

**Appendix Materials for  
“Does Welfare Prevent Crime?  
The Criminal Justice Outcomes of  
Youth Removed From SSI”**

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## A Cost-Benefit Analysis

We use our estimates of the effect of SSI removal at age 18 on criminal charges and incarceration to estimate the costs and benefits to the government of removing young adults from SSI at age 18. We consider three types of cost savings: savings from reduced SSI payments, savings from reduced Medicaid costs, and tax revenues from higher earned income among those who are removed. The estimate for SSI payments comes directly from our IV estimates: each removal reduces SSI payments by \$37,700 over the next 21 years (no discounting applied). To estimate cost savings to Medicaid, we use our estimate of the effect of SSI removal on the likelihood of receiving SSI over the next 21 years, combined with estimates of the likelihood of losing Medicaid after leaving SSI (prior to the ACA Medicaid expansions) and estimates of the net cost of Medicaid to the government. We estimate that SSI removal decreases the annual likelihood of receiving SSI by 24 percentage points over the next 21 years. Hemmeter (2011) estimates that 96% of youth who remain on SSI after age 18 retain Medicaid access, compared to just 25% of those who leave SSI. Finkelstein, Hendren, and Luttmer (2019) estimate that the net cost to the government of Medicaid is \$1,450 per recipient for the general low-income adult population; they argue that the net cost of Medicaid is much lower than the gross cost because the government still subsidizes health care for nominally uninsured individuals through charity care. To be conservative, we double this amount (\$2,900 per recipient per year) to account for the possibility that Medicaid might pay more on net for adults with disabilities than for the general adult population. Multiplying these three figures, we calculate that each SSI removal results in average annual Medicaid savings of \$494, which amounts to \$8,400 from 1997–2013 (since state Medicaid expansions began in 2014). The estimate for tax revenue (\$3,000) comes from multiplying our IV estimate of the effect of removal on earnings (\$1,420 annually over 21 years) by an assumed 10% tax rate. Note that for many young adults removed from SSI, the EITC and other progressive taxation might make their average tax rate zero or negative. Therefore a 10% tax rate is likely a conservative assumption.

We consider two types of costs to the government: enforcement and court costs and correc-

tional costs (including prison, jail, parole, and probation). We additionally consider victim costs, which are not direct costs to the government but costs to society more generally. For all costs, we start with the IV estimates of the effect of SSI removal on specific types of crime by the 18-year-old as well as as any siblings we observe, from Appendix Table B18. We use the following procedures to estimate each type of cost.

**Enforcement and court costs.** Appendix Table B19 details the calculation of enforcement and court costs. For each charge type, we start with our IV estimate of the effect of SSI removal on the number of charges for the 18-year-old and any observed siblings, from Appendix Table B18. Since enforcement costs begin at the time an offense is reported, we use estimates from a number of sources of the fraction of reported offenses that lead to a court charge, given in the second column (Criminal Justice Information Services Division, 2019). The fraction ranges from 14% for burglary to 52% for assault. We scale up the original IV estimates to get these “corrected” IV estimates of the effect of SSI removal on reported offenses. For most charges, the price of investigation is around \$1,000–\$2,000, but costs are lower for drug possession (\$420) and much higher for violent crimes (e.g., \$10,700 for assault) (Caulkins, 2010; Hunt, Saunders, and Kilmer, 2018). Multiplying the corrected IV estimates by the price of investigation gives total enforcement costs.


To calculate court costs, we use our original IV estimates of the effect of SSI removal on number charges and multiply by the price per prosecution for that charge type (The Vermont Center for Justice Research, 2014; Hunt, Anderson, and Saunders, 2016). The price per prosecution is less variable than the price of investigation: the price for most charges is within a few hundred dollars of \$1,000, reflecting the modest amount of time spent per case in the U.S. justice system. The product is total court costs.

**Correctional costs.** Appendix Table B20 details the calculation of correctional costs. We use our estimates of the effect of SSI removal on the total number of days spent in prison, jail, probation, and parole by the 18-year-old and any observed siblings, over the 21 years following SSI removal, from Appendix Table B18. Prison time increases by 227 days, jail time by 70 days, probation by 349 days, and parole by 73 days. We multiply each of these types of corrections by their daily marginal cost from various sources: The cost is high for prison (\$94) and jail (\$104) and much lower for probation (\$3) and parole (\$7) (Henrichson and Galgano, 2013; Henrichson, 2015; Prisons Bureau, 2019). Multiplying the IV estimates by the price per day yields the total correctional costs. By far the largest cost is from prison time, since the IV estimate for prison days is large and the cost of prison is high.

**Victim costs.** Appendix Table B21 details the calculation of victim costs. To get the total number of offenses (rather than just reported offenses), we scale up our IV estimates by estimates from other sources of the fraction of illicit acts that result in a charge (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2020, 2021). This fraction is smallest for charges that do not have a direct victim, such as drug crimes and prostitution, and largest for robbery (17%) and assault (22%). We scale up the original IV estimates to get “corrected” IV estimates that reflect the true number of offenses committed against victims. Finally, we multiply by victim cost per offense. We take a conservative approach by 1) assuming that prostitution and drug crimes have no victim costs and 2) using lower bound estimates of the victim cost from Miller (1996) and McCollister, French, and Fang (2010) for the other offense types.

## B Appendix Figures and Tables


Figure B1: Characteristics of LATE “complier” population



Notes: Figure plots complier ratios (for the instrument of having an 18th birthday after the August 22, 1996, cutoff, and the endogenous variable of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review) using the methodology from Angrist and Pischke (2008). The top graph shows under- and over-representation of demographic characteristics. “High/low parent earn” indicates children with parental earnings above/below the sample median (\$5,500 annually) when the child was between 12 and 17 years of age. “High crime” indicates county crime rate in 1997–98 above sample median, “High unemployment” indicates average annual county unemployment rate over 1997–2017 above sample median, “High Dem share” indicates county Democratic presidential vote share in 2000 above sample median, and “High pop density” indicates county population in 2000 Census above sample median. The second graph shows under- and over-representation of diagnosis or body system code. Orange diamonds represent mental conditions, green squares represent physical conditions, and blue circles represent intellectual disabilities.




Figure B3: Robustness to alternative bandwidths




Notes: Figure plots parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured from ages 18–38 years ( $\beta$  from equation (1)), using different bandwidths. The outcomes are total number of charges from ages 18–38 years (top left), average annual likelihood of incarceration from ages 18–38 years (top right), total number of income-generating charges (bottom left), and total number of non-income-generating charges (bottom right). Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. The sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage.

Figure B4: Test of validity: histogram of birthdate



Notes: Histogram plots the frequency of 18th birthday relative to August 22, 1996. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage.


Figure B5: Trends in criminal charges and incarceration in general population



	150-day bwidth		200-day bwidth		250-day bwidth		300-day bwidth	
	Charges	Incarceration	Charges	Incarceration	Charges	Incarceration	Charges	Incarceration
Post	-25.89 (23.96)	-12.47** (5.591)	30.13 (21.15)	2.552 (4.971)	70.99*** (19.20)	14.70*** (4.611)	75.51*** (17.35)	17.18*** (4.202)
DOB	1.683*** (0.194)	0.439*** (0.0453)	0.731*** (0.129)	0.206*** (0.0304)	0.389*** (0.0937)	0.114*** (0.0225)	0.240*** (0.0705)	0.0683*** (0.0171)
Post x DOB	-1.841*** (0.276)	-0.450*** (0.0643)	-0.933*** (0.183)	-0.248*** (0.0430)	-0.800*** (0.133)	-0.230*** (0.0319)	-0.554*** (0.100)	-0.166*** (0.0242)
Constant	1,493*** (16.83)	289.4*** (3.927)	1,439*** (14.89)	276.1*** (3.499)	1,414*** (13.52)	269.4*** (3.247)	1,401*** (12.23)	265.3*** (2.962)
N (individuals)	424,686	80,135	563,047	106,012	699,700	131,186	838,082	156,847


Notes: Left (right) graph plots the number of people charged (incarcerated) in each birthweek in the general population in states in our main sample, for individuals with an 18th birthday within 90 weeks of the August 22, 1996, cutoff. Data come from the Criminal Justice Administrative Records System (CJARS). Table presents RD estimates of the discontinuity in those two outcomes at August 22, 1996, in the general population using a variety of bandwidths. Regressing the outcome on date of birth alone (normalized to the cutoff) yields a trend estimate (standard error) of 0.376 (0.0472) for charges and 0.0911 (0.0112) for incarceration using a 200-day bandwidth.

