Online Appendix

A Alternate measures of correlated adoptions

In the hazard model analysis (Section 4.2), we use a two-sided "likelihood" as the baseline measure of how concentrated the adoption of a policy has been among states that are (dis)similar in each dimension. We tried other measures that may be simpler but did not perform as well in specification checks. In this section, we define three alternate measures and discuss their shortcomings. Reassuringly, as shown in Table A.5, we find that the dynamic patterns of policy diffusion remain similar regardless of the measure used.

We assess two attributes of each measure. First, we consider its range of possible values as a function of the number of total adopters. Drastic variation in the range may lead to mis-specification when entering the measure as a linear term in the logit, as done in the main analysis of Table 3, since this assumes that the same coefficient applies to early as well as to late adopters of the policy. In the second assessment, we check directly for this mis-specification by allowing the coefficient on the measure to vary by the number of total adopters so far: for the first five adopters (1-5), the second five adopters (6-10), the third five adopters (11-15), and the later adopters (>15). Stable coefficients are encouraging, but coefficients that systematically differ between the early and the later adopters indicate that the estimates from the model under- or over-estimate the responsiveness to adoption among similar states at some stage of the policy's life-cycle.

To start with the baseline likelihood measure, Figure A.7a shows that its range goes from -1 to 1 and is fairly consistent across the domain of total adopters. Figure A.7e then plots the coefficients on the first three groups of 5 adopters and on the following adopters for the two dimensions of interest, distance and Republican vote-share. There does not appear to be any systematic ordering or reversals in the coefficients across the bins, and the coefficients generally remain within each other's confidence intervals. These checks return a favorable evaluation of the baseline measure.

Now for the three alternate measures below, we notate $a^k \in \{0, 1, ..., 16\}$ as the number of adopters among the 16 states that compose the closest third in dimension k, and $A \in \{0, 1, ..., 47\}, A \geq a^k$, as the number of adopters among all other 47 contiguous states.

Proportion of states in the closest third that are adopters ($a^k/16$)**.** As Figure A.7b shows, the range of this measure is limited in both the early and late stages of a policy's life-cycle. For instance, if there are 5 total adopters of the policy, then the measure can range only from 0/16 to 5/16. From 16 to 31 total adopters, the measure ranges from 0 to 1. After 32 total adopters, the range shrinks toward the upper region. Another downside is that this measure

does not incorporate information about the total number of adopters, though intuitively, we should consider a case when there are 10 total adopters of a policy and all 10 are in the closest third as a stronger sign of correlated adoptions than the case when there are 30 total adopters of which 10 are in the closest third. In light of these drawbacks, Figure A.7f finds that the coefficients on the first bin of 5 adopters are significantly lower, and even becomes negative, compared to the coefficients for the rest of the bins. Hence using this measure in the main specification would lead to a poor fit of the early stage diffusion process.

Proportion of all adopters that are in the closest third (a^k/A)**.**[14] As shown in Figure A.7c, this measure ranges from 0 to 1 until there are 17 total adopters, at which point there must be more total adopters than adopters in the closest third and thus the upper bound of the range decreases. From 32 total adopters, the lower bound of the range becomes strictly positive, since there must be at least one adopter in the closest third, and continues to increase. Given this narrowing range, similar concerns arise as with the previous measure. Figure A.7g confirms these issues, and shows that the coefficients are systematically increasing in the bins. For this measure, a single coefficient in the specification would be overly sensitive for the early adopters and too unresponsive for the later adopters.

Proportion of states in the closest third that adopters minus proportion of all states that are adopters $\left(\frac{a^k}{16} - \frac{A}{47}\right)$**.** Figure A.7d plots the range of this measure. The difference between the upper and lower bounds linearly increases in the number of total adopters and is maximized at 1 while the number of total adopters is between 16 and 31. After 32 total adopters, the range begins to linearly decrease. Figure A.7h shows that this measure is not as poorly behaved as the previous two in the logit model, but the coefficients do seem to systematically decrease across the bins in the distance dimension. The pseudo-R^2 from row 9 of Table A.5 also indicates that this measure provides a poorer fit of the data compared to the baseline measure (row 4 of Table A.5).

[14] Another interpretation of this measure is the ratio of the proportion of states in the closest third that are adopters to the proportion of all states that are adopters, or $(a^k/16)/(A/47)$, multiplied by a constant (16/47).

