Web Appendix, "Increasing the Demand for Workers with a Criminal Record", by Cullen, Dobbie, and Hoffman

Appendix A provides the complete list of questions that the Platform gave to hiring managers. Appendix B contains additional figures and tables.

Appendix A. Complete List of Questions

Q1. How do you work with Platform A? (select all that apply)

Q1a. If "Other" is selected: You selected "Other". Please provide more information about your role in the company

Q2. What is your position in the company?

Q3. How many years of experience do you have in labor sourcing and/or hiring?

Q4. We are considering expanding our pool of users to include individuals that have a criminal record. We want to learn whether this expanded pool would suit your needs. If you indicate that you're interested in connecting with Platform A users with a criminal record, then (and only then) your choice could affect whether these users are able to accept jobs you post. These individuals would be at most 5% of your pool of possible matches.

Q5. Would you currently have the authority to permit a user with a criminal record to accept a job you posted on Platform A?

Q5a. If "Yes" is not selected: Please continue answering the survey as if you had full authority to make the decision.

Q6. [Binary Choice] If Platform A gave you a {Wage Subsidy} discount for users with a criminal record, would you permit such users to perform jobs you post? This means you would only pay (100 - {Wage Subsidy}) of the wage for those with a criminal record. All Platform A users would still receive the full pay amount after the discount (Platform A would pay the difference).

Q6a. [Display this question if binary choice answer is not "Yes"] If Platform A could cover damages up to {Crime and Safety Insurance} related to theft or safety incurred by workers with a criminal record, would you permit such Platform A users to perform jobs you post? Platform A would still give you a {Wage Subsidy} discount, but no other supplementary policies would apply. If you have any questions about what damages would or would not be included, please share those with us.

Q6b. [Display this question if binary choice answer is not "Yes"] If Platform A required users of Platform A with a criminal record to have satisfactorily completed {Performance History} job(s), receiving more than 85% 5-star reviews, would you permit such users to perform jobs you post? Platform A would still give you a {Wage Subsidy} discount, but no other supplementary policies would apply.

Q6d. [Display this question if binary choice answer is not "Yes"] If Platform A required users with a criminal record to have maintained a clean record for at least {Clean Record Length} would you

permit such users to perform jobs you post? Platform A would still give you a {Wage Subsidy} discount, but no other supplementary policies would apply.

Q7. If the unemployment rate were {Unemployment Rate} meaning the local labor market was {Labor Market Tightness} and {Qualitative Unemployment Level} share of people were looking for jobs, would you permit users with a criminal record to perform jobs you post? Platform A would still give you a {Wage Subsidy} discount, but no other supplementary policies would apply.

Q8. We will now ask you about individuals with particular criminal record. Please indicate whether you would permit Platform A users with these types of convictions to perform jobs you post. Platform A would still give you a {Wage Subsidy} discount, but no other supplementary policies would apply.

Q8a. Property/financial felony (example: breaking and entering, car theft, fraud, embezzlement over $2,000)

Q8b. Violent felony (example: aggravated assault, domestic violence)

Q8c. Substance-related felony (example: drug trafficking/distribution, multiple DUIs)

Q8d. Property/financial misdemeanor: (example: petty theft, vandalism); financial misdemeanor (example: embezzlement under $500)

Q8e. Violent misdemeanor (example: attempting to commit violent injury)

Q8f. Substance-related misdemeanor (example: drug possession, public intoxication)

Q9. Does your company or organization currently have a hiring policy regarding individuals with a criminal record?

Q10. Which of the following factor into your organization's decision to hire individuals with criminal records? (select all that apply or alternatively "we did not decide to hire individuals with a criminal background")

Q11. Think about other companies or organizations in your area. How much do you believe that the following are concerns to companies or organizations regarding hiring individuals with criminal records?

Q12. Do your jobs involve Platform A users having contact with customers?

Q13. At your jobs, is there cash or high-value inventory that Platform A users could steal?

Q14. [Respondents were randomized to either a low rating or a high rating arm] In 2019, 86% of jobs on Platform A resulted in a 5-star rating. What percentage of jobs completed by people with a criminal record do you think would result in a 5-star rating on Platform A or a similar platform? If your guess is within 5% of the truth, we will send you an additional $2 reward!