Figure B6: Reduced form: Criminal justice outcomes across cutoff (extensive margin)




Notes: Figure plots likelihood of a criminal charge between ages 18–38 years (top left); the likelihood of ever being incarcerated from ages 18–38 years (top right); the likelihood of an income-generating charge between 18–38 (bottom left); and the likelihood of a non-income-generating charge between 18–38 (bottom right). Outcomes are residualized (and then control mean added back) using the same covariates used in the main specification: medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 18 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage. Table I reports point estimates and standard errors.

Figure B7: Timing of effects of SSI removal on earnings and income




Notes: Figure plots IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review on the likelihood of receiving SSI benefits in each period (right axis), the 18-year-old's earnings in the formal labor market (left axis), the 18-year-old's earnings plus SSI income (left axis), and the 18-year-old's earnings plus SSI income plus parental earnings (left axis). Parent earnings are not available for the last period. The estimates are within each period, not cumulative. The IV estimates for earnings and income are measured on the left axis, and the IV estimate for receiving SSI benefits is measured on the right axis. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage.

Figure B8: Effect of SSI removal on criminal outcomes by time period




Notes: Figure plots IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review on the outcome indicated across time periods. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage.

Figure B9: Comparing complier characteristics across subgroups




Notes: Figure plots complier ratios (for the instrument of having an 18th birthday after the August 22, 1996, cutoff, and the endogenous variable of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review) using the methodology from Angrist and Pischke (2008). The top left graph shows under- and over-representation of demographic characteristics by sex, the top right by race, the bottom left by parent earnings, and the bottom right by diagnosis. “High/low parent earn” indicates children with parental earnings above/below the sample median (\$5,500 annually) when the child was between 12 and 17 years of age. “High crime” indicates county crime rate in 1997-98 above sample median, “High unemployment” indicates average annual county unemployment rate over 1997–2017 above sample median, “High Dem share” indicates county Democratic presidential vote share in 2000 above sample median, and “High pop density” indicates county population in 2000 Census above sample median.

Figure B10: Heterogeneity in effects by race and family structure




Notes: Figure plots change in number of charges from 1997–2017 for each crime resulting from SSI removal at age 18, by Black youth versus white youth (top graph) and by parent earnings (bottom graph). Each arrow starts at the control mean for that subgroup and ends at the control mean plus IV estimate of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review (so that the arrowhead represents the *level* of criminal charges for those removed as a result of the age 18 review). Shaded bars represent confidence intervals for the estimate of the effect of the treatment on the treated. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage. Appendix Tables B11 and B10 report point estimates and standard errors by race and parent earnings, respectively.

Figure B11: Effect of SSI removal on joint crime and employment outcomes (extensive margin)




Notes: Figure plots IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review on the joint likelihood of having at least one criminal charge for an income-generating crime from 1997–2017 and having annual earnings of at least \$15,000 (in 2012 dollars) in at least half of the years from 1997–2017. “Crime, no work” indicates the outcome of having at least one criminal charge but not earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. “Crime, work” indicates the outcome of having at least one criminal charge and earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. “No crime, work” indicates having no criminal charge and earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage. Appendix Table B15 reports point estimates and standard errors.

Figure B12: Effect of SSI removal on joint crime and employment outcomes by subgroup




Notes: Figure plots IV estimates by subgroup of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review on the joint likelihood of having a criminal charge for an income-generating crime from 1997–2017 and having annual earnings of at least \$15,000 (in 2012 dollars) in at least half of the years from 1997–2017. “Crime-only” indicates the outcome of having a criminal charge but not earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. “Employment-only” indicates not having a criminal charge and earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. “Both” indicates having a criminal charge and earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. “High/low parent earn” indicates children with parental earnings above/below the sample median (\$5,500 annually) when the child was between 12 and 17 years of age. “High/low crime area” indicates children in counties with a crime rate in 1997–98 above/below sample median; “high/low unemp area” indicates children in counties with an average annual unemployment rate in 1997–2017 above/below sample median. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage.

Figure B13: Comparison of estimates to literature




Notes: Figure plots estimates of the annual effect size per \$1,000 transfer across papers. Our estimate of the effect of SSI removal, indicated as “Deshpande and Mueller-Smith (2022),” is the annualized version of the IV estimate of the effect of SSI removal on the number of criminal charges from Table I (and Appendix Tables B6 and B7). Estimates for Moving to Opportunity and Section 8 housing voucher come from Kling et al. (2005); the outcome is number of arrests (not charges) from a combination of administrative and survey data. Estimates for Head Start come from Garces et al. (2002) and Deming (2009). The outcome in Garces et al. (2002) is the self-reported likelihood of being booked or charged with a crime. The outcome in Deming (2009) is a composite measure of self-reported contact with the criminal justice system.

Figure B14: Heterogeneity in effects by physical versus all mental conditions




Notes: Figure plots change in number of charges from 1997–2017 for each crime resulting from SSI removal at age 18 by youth with physical versus non-physical (intellectual or other mental) conditions, on the extensive margin (top graph) and intensive margin (bottom graph). “Violent+disorder” indicates non-robbery violent crime plus disorderly conduct, which we refer to as an “anti-social” index in the text. Each arrow starts at the control mean for that subgroup and ends at the control mean plus IV estimate of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review (so that the arrowhead represents the *level* of criminal charges for those removed as a result of the age 18 review). Shaded bars represent confidence intervals for the estimate of the effect of the treatment on the treated. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage.

Figure B15: Transition from initial and long-term response to SSI removal




Notes: Figure plots IV estimates of the effect of age 18 SSI removal on the likelihood of various combinations of outcomes in the initial (1997–2001) and long-term (2002–2017) periods following SSI removal. “Work” indicates that the individual earns at least \$5,000 in at least 70% of the years during the given period and has no criminal charges. “Crime” indicates that the individual has at least one criminal charge in the given period (even if they also work). “Neither” indicates that the individual neither works nor has a criminal charge in that period.

Figure B16: Decomposition of effect of SSI removal on criminal justice involvement in later period




Notes: Figure plots IV estimates of the effect of age 18 SSI removal on the likelihood of having a criminal charge during 2007–2017. The IV estimate is decomposed into whether the individual had the same type of charge between 1997–2006, whether the individual had a different type of charge between 1997–2006, and whether the individual had no charge during between 1997–2006.

Figure B17: Effects on distribution of criminal charges



Notes: Figure plots control mean (lighter part of bar) and IV estimate of the effect of SSI removal (darker part of bar) on the likelihood of having a given number of criminal charges from ages 18 to 38 (top graph) or the likelihood of having at least a given number of criminal charges from ages 18 to 38 (bottom graph). Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage.

Figure B18: Cumulative effect of SSI removal on income-generating charges



Notes: Figure plots cumulative likelihood of having an income-generating criminal charge (top graph) or cumulative number of income-generating criminal charges (bottom graph) for the control group (blue circles) and the treated (i.e., removed as a result of receiving an age 18 review) group (orange Xs). Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage.