Figure A.1: Innovating states

(a) SPID policies



(b) NBER policies



Figure A.2: Correlation in geography and politics among adopters (alternate thresholds)

(a) Correlation in geographic distance (first **16** adopters)



(b) Correlation in Republican vote-share (first **16** adopters)



4 policies with a correlation less than -0.2 or greater than 0.5 have been censored.

(c) Correlation in geographic distance (first **24** adopters)



(d) Correlation in Republican vote-share (first **24** adopters)



1 policy with a correlation less than -0.2 or greater than 0.5 has been censored.

This figure replicates the analysis in Figures 5a-5b, but instead uses a threshold of the first 16 (Figures A.2a-A.2b) and of the first 24 (Figures A.2c-A.2d) adopters of a policy. The assignment of each policy to a decade is held constant at the year in which it reached 10 adopters. The sample of policies shrinks with higher thresholds as there are fewer policies that reach those thresholds.

Figure A.3: Simulated policy diffusion

(a) Coefficients from 1990s (Connecticut)



(b) Coefficients from 2010-20s (Connecticut)



Figure A.3: Simulated policy diffusion

(c) Coefficients from 1990s (Texas)



(d) Coefficients from 2010-20s (Texas)



Figure A.3: Simulated policy diffusion

(e) Coefficients from 1990s (Ohio)



(f) Coefficients from 2010-20s (Ohio)



Figure A.4: Robustness checks: Threshold of closest states

(a) Dimension: Demographic index



(b) Dimension: Distance



(c) Dimension: Republican vote-share



Figure A.5: Correlation of policy outcomes with geography: 1980-85 vs. 2005-10



Figure A.6: Categorizing the ideology of policies for event study analysis

(a) Distribution of policy ideologies



(b) Ideology of most extreme and neutral policies over time



(c) Number of policies under each ideology as a function of the threshold



Figure A.7: Specification checks: Range of measure by number of adopters

(a) Baseline two-sided likelihood measure



(b) Proportion of states in the closest third that are adopters



(c) Proportion of all adopters that are in the closest third



(d) Proportion of closest third that are adopters − Proportion of all states (excluding own) that are adopters



Figure A.7: Specification checks: Stability in coefficients by number of adopters

(e) Baseline two-sided likelihood measure



(f) Proportion of states in the closest third that are adopters



(g) Proportion of all adopters that are in the closest third



(h) Proportion of closest third that are adopters − Proportion of all states (excluding own) that are adopters