Q15. [Respondents were randomized to either a low rating or a high rating arm] In 2019, 5% of jobs on Platform A resulted in a either a no-show or low rating (1 or 2 stars). What percentage of jobs completed by people with a criminal record do you think would result in a no-show or low rating on Platform A or a similar platform? If your guess is within 5% of the truth, we will send you an additional $2 reward!

Q16. Next, a group of individuals participating in this survey will be chosen to receive some information about the performance of people with a criminal background on the same or similar platforms. Please continue to the next screen to find out if you will be selected to receive this information.

Q17a. [Display if selected to receive information] The truth is that 87% of jobs completed by people with a criminal record resulted in a 5-star rating on the same or a similar platform - actually better than everyone else. Please take some time to read and understand this information carefully. When you are ready, proceed to the next screen.

Q17b. [Display if selected to receive information] The truth is that only 3% of jobs completed by people with a criminal record resulted in a either a no-show or a low rating (1 or 2 stars) on the same or a similar platform - actually fewer no-shows and low ratings than everyone else. Please take some time to read and understand this information carefully. When you are ready, proceed to the next screen.

Q18. [Display if not selected to receive information] You have not been selected to receive the following information. When you are ready, proceed to the next screen.

Q19. We want to give you the opportunity to reassess your answer to the question below. This opportunity is given automatically to all survey participants, regardless of their responses.

Q20a. In 2019, 86% of jobs on Platform A resulted in a 5-star rating. What percentage of jobs completed by people with a criminal record do you think would result in a 5-star rating on Platform A or a similar platform? If your guess is within 5% of the truth, we will send you an additional $2 reward!

Q20b. In 2019, 5% of jobs on Platform A resulted in either a no-show or low rating (1 or 2 stars). What percentage of jobs completed by people with a criminal record do you think would result in a no-show or low rating on Platform A or a similar platform? If your guess is within 5% of the truth, we will send you an additional $2 reward!

Q21. Next, a group of individuals participating in this survey will be chosen to receive some information about the performance of people with a criminal background on the same or similar platforms. Please continue to the next screen to find out if you will be selected to receive this information.

Q21a. [25% of respondents] The truth is that only 3% of jobs completed by people with a criminal record resulted in a either a no-show or a low rating (1 or 2 stars) on the same or a similar platform—actually fewer no-shows and low ratings than everyone else. Please take some time to read and understand this information carefully. When you are ready, proceed to the next screen.

Q21b. [25% of respondents] The truth is that 87% of jobs completed by people with a criminal record resulted in a 5-star rating on the same or a similar platform—actually better than everyone

else. Please take some time to read and understand this information carefully. When you are ready, proceed to the next screen.

Q22a. In 2019, 86% of jobs on Platform A resulted in a 5-star rating. What percentage of jobs completed by people with a criminal record do you think would result in a 5-star rating on Platform A or a similar platform? If your guess is within 5% of the truth, we will send you an additional $2 reward!

Q22b. In 2019, 5% of jobs on Platform A resulted in a either a no-show or low rating (1 or 2 stars). What percentage of jobs completed by people with a criminal record do you think would result in a no-show or low rating on Platform A or a similar platform? If your guess is within 5% of the truth, we will send you an additional $2 reward!

Q23. We also give all participants the chance to reassess their answer to the earlier question regarding expanding the pool of Platform A users.

Q24. If Platform A gave you a {Wage Subsidy} discount for Platform A users with a criminal record, would you permit such Platform A users to perform jobs you post? This means you would only pay (100 - {Wage Subsidy}) of the wage for those with a criminal record. All Platform A users would still receive the full pay amount after the discount (Platform A would pay the difference).

Q25. Do you agree with the following statement? "In the types of jobs I post on Platform A, a user of Platform A with a criminal record is likely to perform well."

Q26. Do you agree with the following statement? "In the types of jobs I post on Platform A, a user of Platform A with a criminal record is likely to put other workers, clients or their supervisor at risk."

Q27. Do you agree with the following statement? "In the types of jobs I post on Platform A, a user of Platform A with a criminal record is likely to steal or cause damage to physical assets and property."