Table B1: Comparison table

	CJARS sample	Non-CJARS sample	t-test (p-value)
Diagnosis			
Infectious	0.039	0.037	0.2360
Endocrine	0.033	0.038	0.0002
Blood	0.010	0.010	0.5074
Mental	0.727	0.738	0.0004
Nervous	0.058	0.052	0.0001
Sensory	0.037	0.034	0.0267
Respiratory	0.010	0.011	0.0158
Musculoskeletal	0.013	0.012	0.7174
Congenital	0.012	0.011	0.1253
Missing	0.023	0.021	0.2331
Single mother	0.51	0.51	0.0569
No parent	0.16	0.15	0.0000
Age at SSI entry	11.29	11.47	0.0000
Ann. parent earnings, 1990-1995	\$13,522	\$12,262	0.0000
N	28,843	53,122	

Notes: Table presents summary statistics from the Supplemental Security Record (and Master Earnings File) for the Deshpande (2016) Age 18 sample, split by CJARS coverage status. “CJARS sample” indicates that the child lives in a county covered by the CJARS data, while “Non-CJARS sample” indicates that child does not live in a county covered by the CJARS data. The third column gives the p-value on the t-test of the difference in means between the samples.

Table B2: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (no covariates)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
First stage (N = 28,843)						
Age 18 medical review	0.861*** (0.006)		0.002			
Unfavorable review	0.338*** (0.008)		0.0004			
On SSI from ages 19-22	-0.128*** (0.008)		0.822			
All crime						
Any charge (N = 21,768)	0.001 (0.013)	0.003 (0.037)	0.387	0.033 (0.010)	0.095 (0.286)	2.041
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 26,991)	0.006* (0.003)	0.019* (0.011)	0.047	2.011* (1.164)	5.844* (3.378)	13.39
Incarceration/parole/probation (likelihood/days) (N = 22,705)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.032)	0.229	2.500 (2.524)	7.271 (7.330)	36.03
Charges related to income-generating activity (N = 21,768)						
Total	0.021* (0.012)	0.060* (0.033)	0.240	0.103** (0.040)	0.295** (0.115)	0.625
Burglary	0.001 (0.007)	0.004 (0.019)	0.068	0.016 (0.015)	0.046 (0.044)	0.129
Theft	0.023** (0.009)	0.065** (0.025)	0.121	0.074*** (0.024)	0.211*** (0.069)	0.258
Fraud/forgery	0.001 (0.007)	0.004 (0.021)	0.076	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.047)	0.135
Robbery	0.005 (0.005)	0.015 (0.013)	0.030	0.003 (0.008)	0.008 (0.022)	0.046
Drug distribution	0.002 (0.007)	0.004 (0.020)	0.071	0.014 (0.015)	0.039 (0.044)	0.125
Prostitution	0.004** (0.002)	0.012** (0.005)	0.004	0.014*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.014)	0.010
Charges unrelated to income-generating activity (N = 21,768)						
Total	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.045 (0.037)	0.357	-0.074 (0.082)	-0.211 (0.237)	1.585
Non-robbery violent	0.001 (0.010)	0.004 (0.029)	0.182	0.003 (0.028)	0.009 (0.079)	0.377
Disorderly conduct/obstruction/resisting arrest	0.007 (0.009)	0.021 (0.026)	0.128	0.032 (0.024)	0.092 (0.069)	0.260
Criminal trespass	0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.016)	0.045	0.023* (0.012)	0.067* (0.035)	0.062
Drug possession or paraphernalia	0.005 (0.009)	0.015 (0.027)	0.136	0.015 (0.029)	0.043 (0.082)	0.303
Driving under the influence	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.046	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.045 (0.029)	0.072
Employment (N = 28,843)						
Annual employment (earnings > \$ 5K/yr)	0.030*** (0.007)	0.084*** (0.019)	0.216			
Annual employment (earnings > \$ 15K/yr)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.049*** (0.014)	0.113			
Annual earnings				583.5*** (196)	1613*** (537)	\$4,676

Notes: Table presents parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured between ages 18–38 years ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). No covariates are included in the specification. The sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, incarceration spell or ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of incarceration spells or number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B3: Non-parametric RD estimates of criminal justice outcomes (all, men, women)

	Extensive		Intensive	
	RD Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	Mean
All (N = 86,387)				
Any charge	0.022 (0.016)	0.387	0.185 (0.123)	2.041
Income-generating charge	0.031** (0.014)	0.240	0.158*** (0.048)	0.625
Non-income-generating charge	0.003 (0.016)	0.357	0.049 (0.102)	1.585
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 106,471)	0.011** (0.005)	0.047	3.348** (1.389)	13.39
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 113,885)	0.015** (0.007)	0.113		
Men (N = 53,906)				
Any charge	0.041** (0.020)	0.467	0.175 (0.175)	2.681
Income-generating charge	0.026 (0.018)	0.300	0.103* (0.061)	0.799
Non-income-generating charge	0.015 (0.020)	0.441	0.077 (0.148)	2.116
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 66,465)	0.016** (0.007)	0.072	4.325** (2.117)	20.51
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 71,001)	0.014* (0.008)	0.134		
Women (N = 32,481)				
Any charge	0.008 (0.024)	0.260	0.199 (0.131)	1.017
Income-generating charge	0.048** (0.019)	0.145	0.203*** (0.061)	0.346
Non-income-generating charge	-0.008 (0.022)	0.223	-0.0003 (0.099)	0.735
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 40,006)	0.006** (0.003)	0.007	1.826** (0.754)	1.913
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 42,884)	0.011 (0.010)	0.080		

Notes: Table presents non-parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured between ages 18–38 years using the Stata program “rdrobust” (Calonico et al., 2018). Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. The sample is SSI children located in counties with CJARS coverage with an 18th birthday within the number of days that “rdrobust” selects. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, incarceration spell or ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of incarceration spells or number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B4: Covariate balance test

	Pt. Est.	Control mean	% diff
Demographic characteristics			
Male	0.0002 (0.013)	0.62	0.04%
Age at entry	-0.196 (0.119)	11.66	-1.68%
Single parent	-0.015 (0.013)	0.51	-2.98%
No parent	0.003 (0.0095)	0.17	1.62%
Diagnosis			
Mental	-0.015 (0.012)	0.72	-2.06%
Nervous	0.015** (0.006)	0.05	28.45%
Sensory	0.013** (0.005)	0.03	40.18%
Infectious	-0.013*** (0.005)	0.04	-30.30%
Endocrine	0.0006 (0.005)	0.03	1.84%
Congenital	-0.003 (0.003)	0.01	-21.24%
Musculoskeletal	0.0005 (0.003)	0.01	3.97%
Respiratory	0.0014 (0.003)	0.01	16.21%
Blood	-0.00064 (0.003)	0.01	-6.45%
Neoplasm	0.0025 (0.002)	0.01	24.29%
Missing	-0.002 (0.004)	0.03	-7.84%
HH earnings (1990-95)	-459.0 (441.0)	\$12,075	-3.80%
N	22,078		
<i>p</i> -value on joint <i>F</i> -test		0.0246	

Notes: Table shows the estimate of  $\beta$  from equation (1) when the covariate indicated is put on the left-hand-side of the specification (and no additional covariates on the right-hand-side). The p-value is that from the joint F test of the null hypothesis that the covariate discontinuities are statistically different from zero.