Table A.1a: SPID sample examples

Number	Source	Description	Area	Adoptions	First year	Last year
4	Boehmke-Skinner	Abortion Pre-Roe	Civil Rights	16	1966	1972
44	Biggers	Request Any Id For Voting	Civil Rights	32	1972	2013
49	Uniform Law	Provides Judicial Facilitation Of Private Dispute Resolution	Law and Crime	19	2001	2018
61	Walker	Automobile Safety Compact	Public Services	43	1962	1965
64	Sheprd	Full Smoking Ban In Bars	Public Services	24	1980	2010
68	Walker	Aid To The Blind (Social Security)	Public Services	48	1936	1953
71	Boushey	Short-Term Programs For Incarcerated Youth (Similar To Military School)	Law and Crime	22	1982	1999
79	Karch	System For Bus Fleet Owners To Pro-Rate Mileage In Multiple States	Public Services	5	1965	1983
103	Kreitzer	No-Protest Zone Around Abortion Clinic	Civil Rights	16	1973	2005
118	Karch	Provides All The Benefit Of Adoption Subsidy Agreement, Regardless Of State	Law and Crime	21	1984	2002
158	Uniform Law	Authorizes Courts To Adjudicate Actual Controversies Concerning Legal Rights And Duties Even Though Traditional Remedies For Damages Or Equitable Relief Are Not Available.	Law and Crime	41	1922	2008
162	Lacy	Comprehensive Remediation Reform	Public Services	17	1988	2009
167	Lacy	Placement Policies (Placement Examination, Changes To Placement Criteria	Public Services	3	1997	2008
177	Other	Notification Of Sex Offenders Is At Authority'S Discretion	Law and Crime	8	1995	2006
187	Caughey-Warshaw	Is It Legal To Use Marijuana For Medical Purposes?	Public Services	19	1996	2021
213	Uniform Law	Allows State Governments During A Declared Emergency To Give Reciprocity To Other States Licenses On Emergency Service Providers	Economics	17	2007	2018
219	Boehmke-Skinner	State Enterprise Zones	Public Services	37	1981	1992
225	Caughey-Warshaw	Does The State Have A Recycling Program For Electronic Waste?	Environment and Energy	28	2000	2012
231	Walker	Equal Pay For Females	Civil Rights	27	1919	1966
284	Caughey-Warshaw	Has The State Passed A State-Level Equivalent To The Equal Rights Amendment?	Civil Rights	20	1971	1999
291	Caughey-Warshaw	Does The State Require Background Checks For Private Rifle Sales?	Law and Crime	9	1966	2014
324	Caughey-Warshaw	Does The State Allow In-State Tuition For Illegal Immigrants?	Civil Rights	18	2001	2014
337	Uniform Law	Provides Cognitive Test For Determining Insanity	Law and Crime	1	1985	1985
382	Caughey-Warshaw	Does The State Have Collective Bargaining Rights For Local Teachers?	Economics	31	1960	1987
418	Uniform Law	It Minimizes The Number Of Prohibited Marriages, And Includes The Concept Of No-Fault Divorce.	Law and Crime	6	1973	1978
433	Uniform Law	Provides That A Student Loan Is Enforceable Against Debtor	Public Services	6	1970	1973
482	Walker	Parolees And Probationers Supervision	Law and Crime	48	1935	1951
522	Uniform Law	Articulate And Confirm The Role Of The State Attorney General In Protecting Charitable Assets.	Economics	1	2014	2014
524	Uniform Law	Requires Prudent And Diverse Investments Of State Funds	Government Operations	47	2007	2012
556	Caughey-Warshaw	Does The State Have A Law Permitting Individuals Control Over The Use Of Heroic Medical Treatment In The Event Of A Terminal Illness?	Public Services	48	1976	1992
560	Caughey-Warshaw	Enables Cities To Adopt A Home Rule Charter That Acts As The City'S Basic Governing Document Over Local Issues.	Government Operations	29	1875	1960
569	Caughey-Warshaw	Does The State Have Anti-Sedition Laws?	Civil Rights	30	1935	1955
598	Uniform Law	Regulates Offer And Sale Of Securities	Economics	18	2003	2016
632	Boushey	Laws Establishing State Exchanges For Used Needles	Public Services	13	1987	2004
659	Uniform Law	Attempts To Standardize Negotiable Instruments In States	Economics	47	1991	2008
678	Uniform Law	Governs All Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations That Are Formed Or Operate In A State	Economics	12	1993	2008
687	Uniform Law	Protect The Purchaser Of Real Estate Where There Is A Binding Contract Of Sale	Economics	12	1937	1997
694	Uniform Law	Regulating Satisfaction Of Losses Suffered From Victims Of Crime	Law and Crime	1	1995	1995
704	Caughey-Warshaw	Does The State Approve For A Local Tax Credit For Residential Solar Installations?	Environment and Energy	8	1975	2007
726	Sheprd	Law That Establishes Legal Bac Limit Of .02 For Underage Drivers	Public Services	48	1983	1998

