected, not in subsequent decades).[78]

After estimating equation (3), we construct the predicted number of migrants by multiplying the fitted values from (3) by the beginning of decade Black population. We then aggregate these (predicted) flows to obtain the predicted number of Black migrants from each state in each decade, $B\hat{l}_{s\tau}$. Finally, we replace the actual number of Black migrants, $Bl_{s\tau}$, with this predicted value to construct a modified version of the shift-share instrument in equation (2) in the main text.

D.2.2 Results

Table D.10 replicates our preferred specification for the Democratic vote share (columns 1-2), turnout (columns 3-4), and CORE demonstrations (columns 5-6) using the push-factor version of the instrument. In Panel A, we present 2SLS estimates, while in panel B we present the associated first stage. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report results obtained using the push instrument constructed with the southern characteristics described above in the zeroth stage. Columns 2, 4, and 6 turn to the

omitting these restrictions.

[78] All other coefficients have the expected signs.

version of the push instrument obtained by selecting predictors of southern Black out-migration with the LASSO procedure (Derenoncourt, 2018).
Reassuringly, both versions of the instrument are strong, with the KP F-stat above conventional levels. Moreover, the 2SLS estimates are in line with – in fact, for the Democratic vote share and CORE demonstrations, stronger than – those presented in the main text. Also in this case, Black in-migration has a positive and statistically significant effect on all outcomes. In the case of the Democratic vote share and CORE demonstrations, point estimates are somewhat larger than those in our baseline specification.

Table D.9. Zeroth Stage

Dependent Variable	Net Black Migration Rate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share Land in Cotton	-0.191	-0.271**	-0.324***
	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.094)
Share Farms with Tenants	0.056	-0.009	-0.158**
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.064)
WWII Spending per Capita	1.984***	0.361	-0.216
	(0.331)	(0.364)	(0.299)
Thurmond Vote Share	-0.163***	-0.042	-0.254***
	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.051)
Share LF in Manufacturing	-0.342***	-0.195**	-0.111
	(0.097)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Share LF in Mining	-0.326	-0.506***	-0.536***
	(0.218)	(0.181)	(0.206)
Share LF in Agriculture	-0.447***	-0.446***	-0.174***
	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.054)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.226	0.212	0.164
Observations	1,235	1,235	1,235
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the net Black migration rate for southern counties for each decade indicated at the bottom of the table. All regressors refer to 1940, except for Thurmond vote share, which is the vote share of Thurmond in 1948 Presidential elections, and WWII spending per capita, which is measured over the entire WWII period. All regressions include state fixed effects. See the appendix for the definition and source of variables included in the table. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.10. Replicating Results with Push Instrument

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	2.196***	2.590***	0.791**	0.690**	0.062***	0.065***
	(0.519)	(0.662)	(0.334)	(0.326)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.848***	0.781***	0.848***	0.781***	0.848***	0.781***
	(0.260)	(0.247)	(0.260)	(0.247)	(0.260)	(0.247)
F-stat	10.65	10.02	10.65	10.02	10.65	10.02
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Push Instrument	Baseline	LASSO	Baseline	LASSO	Baseline	LASSO

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification using the version of the instrument constructed with southern specific "push" factors. Columns 1, 3, and 5 (resp. columns 2-4-6) report results for the "push" instrument constructed using the baseline (resp. LASSO) procedure. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.3 Alternative Instrument: Linked Data Initial Black Shares

In this section, we construct an alternative instrument using a county-to-county (rather than a state-to-county) migration matrix. Using the linked dataset made available by Abramitzky et al. (2020), we consider African Americans who were living in a southern county in 1910 and who had moved to another county by 1930. We choose this time frame because it spans the two decades during which the First Great Migration occurred, but results are robust to using other time windows as well.[79] For each (non-southern) county in our sample, we then compute the number of African Americans who were living in that county in 1930 and originated from any southern county.[80] We scale this by the total number of African Americans who were living in the (southern) origin county in 1910 and

[79]This approach is similar to that used in Derenoncourt (2018), but has the advantage of including migrants that moved between 1910 and 1930, rather than only between 1935 and 1940.

[80]As documented in Dahis et al. (2020), this time period was characterized by a high "passing rate", with African Americans changing their racial identity so as to "pass for whites". We keep only African Americans whose race was coded as "Black" in both 1910 and 1930.

moved to another county by 1930. We take these as our "initial Black settlements". They are identical, in spirit, to those used to construct the baseline instrument, but vary at the county-to-county (rather than state-to-county) level.[81]

Then, we proceed as before: for each origin, we interact the initial share of African Americans in each non-southern county in our sample with the decadal number of Black migrants who left the southern county in each decade between 1940 and 1970. We thus obtain the predicted number of Black migrants who moved to a non-southern county in each decade from each southern county. Aggregating this across all origins, we obtain the decadal predicted number of African American migrants, which we then scale by the 1940 (non-southern) county population to recover the predicted change in the Black share. We construct two versions of this alternative instrument: one that uses actual migration flows; and, one that instead uses the predicted flows computed in Appendix D.2 above.

While this instrument rests on initial shares that are constructed using a linked sample, and may thus be at least partly "selected" (Bailey et al., 2020), it has a key advantage: it implies that the shift-share instrument now depends on a very large (more than 1,200) number of shifts. As discussed above, Borusyak et al. (2021) note that the validity of shift-share designs can be guaranteed if the "shifts" – in our case, decadal Black migration from each southern origin – are exogenous to local conditions. Thus, as long as out-migration flows across southern counties are uncorrelated with changes in the political conditions of specific non-southern counties, the identifying assumption of the instrument is not violated. Using predicted rather than actual county out-migration flows further corroborates support for the validity of this condition.

In Table D.11 (Panel A), we replicate our baseline results using the two versions of the alternative instrument just described, focusing on the Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations in columns 1 to 3, 4 to 6, and 7 to 9 respectively.[82] Columns 1, 4, and 7 replicate the baseline specification reported in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) in the main text. Columns 2, 5, and 8 (resp. columns 3, 6, and 9) show that results remain similar when considering the alternative version, constructed with the actual (resp. predicted) southern decadal migration flows.

Together with results in Appendix D.2, this exercise increases the confidence that our main findings are not driven by local pull shocks simultaneously correlated with the pre-1940 distribution of Black settlements across northern counties.

[81] As for the baseline instrument, the denominator of the initial shares of African Americans includes all individuals from the origin county who were living in any other county – in or out the US South – by 1930.

[82] Panel B reports the first stage. When using the alternative instrument that relies on predicted migration flows, the F-stat falls slightly below conventional levels.

Table D.11. Replicating Results with IV based on Linked Data

Dependent Variable	Change in								
	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout			1[CORE Demonstration]		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: 2SLS									
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.660***	1.911***	0.756**	0.678**	0.689**	0.057***	0.042***	0.053***
	(0.439)	(0.316)	(0.378)	(0.348)	(0.339)	(0.338)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Panel B: First Stage									
Predicted Change	0.758***	1.693***	1.870***	0.758***	1.693***	1.870***	0.758***	1.693***	1.870***
Black Share	(0.233)	(0.511)	(0.646)	(0.233)	(0.511)	(0.646)	(0.233)	(0.511)	(0.646)
F-stat	10.57	10.95	8.385	10.57	10.95	8.385	10.57	10.95	8.385
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Instrument	Baseline	Linked Actual	Linked Predicted	Baseline	Linked Actual	Linked Predicted	Baseline	Linked Actual	Linked Predicted

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification using the version of the instrument constructed with the linked sample from Abramitzky et al. (2020), for which a county-to-county migration matrix is used to define the initial Black shares. Columns 1, 4, and 7 replicate the baseline specification reported in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6). Columns 2, 5, and 8 (resp. columns 3, 6,and 9) report results with the alternative instrument using actual (resp. predicted) migration flows. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 for Democratic incumbency in 1940 Congressional elections. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.4 Local Pull Shocks and Predicted Economic Growth

In Table D.12, we investigate if the instrument constructed in equation (2) in the main text is correlated with county-specific pull factors. We consider two such factors that might have been particularly relevant in this context: WWII contracts and New Deal spending. As discussed in Boustan (2016), the surge in demand across northern and western factories triggered by WWII was one of the pull factors of the Great Migration. Similarly, the generosity of New Deal spending might have influenced the location decision of African Americans prior to 1940, while at the same time having long-lasting effects on political conditions across northern counties.