Table B5: Placebo tests of discontinuities at August 22 in surrounding years

	Placebo cutoffs			
	1996	1994	1995	1997
<b>First stage</b>				
Age 18 medical review	0.853*** (0.005)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.0013 (0.006)	-0.078*** (0.009)
Unfavorable review	0.36*** (0.007)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.076*** (0.011)
N	28,843	15,393	19,514	23,188
<b>Charges</b>				
Any crime charge	0.023* (0.012)	0.0195 (0.014)	0.0095 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.011)
Number of crime charges	0.171* (0.092)	-0.0065 (0.100)	-0.042 (0.093)	-0.174* (0.091)
Any income-generating charge	0.034*** (0.011)	-0.0019 (0.013)	-0.0016 (0.011)	-0.0073 (0.011)
Number of income-generating charges	0.140*** (0.039)	-0.014 (0.044)	-0.059 (0.042)	-0.030 (0.040)
N	21,768	15,393	19,514	23,188
<b>Incarceration</b>				
Annual likelihood of incarceration	0.011*** (0.004)	-0.0012 (0.0042)	-0.0009 (0.0037)	-0.004 (0.0034)
N	26,991	19,011	24,036	28,589

Notes: Table presents RD estimates of the discontinuity in first stage outcomes and criminal justice outcomes at the true cutoff (August 22, 1996) and placebo cutoffs (August 22 of 1994, 1995, and 1997). Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. The sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22 cutoff in each year, located in counties with CJARS coverage.

Table B6: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (men)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
First stage (N = 17,979)						
Age 18 medical review	0.833*** (0.007)		0.002			
Unfavorable review	0.377*** (0.009)		0.001			
On SSI from ages 19-22	-0.153*** (0.009)		0.784			
All crime						
Any charge (N = 13,566)	0.029* (0.015)	0.076* (0.04)	0.467	0.175 (0.131)	0.453 (0.338)	2.681
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 16,839)	0.014** (0.006)	0.036** (0.015)	0.072	4.32** (1.741)	11.27** (4.541)	20.51
Incarceration/parole/probation (likelihood/days) (N = 14,113)	0.014 (0.014)	0.036 (0.036)	0.302	5.326 (3.43)	13.73 (8.830)	50.96
Charges related to income-generating activity (N = 13,566)						
Total	0.029* (0.015)	0.075* (0.039)	0.300	0.115** (0.054)	0.299** (0.139)	0.799
Burglary	0.008 (0.010)	0.022 (0.026)	0.099	0.038 (0.024)	0.099 (0.061)	0.193
Theft	0.031*** (0.012)	0.079*** (0.031)	0.147	0.078** (0.032)	0.203** (0.084)	0.320
Fraud/forgery	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.024)	0.083	-0.028 (0.020)	-0.072 (0.052)	0.140
Robbery	0.011 (0.007)	0.029 (0.018)	0.044	0.009 (0.012)	0.023 (0.031)	0.068
Drug distribution	0.007 (0.010)	0.018 (0.027)	0.100	0.026 (0.023)	0.068 (0.060)	0.180
Prostitution	0.004** (0.002)	0.010** (0.004)	0.002	0.007*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.007)	0.005
Charges unrelated to income-generating activity (N = 13,566)						
Total	0.011 (0.015)	0.028 (0.040)	0.441	0.063 (0.109)	0.163 (0.283)	2.116
Non-robbery violent	0.021 (0.014)	0.055 (0.036)	0.238	0.056 (0.039)	0.146 (0.101)	0.518
Disorderly conduct/obstruction/resisting arrest	0.022* (0.012)	0.057* (0.032)	0.163	0.069** (0.034)	0.180** (0.087)	0.338
Criminal trespass	0.004 (0.008)	0.009 (0.020)	0.059	0.041** (0.018)	0.106** (0.048)	0.082
Drug possession or paraphernalia	0.014 (0.013)	0.037 (0.034)	0.188	0.019 (0.041)	0.049 (0.107)	0.426
Driving under the influence	0.001 (0.008)	0.002 (0.021)	0.062	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.050 (0.039)	0.099
Employment (N = 17,979)						
Annual employment (earnings > \$5K/yr)	0.025*** (0.009)	0.067*** (0.023)	0.241			
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr)	0.013* (0.007)	0.036* (0.018)	0.134			
Annual earnings				381.4 (266.6)	1011 (702)	\$5,442

Notes: Table presents, for men, parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured between ages 18–38 years ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. The sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, incarceration spell or ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of incarceration spells or number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B7: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (women)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
First stage (N = 10,864)						
Age 18 medical review	0.887*** (0.008)		0.001			
Unfavorable review	0.332*** (0.012)		0.000			
On SSI from ages 19-22	-0.150*** (0.010)		0.882			
All crime						
Any charge (N = 8,202)	0.014 (0.018)	0.040 (0.053)	0.260	0.184* (0.108)	0.541* (0.316)	1.017
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 10,152)	0.006** (0.002)	0.016** (0.007)	0.007	1.659** (0.684)	4.904** (2.023)	1.913
Incarceration/parole/probation (likelihood/days) (N = 8,592)	0.009 (0.013)	0.026 (0.039)	0.113	4.037* (2.200)	12.08* (6.558)	12.21
Charges related to income-generating activity (N = 8,202)						
Total	0.046*** (0.015)	0.134*** (0.045)	0.145	0.188*** (0.051)	0.551*** (0.150)	0.346
Burglary	0.002 (0.006)	0.005 (0.016)	0.018	0.002 (0.009)	0.006 (0.025)	0.027
Theft	0.027** (0.012)	0.080** (0.035)	0.08	0.105*** (0.033)	0.308*** (0.097)	0.158
Fraud/forgery	0.028** (0.012)	0.083** (0.034)	0.064	0.064** (0.028)	0.188** (0.081)	0.128
Robbery	0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.011)	0.008	0.003 (0.006)	0.008 (0.017)	0.012
Drug distribution	0.002 (0.007)	0.007 (0.020)	0.025	0.006 (0.010)	0.018 (0.030)	0.036
Prostitution	0.006* (0.004)	0.018* (0.011)	0.006	0.028** (0.013)	0.082** (0.038)	0.018
Charges unrelated to income-generating activity (N = 8,202)						
Total	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.050)	0.223	0.005 (0.083)	0.015 (0.241)	0.735
Non-robbery violent	0.001 (0.012)	0.002 (0.035)	0.092	-0.011 (0.025)	-0.033 (0.073)	0.151
Disorderly conduct/obstruction/resisting arrest	0.005 (0.011)	0.016 (0.032)	0.072	0.010 (0.026)	0.029 (0.077)	0.135
Criminal trespass	0.004 (0.006)	0.012 (0.018)	0.022	0.004 (0.010)	0.011 (0.029)	0.031
Drug possession or paraphernalia	0.016* (0.010)	0.048* (0.029)	0.054	0.062** (0.029)	0.183** (0.086)	0.107
Driving under the influence	0.002 (0.006)	0.005 (0.019)	0.02	0.004 (0.010)	0.013 (0.031)	0.028
Employment (N = 10,864)						
Annual employment (earnings > \$5K/yr)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.098*** (0.030)	0.177			
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.060*** (0.021)	0.080			
Annual earnings				721.7*** (252.3)	2175*** (748)	\$3,452

Notes: Table presents, for women, parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured between ages 18–38 years ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. The sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, incarceration spell or ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of incarceration spells or number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B8: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes in each time period

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
Period 1: 1997–2001						
On SSI (N = 28,843)	-0.16*** (0.007)		0.796			
Income-generating charge (N = 22,078)	0.012 (0.008)	0.032 (0.022)	0.107	0.011 (0.017)	0.031 (0.047)	0.181
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 27,268)	0.006 (0.004)	0.017 (0.011)	0.045	1.680 (1.170)	4.576 (3.186)	12.08
Period 2: 2002–2006						
On SSI (N = 28,843)	-0.111*** (0.010)		0.566			
Income-generating charge (N = 22,078)	0.013 (0.008)	0.034 (0.021)	0.099	0.018 (0.016)	0.048 (0.045)	0.162
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 27,268)	0.008 (0.005)	0.021 (0.014)	0.064	2.259 (1.601)	6.153 (4.359)	18.46
Period 3: 2007–2012						
On SSI (N = 28,843)	-0.051*** (0.010)		0.468			
Income-generating charge (N = 22,078)	0.019** (0.008)	0.054** (0.022)	0.098	0.067*** (0.018)	0.180*** (0.048)	0.177
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 27,268)	0.005 (0.005)	0.013 (0.013)	0.059	1.300 (1.536)	3.540 (4.18)	17.50
Period 4: 2013–2017						
On SSI (N = 28,843)	-0.031*** (0.010)		0.404			
Income-generating charge (N = 22,078)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.051*** (0.018)	0.063	0.047*** (0.014)	0.127*** (0.037)	0.11
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 27,268)	0.009** (0.005)	0.024* (0.012)	0.048	3.237** (1.497)	8.819** (4.079)	14.56