Q28. [Display this question if the respondent has indicated they do not have authority to permit users of Platform A with a criminal background to perform a job.] If you would like to refer us to someone with the appropriate authority to permit a user of Platform A with a criminal background to perform a job, please provide their name, email address, and any additional comments you would like to offer about how this decision will be made in your organization. We will only use this information to inquire about expanding the pool of users of Platform A to include individuals with a criminal record.

Q29. Did you have any technical or language-related issues with this survey?

Q30a. [Display this question if the respondent indicates that they had issues with the survey] What issues did you have with this survey?

Q30. Please share any other thoughts on this program to expand the group of users of Platform A who can perform jobs your business posts (optional)

Q31. Please select how you would like to receive your gift for completing this survey.

Appendix B. Additional Figures and Tables

Figure B.1
Heterogeneity by Labor Market Conditions
A. Effect in the No Wage Subsidy Sample



B. Mean Effect in the Full Sample



Notes. This figure presents estimates of the mean willingness to work with WCs (and 95% confidence interval) by labor market conditions. The estimates are based on results from regression specifications similar to Equation (2). Panel A reports results for the sample of 234 hiring managers from 203 businesses in the no wage subsidy sample. Panel B reports results for the full sample of 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment. In both panels, the first set of bars show the fraction of respondents willing to work with a WC under a randomly assigned potential local unemployment rate of 10% or 2%, the second set of bars for firm's whose metropolitan area are above and below the median unemployment rate in January-March 2020, the third set of bars for firm's whose metropolitan area are above and below the median industry-specific unemployment rate in January-March 2020, and the fourth set of bars for firm's whose metropolitan area are above and below the median unemployment rate for worker with a high school diploma or below in January-March 2020. The p-values and 95% confidence intervals are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by business.

FIGURE B.2
Labor Demand Curves for Main Results



Notes. This figure presents estimates of the mean willingness to work with WCs (and 95% confidence interval) by randomized wage subsidy as labor demand curves. In each panel, the baseline estimates are from a regression model similar to Equation (1), but where we include dummies for the different subsidy levels instead of a pseudo-continuous effective wage. All the other estimates are based on results from a regression model similar to Equation (3), but where we exclude the indicator for the policy level of interest and include an indicator for no subsidy. Each panel also shows the line of best fit, labor demand elasticities, and the mean effect of the treatment across all wage subsidy levels. The estimates are based on the 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment. Panel A plots the fraction of respondents willing to work with a WC at baseline and if the Platform provides crime and safety insurance policy that covers damages up to $5,000. Panel B plots the fraction of respondents willing to work with a WC at baseline and if the Platform provides job history screening so that WCs can only accept jobs only if they have satisfactorily completed at least one job on the Platform. Panel C plots the fraction of respondents willing to work with a WC at baseline and if the Platform provides limited criminal record screening so that WCs can only accept jobs if it has been at least one year since the most recent arrest or conviction. The 95% confidence intervals are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by business.

FIGURE B.3
Crime and Safety Insurance by Treatment Intensity

A. Effect in the No Wage Subsidy Sample



B. Mean Effect in the Full Sample



Notes. This figure presents estimates of the mean willingness to work with WCs (and 95% confidence interval) if the Platform provides different levels of crime and safety insurance. The estimates are based on results from regression specifications described by Equation (3). Each p-value corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis that a given higher level of insurance has no effect relative to the lowest level of insurance. Panel A reports results for the sample of 234 hiring managers from 203 businesses in the no wage subsidy sample. Panel B reports results for the full sample of 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment. The first bar in both panels reports the fraction of respondents willing to work with a WC if the Platform provides crime and safety insurance policy that covers damages up to $5,000, the second if the Platform provides a policy that covers damages up to $100,000, and the third if the Platform provides a policy that covers damages up to $5 million. The p-values and 95% confidence intervals are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by business.

FIGURE B.4
Job History Screening by Treatment Intensity

A. Effect in the No Wage Subsidy Sample



B. Mean Effect in the Full Sample



Notes. This figure presents estimates of the mean willingness to work with WCs (and 95% confidence interval) if the Platform provides different levels of job history screening. The estimates are based on results from regression specifications described by Equation (3). Each p-value corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis that a given higher level of treatment intensity has no effect relative to the lowest level of treatment intensity. Panel A reports results for the sample of 234 hiring managers from 203 businesses in the no wage subsidy sample. Panel B reports results for the full sample of 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment. The first bar in both panels reports the fraction of respondents willing to work with a WC if the Platform provides job history screening so that WCs can only accept jobs if they have satisfactorily completed at least one job on the Platform, the second if it is at least five jobs, and the third if it is at least 25 jobs. The p-values and 95% confidence intervals are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by business.