The dependent variable in Table D.12 is the change in predicted Black in-migration, scaled by 1940 county population. The main regressor of interest is WWII spending per capita (Panel A) and generosity of New Deal (Panel B). Columns 1 to 3 consider each decade separately, whereas column 4 focuses on the long difference (1940-1970) change in predicted Black in-migration. We always include the set of controls used in our most preferred specification – i.e., state dummies, the 1940 Black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if in 1940 the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republican vote share in Congressional elections – and weigh regressions by 1940 county population. Reassuringly, in all cases the coefficient is imprecisely estimated and quantitatively small.

To further mitigate concerns that the instrument may be spuriously correlated with economic pull shocks, in Table D.13, we augment the baseline specification by separately controlling for a measure of labor demand growth predicted using a Bartik-type approach (similar to e.g. Sequeira et al., 2020, and Tabellini, 2020). Restricting attention to non-southern counties, we first compute the 1940 share of employment in each 1-digit industry in each county; then, we interact these initial shares with the national growth rate of employment in that industry.[83] To ease comparison, we report the baseline 2SLS specification in columns 1, 3, and 5 for Democratic vote share, turnout, and civil rights demonstrations, respectively. Columns 2, 4, and 6 verify that results remain quantitatively similar, in fact slightly larger, when including the Bartik measure of predicted labor demand.

[83] To more precisely proxy for labor demand shocks in non-southern industries, we compute the national growth rate for the non-South only. Results are unchanged when including the US South to compute national demand growth.

Table D.12. Placebo Checks

Dependent Variable	Predicted Change in Black Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: WWII				
Spending Per Capita	0.049	0.033	0.026	0.108
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.116)
Panel B: New Deal				
Spending Per Capita	-0.122	-0.103	-0.057	-0.283
	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.250)
Observations	1,263	1,263	1,263	1,263
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970	1940-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 county population. Each column considers the period specific to the decade reported at the bottom of the table. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and control for state dummies, for the 1940 Black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. In Panels A and B, the regressor of interest is WWII spending per capita and New Deal spending per capita, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table D.13. Replicating Results Controlling for Predicted Economic Growth

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	1.885***	2.135***	0.756**	1.010**	0.057***	0.056***
	(0.439)	(0.584)	(0.348)	(0.459)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.781***	0.758***	0.781***	0.758***	0.781***
	(0.233)	(0.247)	(0.233)	(0.247)	(0.233)	(0.247)
F-stat	10.57	10.02	10.57	10.02	10.57	10.02
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Control	Baseline	Economic Growth	Baseline	Economic Growth	Baseline	Economic Growth

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Tables 2 and 3, column 6 controlling for a measure of labor demand growth predicted using a Bartik type approach, as described in the main text. To ease comparisons, columns 1, 3, and 5 report the baseline specification. Columns 2, 4, and 6 augment the regressions with the additional Bartik control. The dependent variable is the change in: Democratic vote share, turnout, and the probability of CORE demonstrations in columns 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6 respectively. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p$<$ 0.01, ** p$<$ 0.05, * p$<$ 0.1.

D.5 Testing for Pre-Trends

In Table D.14, we perform a key placebo check, and show that there is no correlation between pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest and the (instrumented) change in the Black share. Since 1942 is the first year in which CORE demonstrations occurred, we conduct this exercise only for the Democratic vote share and for turnout in Congressional elections.[84] Table D.14 reports results for the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6). To ease comparisons, columns 1 and 4 present the baseline specification (Table 2, column 6); next, in columns 2 and 5, we replicate our analysis restricting attention to counties for which "pre-trends" regressions can be estimated.[85] Results remain very similar to those in the baseline sample. Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we turn to the formal test for pre-trends, regressing the 1930 to 1940 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 instrumented change in the Black share. Reassuringly, the coefficient is not statistically significant and very different from that estimated in the baseline specification.

[84] Appendix D.8 below conducts a similar test (at the CD level) for legislators' ideology.

[85] 18 counties in our sample did not have data for Congressional elections in 1930.

Table D.14. Testing for Pre-Trends: Congressional Elections

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.955***	0.185	0.756**	0.734**	0.017
	(0.439)	(0.452)	(0.369)	(0.348)	(0.343)	(0.255)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.765***	0.842***	0.758***	0.765***	0.842***
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.250)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.250)
F-Stat	10.57	10.77	10.53	10.57	10.77	10.53
Observations	3,789	3,735	1,245	3,789	3,735	1,245
Specification	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends

Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates for the change in the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in Congressional elections in columns 1 and 3 (resp. 4 and 6). Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline specification (see Table 2, column 6), and columns 2 and 5 replicate the baseline specification restricting attention to counties for which the change in the Democratic vote share and turnout between 1934 and 1940 can be computed. Columns 3 and 6 estimate first difference regressions for the 1930-1940 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 instrumented change in the Black share. Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include state dummies, the 1940 Black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. These variables are interacted with period dummies in columns 1-2 and 4-5 (as in the main text). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.6 Differential Trends by County Characteristics

In Tables D.15 and D.16, we address concerns that 1940 Black settlements (from each southern state) might be correlated with county-specific characteristics that had a time varying effect on changes in political conditions. We interact period dummies with several 1940 or time invariant county characteristics. Column 1 replicates the baseline specification estimated in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) in the main text. For completeness, we also report first stage estimates at the bottom of each table. Columns 2, 3, and 4 include a set of time-invariant geographic controls interacted with decade dummies: latitude and longitude of county centroid, distance from the Mason-Dixon line, and distance from the closest city where Forty-Eighters settled (Dippel and Heblich, 2021). In all cases, coefficients remain statistically significant

and quantitatively close to those estimated in the baseline specification. This exercise assuages the potential concern that the instrument may be correlated with distance from key locations (including the US South) that might also influence the evolution of political ideology in northern counties.

Columns 5 to 7 augment the baseline specification by including interactions between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940: *i*) male employment to population ratio; *ii*) share of employment in manufacturing; and, *iii*) urban share. The coefficient remains statistically significant and, for both the Democratic vote share and turnout, increases in magnitude when adding the manufacturing share of employment and the urban share of the population.[86]

[86]Even in these cases, however, the coefficient is not statistically different from that obtained from the baseline specification (column 1). In columns 6 and 7, the KP F-stat falls below conventional levels, due to the stringent nature of the exercise performed, but, again the results are qualitatively unchanged.

Table D.15. Congressional Elections: Controlling for 1940 County Characteristics

	(1) 2SLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS
Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share							
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.929***	1.959***	1.892***	1.841***	2.206***	2.710***
	(0.439)	(0.476)	(0.461)	(0.440)	(0.423)	(0.657)	(0.913)
Panel B: Change in Turnout							
Change Black Share	0.756**	0.812**	0.745**	0.759**	0.770**	0.869*	1.456**
	(0.348)	(0.396)	(0.347)	(0.348)	(0.349)	(0.451)	(0.743)
Panel C: First Stage							
Predicted Change	0.758***	0.723***	0.743***	0.756***	0.761***	0.598***	0.458***
Black share	(0.233)	(0.232)	(0.229)	(0.228)	(0.234)	(0.217)	(0.175)
Control	Baseline	Coordinates	Distance Mason	Distance 48ers City	Employment to Population	Manufacturing Share	Urban Share
F-Stat	10.57	9.744	10.53	11.03	10.57	7.614	6.87
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Panel A (resp. Panel B) for the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) results reported in Table 2 (column 6). Column 1 replicates the baseline results. The remaining columns include the interaction between period dummies and, respectively: *i*) latitude and longitude of county centroid (column 2); *ii*) distance from the Mason-Dixon line (column 3); *iii*) distance from the closest city where Forty-Eighters settled (column 4); *iv*) the 1940 male employment to population ratio (column 5); *v*) the 1940 share of employment in manufacturing (column 6); and *vi*) the 1940 urban share (column 7). Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table D.16. CORE Demonstrations: Controlling for 1940 County Characteristics

Dependent Variable	Change in 1[CORE Demonstration]						
	(1) 2SLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS
Panel A: 2SLS							
Change Black Share	0.057***	0.059***	0.055***	0.057***	0.056***	0.067***	0.064**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Panel B: First Stage							
Predicted Change	0.758***	0.723***	0.743***	0.756***	0.761***	0.598***	0.458***
Black share	(0.233)	(0.232)	(0.229)	(0.228)	(0.234)	(0.217)	(0.175)
Control	Baseline	Coordinates	Distance Mason	Distance 48ers City	Employment to Population	Manufacturing Share	Urban Share
F-stat	10.57	9.744	10.53	11.03	10.57	7.614	6.870
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification for results reported in Table 3 (column 6). Column 1 replicates the baseline results. The remaining columns include the interaction between period dummies and, respectively: *i*) latitude and longitude of county centroid (column 2); *ii*) distance from the Mason-Dixon line (column 3); *iii*) distance from the closest city where Forty-Eighters settled (column 4); *iv*) the 1940 male employment to population ratio (column 5); *v*) the 1940 share of employment in manufacturing (column 6); and *vi*) the 1940 urban share (column 7). Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7 Additional Robustness Checks

D.7.1 Results for the Unbalanced Sample

As discussed in Section 3 of the main text, data on Congressional elections are not consistently available for all counties – a problem that is particular evident for California (see Figure 1 in the main text). In our analysis, we consider a strongly balanced sample, which includes only the counties for which data on Congressional elections were available in all Census decades from 1940 to 1970. We now verify that results are unchanged when including all counties for which outcomes are available in at least one Census decade.