Table A.1b: NBER working paper sample

Number	Policy	Title	Area	Adoptions	First year	Last year
18187	Stand Your Ground laws	Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and Injuries	Law and Crime	25	1994	2009
18299	Leave for state employee organ donors	Removing Financial Barriers to Organ and Bone Marrow Donation: The Effect of Leave and Tax Legislation in the U.S.	Public Services	29	1989	2007
18341	Physical education requirement	The Impact of Physical Education on Obesity among Elementary School Children	Public Services	38	1940	2007
18516	Wrongful discharge laws	Wrongful Discharge Laws and Innovation	Economics	45	1970	1998
18773	Bicycle helmet laws	Effects of Bicycle Helmet Laws on Children's Injuries	Public Services	19	1987	2006
18887	AFDC waiver	Effects of Welfare Reform on Women's Crime	Economics	27	1992	1996
18887	TANF	Effects of Welfare Reform on Women's Crime	Economics	48	1996	1998
19294	Biotech tax incentives	State Incentives for Innovation, Star Scientists and Jobs: Evidence from Biotech	Economics	11	1984	2003
19904	Community rating regulations	Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance	Public Services	7	1993	1997
20149	Interstate bank branching laws	Does Financing Spur Small Business Productivity? Evidence from a Natural Experiment	Economics	48	1995	1997
20565	Medical record copy fee cap	Expanding Patients' Property Rights In Their Medical Records	Public Services	42	1972	2007
20808	NOx cap-and-trade	Who Loses Under Power Plant Cap-and-Trade Programs?	Environment and Energy	20	2003	2007
21170	Commonsense Consumption Acts	Do Ã¢Â€Â˜Cheeseburger BillsÃ¢Â€Â™ Work? Effects of Tort Reform for Fast Food	Economics	26	2003	2013
21345	Medical marijuana laws	Do Medical Marijuana Laws Reduce Addictions and Deaths Related to Pain Killers?	Public Services	21	1996	2014
21373	Individual income tax	Broadening State Capacity	Economics	42	1911	1971
21373	Coporate income tax	Broadening State Capacity	Economics	43	1911	1971
22344	Nurse Licensure Compact	Labor Supply Effects of Occupational Regulation: Evidence from the Nurse Licensure Compact	Public Services	25	1999	2015
22899	Initial Medicaid implementation	The Long-Run Effects of Childhood Insurance Coverage: Medicaid Implementation, Adult Health, and Labor Market Outcomes	Public Services	48	1966	1982
23171	Good Samaritan Law	With a Little Help from My Friends: The Effects of Naloxone Access and Good Samaritan Laws on Opioid-Related Deaths	Public Services	45	2007	2019
23171	Naloxone Access Law	With a Little Help from My Friends: The Effects of Naloxone Access and Good Samaritan Laws on Opioid-Related Deaths	Public Services	48	2001	2017
23313	E-cigarette minimum age law	The Effects of E-Cigarette Minimum Legal Sale Age Laws on Youth Substance Use	Public Services	48	2010	2016
23388	Substance use disorder parity laws	Health Insurance and Traffic Fatalities: The Effects of Substance Use Disorder Parity Laws	Public Services	12	1994	2009
23510	Concealed handgun carry law	Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level Synthetic Control Analysis	Law and Crime	41	1959	2014
23995	Smoking ban	Impact of Comprehensive Smoking Bans on the Health of Infants and Children	Public Services	34	1994	2012
24153	Interstate tax audit info sharing	Intergovernmental Cooperation and Tax Enforcement	Government Operations	41	1950	1955
24259	Right-to-work laws	From the Bargaining Table to the Ballot Box: Political Effects of Right to Work Laws	Economics	27	1943	2017
24381	Ban-the-box laws	Do Ban the Box Laws Increase Crime?	Economics	11	2009	2014
24651	Same-sex marriage	Effects of Access to Legal Same-Sex Marriage on Marriage and Health: Evidence from BRFSS	Civil Rights	33	2004	2014
24662	Merit-aid programs	State Merit Aid Programs and Youth Labor Market Attachment	Public Services	24	1988	2005
24782	Duty-to-bargain laws	The Long-run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining	Economics	31	1960	1987