FIGURE B.5
Limited Record Screening by Treatment Intensity

A. Effect in the No Wage Subsidy Sample



B. Mean Effect in the Full Sample



Notes. This figure presents estimates of the mean willingness to work with WCs (and 95% confidence interval) if the Platform provides different levels of limited criminal record screening. The estimates are based on results from regression specifications described by Equation (3). Each p-value corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis that a given higher level of treatment intensity has no effect relative to the lowest level of treatment intensity. Panel A reports results for the sample of 234 hiring managers from 203 businesses in the no wage subsidy sample. Panel B reports results for the full sample of 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment. The first bar in both panels reports the fraction of respondents willing to work with a WC if the Platform provides limited criminal record screening so that WCs can only accept jobs if it has been at least one year since the most recent arrest or conviction, the second if it is at least three years, and the third if it is at least seven years. The p-values and 95% confidence intervals are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by business.

FIGURE B.6
First Stage and IV Estimates of Objective Performance Information



Notes. This figure reports binned scatter-plot estimates of the impact of high- and low-performance information on business beliefs and hiring decisions. Panels A-B plot the difference between the reported performance beliefs at the end of the experiment and prior beliefs against the perception gap. For graphical exposition, we plot the belief update rather than the posterior belief as observations along the 45-degree line imply the manager updated completely from her prior to a posterior that exactly matches the information shown. Panels C-D plot the willingness to work with WCs at the end of the experiment against the fitted posterior belief predictions from the first stage regression. Panels A and C present results for being shown information on the fraction of no-shows and either one- or two-star ratings. Panels B and D present results for being shown information on the fraction of five-star ratings. See Section V of the text for additional details.

FIGURE B.7
Heterogeneity by County COVID-19 Prevalence and State of Emergency

A. Effect in the No Wage Subsidy Sample



B. Mean Effect in the Full Sample



Notes. This figure presents estimates of the mean willingness to work with WCs (and 95% confidence interval) for respondents who across different COVID-19 contexts. The estimates are based on results from regression specifications similar to Equation (2). Each p-value corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in demand by COVID-19 prevalence or whether it is after the state of emergency. Panel A reports results for the sample of 234 hiring managers from 203 businesses in the no wage subsidy sample. Panel B reports results for the full sample of 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment. In both panels, the first set of bars report the fraction of respondents willing to work with WCs before and after the national declaration of state of emergency (SOE) and the second set of bars report the fraction of respondents willing to work with WCs in less and more exposed counties, where less exposed counties are defined as below the median in terms of COVID-19 prevalence during the experiment and more exposed counties are defined as above the median in terms of COVID-19 prevalence during the experiment. The results are similar if we split by the bottom three quartiles versus the top quartile in terms of COVID-19 prevalence. The p-values and 95% confidence intervals are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by business.

TABLE B.1
Description of Additional Characteristics

Job Characteristic	Survey Question
Customer Interactions	Do your jobs involve [Platform] users having contact with customers?
High-Value Inventory	At your jobs, is there cash or high-value inventory that [Platform] users could steal?
Hiring Policies	Does your company or organization currently have a hiring policy regarding individuals with a criminal record?
Potential Unemployment Rate	If the unemployment rate were $\langle \mathbf{a} \in \{2\%, 6\%, 10\%\} \rangle$, meaning the local labor market was $\langle \mathbf{b} \in \{$"doing very well", "doing about average", "not doing so well" $\}\rangle$ and $\langle \mathbf{c} \in \{$"a less than typical", "an average", "a more than typical"$\}\rangle$ share of people were looking for jobs, would you permit [Platform Workers] with a criminal record to perform jobs you post?
Prior High-Performance Beliefs	In 2019, 85% of jobs on the Platform resulted in a 5-star rating. What percentage of jobs completed by people with a criminal record do you think would result in a 5-star rating on the Platform or a similar platform? If your guess is within 5% of the truth, we will send you an additional {bonus} reward!
Prior Low-Performance Beliefs	In 2019, 5% of jobs on the Platform resulted in a no-show or low rating (1 or 2 stars). What percentage of jobs completed by people with a criminal record do you think would result in a no-show or low rating (1 or 2 stars) on the Platform or a similar platform? If your guess is within 5% of the truth, we will send you an additional {bonus} reward!