Notes: Table presents parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on the likelihood of receiving SSI benefits in each period, the likelihood of having a criminal charge for an income-generating crime in each period, and the likelihood of being incarcerated in each period. It also presents IV estimates (shown in Figure V) of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). The estimates are within each period, not cumulative. Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. The sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B9: Estimates adjusting for sample composition across periods

	Baseline		Period-specific denominators		Non-missing for all periods	
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)
Period 1: 1997–2001						
Any income-generating charge	0.012 (0.008)	0.032 (0.022)	0.015* (0.009)	0.042* (0.024)	0.015* (0.009)	0.042* (0.024)
Number of income-generating charges	0.011 (0.017)	0.031 (0.047)	0.013 (0.019)	0.035 (0.051)	0.013 (0.019)	0.035 (0.051)
Annual likelihood of incarceration	0.006 (0.004)	0.017 (0.011)	0.007* (0.004)	0.020* (0.012)	0.007* (0.004)	0.020* (0.012)
N (charges)	22,078	22,078	20,177	20,177	20,177	20,177
N (incarceration)	27,268	27,268	25,404	25,404	25,404	25,404
Period 2: 2002–2006						
Any income-generating charge	0.013 (0.008)	0.034 (0.021)	0.012 (0.008)	0.033 (0.021)	0.017** (0.008)	0.047** (0.023)
Number of income-generating charges	0.018 (0.016)	0.048 (0.045)	0.018 (0.016)	0.048 (0.044)	0.024 (0.018)	0.064 (0.048)
Annual likelihood of incarceration	0.008 (0.005)	0.021 (0.014)	0.008 (0.005)	0.021 (0.014)	0.013** (0.005)	0.035** (0.014)
N (charges)	22,078	22,078	22,206	22,206	20,177	20,177
N (incarceration)	27,268	27,268	27,391	27,391	25,404	25,404
Period 3: 2007–2012						
Any income-generating charge	0.019** (0.008)	0.054** (0.022)	0.019** (0.008)	0.053** (0.021)	0.021** (0.008)	0.057** (0.023)
Number of income-generating charges	0.067*** (0.018)	0.180*** (0.048)	0.064*** (0.017)	0.176*** (0.047)	0.071*** (0.018)	0.193*** (0.049)
Annual likelihood of incarceration	0.005 (0.005)	0.013 (0.013)	0.004 (0.004)	0.010 (0.012)	0.010** (0.005)	0.028** (0.013)
N (charges)	22,078	22,078	23,367	23,367	20,177	20,177
N (incarceration)	27,268	27,268	32,354	32,354	25,404	25,404
Period 4: 2013–2017						
Any income-generating charge	0.019*** (0.007)	0.051*** (0.018)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.016)	0.018*** (0.007)	0.049*** (0.018)
Number of income-generating charges	0.047*** (0.014)	0.127*** (0.037)	0.049*** (0.013)	0.133*** (0.034)	0.049*** (0.014)	0.135*** (0.039)
Annual likelihood of incarceration	0.009** (0.005)	0.024** (0.012)	0.005 (0.004)	0.015 (0.011)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.035*** (0.013)
N (charges)	22,078	22,078	26,965	26,965	20,177	20,177
N (incarceration)	27,268	27,268	35,014	35,014	25,404	25,404

Notes: Table presents parametric RD and IV estimates of sample composition across periods using three different methods. “Baseline” indicates the estimates reported in Figure V, where states are included if they are covered for at least 80% of years between 1997 and 2017. “Period-specific denominators” indicates the estimates with period-specific denominators, where states are included for a given period if it has at least 80% coverage of the years *in that period*. “Non-missing for all periods” indicates the estimates in which states are included only if the period-specific variable is non-missing for each period. It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). The estimates are within each period, not cumulative. Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. The sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage.

Table B10: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (by family background)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
Two parents (N = 7,121)						
Any charge	0.035* (0.020)	0.100* (0.058)	0.330	0.223 (0.143)	0.645 (0.411)	1.663
Income-generating charge	0.029 (0.018)	0.085 (0.052)	0.202	0.113* (0.060)	0.327* (0.174)	0.526
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 9,021)	0.004 (0.005)	0.013 (0.015)	0.034	1.180 (1.543)	3.418 (4.457)	9.810
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 9,564)	0.018* (0.009)	0.054** (0.027)	0.122			
Single/no parent (N = 14,647)						
Any charge	0.016 (0.015)	0.042 (0.038)	0.414	0.136 (0.117)	0.359 (0.310)	2.216
Income-generating charge	0.036*** (0.014)	0.094*** (0.036)	0.258	0.149*** (0.050)	0.396*** (0.131)	0.671
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 17,970)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.013)	0.053	4.284*** (1.516)	11.40*** (4.034)	15.09
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 19,279)	0.014** (0.006)	0.039** (0.016)	0.109			
High parent earn (N = 10,349)						
Any charge	0.029* (0.017)	0.085* (0.049)	0.334	0.150 (0.121)	0.442 (0.354)	1.689
Income-generating charge	0.032** (0.015)	0.094** (0.044)	0.202	0.105** (0.049)	0.310** (0.142)	0.500
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 12,587)	-0.0002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.038	0.130 (1.423)	0.382 (4.186)	10.93
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 13,132)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.065*** (0.024)	0.125			
Low parent earn (N = 11,535)						
Any charge	0.016 (0.017)	0.041 (0.042)	0.434	0.181 (0.136)	0.460 (0.344)	2.348
Income-generating charge	0.035** (0.016)	0.089** (0.040)	0.274	0.170*** (0.059)	0.432*** (0.150)	0.734
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 14,505)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.052*** (0.014)	0.054	6.030*** (1.708)	15.49*** (4.402)	15.48
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 15,711)	0.010 (0.007)	0.026 (0.017)	0.104			