Figures D.1, D.2, and D.3 plot the distribution of the 1940-1970 change in the Black share (Panel A) and the 1940 Black share (Panel B) for, respectively: *i*) the balanced sample used in the main paper; *ii*) the unbalanced sample of counties for which electoral outcomes are available in at least one decade; *iii*) the sample without restrictions used for CORE demonstrations.[87] The sample included in Figures D.2 and D.3 covers a higher number of counties (and, almost the entire state of California, which is instead missing – except for 4 counties – in our baseline sample). Table D.17 replicates our results including the additional counties. To ease comparisons, columns 1, 3, and 5 report the baseline estimates (Tables 2 and 3, column 6). Columns 2, 4, and 6 show that our results are very similar when considering the unbalanced sample. In the case of turnout (column 4), the coefficient becomes smaller and less precisely estimated. However, and most importantly for us, neither the magnitude nor the precision of coefficients for the Democratic vote share and for civil rights demonstrations is significantly affected.

[87] As noted in the paper, we always restrict attention to counties with at least one African American resident in 1940.

Figure D.1. Balanced Sample

Panel A: 1940-1970 Change in Black Share



Panel B: 1940 Black Share



Notes: The two maps plot the 1940-1970 change in the Black share and the 1940 Black share of the county population in Panels A and B respectively. The sample is restricted to the 1,263 non-southern counties in the fully balanced (baseline) dataset.

Figure D.2. Unbalanced Sample: Electoral Outcomes

Panel A: 1940-1970 Change in Black Share



Panel B: 1940 Black Share



Notes: The two maps plot the 1940-1970 change in the Black share and the 1940 Black share of the county population in Panels A and B respectively. The sample includes the 1,328 non-southern counties for which electoral outcomes are available in at least one decade.

Figure D.3. Unbalanced Sample: CORE Demonstrations

Panel A: 1940-1970 Change in Black Share



Panel B: 1940 Black Share



Notes: The two maps plot the 1940-1970 change in the Black share and the 1940 Black share of the county population in Panels A and B respectively. The sample includes the 1,333 non-southern counties that can be used in the analysis of CORE demonstrations.

Table D.17. Congressional Elections, Unbalanced Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.653***	0.756**	0.371*	0.057***	0.045***
	(0.439)	(0.279)	(0.348)	(0.224)	(0.018)	(0.010)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	1.177***	0.758***	1.177***	0.758***	1.206***
	(0.233)	(0.313)	(0.233)	(0.313)	(0.233)	(0.307)
F-stat	10.57	14.17	10.57	14.17	10.57	15.45
Observations	3,789	3,900	3,789	3,900	3,789	3,996
Sample	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced

Notes: The table replicates the main specification in Tables 2 and 3, column 6, (which are reported in columns 1, 3, and 5) focusing on the unbalanced sample (columns 2, 4, and 6). The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7.2 Controlling for 1940 Democratic Vote Share

In our baseline analysis, we interact period dummies with a dummy equal to 1 if the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was greater than the Republican one to allow counties to be on different trends depending on Democratic incumbency (and potentially deal with mean reversion). To more flexibly account for initial support for the Democratic Party, in column 2 of Tables D.18 and D.19, we replicate the baseline analysis (reported in column 1 to ease comparisons) by interacting the 1940 Democratic vote share with period dummies. Results are virtually unchanged.

D.7.3 Dropping Potential Outliers

As discussed in the main text, some areas of the US North and West, such as Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles, received a disproportionately large inflow of Black migrants between 1940 and 1970. Others, instead, received very few African Americans. In our main analysis we omit counties with zero Black individuals in 1940, so as to compare counties

that received different numbers of migrants with each other (and exclude from this comparison counties that did not have any Black resident in 1940). We now show that all results are robust to restricting the sample in different ways.
First, in columns 3 and 4 of Tables D.18 and D.19, we restrict attention to counties for which the predicted and the actual Black share was strictly positive in all decades between 1940 and 1970. Not surprisingly, results are unchanged. Next, in column 5 (resp. 6), we exclude counties at the top 1^{st} (resp. 5^{th}) and at the bottom 99^{th} (resp. 95^{th}) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration. Also in this case, results remain in line with those of our baseline specification.

D.7.4 Controlling for Southern White In-Migration

Yet another potential concern is that Black in-migration might be correlated with simultaneous white inflows from the South. As documented in Gregory (2006) among others, between 1940 and 1970 even more whites than Black Americans left the US South. The historical evidence suggests that African Americans were significantly more likely than whites to settle in metropolitan areas either in the Northeast or in the West, while white migration was more evenly distributed across the non-South (Gregory, 1995). However, it is still possible that the patterns of white and Black migration from the South were correlated with each other. If this were to be the case, at least part of our findings might be due to the arrival of white – rather than Black – migrants. Due to data limitations, we cannot measure the actual change in southern born white migrants after 1940 at the county level. However, to at least partly overcome this problem, we construct a predicted measure of white in-migration from the US South implementing the same procedure used to construct the instrument for Black in-migration (see equation (2) in the main text). Specifically, we first compute the share of whites born in each southern state who were living in a non-southern county as of 1940. Next, we interact these shares with the number of white migrants from each southern state in each decade between 1940 and 1970. Finally, for each non-southern county and for each decade, we sum the predicted number of whites moving from each origin over all southern states to obtain the total number of (predicted) white migrants moving to county c during decade τ. In formulas, this measure is given by:

$$ZW_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in South} sh^{w}_{jc} Wh_{j\tau} \tag{4}$$

where sh^{w}_{jc} is the share of whites born in southern state j and living in non-southern county c in 1940, relative to all whites born in j living outside this state; and $Wh_{j\tau}$ is the number of whites who left southern state j during decade τ.

Then, in column 7 of Tables D.18 and D.19, we augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for the predicted southern white in-migration. Reassuringly, in all cases, results are similar to those in our preferred specification.

Table D.18. Additional Robustness Checks: Congressional Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share							
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.887***	1.904***	1.895***	2.028***	2.478***	2.168***
	(0.439)	(0.385)	(0.447)	(0.442)	(0.498)	(0.529)	(0.510)
Panel B: Change in Turnout							
Change Black Share	0.756**	0.637**	0.795**	0.761**	0.675*	0.481	0.558*
	(0.348)	(0.300)	(0.356)	(0.349)	(0.390)	(0.354)	(0.330)
Panel C: First Stage							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.834***	0.747***	0.755***	0.771***	0.774***	0.710***
	(0.233)	(0.241)	(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.264)	(0.229)	(0.233)
F-Stat	10.57	11.97	10.41	10.51	8.512	11.45	9.260
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,129	3,549	3,712	3,446	3,789
Specification	Baseline	1940 Dem Vote Share	Drop IV Equal to 0	Drop Black Share Equal to 0	Trim Top 99 and Bottom 1 Pctile	Trim Top 95 and Bottom 5 Pctile	Southern White In-migration

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 2 (column 6) by: *i*) replacing the interaction between period dummies and the 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy with that with the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (column 2); *ii*) considering only counties with predicted (resp. actual) Black share strictly positive in all decades in column 3 (resp. column 4); *iii*) trimming counties at the top 1^{st} (resp. 5^{th}) and at the bottom 99^{th} (resp. 95^{th}) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration in column 5 (resp. column 6); and *iv*) controlling for predicted southern white in-migration (column 7). Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.19. Additional Robustness Checks: CORE Demonstrations