Notes. This table summarizes the main job and firm characteristics used in our analysis, as well as the measure of prior information on WC performance. The text in square brackets is redacted information identifying the Platform. The text in angular brackets is a placeholder for a randomized value from a set of options.

TABLE B.2
Descriptive Statistics of Firms on the Platform by Survey Response

Firm Characteristics	Responded to Survey	Did Not Respond to Survey
Median Firm Age	19.0	22.0
Median Number of Employees	40	21
Service	0.31	0.29
Manufacturing	0.19	0.19
Retail	0.15	0.17
Public Administration	0.10	0.10
Transportation & Public Utilities	0.10	0.11
Wholesale Trade	0.09	0.08
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate	0.03	0.04
Construction	0.01	0.02
Nonclassifiable	0.01	0.00
Firms with Nonmissing Age or Number Employees	666	2,847
with Nonmissing Industry Classification	518	2,124
Mean Number of Jobs Posted	2828	561

Notes. This table compares descriptive statistics for the experimental sample comprised of the 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment to that of the 5851 firms on the Platform that did not respond to the survey. The industry characteristics are further limited to the firms in our sample with that data available in the Infogroup Database. The data used to calculate mean number of jobs posted extends from 2018 to the beginning of 2020.

TABLE B.3
Labor Demand Elasticities

	Linear	Quadratic	Non-Parametric
10% Subsidy†	-0.354	-0.748	-1.091
	(0.094)	(0.341)	
25% Subsidy	-0.300	-0.548	0.360
	(0.080)	(0.220)	
50% Subsidy	-0.203	-0.272	-0.690
	(0.054)	(0.079)	
100% Subsidy	-0.071	-0.030	0.001
	(0.019)	(0.039)	
Average Elasticity	-0.207	-0.273	-0.161
	(0.055)	(0.078)	
Firms	913	913	913
Managers	1,095	1,095	1,095

Notes. This table reports alternate estimates of labor demand elasticity. Column 1 reports linear estimates, calculated as $(^{dH}/_{dw})(^{w}/_{H})$, where $^{dH}/_{dw}$ represents the slope from a linear regression of willingness to work with WCs on effective wage and is constant across rows. w and H represent the midpoint between two effective wage levels of the effective wage and mean willingness to work with WCs, respectively. For example, in the 10% subsidy row, w is the midpoint between a 100% and 90% effective wage. Column 2 reports quadratic estimates, again calculated as $(^{dH}/_{dw})(^{w}/_{H})$, where $^{dH}/_{dw}$ represents the marginal effect from a regression of willingness to work with WCs on effective wage and effective wage squared. The marginal effect is calculated at the midpoint between two effective wage levels and as such varies across columns. w and H are defined as in column 1. Column 3 reports non-parametric estimates, calculated as the percent change in willingness to work with WCs over the percent change in effective wage between two effective wage levels. The average elasticity in Column 1 is calculated as $(^{dH}/_{dw})(^{\bar{w}}/_{\bar{H}})$, where $^{dH}/_{dw}$ represents the slope from the linear regression of willingness to work with WCs on effective wage, and $\bar{w}$ and $\bar{H}$ represent mean effective wage and willingness to work with WCs across all subsidy levels. The average elasticity in Column 2, $(^{dH}/_{dw})(^{w}/_{H})$, is instead calculated as the marginal effect at the mean from the quadratic regression. In Column 3, it is the percent change from 0% effective wage to 100% effective wage.

† We use different values for low levels of subsidy (5% and 10%) in two survey arms. For exposition, we pool the 5 and 10 percent subsidy levels which results in a uniform number of observations across values displayed under the label *10%*.