Notes: Table presents, by family background, parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured between ages 18–38 years ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B11: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (by race and diagnosis)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
White (N = 9,117)						
Any charge	0.039** (0.018)	0.116** (0.053)	0.325	0.122 (0.129)	0.360 (0.378)	1.598
Income-generating charge	0.031* (0.016)	0.091* (0.047)	0.196	0.111** (0.056)	0.327** (0.165)	0.511
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 12,330)	0.004 (0.004)	0.011 (0.011)	0.031	1.355 (1.212)	3.946 (3.522)	8.710
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 12,835)	0.015* (0.008)	0.045* (0.023)	0.124			
Black (N = 8,744)						
Any charge	0.003 (0.019)	0.006 (0.046)	0.487	0.242 (0.159)	0.606 (0.397)	2.751
Income-generating charge	0.031* (0.018)	0.077* (0.046)	0.319	0.161** (0.067)	0.404** (0.167)	0.832
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 9,869)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.053*** (0.018)	0.072	6.172*** (2.287)	15.39*** (5.706)	20.60
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 10,529)	0.014* (0.008)	0.035* (0.019)	0.095			
Intellectual (N = 10,174)						
Any charge	0.014 (0.017)	0.044 (0.053)	0.369	0.202 (0.127)	0.630 (0.395)	1.857
Income-generating charge	0.020 (0.016)	0.063 (0.049)	0.227	0.094* (0.053)	0.294* (0.165)	0.584
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 12,578)	0.007 (0.005)	0.022 (0.016)	0.043	1.984 (1.525)	6.424 (4.931)	12.28
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 13,379)	0.014** (0.006)	0.047** (0.021)	0.078			
Physical (N = 5,847)						
Any charge	0.044** (0.021)	0.137** (0.066)	0.268	0.261* (0.142)	0.805* (0.437)	1.273
Income-generating charge	0.045** (0.019)	0.138** (0.057)	0.159	0.199*** (0.063)	0.616*** (0.196)	0.392
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 7,270)	0.008 (0.006)	0.024 (0.017)	0.029	1.895 (1.782)	5.666 (5.318)	8.408
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 7,885)	0.019* (0.011)	0.059* (0.033)	0.138			
Other Mental (N = 5,747)						
Any charge	0.018 (0.024)	0.037 (0.048)	0.540	0.039 (0.217)	0.079 (0.435)	3.125
Income-generating charge	0.049** (0.024)	0.099** (0.049)	0.346	0.155* (0.092)	0.314* (0.185)	0.929
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 7,143)	0.019** (0.009)	0.039** (0.017)	0.072	6.629** (2.765)	13.26** (5.539)	20.28
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 7,579)	0.016 (0.011)	0.032 (0.022)	0.146			
All mental (intellectual + other mental) (N = 16,127)						
Any charge	0.0066 (0.014)	0.017 (0.036)	0.436	0.133 (0.116)	0.347 (0.301)	2.388
Income-generating charge	0.027** (0.013)	0.071** (0.034)	0.273	0.120** (0.048)	0.311** (0.125)	0.726
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 19,909)	0.008* (0.0047)	0.021* (0.012)	0.062	2.684* (1.484)	7.074* (3.909)	17.93
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 20,958)	0.0143** (0.0057)	0.038** (0.015)	0.104			

Notes: Table presents, by race and diagnosis, parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured between ages 18–38 years ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B12: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (by unemployment rate)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
Low-unemployment counties (N = 12,983)						
Any charge	0.009 (0.015)	0.025 (0.041)	0.411	0.116 (0.116)	0.317 (0.316)	2.265
Income-generating charge	0.023 (0.014)	0.061 (0.039)	0.245	0.126** (0.050)	0.343** (0.137)	0.636
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 15,449)	0.006 (0.005)	0.015 (0.013)	0.046	1.648 (1.431)	4.470 (3.876)	13.27
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 15,521)	0.012* (0.007)	0.032* (0.019)	0.119			
High-unemployment counties (N = 8,785)						
Any charge	0.045** (0.019)	0.122** (0.049)	0.372	0.281* (0.150)	0.753* (0.400)	1.892
Income-generating charge	0.052*** (0.017)	0.140*** (0.046)	0.238	0.167*** (0.061)	0.449*** (0.163)	0.618
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 11,542)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.016)	0.048	5.327*** (1.844)	14.59*** (5.052)	13.48
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 13,322)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.060*** (0.021)	0.106			

Notes: Table presents, by average annual county unemployment rate from 1997–2017, parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured between ages 18–38 years ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). Average annual county unemployment rate from 1997–2017 is calculated from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B13: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (by age at SSI entry, pre-18 criminal record and removal probability)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
Age at SSI entry <=6 (N = 4,000)						
Any charge	0.049** (0.021)	0.309** (0.130)	0.128	0.352*** (0.123)	2.208*** (0.773)	0.504
Income-generating charge	0.048*** (0.017)	0.298*** (0.107)	0.069	0.162*** (0.052)	1.017*** (0.328)	0.152
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 5,040)	0.0088** (0.004)	0.051** (0.025)	0.011	2.648* (1.414)	15.44* (8.186)	2.978
Age at SSI entry from 7 to 13 (N = 8,207)						
Any charge	0.016 (0.019)	0.043 (0.053)	0.394	0.156 (0.154)	0.421 (0.413)	2.034
Income-generating charge	0.032* (0.018)	0.086* (0.049)	0.248	0.136** (0.066)	0.365** (0.176)	0.666
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 10,139)	0.008 (0.006)	0.0202 (0.016)	0.051	2.594 (1.901)	7.000 (5.122)	14.261
Age at SSI entry >13 (N = 9,561)						
Any charge	0.014 (0.019)	0.031 (0.041)	0.472	0.049 (0.150)	0.109 (0.336)	2.572
Income-generating charge	0.027 (0.018)	0.059 (0.040)	0.294	0.116* (0.064)	0.261* (0.143)	0.762
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 11,812)	0.0104* (0.006)	0.024* (0.014)	0.058	3.017 (1.889)	6.841 (4.28)	16.57
Pre-18 criminal record (N = 1,193)						
Any charge	0.077*** (0.028)	0.197*** (0.072)	0.921	0.464 (0.435)	1.187 (1.095)	5.675
Income-generating charge	0.136*** (0.051)	0.348*** (0.133)	0.653	0.458** (0.208)	1.173** (0.536)	1.757
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 1,205)	0.0358 (0.031)	0.0902 (0.0774)	0.222	9.953 (10.46)	25.04 (25.93)	64.78
Low removal probability (N = 10,388)						
Any charge	0.0046 (0.016)	0.029 (0.099)	0.265	0.047 (0.114)	0.300 (0.729)	1.396
Income-generating charge	0.022 (0.014)	0.140 (0.087)	0.162	0.128*** (0.047)	0.819*** (0.305)	0.396
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 13,009)	0.003 (0.004)	0.0196 (0.025)	0.034	0.670 (1.212)	4.282 (7.722)	10.12
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 14,145)	0.014** (0.006)	0.093** (0.038)	0.096			
High removal probability (N = 11,690)						
Any charge	0.024 (0.017)	0.043 (0.031)	0.418	0.245* (0.144)	0.446* (0.261)	2.246
Income-generating charge	0.037** (0.017)	0.067** (0.030)	0.259	0.141** (0.061)	0.257** (0.11)	0.687
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 14,258)	0.009 (0.006)	0.017 (0.011)	0.059	3.144 (1.992)	5.713 (3.616)	17.09
Annual employment (earnings > \$15K/yr) (N = 14,697)	0.017** (0.008)	0.031** (0.015)	0.118			

Notes: Table presents, by age at SSI entry, pre-18 criminal record, and removal probability, parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured between ages 18–38 years ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). “Pre-18 criminal record” means that the individual had an adult criminal charge in CJARS records prior to the age of 18. To calculate predicted “removal probability,” we regress an indicator for receiving an unfavorable age 18 review on observable characteristics for children with an 18th birthday after the PRWORA cutoff and then predict the likelihood of receiving an unfavorable age 18 review for the entire sample. The R-squared of the prediction regression is 0.16. Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B14: Variation in effect of SSI removal on charges by geographic factors

Dependent variable: number of criminal charges in 2007–12 (Great Recession)								
	Baseline specification		By local unemployment rate		By local minimum wage		By local cost of living	
Post x Rate			-0.000208 (0.00437)	0.000185 (0.00435)	-0.00250 (0.0208)	-0.00345 (0.0208)	-0.0000261 (0.00103)	-0.0000616 (0.00102)
Post	0.0683*** (0.0175)	0.0666*** (0.0175)	0.0702* (0.0410)	0.0651 (0.0408)	0.0874 (0.161)	0.0930 (0.161)	0.0713 (0.104)	0.0731 (0.104)
Rate			-0.00158 (0.00306)	-0.0000907 (0.00366)	-0.0357** (0.0147)	0.0560** (0.0232)	-0.00290*** (0.000747)	-0.00240** (0.00117)
DOB	-0.000194** (0.0000804)	-0.000196** (0.00008)	-0.000195** (0.0000803)	-0.000196** (0.00008)	-0.000193** (0.0000804)	-0.000196** (0.00008)	-0.000192** (0.0000854)	-0.000197** (0.0000851)
Post x DOB	0.000051 (0.000118)	0.0000529 (0.000118)	0.0000516 (0.000118)	0.0000529 (0.000118)	0.00005210 (0.000118)	0.000053 (0.000118)	0.0000399 (0.000126)	0.0000456 (0.000126)
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age at entry FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Body system FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Severity FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
State FEs		X		X		X		X
N	22,078	22,078	22,078	22,078	22,078	22,078	18,826	18,826