Table A.1b: NBER working paper sample

Number	Policy	Title	Area	Adoptions	First year	Last year
24986	Community eligibility provision	School Nutrition and Student Discipline: Effects of Schoolwide Free Meals	Public Services	10	2012	2014
25209	Child gun access prevention laws	Child Access Prevention Laws and Juvenile Firearm-Related Homicides	Law and Crime	25	1989	2001
25369	Age anti-discrimination	Do State Laws Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Reduce Age Discrimination in Hiring? Evidence from a Field Experiment	Economics	45	1934	1997
25369	Disability anti-discrimination	Do State Laws Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Reduce Age Discrimination in Hiring? Evidence from a Field Experiment	Economics	46	1971	1988
25390	Wind energy incentives	Technological Spillover Effects of State Renewable Energy Policy: Evidence from Patent Counts	Environment and Energy	48	2000	2011
25758	Minor abortion parental consent	The Impact of Parental Involvement Laws on Minor Abortion	Public Services	37	1974	2013
25974	Initial prescription drug monitoring	Can Policy Affect Initiation of Addictive Substance Use? Evidence from Opioid Prescribing	Public Services	24	1988	2018
25974	Must-access prescription drug monitoring	Can Policy Affect Initiation of Addictive Substance Use? Evidence from Opioid Prescribing	Public Services	29	2007	2019
26017	E-cigarette tax	The Effects of Traditional Cigarette and E-Cigarette Taxes on Adult Tobacco Product Use	Public Services	7	2010	2017
26135	Pill mill laws	Mortality and Socioeconomic Consequences of Prescription Opioids: Evidence from State Policies	Public Services	8	2005	2014
26140	NBCCEDP cancer screenings	Effects of Direct Care Provision to the Uninsured: Evidence from Federal Breast and Cervical Cancer Programs	Public Services	48	1991	1999
26206	Strict voter ID	Strict Voter Identification Laws, Turnout, and Election Outcomes	Civil Rights	11	2004	2016
26405	State EITC	The EITC and the Extensive Margin: A Reappraisal	Economics	28	1986	2018
26500	Triplicate prescription	Origins of the Opioid Crisis and Its Enduring Impacts	Public Services	7	1939	1988
26676	E-verify for employment	States Taking the Reins? Employment Verification Requirements and Local Labor Market Outcomes	Economics	22	2006	2015
26749	Modern prescription drug monitoring	Effect of Prescription Opioids and Prescription Opioid Control Policies on Infant Health	Public Services	47	1999	2017
26777	Anti-bullying laws	Anti-Bullying Laws and Suicidal Behaviors among Teenagers	Law and Crime	48	2001	2015
26832	Mandated sick pay	Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage, Utilization, and Welfare Effects	Economics	10	2011	2018
27054	Salary history ban	Information and the Persistence of the Gender Wage Gap: Early Evidence from California's Salary History Ban	Economics	12	2017	2021
27306	Medicaid expansion	Medicaid Expansion and the Mental Health of College Students	Public Services	36	2014	2021
27520	Tramadol as Schedule IV drug	Competitive Effects of Federal and State Opioid Restrictions: Evidence from the Controlled Substance Laws	Public Services	12	2007	2014
27728	2003 standard certificate of live birth implementation	Heterogeneous Effects Of Health Insurance On Birth Related Outcomes: Unpacking Compositional Vs. Direct Changes	Public Services	48	2003	2016
27788	Paid family leave	Paid Leave Pays Off: The Effects of Paid Family Leave on Firm Performance	Economics	6	2002	2018
28173	Tobacco 21 laws	Do State Tobacco 21 Laws Work?	Public Services	15	2016	2019
28903	Right of workers to talk law	Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency	Economics	12	2004	2016
29087	Recreational marijuana legalization	Recreational Marijuana Laws and the Use of Opioids: Evidence from NSDUH Microdata	Public Services	17	2012	2021
29318	CPA 150-hour rule	Occupational Licensing and Accountant Quality: Evidence from the 150-Hour Rule	Economics	48	1983	2015

Table A.2a: Summary statistics: Policy outcomes from NBER papers

Outcome	Coverage	Example NBER policy	NBER WP numbers
Log(income per capita)	1950-2020	Partial paid leave for pregnancy	26416, 19294
Voter turnout rate	1980-2019	Strict voter ID	26206, 24259
Log(opioid mortality rate)	1968-2014	Naloxone Access Law	23171, 25974, 26135, 26500, 27520, 29087
Employment rate in energy-intensive industry	1975-2018	NOx cap-and-trade	20808
Private insurance coverage rate	1987-2006	Community rating regulations	19904
Log(state revenue per capita)	1950-2016	Tax audit info sharing	21373, 24153
Log(state expenditure per capita)	1950-2016	State income and corporate taxes	21373, 24153
Average BMI	1987-2020	Physical education requirements	18341, 21170
Firearm mortality rate	1968-2016	Stand Your Ground laws	18187, 23510, 25209
Alcohol-induced traffic mortality rate	1975-2015	Substance use disorder parity laws	23388