TABLE B.4
Descriptive Statistics by Willingness to Hire WCs

	Wage Subsidy											
	No Subsidy		10% Subsidy		25% Subsidy		50% Subsidy		100% Subsidy			
	Work w/ WCs?		Work w/ WCs?		Work w/ WCs?		Work w/ WCs?		Work w/ WCs?			
A. Firm Characteristics	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	p(F-stat)	N
Years Experience of Hiring Manager	7.34	7.27	6.13	7.76	7.16	8.23	7.42	7.33	6.31	8.09	0.037	1,095
	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.51)	(0.55)	(0.57)	(0.45)	(0.60)		
Employees	1,742	2,026	3,404	2,152	356	2,171	7,333	9,095	696	2,411	0.558	824
	(1,546)	(1,400)	(2,913)	(1,055)	(107)	(1,533)	(4,172)	(3,724)	(345)	(1,095)		
N. Jobs Posted on Platform	543	1,245	769	4,976	855	1,218	3,874	6,567	1,077	2,373	<0.001	1,095
	(189)	(249)	(495)	(2,566)	(232)	(366)	(2,504)	(3,518)	(494)	(870)		
Service	0.28	0.41	0.28	0.31	0.37	0.41	0.20	0.27	0.38	0.36	0.612	687
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)		
Manufacturing	0.17	0.06	0.26	0.25	0.13	0.12	0.26	0.20	0.14	0.21	0.352	687
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)		
Retail	0.21	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.16	0.15	0.25	0.14	0.10	0.803	687
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)		
Transportation & Public Utilities	0.08	0.11	0.06	0.14	0.21	0.04	0.17	0.17	0.08	0.07	0.204	687
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Wholesale	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.09	0.03	0.14	0.18	0.302	687
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.975	687
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Construction	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.210	687
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)		
Firm-Wide WC Hiring Policy	0.42	0.54	0.36	0.50	0.41	0.54	0.41	0.51	0.37	0.56	<0.001	1,075
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)		
B. Policies Concerning Whether WCs can Work												
Consider WCs Because Best Candidate	0.64	0.37	0.60	0.21	0.62	0.22	0.70	0.19	0.62	0.27	<0.001	1,075
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)		
Consider WCs Because Second Chances Are Important	0.70	0.38	0.67	0.24	0.61	0.25	0.72	0.32	0.67	0.30	<0.001	1,075
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Consider WCs Because of Financial Incentives	0.11	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.10	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.207	1,075
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Concerned About Customer Reactions	0.55	0.57	0.40	0.50	0.46	0.48	0.47	0.45	0.44	0.53	0.517	1,075
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)		
Concerned About Performance	0.16	0.09	0.14	0.17	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.16	0.13	0.11	0.520	1,075
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Concerned About Local, State, or Federal Regulations	0.33	0.22	0.19	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.094	1,075
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)		
C. WC Perceptions, Binary Scale												
Confidence a WCs will Perform Well	0.97	0.90	0.99	0.86	0.99	0.90	0.99	0.90	1.00	0.90	<0.001	1,095
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.03)		
Concern a WCs will Put Others at Risk	0.49	0.80	0.52	0.74	0.51	0.75	0.41	0.76	0.40	0.81	<0.001	1,095
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)		
Concern a WCs will Steal or Cause Damage	0.54	0.83	0.52	0.82	0.52	0.76	0.50	0.82	0.44	0.84	<0.001	1,095
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)		

Notes. Each row presents means of some attribute for each subsidy level, split by whether the respondent is willing to work with a WC at that subsidy level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Column 11 shows the p-value associated with the F-statistic from the test that the means are equal for the hiring and not hiring groups at every subsidy level. Column 12 shows the number of respondents for whom the attribute of interest is available. See the Table II notes for additional details on the outcomes and sample.

TABLE B.5
Crime and Safety Insurance, Job History, and Limited Record Screening

A. Crime and Safety Insurance	No Subsidy Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample w/ Interactions
$5k†	0.118	0.120	0.118
	(0.049)	(0.024)	(0.049)
	[0.273]	[0.055]	–
$100k	0.177	0.167	0.177
	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.052)
	[0.212]	[0.008]	–
$5m	0.179	0.174	0.179
	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.056)
	[0.212]	[0.008]	–
Interactions p-value	–	–	0.779
B. Job History Screening			
1 Job	0.111	0.128	0.111
	(0.052)	(0.026)	(0.052)
	[0.273]	[0.055]	–
5 Jobs	0.222	0.190	0.222
	(0.051)	(0.023)	(0.051)
	[0.129]	[0.002]	–
25 Jobs	0.191	0.121	0.191
	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.052)
	[0.173]	[0.043]	–
Interactions p-value	–	–	0.518
C. Limited Record Screening			
1 Year	0.214	0.174	0.214
	(0.049)	(0.023)	(0.049)
	[0.129]	[0.008]	–
3 Years	0.251	0.256	0.251
	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.054)
	[0.115]	[0.000]	–
7 Years	0.414	0.280	0.414
	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.048)
	[0.011]	[0.000]	–
Interactions p-value	–	–	0.017
Firms	203	913	913
Managers	234	1,095	1,095