Notes: Table presents the estimates of how the RD effect varies by local unemployment rate, local minimum wage, and cost of living. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the number of criminal charges during the Great Recession period (2007–12). The first two columns (“Baseline specification”) present estimates from the standard RD specification, where “Post” is an indicator for having an 18th birthday after the August 22, 1997, cutoff. The next two columns (“By local unemployment rate”) interact “Post” with local area unemployment rate from 2007–12 (from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2021)). The next two columns (“By local minimum wage”) interact “Post” with local minimum wage in 2007–12 (from Vaghul and Zipperer (2016)). The final two columns (“By local cost of living”) interact “Post” with cost of living in 2008 (regional price parities from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2021)). Covariates include demographic characteristics (sex, family structure, and parent earnings), age at entry, body system code, and severity. State fixed effects are excluded from the first specification in each set of columns and included in the second specification.

Table B15: IV estimates of SSI removal on joint crime and employment outcomes

	Extensive		Intensive	
	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
Crime, no work	0.069** (0.029)	0.2423	0.066*** (0.025)	0.146
Crime, work	0.024*** (0.008)	0.009	0.008 (0.005)	0.003
No crime, work	0.024 (0.019)	0.081	0.040** (0.020)	0.087
No crime, no work	-0.117*** (0.031)	0.668	-0.114*** (0.029)	0.764
N	22,078	22,078	22,078	22,078

Notes: Table presents IV estimates, from Figure VII and Appendix Figure B11, of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review) on the joint likelihood of having at least one (“Extensive”), or more than one (“Intensive”) criminal charge for an income-generating crime from 1997–2017 and having annual earnings of at least \$15,000 (in 2012 dollars) in at least half of the years from 1997–2017. “Crime, no work” indicates the outcome of having at least one (or more than one) criminal charge but not earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. “Crime, work” indicates the outcome of having at least one (or more than one) criminal charge and earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. “No crime, work” indicates having no criminal charge (or one or fewer) and earning at least \$15,000 in at least one-half of years. Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff who reside in a county with CJARS coverage. “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B16: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (siblings, 18-year-old plus siblings, parents)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
Sibling sample (N = 8,514)						
Any charge	0.015 (0.020)	0.037 (0.049)	0.429	0.272* (0.164)	0.659* (0.397)	2.386
Income-generating charge	0.020 (0.018)	0.048 (0.044)	0.268	0.104 (0.068)	0.252 (0.164)	0.728
Non-income-generating charge	0.017 (0.020)	0.042 (0.048)	0.396	0.200 (0.136)	0.484 (0.329)	1.855
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 10,650)	0.013** (0.005)	0.031** (0.014)	0.045	3.487** (1.646)	8.704** (4.110)	12.60
18-year-old and sibling sample (N = 22,078)						
Any charge	0.019 (0.012)	0.051 (0.032)	0.457	0.276** (0.136)	0.748** (0.367)	3.069
Income-generating charge	0.030*** (0.011)	0.082*** (0.031)	0.299	0.179*** (0.052)	0.486*** (0.141)	0.901
Non-income-generating charge	0.007 (0.012)	0.019 (0.032)	0.426	0.116 (0.112)	0.314 (0.302)	2.420
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 27,268)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.029*** (0.011)	0.064	3.965*** (1.408)	10.80*** (3.839)	19.54
Parent sample (N = 28,980)						
Any charge	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.140	-0.022 (0.029)	-0.061 (0.081)	0.374
Income-generating charge	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.015)	0.062	0.006 (0.013)	0.018 (0.035)	0.107
Non-income-generating charge	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.016 (0.020)	0.118	-0.031 (0.024)	-0.086 (0.066)	0.288
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 36,097)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004	0.210 (0.338)	0.591 (0.948)	1.184

Notes: Table presents, for various family members, parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). The “Sibling” sample is siblings (who themselves receive SSI) of SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage. The “18-year-old and sibling” sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage, plus their siblings who themselves receive SSI. The “Parent” sample is parents of SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B17: Variation in effect of SSI removal by Medicaid and FQHC availability

Dependent variable: any income-generating charge (annual)							
	Baseline specification	By Medicaid availability			By FQHC availability		
Post	0.00502*** (0.00139)	0.0048*** (0.00142)	0.00482*** (0.00142)	0.00467*** (0.00141)	0.00420** (0.00189)	0.00412** (0.00190)	0.00380** (0.00189)
Post x Medicaid		0.001100 (0.00154)	0.00108 (0.00153)	0.00126 (0.00153)			
Medicaid		-0.00425*** (0.00107)	-0.00178 (0.00113)	-0.00308** (0.00126)			
Post x FQHC					0.00102 (0.00165)	0.00108 (0.00165)	0.00122 (0.00165)
FQHC					-0.000722 (0.00116)	0.00189 (0.00118)	0.00289** (0.00145)
DOB	-0.00000414 (0.00000629)	-0.00000424 (0.00000629)	-0.00000418 (0.00000629)	-0.00000431 (0.00000624)	-0.00000415 (0.00000629)	-0.00000412 (0.00000629)	-0.00000411 (0.00000626)
Post x DOB	0.00000601 (0.0000092)	0.00000953 (0.0000092)	0.00000701 (0.0000092)	-0.00000154 (0.00000913)	0.00000615 (0.0000092)	0.00000619 (0.0000092)	-0.00000034 (0.00000916)
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age at entry FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Body system FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Severity FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Year FEs			X	X		X	X
State FEs				X			
County FEs							X
N (individual-years)	463,638	463,638	463,638	463,638	463,638	463,638	463,638
N (individuals)	22,078	22,078	22,078	22,078	22,078	22,078	22,078

Notes: Table presents the estimates of how the RD effect varies by Medicaid and Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC) availability. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the likelihood of any income-generating charge during the 1997–2017 period. The first column (“Baseline specification”) present estimates from the standard RD specification, where “Post” is an indicator for having an 18th birthday after the August 22, 1997, cutoff. The next three columns (“By Medicaid availability”) interact “Post” with Medicaid availability across states from 1997–2017 (from Rudowitz, Artiga, and Arguello (2013)). The final three columns (“By FQHC availability”) interact “Post” with FQHC availability across counties from 1997–2017 (from the Uniform Data Set (UDS) collected by HRSA and the Provider of Service (POS) file collected by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)). Covariates include demographic characteristics (sex, family structure, and parent earnings), age at entry, body system code, and severity. Year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and county fixed effects are included as indicated.