Dependent Variable	Change in 1[CORE Demonstration]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: 2SLS							
Change Black Share	0.057***	0.056***	0.057***	0.057***	0.062***	0.041*	0.037**
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Panel B: First stage							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.834***	0.747***	0.755***	0.771***	0.774***	0.710***
	(0.233)	(0.241)	(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.264)	(0.229)	(0.233)
F-Stat	10.57	11.97	10.41	10.51	8.512	11.45	9.260
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,129	3,549	3,712	3,446	3,789
Specification	Baseline	1940 Dem Vote Share	Drop IV Equal to 0	Drop Black Share Equal to 0	Trim Top 99 and Bottom 1 Pctile	Trim Top 95 and Bottom 5 Pctile	Southern White In-migration

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 3 (column 6) by: *i*) replacing the interaction between period dummies and the 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy with that with the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (column 2); *ii*) considering only counties with predicted (resp. actual) Black share strictly positive in all decades in column 3 (resp. column 4); *iii*) trimming counties at the top 1^{st} (resp. 5^{th}) and at the bottom 99^{th} (resp. 95^{th}) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration in column 5 (resp. column 6); and *iv*) controlling for predicted southern white in-migration (column 7). Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7.5 Additional Outcomes

In the paper, we focus on the Democratic vote share as the main electoral outcome of interest. In Table D.20, we verify that results are unchanged when considering different proxies for support for the Democratic Party in Congressional elections. Column 1 presents our main 2SLS results for the Democratic vote share (Table 2, column 6). Next in columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is defined respectively as the Democratic vote margin and as a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was larger than the Republicans vote share. In both cases, Black in-migration is associated with an increase in support for the Democratic Party.

Table D.20. Additional Outcomes: Congressional Elections

Dependent Variable	Change in		
	Democratic Vote Share	Democrats-Republicans Vote Margin	1[Higher Democratic Vote Share]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: 2SLS			
Change Black Share	1.885***	3.651***	0.050***
	(0.439)	(0.875)	(0.013)
Panel B: First Stage			
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)
F-Stat	10.57	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for the effects of changes in the Black share on the Democratic vote share (Table 2, column 6). In columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is, respectively, the Democrats-Republicans vote margin in Congressional elections, and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republicans vote share in Congressional elections. Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7.6 Stacked Panel Specification

In this section, we verify that our results are robust to estimating stacked panel regressions separately controlling for county fixed effects, rather than taking the model in (stacked) first differences. Specifically, we stack the data for the four decades between 1940 to 1970 (included), and run a regression of the form:

$$y_{ct} = \xi_c + \delta_{st} + \beta Bl_{ct} + \gamma X_{ct} + u_{ct} \tag{5}$$

where y_{ct} refers to the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections or to the probability of CORE demonstrations in county c in year t, ξ_c and δ_{st} are county and state by year fixed effects, and Bl_{ct} is the Black share in county c in year t. As for the stacked first difference specification, X_{ct} includes interactions between period dummies and baseline Black share and Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections.[88]

In our baseline specification, we used predicted Black inflows in each decade to instrument for the change in Black population. However, when estimating equation (5), an instrument is needed for Black population in each year from 1940 to 1970. That is, 1940 can no longer be used as "baseline" year to predict Black inflows. Also, since we are now interested in Black population (relative county population) rather than in its change, we need an instrument for the stock – and not the change – of Black Americans in the county. We thus modify the baseline instrument constructed in the main text in two ways. First, we use 1930 settlements of African Americans across northern counties to apportion post-1930 out-migration from the South. Second, after predicting the inflow of Black migrants to county c in the ten years prior to year t, we recursively add previous predicted inflows to generate a measure of predicted stock.[89]

With this instrument at hand, we proceed to estimate equation (5) with 2SLS. We report results in Panel A of Table D.21, presenting the first stage in Panel B. Focusing on Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations respectively, we report the baseline (stacked first difference) specification in columns 1, 3, and 5 to ease comparisons, and the stacked panel regressions in columns 2, 4, and 6. The first

[88] Since in a stacked panel setting 1940 is our first estimation year, we measure the baseline Black share and Democratic incumbency in 1930. Results are unchanged if we measure both variables in 1940.

[89] As before, we scale the predicted number of Black migrants by 1940 county population. Results are unchanged when dividing it by 1930 population.

stage remains strong, with the F-stat becoming slightly larger than in the baseline specification, and results for the Democratic vote share and pro-civil rights demonstrations are again positive and statistically significant. The 2SLS coefficient for turnout is now imprecisely estimated, but the relative instability of coefficients for turnout was already something we noted in the main text.

The point estimates in the stacked panel specification are smaller than those in the stacked first difference specification. However, both the mean and the standard deviation of the Black share differ from those of its change. Thus, it is not possible to directly compare the magnitude of the coefficients in Table D.21.[90]

[90]Consider, for instance that the average Black share in the stacked panel dataset is 6%, and the average change in the Black share is instead 1.78 percentage points.

Table D.21. Stacked Panel Specification

Dependent Variable	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.082*** (0.164)	0.756** (0.348)	0.203 (0.168)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.038*** (0.010)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	1.162*** (0.278)	0.758*** (0.233)	1.162*** (0.278)	0.758*** (0.233)	1.162*** (0.278)
F-stat	10.57	17.08	10.57	17.08	10.57	17.08
Observations	3,789	5,036	3,789	5,036	3,789	5,036
Specification	Stacked First Differences	Stacked Panel	Stacked First Differences	Stacked Panel	Stacked First Differences	Stacked Panel

Notes: The table replicates the baseline stacked first difference specification using a stacked panel specification. The dependent variable is the (resp. the change in) Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations in columns 2, 4, and 6 (resp. in columns 1-3-5). Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include county and state by year fixed effects, and control for interactions between period dummies and: *i*) the 1930 Black share; and, *ii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1934 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Results in columns 2, 4, and 6 are unchanged when including interactions using 1940 values (rather than pre-1940 values). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7.7 Standard Errors Correction

In Table D.22, we address the potential concern of spatial correlation. To do so, we replicate our baseline results for Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations (reported in columns 1-3-5 to ease comparisons) by clustering standard errors at the CZ level. Reassuringly, the precision of the estimates is barely affected (columns 2-4-6).[91]

Next, In Table D.23, we deal with the possibility that standard errors associated with the shift-share instrument may be excessively small – a potential concern recently formalized in Adao et al. (2019). The first row reports the 2SLS coefficient from the baseline specification (Tables 2 and 3, column 6). Subsequent rows present the 95% confidence intervals associated with this specification and those derived using the procedure in Adao et al. (2019).[92]

Reassuringly, even when applying the correction procedure from Adao et al. (2019), the 95% confidence intervals for the Democratic vote share do not include 0, and the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimates on the probability of CORE demonstrations become instead less precise, with the p-value increasing to 0.15. Finally, consistent with the relative instability of results for turnout already discussed above, confidence intervals become very large, with an associated p-value of 0.28.

It is important to note that, in our setting, we rely on only 14 "shifters" – the southern states from which Black out-migration is measured. For this reason, one should evaluate the exercise described in Table D.23 with caution. Nevertheless, in light of these results, we conclude that the effects of the Great Migration on support for civil rights estimated in our work are unlikely to be due to noise.

[91] Panel B of Table D.22 reports the corresponding first stage.

[92] This procedure is based on the assumption of independence of the shifters across counties conditional on controls and the initial shares. Adao et al. (2019) show that imposing restrictions on the conditional distribution of the shifters is a sufficient condition for standard errors to remain valid under any correlation structure of the residuals that is not accounted for by other methods.

Table D.22. Correcting for Spatial Correlation

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.885***	0.756**	0.756**	0.057***	0.057***
	(0.439)	(0.444)	(0.348)	(0.373)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***
	(0.233)	(0.245)	(0.233)	(0.245)	(0.233)	(0.245)
F-stat	10.57	9.540	10.57	9.540	10.57	9.540
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Specification	Baseline	CZ	Baseline	CZ	Baseline	CZ

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) correcting standard errors for spatial correlation. The dependent variable is the change in, respectively, the Democratic vote share (columns 1-2), turnout (columns 3-4), and probability of CORE demonstrations (columns 5-6). Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the baseline results, and columns 2, 4, and 6 present results obtained with CZ clustered standard errors. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p$<$ 0.01, ** p$<$ 0.05, * p$<$ 0.1.