Table A.2b: COVID-19 policies

Example policy	Coverage (MM/DD/YYYY)	Num. adopted states
SNAP Waiver - Temporary Suspension of Claims Collection	4/2/2020-5/13/2020	24
SNAP Waiver - Pandemic EBT during school year 2019-2020	4/9/2020-8/13/2020	48
CDC moratorium start	9/4/2020-12/15/2020	15
Date K-12 school employees became eligible for COVID-19 vaccination	1/8/2021-4/5/2021	48
Date banned visitors to nursing homes	3/9/2020-8/13/2020	30
Stopped legal visitation in state prisons	3/7/2020-6/25/2020	18
Date adults ages 55+ became eligible for COVID-19 vaccination	3/1/2021-4/19/2021	48
Utilities reconnection start	3/4/2020-4/13/2020	8
Reopened bars (x2)	8/11/2020-5/7/2021	18
Face mask mandate in public spaces	4/8/2020-12/9/2020	38
SNAP Waiver - Pandemic EBT during school year 2020-2021	12/15/2020-3/23/2021	25
Face mask mandate in schools for 2021-22 school year	5/1/2020-4/16/2021	15
Closed movie theaters (x2)	6/29/2020-12/12/2020	6
Closed gyms (x2)	6/29/2020-12/12/2020	7
State of emergency issued	2/29/2020-3/16/2020	48
Modify Medicaid requirements with 1135 waivers (date of CMS approval)	3/16/2020-4/22/2020	48
Date closed K-12 public schools	3/16/2020-4/3/2020	47
First eviction hearing ban start	3/13/2020-3/23/2020	23
Utilities shutoff moratorium start	3/4/2020-5/8/2020	29
Date adults ages 75+ became eligible for COVID-19 vaccination	12/23/2020-2/15/2021	48
SNAP Waiver - Emergency Allotments to Current SNAP Households	3/24/2020-4/17/2020	48
Allowed restaurants to sell takeout alcohol	3/16/2020-5/8/2020	42
Reopened ACA enrollment using a special enrollment period	3/10/2020-4/6/2020	11
Use of telemedicine for schedule II-V prescriptions	10/24/2019-3/31/2020	5
Closed restaurants except take out	3/16/2020-4/3/2020	47
Date adults ages 40+ became eligible for COVID-19 vaccination	3/9/2021-4/19/2021	48
Reopened hair salons/barber shops	4/24/2020-8/28/2020	47
Date adults ages 50+ became eligible for COVID-19 vaccination	3/3/2021-4/19/2021	48
Reopened religious gatherings	4/26/2020-6/22/2020	34
Closed gyms	3/16/2020-4/3/2020	47
Average (all 77 policies)	6/29/2020-9/25/2020	30.56

This table shows 30 randomly selected COVID-19 policies in the data set as well as the overall average. Policies are kept in data set until the first repeal. Source: COVID-19 US State Policies (CUSP)

Table A.2c: Vaccine regulations

Policy	Coverage	Num. adopted states
Hepatitis A Vaccine Mandates for Child Care	1998-2021	22
Hepatitis A Vaccine Mandates for K-12	1988-2021	15
Hepatitis B Vaccine Mandates for Child Care	1993-2018	41
Hepatitis B Vaccine Mandates for Colleges and Universities	1992-2011	15
Hepatitis B Vaccine Mandates for elementary	1994-2008	43
Hepatitis B Vaccine Mandates for secondary	1997-2009	35
Influenza Vaccine Mandates for Child Care and Pre-K	1999-2020	7
MenACWY Vaccine Mandates for Colleges and Universities	2001-2020	23
MenACWY Vaccine Mandates for Elementary and Secondary Schools	2005-2021	33
PCV Vaccine Mandates for Childcare	2001-2018	39
Rotavirus Vaccine Mandates for Child Care and Pre-K	1999-2021	8
Tdap Vaccine Mandates for Elementary and Secondary Schools	2006-2017	48
Varicella Vaccine Mandates for Child Care	1997-2015	46
Varicella Vaccine Mandates for Elementary School	1998-2015	48
Varicella Vaccine Mandates for Middle/junior/senior high	1999-2015	37
Hep B vaccine is either offered or mandated in hospitals	1993-2016	8
Hep B vaccine is either offered or mandated in long-term care facilities	1978-2018	9
Hep B vaccine is either offered or mandated in ambulatory care facilities	1993-2016	12
Any of the MMR vaccines are either offered or mandated in hospitals	1980-2014	14
Any of the MMR vaccines are either offered or mandated in long-term care facilities	1981-2020	10
Any of the MMR vaccines are either offered or mandated in ambulatory care facilities	1992-2022	12
Pertussis vaccine is either offered or mandated in hospitals	2002-2013	5
Pneumococcal vaccine is either offered or mandated in hospitals	2002-2017	13
Pneumococcal vaccine is either offered or mandated in long-term care facilities	1975-2015	25
Varicella vaccine is either offered or mandated in ambulatory care facilities	1995-2017	5
Influenza vaccine is either offered or mandated in hospitals	1995-2019	23
Influenza vaccine is either offered or mandated in long-term care facilities	1995-2020	30
Influenza vaccine is either offered or mandated in ambulatory care facilities	1975-2021	12
Average (28 policies)	1994-2017	22.79

This table lists all 28 policies in the vaccine regulations data set.