Table B18: RD and IV estimates of criminal justice outcomes (18-year-old plus siblings)

	Extensive			Intensive		
	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean	RD Pt Est (SE)	IV Pt Est (SE)	Mean
All crime						
Any charge (N = 22,078)	0.019 (0.012)	0.051 (0.032)	0.457	0.276** (0.136)	0.748** (0.367)	3.069
Incarcerated (annual likelihood/days) (N = 27,268)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.029*** (0.011)	0.064	3.965*** (1.408)	10.8*** (3.839)	19.54
Incarceration/parole/probation (likelihood/days) (N = 22,705)	0.015 (0.011)	0.041 (0.029)	0.282	7.082** (3.093)	19.28** (8.415)	51.84
Charges related to income-generating activity (N = 22,078)						
Total (income generating)	0.03*** (0.011)	0.082*** (0.031)	0.300	0.179*** (0.052)	0.486*** (0.141)	0.901
Burglary	0.012 (0.007)	0.032 (0.02)	0.091	0.031* (0.019)	0.084* (0.051)	0.177
Theft	0.021** (0.009)	0.058** (0.025)	0.152	0.092*** (0.030)	0.249*** (0.081)	0.340
Fraud/forgery	0.004 (0.008)	0.011 (0.021)	0.101	0.011 (0.020)	0.029 (0.055)	0.192
Robbery	0.014** (0.005)	0.037** (0.015)	0.041	0.013 (0.010)	0.035 (0.026)	0.068
Drug distribution	0.008 (0.008)	0.023 (0.021)	0.099	0.029 (0.020)	0.078 (0.055)	0.191
Prostitution	0.003 (0.002)	0.008 (0.006)	0.005	0.008 (0.006)	0.022 (0.017)	0.011
Charges unrelated to income-generating activity (N = 22,078)						
Total (non-income generating)	0.007 (0.012)	0.019 (0.032)	0.426	0.116 (0.112)	0.314 (0.302)	2.420
Non-robbery violent	0.013 (0.011)	0.034 (0.028)	0.229			
Criminal trespass	0.004 (0.006)	0.010 (0.017)	0.059	0.037*** (0.014)	0.101*** (0.037)	0.081
Drug possession or paraphernalia	0.009 (0.010)	0.024 (0.026)	0.184	0.048 (0.035)	0.130 (0.096)	0.455
Driving under the influence	0.0001 (0.006)	0.0001 (0.017)	0.059	-0.0113 (0.012)	-0.0307 (0.033)	0.102

Notes: Table presents, for 18-year-old plus siblings, parametric RD estimates of the effect of having an 18th birthday just after the August 22, 1996, cutoff on outcomes measured over 1997–2017 ( $\beta$  from equation (1)). It also presents IV estimates of the effect of receiving an unfavorable age 18 medical review ( $\beta$  from equation (1) scaled up by the likelihood of an unfavorable medical review). Covariates include medical diary (severity), sex, first age of SSI receipt, body system code, family structure, parent earnings, and state. The sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 10 months of the August 22, 1996, cutoff, located in counties with CJARS coverage, plus their siblings who themselves receive SSI. “Extensive” indicates the likelihood of any charge (or, alternatively, incarceration spell or ever incarcerated). “Intensive” indicates the number of charges (or, alternatively, number of incarceration spells or number of days incarcerated). “Mean” indicates the average outcome for individuals with an 18th birthday within 6 months to the left of the August 22, 1996, cutoff.

Table B19: Cost-benefit analysis: enforcement and court cost of crime

	Enforcement cost					Court cost			Total
	Original IV estimate: $\Delta$ charges	% of reported offenses cleared by arrest	Corrected IV estimate: $\Delta$ reported offenses	Price per investigation	Total Enforcement Costs	IV estimate: $\Delta$ charges	Price per prosecution	Total Court Costs	
Burglary	0.08	14%	0.60	\$1,550	\$928	0.08	\$404	\$34	\$962
Theft	0.25	19%	1.35	\$1,332	\$1,802	0.25	\$492	\$122	\$1,924
Robbery	0.03	31%	0.11	\$2,895	\$328	0.03	\$936	\$32	\$360
Fraud/forgery	0.03	32%	0.09	\$1,354	\$120	0.03	\$456	\$13	\$133
Prostitution	0.02	n/a	0.02	\$1,354	\$30	0.02	\$456	\$10	\$40
Drug Dealing	0.08	n/a	0.08	\$786	\$61	0.08	\$1,064	\$83	\$144
Drug Possession	0.09	n/a	0.09	\$424	\$36	0.09	\$1,064	\$91	\$127
Sexual Assault	0.05	33%	0.14	\$25,230	\$3,589	0.05	\$3,311	\$155	\$3,744
Assault	0.114	52%	0.22	\$10,729	\$2,339	0.114	\$1,438	\$164	\$2,503
Trespass	0.101	17%	0.59	\$1,354	\$795	0.101	\$404	\$41	\$836
Total					\$10,028			\$746	\$10,774

Notes: Table presents enforcement and court cost of crime resulting from each SSI removal. For enforcement cost, it presents the original IV estimates of the change in the number of charges for different types of offenses for both the 18-year-old and observable siblings from Appendix Table B18. The original IV estimates are scaled by the fraction of reported offenses that lead to a charge, from Criminal Justice Information Services Division (2019), to obtain the “corrected” IV estimates of the change in the number of reported offenses. Corrected IV estimates are multiplied by investigation costs adjusted to 2012 prices to obtain total enforcement costs. Burglary, theft, robbery, fraud/forgery, prostitution, sexual assault, assault and trespass investigation costs come from Hunt, Saunders, and Kilmer (2018), and drug dealing and drug possession investigation costs come from Caulkins (2010). For court cost, the table presents the IV estimates of change in number of charges for different types of offenses. IV estimates are multiplied by prosecution costs adjusted to 2012 prices to obtain total court costs. Burglary, theft, robbery, fraud/forgery, prostitution, sexual assault, assault and trespass prosecution costs come from Hunt, Anderson, and Saunders (2016), and drug dealing and drug possession prosecution costs come from The Vermont Center for Justice Research (2014).

Table B20: Cost-benefit analysis: corrections cost of crime

	IV estimate: $\Delta$ days	Price per day	Total correctional costs
Total days in prison	227	\$94	\$21,280
Total days in jail	70.4	\$104	\$7,361
Total days on probation	349	\$3	\$1,033
Total days on parole	73	\$7	\$486
Total			\$30,160

Notes: Table presents prison cost of crime resulting from each SSI removal. It presents IV estimates of change in number of days in prison/jail or on probation/parole for both the 18-year-old and observable siblings from Appendix Table B18. IV estimates are multiplied by cost per day incarcerated adjusted to 2012 prices to obtain total correctional costs. Prison costs of crime come from Prisons Bureau (2019), jail costs of crime come from Henrichson (2015), and probation and parole costs of crime come from Henrichson and Galgano (2013).

Table B21: Cost-benefit analysis: victim cost of crime

	Original IV estimate: $\Delta$ charges	% of illicit acts $\rightarrow$ charges	Corrected IV estimate: $\Delta$ illicit acts	Price per offense	Total victim costs
Burglary	0.08	7%	1.21	\$2,225	\$2,694
Theft	0.25	5%	4.89	\$588	\$2,873
Robbery	0.03	17%	0.21	\$12,716	\$2,642
Fraud/forgery	0.03	5%	0.64	\$0	\$0
Prostitution	0.02	0.03%	70.06	\$0	\$0
Drug Dealing	0.08	0.02%	464.8	\$0	\$0
Drug Possession	0.09	0.02%	511.3	\$0	\$0
Sexual Assault	0.05	10%	0.48	\$138,287	\$66,909
Assault	0.11	23%	0.51	\$14,941	\$7,574
Trespass	0.10	8%	1.32	\$2,225	\$2,936
Total					\$85,628

Notes: Table presents victim cost of crime resulting from each SSI removal. It presents the original IV estimates of the change in the number of charges for different types of offenses for both the 18-year-old and observable siblings from Appendix Table B18. The original IV estimates are scaled by the fraction of total offenses reported to law enforcement (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2020, 2021) and the fraction of reported offenses resulting in arrest (Criminal Justice Information Services Division, 2019) to obtain the “corrected” IV estimates of change in number of illicit acts. Corrected IV estimates are multiplied by victim cost per crime type adjusted to 2012 prices to obtain total victim costs. Victim costs of crime for all types of offenses in the table come from Miller (1996).