Table D.23. Confidence Intervals Adjusted for Robust Inference

Dependent Variable	Change in		
	Democratic Vote Share	Turnout	1[CORE Demonstration]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Change Black Share	1.885	0.756	0.057
95% Confidence Intervals			
Baseline	(1.024, 2.746)	(0.074, 1.437)	(0.022, 0.091)
Adao et al. (2019) adjustment	(0.479, 3.291)	(-0.634, 2.145)	(-0.021, 0.135)
F-stat	10.57	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification of Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) applying the standard errors correction method developed in Adao et al. (2019). We report the 2SLS point estimate at the top of the table. In subsequent rows, we present the 95% confidence intervals associated with the baseline specification and those obtained applying the procedure in Adao et al. (2019). The dependent variable is the change in, respectively, the Democratic vote share (columns 1), turnout (columns 2), and probability of CORE demonstrations (columns 3). All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments.

D.8 Robustness Checks on CD Results

D.8.1 Testing for Pre-Trends

Table 8 in the main text shows that Black in-migration moved legislators' ideology to the left between 1940 and 1950. In Table D.24, we check that this pattern does not capture pre-existing trends. Similar to what we did for the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections (Section D.5 above), we construct the pre-period change in the ideology scores, considering the ideology scores prevailing during Congress 71 (corresponding to years 1929-1931). Then, we estimate 2SLS regressions for the pre-period change in the agnostic and the constrained version of the scores against the instrumented change in the Black share, controlling for the same variables included in our baseline specification (i.e. state dummies, and baseline: *i*) Black share; *ii*) Democratic incumbency indicator; and, *iii*) ideology score).[93]

To ease comparisons, we report the baseline specification for the 78-82 Congress period – when Black in-migration induced a liberal shift in legislators' ideology – in columns 1 and 4 for the agnostic and the constrained version of the scores respectively. Since the pre-period change in ideology could not be estimated for all CDs, in columns 2 and 5, we replicate columns 1 and 4 restricting attention to CDs for which the pre-trend check can be performed. When doing so, the F-stat falls substantially, suggesting that results should be interpreted with caution. However, the point estimate remains negative, quantitatively close to that obtained for the full sample, and statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.074 and 0.054 for agnostic and constrained scores respectively). Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we turn to the formal test for pre-trends. Reassuringly, the point estimate is positive, close to zero, and imprecisely estimated. Also, note that in this case, the F-stat is again above conventional level, increasing the confidence that the estimated coefficient is a "true zero". These patterns indicate that the main results documented above are not influenced by a spurious correlation between the instrument and potential pre-existing trends in ideology of legislators.

[93] As usual, regressions are weighed by baseline CD population.

Table D.24. Testing for Pre-Trends: Ideology Scores

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores			Constrained Scores		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black	-0.300***	-0.223*	0.016	-0.337***	-0.281*	0.029
Share	(0.116)	(0.125)	(0.032)	(0.124)	(0.145)	(0.035)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predcted Change	1.054***	1.056**	1.851***	1.054***	1.056**	1.851***
Black Share	(0.377)	(0.528)	(0.562)	(0.377)	(0.528)	(0.562)
F-stat	7.814	3.998	10.84	7.770	3.914	10.60
Observations	285	201	201	285	201	201
Specification	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends (1940-1960)	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends (1940-1960)

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates and Panel B reports first stage estimates. Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline specification for Congress period 78-82 (see Table 8, columns 2 and 5), and columns 2 and 5 replicate this by restricting attention to counties for which the change in the scores for the pre-period can be constructed. Columns 3 and 6 estimate 2SLS regressions for the change in the ideology scores between Congress 71 and Congress 78 against the instrumented 1940-1960 change in the Black share. The pre-period is defined using the Congress 71 (1929-1931). All regressions are weighed by 1940 CD population, and include state dummies, and the baseline: Black share, Democratic incumbency dummy, and ideology score. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.8.2 Alternative Timing Conventions for Congress Periods

In our baseline specification for the effects of the Great Migration on legislators' ideology, we map the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black share to the 78-82 (resp. 82-88) Congress period. This is done in order to include the longest periods without redistricting while at the same time ending the analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA. We now verify that our results are robust to using different timing conventions.

First, in Table D.25, we define the second period as ending with Congress 87 (rather than Congress 88). The structure of the table mirrors that of Table 8 in the main text: columns 1 to 3 consider the agnostic version of the scores, while columns 4 to 6 focus on the constrained one. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, whereas Panel B presents the first stage. Results are in line with those in the main text. Mechanically, estimates for the first Congress period (columns 2 and 5) are unchanged. Results for the second Congress period (columns 3 and 6) become slightly smaller in size, but remain imprecisely estimated and very close to zero. If anything, the stacked specification in columns 1 and 4 is now marginally statistically significant with a p-value of 0.081 and 0.09, respectively.

Second, in Table D.26, we define the end of the first period with Congress 83, in order to have two symmetric periods. While the coefficient on the Great Migration remains highly negative and precisely estimated in the first period, it becomes statistically significant (and positive) in the second period, consistent with results on polarization discussed in Section 6.2 in the main text.

In both tables, the number of observations is slightly different than that in our baseline specification reported in the main text. This is because, in Congresses 83 and 87, ideology scores are missing for 4 and 3 CDs respectively. Since the scores constructed in Bateman et al. (2017) use past voting behavior of legislators, it is possible that in a few instances (as it happens for Congresses 83 and 87) there are not enough data points to estimate the ideology scores. Reassuringly, all our results are identical when replicating the baseline specification (with the original timing convention) omitting the CDs missing in Tables D.25 and D.26.

Table D.25. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Ending Analysis with Congress 87

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	-0.087*	-0.300***	-0.004	-0.086*	-0.337***	0.013
	(0.050)	(0.116)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.124)	(0.064)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.571***	1.054***	1.946***	1.554***	1.050***	1.920***
	(0.438)	(0.377)	(0.558)	(0.442)	(0.377)	(0.564)
F-Stat	12.88	7.814	12.19	12.36	7.770	11.57
Observations	567	285	282	567	285	282
Congress Period	78-82; 82-87	78-82	82-87	78-82; 82-87	78-82	82-87

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-82 and 82-87). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CD population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78^{th} Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78^{th} Congress. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.26. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Symmetric Congress Periods

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	-0.037	-0.444***	0.123***	-0.040	-0.489***	0.139***
	(0.036)	(0.156)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.165)	(0.049)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.570***	1.054***	1.944***	1.552***	1.050***	1.917***
	(0.436)	(0.376)	(0.555)	(0.441)	(0.375)	(0.562)
F-Stat	12.94	7.857	12.25	12.42	7.817	11.62
Observations	562	281	281	562	281	281
Congress Period	78-83; 83-88	78-83	83-88	78-83; 83-88	78-83	83-88

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-83 and 83-88). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 black share in the CD; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78^{th} Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78^{th} Congress. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.8.3 Alternative Samples

Our CD-level analysis is based on the balanced sample of CDs for which outcomes could be systematically found in all Congress periods. However, these CDs slightly differ from those that span the balanced county sample used in Section 5 of the paper. For robustness, we thus replicate the results for ideology scores reported in Table 8 of the paper, restricting attention to the CDs that include only the counties in the balanced sample. Results are reported in Table D.27 (Panel B). Reassuringly, they remain virtually unchanged relative to the baseline ones (reported in Panel A to ease comparisons).