Table A.3: Highest and lowest innovators of NBER policies (20%)

	1991-2020		Difference (SE)
	(1) Top 20%	(2) Bottom 20%	(1)-(2)
Rep. two-party voteshare %	45.40	57.07	-11.67
	[8.56]	[5.53]	(2.32)
|Demeaned two-party voteshare|	8.64	6.44	2.20
	[5.06]	[4.23]	(1.42)
Unified Dem. state gvt.	0.31	0.10	0.21
	[0.46]	[0.30]	(0.06)
Unified Rep. state gvt.	0.14	0.46	-0.32
	[0.35]	[0.50]	(0.09)
Log(population)	15.59	15.07	0.53
	[0.86]	[1.06]	(0.39)
Income per capita	39630.17	32954.06	6676.11
	[13051.79]	[10714.06]	(1834.36)
Log(income per cap.)	10.53	10.35	0.18
	[0.34]	[0.33]	(0.05)
Minority %	29.06	26.31	2.75
	[12.28]	[12.98]	(4.84)
Unemployed %	5.51	5.32	0.19
	[1.81]	[1.77]	(0.35)
States	14	12	

This table compares characteristics of the states in the highest and lowest 20% for first innovations for the NBER policies. Averages are taken over the entire time period. Standard deviations are in brackets and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for the difference are clustered by state. Hawaii, Washington D.C., and Alaska are excluded.

Table A.4: Policy diffusion predictors by decade (expanded)

Dep. var.: Policy adoption (logit)	(1) 50-60s	(2) 70s	(3) 80s	(4) 90s	(5) 00s	(6) 10-20s
Prop. of states adopted	7.04	1.05	2.67	8.76	10.51	3.85
	(1.74)	(1.88)	(1.11)	(1.14)	(1.33)	(1.72)
Prop. of states adopted^2	-9.02	3.75	-0.67	-12.88	-17.05	-0.28
	(3.97)	(5.16)	(2.84)	(2.67)	(2.87)	(3.72)
Prop. of states adopted^3	4.75	-6.88	0.06	8.00	9.69	-0.06
	(2.68)	(4.29)	(2.03)	(1.82)	(1.96)	(2.39)
Republican vote-share	-0.37	-0.07	-0.27	0.13	0.61	-1.00
	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.61)	(0.85)
Unified Dem. state gvnt.	-0.12	0.22	0.00	0.05	0.28	0.13
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Unified Rep. state gvnt.	-0.16	0.19	-0.20	-0.08	-0.02	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)
Log(population)	0.07	0.11	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Income per capita ($10,000s)	1.79	-0.52	0.02	-0.13	-0.20	-0.12
	(1.26)	(0.42)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Urban pop. %	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Non-white %		-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed %			0.04	-0.00	-0.03	0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Measure of adoption among other states closest in:						
Geography						
Distance	0.25	0.19	0.15	0.23	0.15	0.23
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Ideology						
Republican vote-share	0.06	0.11	0.10	0.17	0.42	0.35
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
State gvnt. partisanship	0.12	-0.09	0.11	0.02	0.18	0.32
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Demographics						
Log(population)	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.14	0.13	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Income per capita	0.23	0.13	0.01	0.11	0.11	0.14
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Urban pop. %	0.10	-0.06	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.25
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Other						
Migration flows	0.42	0.25	0.15	0.20	0.28	0.21
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Non-white %		0.05	0.14	0.05	-0.00	0.02
		(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Unemployed %			0.08	-0.03	0.04	0.01
			(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Baseline $P(Adopt)$						
Observations	58494	54399	79132	94437	70892	27479
Policies	162	203	284	397	345	180
Pseudo R^2	0.22	0.13	0.14	0.19	0.18	0.20

This table shows the coefficients from a logit regression. Standard errors are clustered by state. The baseline hazard for each policy is assumed to be constant within a decade and is captured by policy fixed effects. The closest states are defined as the third of all the states with the smallest absolute value difference in each characteristic. The states closest in State gvnt. partisanship are those with the same party in control of the state government (either unified Democratic, unified Republican, or divided). Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington D.C. are excluded from the analyses. Only policies spanning at least 3 years with at least 5 adopters are included.