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates of the effects of different policies on firms' willingness to work with workers with a criminal record. Column 1 reports results for the sample of 234 hiring managers from 203 businesses in the no wage subsidy sample. Column 2 reports results for the full sample of 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment. Column 3 reports results for the full sample with controls for interaction effects. The interactions p-values reported in column 3 are for the joint significance of the interaction effects and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by business. Panel A reports the effect relative to the baseline of providing insurance covering damages related to theft or safety up to the indicated level. Panel B reports the effect relative to the baseline of requiring that WCs satisfactorily complete the indicated number of jobs. Panel C report the effect relative to the baseline of imposing a minimum time since arrest or conviction before allowing WCs to join the pool of workers. All specifications report standard errors clustered by business. Westfall-Young adjusted p-values are reported in brackets.

† We use different values for crime and safety insurance ($1k and $5k) in two survey arms. For exposition, we pool the $1k and $5k insurance levels, which results in a uniform number of observations across values displayed under the label *$5k*.

TABLE B.6
Criminal Record Screening by Conviction Type

	No Subsidy Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample w/ Interactions
Violent Misdemeanor	0.038	0.046	0.038
	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.015)
	[0.089]	[0.002]	–
Property Felony	0.085	0.066	0.085
	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.023)
	[0.034]	[0.002]	–
Property Misdemeanor	0.214	0.245	0.214
	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.031)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	–
Drug Felony	0.209	0.237	0.209
	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	–
Drug Misdemeanor	0.453	0.456	0.453
	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.032)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	–
Interactions p-value	–	–	0.460
Firms	203	913	913
Managers	234	1,095	1,095

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates of the effects of restricting WCs to those with a given crime type on firms' willingness to work with workers with a criminal record. The effects are relative to the fraction of respondents willing to work with WCs if the Platform restricts WCs to those who had a violent felony conviction. Column 1 reports results for the sample of 234 hiring managers from 203 businesses in the no wage subsidy sample. Column 2 reports results for the full sample of 1,095 hiring managers from 913 businesses that completed the experiment. Column 3 reports results for the full sample with controls for interaction effects. The interactions p-values reported in column 3 are for the joint significance of the interaction effects and are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by business. All specifications report standard errors clustered by business. Westfall-Young adjusted p-values are reported in brackets.

TABLE B.7
Unilateral Discretion and Reweighted Results by Treatment Type

	No Subsidy Sample				Full Sample			
A. Crime and Safety Insurance	Unilateral Discretion	Restricted Sample	Reweighted by WC Hiring Policy	Reweighted by Industry Shares and Firm Size	Unilateral Discretion	Restricted Sample	Reweighted by WC Hiring Policy	Reweighted by Industry Shares and Firm Size
$5k†	0.114	0.079	0.059	0.059	0.047	0.111	0.135	0.091
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.053)
$10k	0.271	0.182	0.132	0.252	0.166	0.194	0.194	0.230
	(0.074)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.094)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.048)
$5m	0.191	0.143	0.223	0.186	0.152	0.182	0.168	0.222
	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.095)	(0.122)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.048)
Constant	0.452	0.357	0.353	0.403	0.486	0.343	0.341	0.396
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.060)
B. Job History Screening								
1 Job	0.023	0.090	0.041	0.058	0.061	0.158	0.119	0.170
	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.054)
5 Jobs	0.215	0.174	0.198	0.156	0.187	0.190	0.182	0.174
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.108)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.049)
25 Jobs	0.266	0.218	0.236	0.303	0.093	0.123	0.123	0.123
	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.049)
Constant	0.452	0.357	0.353	0.403	0.478	0.358	0.363	0.409
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.060)
C. Limited Record Screening								
1 Year	0.181	0.215	0.201	0.150	0.164	0.186	0.161	0.193
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.083)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.047)
3 Years	0.206	0.253	0.258	0.263	0.178	0.273	0.296	0.256
	(0.079)	(0.072)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.056)
7 Years	0.473	0.382	0.427	0.360	0.227	0.326	0.337	0.356
	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.045)
Constant	0.452	0.357	0.353	0.403	0.499	0.369	0.370	0.396
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.059)
Firms	118	117	117	117	507	506	506	506
Managers	124	143	143	143	533	668	668	668