Table D.27. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Alternative Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores			Constrained Scores		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Main estimates						
Change Black	-0.051	-0.300***	0.046	-0.054	-0.337***	0.058
Share	(0.039)	(0.116)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.124)	(0.059)
F-stat	12.87	7.814	12.19	12.35	7.77	11.57
Observations	570	285	285	570	285	285
Panel B: Counties in Main Sample Only						
Change Black	-0.056	-0.303***	0.047	-0.059	-0.339***	0.059
Share	(0.041)	(0.117)	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.126)	(0.063)
F-stat	11.31	7.642	10.32	10.89	7.603	9.837
Observations	566	283	283	566	283	283

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-82 and 82-88). Panel A reports the main estimates from panel B of Table 8. Panel B replicates the main estimates focusing on the counties from our main sample. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CD population, and include state dummies, and the baseline: Black share, Democratic incumbency dummy, and ideology score. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.8.4 Redistricting, Black Inflows, and Political Outcomes

One potential concern with results in Section 6 is that the decision of redistricting a CD may have been at least partly driven by the arrival of African Americans. If this were to be the case, and if redistricting had an effect on political outcomes, our results may be biased. As noted in Appendix B, until 1964 (i.e. the end of our sample period), redistricting was unlikely to be strategic (Engstrom, 2013), and was typically mandated at the state level. We exploit the fact that between Congress 78 and Congress 82, five states in our sample (Arizona, Illinois, New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) required their CDs to redistrict, and test whether redistricting was systematically correlated with either Black inflows or changes in political conditions (e.g. party switches, changes in legislators' ideology, etc.).[94] In Table D.28, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a CD belongs to a state

[94]This check cannot be performed between Congress 83 and Congress 88 because most CDs were subject to redistricting in this period.

that did not mandate redistricting, and is regressed against: *i*) changes in the Black share (with OLS in column 1 and with 2SLS in column 2); *ii*) a dummy if the CD underwent a party switch; and, *iii*) the change in the Bateman et al. (2017) ideology score (column 4). Since the dependent variable varies at the state level, we cannot control for state fixed effects; yet, we include (as in our baseline specifications) the 1940 Black share and the 1940 Democratic dummy. Reassuringly, the coefficient is never statistically significant, does not display any systematic pattern, and is always quantitatively small. Overall, this exercise thus suggests that neither changes in the Black share nor changes in political conditions were systematically associated with state-mandated redistricting.

Next, we inspect more directly the possibility that Black inflows led to strategic gerrymandering across CDs. In particular, we rely on the measure of (non-)compactness recently introduced by Kaufman et al. (2017), which is based on the geographic shape of CDs, and captures the "compactness evaluations" made by judges and public officials responsible for redistricting.[95] We prefer to use this measure, instead of an alternative proxy based on the vote distribution, because it provides evidence of (potential) gerrymandering at the CD level. In turn, this allows us to investigate the relationship between non-compactness and Black inflows. The measure of compactness can take values between 1 and 100, with higher values indicating less compact districts, i.e. a higher probability of gerrymandering.

We start by analyzing descriptively the trends of non-compactness between Congress 71 and Congress 90 in Figure D.4. Consistent with the existing literature discussed in Appendix B, for the period considered in our analysis – between Congress 78 and Congress 88 – average compactness changes very little. Reassuringly, other aggregate measures, such as the standard deviation and the interquantile range, do not show any detectable changes either (not shown). Interestingly, and again consistent with existing studies, non-compactness starts to increase precisely after Congress 88, suggesting that after 1964 strategic gerrymandering might have become gradually more common.

Then, we study the relationship between Black inflows and non-compactness during our sample period. To do so, we proceed as follows. First, we assign the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black share to each Congress in the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congress period. Second, we estimate 2SLS regressions where the dependent variable is the measure of non-compactness specific to each Congress number (for the relevant decade) and the main regressor of interest is the instrumented change in the Black share. Figure D.5 reports the implied 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) from previous regressions corresponding to a one standard deviation change in the Black share.

[95] We thank the authors for making their codes available to us.

If the arrival of African Americans induced northern politicians to strategically change the boundaries of CDs, we would expect the association between changes in the Black share and non-compactness to increases over time. Reassuringly, there is no statistically significant relationship between the change in the Black share and the measure of non-compactness in any Congress year. Our estimates are also quantitatively small. For instance, one standard deviation increase in the Black share (around 2.8 percentage points) increases compactness of Congress 78 by 2 points – a negligible effect when compared to a mean of 45 and to a standard deviation of 16. Moreover, coefficients do not display any increasing trend over time, suggesting that strategic gerrymandering in response to Black arrivals was very unlikely to occur during our sample period.

Table D.28. Redistricting Checks

Dependent Variable	1[Non-Redistricting State]			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change Black Share	0.015	0.043		
	(0.013)	(0.039)		
Party Switch			0.084	
			(0.061)	
Change Ideology Scores				-0.008
				(0.049)
F-stat		16.41		
Observations	285	285	285	285

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the CD belongs to a state that did not mandate redistricting between Congress 78 and Congress 82. In columns 1 and 2, the main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share during the 1940-1950 decade. Column 1 (resp. column 2) presents OLS (resp. 2SLS) results. Columns 3 and 4 regress the redistricting state dummy against, respectively, a dummy equal to 1 if the CD experienced a party transition during the 78-82 Congress period, and the change in Bateman et al. (2017) scores. All regressions control for the 1940 Black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure D.4. Average Non-Compactness, Congress 71^{st}-90^{th}



Notes: The figure presents the area-weighed average non-compactness for each Congress between Congress 71 and Congress 90. The red, vertical lines, corresponding to Congresses 78 and 88 isolate the sample period considered in our paper.

Figure D.5. Black In-Migration and Non-Compactness



Notes: The figure presents the 2SLS coefficient with the corresponding 95% confidence interval implied by one standard deviation change in the Black share during the corresponding decade. The dependent variable is the CD non-compactness score from Kaufman et al. (2017). The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1950 (resp. 1950 to 1960) change in the Black share for Congresses between 78 and 82 (resp. between 83 and 88), and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text. All regressions control for state dummies, the 1940 Black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in each Congress.

E Additional Results

E.1 Additional Evidence on Demand for Civil Rights

E.1.1 Electoral Outcomes

Columns 1 to 3 of Table E.1 replicate the analysis conducted in the main text (Section 5.1) separately for each of the three decades, focusing on the preferred specification (Table 2, column 6). The Great Migration had a very strong effect on the Democratic vote share in both the 1940-1950 (column 1) and the 1960-1970 (column 3) decades. Conversely, the point estimate becomes smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant for the 1950s (column 2). Turnout follows a similar pattern, with a higher point estimate in the 1940s and in the 1960s, but results are imprecise and never statistically significant.[96]

One interpretation of these findings is that the 1940s saw the dawn of the civil rights movement, which was partly spurred by the Double V Campaign organized by African American activists during WWII (Qian and Tabellini, 2020). The 1960s culminated with the passage of the CRA and the VRA and, even though in the later period whites' backlash erupted in many northern and western cities (Collins and Margo, 2007; Reny and Newman, 2018), this may have been partly offset by greater engagement among Black Americans. The lack of significance and the smaller magnitude of the coefficient for the 1950s is consistent with the idea that the economic downturn at least temporarily halted the progress of race relations, and cooled off whites' support for racial equality (Sugrue, 2014).

As discussed in Schickler (2016), support for racial equality was stronger within the local fringes of the Democratic Party. Moreover, when it came to national politics, African Americans remained more skeptical about the commitment of Democrats to the civil rights cause. Replicating the preferred specification of Table 2 in the main text for Presidential elections, column 4 of Table E.1 confirms this idea. For the Democratic vote share (Panel A), the coefficient on the change in the Black share remains statistically significant and positive, but is one third smaller than for Congressional elections. The point estimate on turnout (Panel B) is instead similar to – if anything slightly larger than – that for Congressional elections.

[96] The F-stat falls below conventional levels for the 1960-1970 decade, suggesting that one should interpret results with some caution.

E.1.2 CORE Demonstrations

Using detailed information on the cause and the target of the protest available in the CORE dataset, we classified the pro-civil rights demonstrations in different categories. Figure E.1 plots the number of events in each of the top four categories – discrimination in access to goods and services (e.g. restaurants or hotels), school segregation, residential segregation, and police brutality – as a share of all demonstrations in our sample.[97] Each bar in the figure also indicates the share of events within each category that concerned national (dotted bar area) and local (Black bar area) issues. Almost two thirds of the events concerned local issues – such as boycotting a local taxi company for its discriminating hiring process in Seattle or protesting against a white-only barbershop in Chicago – but there existed substantial heterogeneity across categories. For instance, while more than 80% of the events organized to demand a reduction in residential discrimination were focused on local issues, almost 40% of demonstrations in the "access to goods" category were conducted on a more national platform.

Relying on this classification, Figure E.2 replicates the analysis of Table 3 (column 6) in the main text for each category separately. The first four dots from the left report 2SLS coefficients when the dependent variable is the change in the probability of demonstrations for each of the causes reported in Figure E.1. The remaining two crosses on the right report results for the change in the probability of local and national demonstrations respectively.[98] Even though the point estimate is always positive, it is statistically significant and quantitatively larger for protests against discrimination in access to goods and services and against school segregation. The coefficient is also larger and more precisely estimated for demonstrations with local, rather than national, targets – something to be expected, since the CORE was operating through local branches.

[97] Since events were classified according to either the cause or the target of the demonstration, the categories in Figure E.1 do not add to one.

[98] Table E.2 presents the corresponding 2SLS coefficients.

Table E.1. Congressional Elections by Decade and Presidential Elections

Dependent Variable	Congressional Elections			Presidential Elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Democrat Vote Share				
Change Black Share	2.944**	0.665	2.495**	0.567***
	(1.480)	(0.557)	(1.247)	(0.197)
Panel B: Turnout				
Change Black Share	0.979	0.125	1.431	0.805***
	(0.701)	(0.642)	(1.166)	(0.282)
Panel C: First Stage				
Predicted Change	0.792***	0.755***	0.726**	0.758***
Black Share	(0.248)	(0.218)	(0.293)	(0.233)
F-stat	10.21	11.96	6.128	10.57
Observations	1,263	1,263	1,263	3,789
Decade	1940s	1950s	1960s	All
Avg. Change Black Share	1.350	1.838	2.147	1.778

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table replicates column 6 of Table 2 for Congressional elections separately for each decade in columns 1 to 3, and for Presidential elections in column 4. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. In column 4, these controls are interacted with period dummies. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.2. CORE Demonstrations, by Type

Dependent Variable		Cause				Relevance	
	All	School/ College	Housing	Police Brutality	Access to Goods	Local	National
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: 2SLS							
Change Black Share	0.057***	0.037*	0.030*	-0.005	0.057***	0.068***	0.032**
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Panel B: First Stage							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)
F-stat	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Panel A (resp. B) reports 2SLS (resp. first stage) estimates. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the probability of a protest in each category occurring over a decade. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure E.1. Frequency of CORE Demonstrations, by Type



Notes: The figure plots the number of CORE demonstrations as share of all events occurring in our sample period, for each of the four main categories described in the text. The portion of the bar filled with oblique lines (resp. dots) refers to the share of events of each category that involved local (resp. national) issues.

Figure E.2. Black in-Migration and CORE Demonstrations, by Type



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the change in the Black share on the change in CORE demonstrations. The first dot from the left considers all demonstrations in our sample; the next four dots refer to each specific cause, reported on the x-axis; the two dots on the right refer to demonstrations that involved, respectively, local and national issues. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. The corresponding estimates are reported in Table E.2.

E.2 Additional Evidence on Mechanisms

E.2.1 Bounds on Whites' Voting Behavior

As discussed in Section 5.1 of the paper, the fact that changes in the Black share increased the Democratic vote share by more than one for one points to the importance of changes in northern voters' behavior. While northern Black residents certainly played a role, in order to explain our previous estimates, at least some white residents had to switch to the Democratic Party too. In Figure E.3, we provide bounds on the number of white voters who had to switch from the Republican to the Democratic Party in order to match the 2SLS coefficient estimated in column 6 of Table 2 in the main text for the average county in our sample, under different assumptions on turnout and voting preferences of African Americans.[99]
Red diamonds represent the number of votes for the Democratic Party that are implied by the coefficient in Table 2, column 6, following one percentage point increase in the Black share for the average county in our sample. The light blue (resp. dark blue) parts of each bar represent the number of votes from northern Black (resp. white) residents in 1940, before the inflow of African American migrants. The grey area refers to votes for the Democratic Party cast by Black migrants, whereas the white area stands for the total number of Black voters who, in a given scenario, could theoretically switch to the Democratic party in response to the Great Migration. Whenever the diamond falls within the white area of the bar, there are enough African American voters who can switch from the GOP to the Democratic Party to match the coefficient estimated in our preferred specification. When, instead, there is a gap between the bar and the diamond, at least some white voters would need to change their voting behavior to explain our results.
We consider three different scenarios. In all cases, we fix the turnout rate for Black northern residents at 50%.[100] The first bar from the left assumes that, consistent with Bositis (2012), 70% of African American northern residents voted for the Democratic Party. We instead make the extreme assumption that all Black migrants immediately voted, and that all of them voted for the Democratic Party. Under this (rather unrealistic) scenario, if Black northerners switched first, no white voter would

[99] When performing this exercise, we fix turnout, assuming that the inflow of Black migrants may have changed the preferences of northern residents without altering the number of voters.

[100] We chose this number so that it is roughly 30% lower than the average turnout in our sample (70%). The exact figures do not matter for our results.

have to change her voting behavior in order to explain the coefficient in our preferred specification. This is because, under our assumptions about Black voters' behavior, there would still be "enough" African Americans that could potentially switch, before any white does so. Assuming that only 70% of Black migrants voted upon arrival, but that all of them voted for Democrats, yields similar results (second bar from the left). However, in this case, African American northern residents are no longer enough for the white area to reach the red diamond. That is, in this case, also some white northern voter would have to switch, and start voting for the Democratic Party. Finally, we consider a more realistic scenario, where turnout of both northern Black residents and Black migrants were 50%, and 70% of voters in both groups voted for Democrats. Given the evidence in Bositis (2012), we consider the assumption that 70% of registered Black Americans – both northern residents and migrants – voted Democratic the most preferred one. Also in this case, northern Black voters alone are no longer sufficient to explain our results, and some whites would also have to switch from the GOP to the Democratic Party in response to Black arrivals (third bar from the left).[101]

In the figure, the number of white switchers corresponds to the gap between the red diamond and the white portion of the bar. Under the second and third scenario, approximately between one and three white voters would have to switch for every ten Black migrants to explain the 2SLS coefficient estimated in Table 2. Clearly, this exercise is not meant to compute the exact number of white and Black voters switching to the Democratic Party for each new Black migrant. Our goal is instead to show that, under reasonable assumptions, Black migrants' behavior alone is not sufficient to explain the increase in the Democratic vote share estimated in Section 5.1, and that at least some northern residents – both Black *and* whites – started to vote for the Democrats.

E.2.2 Evidence from Gallup

Table E.3 complements the analysis presented in Section 5.3.2 of the paper using data from Gallup for the 1963 and 1964 waves (see Appendix C.2.2 for more details on the data). Consistent with results obtained when using data from the ANES, white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants were less likely to object to the idea of racial mixing in schools (column 1) and more supportive of the

[101] It is also possible that Black in-migration induced previously disengaged whites to start voting.

CRA (column 3). Even though Black in-migration is positively associated with the probability that white respondents would vote for a Black president were their party to nominate one (column 2), this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels. There is instead no relationship between the Great Migration and respondents' views on whether the process of racial integration was proceeding at the right pace (column 4).[102]

E.2.3 Evidence on the Role of Labor Unions from the ANES

In Section 5.3.2 of the paper, we discussed the role that labor unions might have played in increasing demand for racial equality in the northern and western electorate. Here, we provide two more pieces of evidence on this mechanism using the ANES data. First, we investigate the heterogeneity behind results presented in column 5 of Table 5, which showed that the Great Migration was positively correlated with the probability that white respondents considered the civil rights issue as the most important problem for the country.

Figure E.4 documents that these patterns are significantly stronger for union members (second, black bar) and for Democrats (fourth, blue bar).[103] Instead, for Republicans we observe a negative, and statistically significant, relationship between state level increases in the Black share and support for civil rights. Since union status and partisanship may be endogenous to the Great Migration, results in Figure E.4 should be viewed as merely suggestive. However, they paint a picture coherent with our previous discussion. Moreover, they indicate that, even though Black in-migration increased overall support for civil rights among whites, it had very different effects on voters of either party, thereby raising political polarization in the electorate.

Second, we exploit the fact that, in 1964, the ANES included questions on respondents' "feeling thermometers" towards different political, demographic, and socioeconomic groups, with higher values reflecting warmer feelings towards a group. 2SLS estimates in Table E.5 show that Black inflows were positively associated with feelings towards Democrats (column 1), Blacks (column 3), and the NAACP (column 4) among white respondents. The 1940-1960 change in the Black share was also positively correlated with whites' feelings thermometers towards labor unions

[102] The number of observations varies substantially across questions, since some of these were asked repeatedly during 1963 and 1964. This was particularly true for the question on the pace of racial integration (column 4).

[103] See Table E.4 for the 2SLS coefficients plotted in Figure E.4.

(column 2), even though these results are not statistically significant.