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates of the effects of different policies on firms' willingness to work with workers with a criminal record using different samples and weighting methods. In each panel, the constant is the estimate for the mean willingness to work with WCs with no treatment and no subsidy. Panel A reports the effect relative to the constant of providing insurance covering damages related to theft or safety up to the indicated level. Panel B reports the effect relative to the constant of requiring that WCs satisfactorily complete the indicated number of jobs. Panel C reports the effect relative to the constant of imposing a minimum time since arrest or conviction before allowing WCs to join the pool of workers. Columns 1–4 report results for the sample of hiring managers in the no wage subsidy sample. Columns 5–8 report results for the full sample of hiring managers that completed the experiment. Columns 1 and 5 report results for respondents who answered "Yes" when asked whether they have the authority to permit a user with a criminal record to accept a job that they posted on the Platform. Columns 2 and 6 report unweighted results for the restricted sample where the variables for firm size, industry type, and WC hiring policies are nonmissing. Columns 3 and 7 report results for the restricted sample reweighted to match the marginal distributions of the seven WC hiring policies from the nationwide survey commissioned by the SHRM. Columns 4 and 8 report results for the restricted sample reweighted to match the Infogroup Database industry shares. All specifications report standard errors clustered by business.

† We use different values for crime and safety insurance ($1k and $5k) in two survey arms. For exposition, we pool the $1k and $5k insurance levels, which results in a uniform number of observations across values displayed under the label *$5k*.

TABLE B.8
Unilateral Discretion and Reweighted Results by Conviction Type

	No Subsidy Sample				Full Sample			
A. Crime and Safety Insurance	Unilateral Discretion	Restricted Sample	Reweighted by WC Hiring Policy	Reweighted by Industry Shares and Firm Size	Unilateral Discretion	Restricted Sample	Reweighted by WC Hiring Policy	Reweighted by Industry Shares and Firm Size
Violent Misdemeanor	0.040	0.021	0.015	0.042	0.051	0.034	0.033	0.016
	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.036)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Property Felony	0.089	0.098	0.103	0.110	0.075	0.063	0.067	0.064
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.022)
Property Misdemeanor	0.210	0.231	0.190	0.292	0.259	0.251	0.246	0.250
	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Drug Felony	0.234	0.224	0.199	0.249	0.287	0.232	0.225	0.219
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.028)
Drug Misdemeanor	0.492	0.497	0.501	0.554	0.503	0.491	0.499	0.486
	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Constant	0.081	0.042	0.043	0.014	0.062	0.042	0.033	0.049
	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Firms	118	117	117	117	507	506	506	506
Managers	124	143	143	143	533	668	668	668

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates of the effects of restricting WCs to those with a given crime type on firms' willingness to work with workers with a criminal record using different samples and weighting methods. The constant is the estimate for the mean willingness to work with WCs if the Platform restricts WCs to those with a violent felony conviction. Each reported estimate is relative to the constant. Columns 1–4 report results for the sample of hiring managers in the no wage subsidy sample. Columns 5–8 report results for the full sample of hiring managers that completed the experiment. Columns 1 and 5 report results for respondents who answered "Yes" when asked whether they have the authority to permit a user with a criminal record to accept a job that they posted on the Platform. Columns 2 and 6 report unweighted results for the restricted sample where the variables for firm size, industry type, and WC hiring policies are nonmissing. Columns 3 and 7 report results for the restricted sample reweighted to match the marginal distributions of the seven WC hiring policies from the nationwide survey commissioned by the SHRM. Columns 4 and 8 report results for the restricted sample reweighted to match the Infogroup Database industry shares. All specifications report standard errors clustered by business.