E.2.4 Residential Segregation and Independent Local Governments

The lack of (between county) white flight and the higher support for civil rights among some white voters do not imply that all white residents welcomed Black migrants into their neighborhoods. In fact, Black migration may have increased racial segregation and efforts of whites to avoid sharing public goods with Black Americans (Alesina et al., 1999, 2004). In this section, we confirm that these patterns were at play in our context. We also provide evidence that this mechanism may have amplified the positive effect of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights. Notably, higher residential segregation is compatible with higher support for civil rights. For one, until 1965, civil rights legislation was a matter that affected mostly the US South. Furthermore, higher levels of segregation may have helped defuse whites' animosity caused by Black migration into white neighborhoods.

Column 1 of Table E.6 provides evidence consistent with these ideas focusing on CORE demonstrations. Panel A replicates results in Table 3 (column 6), whereas Panels B and C split the sample in counties with 1940 residential segregation (constructed using the procedure in Logan and Parman, 2017) below and above the median, respectively. The pattern that emerges is clear: Black in-migration increased the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations only in counties with higher residential segregation. Said differently, support for civil rights increased *more* in counties where inter-group contact in the housing market was *lower*. This may have happened because residents of initially segregated counties had little contact with Black Americans, and were able to further isolate themselves from inter-racial tensions that Black migration may have brought to neighborhoods and housing markets. To achieve this goal, whites could create more homogeneous local jurisdictions.

In columns 2 to 5 of Table E.6, we examine whether the Great Migration increased the number of local jurisdictions using data from the Census of Government. We replicate the regressions in column 1 focusing on the change in the (log of) number of: *i*) total jurisdictions (column 2); *ii*) school districts (column 3); *iii*) special districts (column 4); and, *iv*) municipalities (column 5). In the full sample (Panel A), Black in-migration had a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of local jurisdictions (column 2) – a pattern driven by school districts (column 3) and,

to a lesser extent, municipalities (column 5). Yet, this happened only in counties with residential segregation above the median (Panel C).

One interpretation, consistent with the historical evidence (Sugrue, 2008), is that, since higher residential segregation lowered the probability that Black and white pupils shared the same school district, whites' incentives to create local jurisdictions were stronger in more segregated counties. Coupled with findings in column 1, this suggests that population sorting within counties and the creation of independent jurisdictions might have reduced potential backlash by allowing whites to live in racially homogeneous communities, where the probability of sharing public goods with Black Americans was low.

Table E.3. Additional Evidence on Whites' Attitudes: Gallup

Dependent Variable	1[Object to Half Pupils in School]	1[Vote for Black Candidate]	1[Approve Civil Rights Act]	1[Racial Integration: Right Pace vs Not Fast Enough]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	-0.043**	0.072	0.038***	0.000
	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black Share	2.273***	2.400***	2.202***	2.432***
	(0.217)	(0.579)	(0.348)	(0.360)
F-Stat	110.2	17.15	40.07	45.53
Observations	851	2,073	931	17,478
Mean Dependent Variable	0.289	0.525	0.706	0.320

Notes: The sample is restricted to white Gallup respondents living in the US North and to years 1963-1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent: i) objects to having half of the classroom composed of Black pupils (column 1); ii) would vote for a Black candidate, were her party nominating one (column 2); iii) approves the Civil Rights Act introduced in 1964 (column 3); and iv) thinks that the process of racial integration is occurring at the right pace or not fast enough (column 4). Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions include region and survey year fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender and age and education fixed effects) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.4. Probability that Civil Rights is Most Important Issue for Whites

Dependent Variable	1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	0.090***	0.033*	0.068***	0.013	-0.045***	0.047***
	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	2.517***	2.749***	2.648***	2.770***	2.874***	2.729***
	(0.483)	(0.396)	(0.431)	(0.417)	(0.412)	(0.438)
F-Stat	27.18	48.25	37.79	44.09	48.72	38.81
Observations	277	648	376	551	310	617
Sample	Union Members	Non-Union Members	Identified Democrat	Identified Non-Democrat	Identified Republican	Identified Non-Republican
Mean Dependent Variable	0.119	0.107	0.119	0.105	0.094	0.119

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in years 1960 and 1964, and residing in their state of birth. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports that supporting civil rights is among the most important issues facing the country at the time of the interview (see online Appendix C.2 for exact wording and additional details on the construction of the variable). The regressor of interest is the state level 1940-1960 change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 state population. Each column restricts attention to white respondents who belong to the group reported at the bottom of the table. Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include survey year and region fixed effects and individual controls of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status), and control for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.5. Whites' Feeling Thermometers

Dependent Variable	Feeling Thermometer Towards			
	(1) Democrats	(2) Unions	(3) Blacks	(4) NAACP
Panel A. 2SLS				
Change Black Share	1.895*	0.918	3.262***	2.821**
	(1.041)	(0.957)	(1.169)	(1.404)
Panel B. First Stage				
Predicted Change Black Share	2.611***	2.607***	2.609***	2.763***
	(0.416)	(0.416)	(0.415)	(0.458)
F-stat	39.36	39.28	39.57	36.47
Observations	562	561	561	453
Mean Dependent Variable	68.91	57.53	62.37	54.93

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in 1964, and residing in their state of birth. The dependent variable is the feeling thermometer towards each group at the top of the corresponding column. Higher values of the thermometer refer to warmer feelings. Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include region fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.6. Black in-Migration, Residential Segregation, and Local Governments

Dependent Variable	Change in	Change Log(Number of Local Governments)			
	1[Pro-civil rights protest]	Total	School districts	Special districts	Municipalities
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Full Sample					
Change Black Share	0.057***	0.052***	0.098***	-0.015	0.019**
	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.008)
F-stat	10.57	12.91	12.91	12.91	12.91
Observations	3,789	3,777	3,777	3,777	3,777
Panel B: Residential Segregation below Median					
Change Black Share	0.023	-0.051	-0.027	-0.147	0.031
	(0.024)	(0.086)	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.034)
F-stat	9.712	9.712	9.712	9.712	9.712
Observations	1,449	1,449	1,449	1,449	1,449
Panel C: Residential Segregation above Median					
Change Black Share	0.054**	0.050***	0.092***	-0.024	0.018*
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.010)
F-stat	7.762	9.677	9.677	9.677	9.677
Observations	1,449	1,437	1,437	1,437	1,437

Notes: The table reports 2SLS results replicating the baseline specification. Panel A estimates the baseline specification from Table 3 (column 6). Panel B (resp. C) estimates the same set of regressions for counties with residential segregation below (resp. above) the sample median. Residential segregation refers to the index constructed in Logan and Parman (2017). In columns 2 to 5 the dependent variable is the (log) number of: *i*) total jurisdictions (column 2); *ii*) school districts (column 3); *iii*) special districts (column 4); and, *iv*) municipalities (column 5). All regressions are weighed by 1940 population and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) 1940 Black share; *ii*) 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy; *iii*) state dummies. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure E.3. Scenarios on Black Behavior and Implied Number of White Switchers



Notes: The red diamonds indicate the number of votes for the Democratic Party implied by the 2SLS point estimate in column 6 of Table 2 in a county with average native-born population and average change in the share of Black Americans. Bars indicate votes cast for the Democratic Party by different segments of the population under different assumptions about turnout and voting preferences of Black voters. In each scenario, "baseline" refers to voting behavior of Black and white northern residents prior to the arrival of southern Black migrants. "Potential Black switchers" is the total number of Black voters voting for the Republicans (and could thus potentially switch to the Democratic party) in each scenario.
Scenario 1: turnout is 70% for northern voters, all Black migrants voted, 70% of northern Black residents, and all Black migrants voted Democrats. *Scenario 2*: Black turnout rate is 50%, 70% of northern Black residents, and all Black migrants voted for Democrats, given a turnout rate of 70% among migrants. *Scenario 3*: Black turnout rate is 50%, 70% of Black voters (both migrants and northern residents) voted for Democrats.

Figure E.4. Probability that Civil Rights is Most Important Issue for Whites



Notes: The figure plots 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for a regression where the dependent variable is the "pro civil rights" dummy reported in Table 5. The first two bars refer to respondents who are not and who are union members (light and dark colors respectively); the third and fourth (resp. fifth and sixth) bars restrict attention to individuals who are not and who are Democrats (resp. Republicans), with darker colors referring to members of the group. Results and details of the specification are reported in Table E.4.