Table A.5: Robustness checks

Demographic index			Distance			Republican vote-share		
1950-70s	1980-90s	2000-20s	1950-70s	1980-90s	2000-20s	1950-70s	1980-90s	2000-20s
Dep. var.: Policy adoption (all logit except (2))								
(1) Baseline (R^2: 0.16, 0.17, 0.17; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 274, 438, 386)								
0.29	0.20	0.20	0.40	0.31	0.29	0.14	0.14	0.47
(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
(2) Baseline linear probability model (coefficients and SEs ×100) (R^2: 0.07, 0.09, 0.10; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 277, 442, 390)								
0.92	0.76	1.02	1.13	1.04	1.29	0.41	0.47	2.14
(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.21)
(3) Full controls (R^2: 0.15, 0.18, 0.19; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 167, 438, 386)								
0.09	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.17	-0.05	0.15	0.42
(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)
(4) Parsimonious model (R^2: 0.16, 0.17, 0.17; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 274, 438, 386)								
0.34	0.24	0.23	0.39	0.30	0.29	0.15	0.14	0.46
(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
(5) Adoption measure: Lagged by one year (R^2: 0.14, 0.16, 0.15; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 242, 405, 369)								
0.26	0.23	0.17	0.33	0.24	0.23	0.13	0.12	0.41
(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
(6) Adoption measure: Rank-inverse weighted average (R^2: 0.16, 0.17, 0.17; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 274, 438, 386)								
1.68	1.27	1.17	2.56	1.80	1.73	0.31	0.86	2.12
(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.22)
(7) Adoption measure: Proportion of closest third that are adopters (R^2: 0.16, 0.17, 0.17; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 274, 438, 386)								
2.10	1.52	1.14	2.36	1.76	1.58	0.88	1.05	2.65
(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.25)
(8) Adoption measure: Proportion of all adopters in the closest third (R^2: 0.14, 0.14, 0.15; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 246, 418, 386)								
0.76	0.44	0.60	0.74	0.71	0.87	0.17	0.22	1.15
(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
(9) Adoption measure: P(Adopt) closest third−P(Adopt) all states (R^2: 0.15, 0.14, 0.15; $N_{\text{pol.}}$: 274, 438, 386)								
2.23	1.56	1.21	2.26	1.70	1.61	0.99	1.05	2.67
(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.26)

This table presents results from alternate specifications of the policy diffusion model. The table shows coefficients on the measure of adopters among the "closest" states (i.e., the closest third unless otherwise noted) in terms of an index for demographic characteristics (see notes in Table 3 for details), distance, and Republication vote-share in the most recent presidential election. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Each model is estimated over three separate time periods (1950-70s, 1980-90s, and 2000-20s). The (pseudo-)R^2 and number of policies are reported in parentheses in chronological order corresponding to the three time periods.

Baseline: replicates the specification from Table 3 over the longer time periods.

Baseline linear probability model: uses the same covariates in the Baseline specification but estimates the coefficients using a linear probability model.

Full controls: takes the specification from Table 3 and adds: non-white % and unemployed %; quadratic terms for the proportion of all other states adopted, Republican vote-share, log population, income per capita, urban %, non-white %, and unemployed %; adoption measures among the closest third of states in migration flows, non-white %, and unemployed %; a more flexible policy-specific baseline hazard parametrized as a step function that can vary every five years; and state fixed-effects.

Parsimonious model: includes only policy fixed effects and the proportion of adopters among all other states, and the adoption measure among the closest third of other states in geography, Republican vote-share in the most recent presidential election, and the demographic index. (This specification is also used in Tables 4-6.)

The following specifications use alternate measures of concentrated adoptions among the similar states, in place of the baseline two-sided likelihood measure. Each specification is "parsimonious" in that the only controls included are policy fixed effects and, except for specifications (8) and (9), the proportion of adopters among all other states.

Lagged by one year: uses the Parsimonious model but takes the adoption measure among the closest other states up to the *prior* (not current) year.

Rank-inverse weighted average: instead of defining the closest states as the third with smallest absolute difference, this measure weights the other states' adoptions by the inverse of their rank in absolute distance, where the closest state is is ranked 1 and the furthest state is ranked 47.

Proportion of closest third that are adopters: uses the proportion of states in the closest third that have adopted.

Proportion of all adopters in the closest third: uses the proportion of all adopters that are in the closest third of states.

P(Adopt) closest third−P(Adopt) all states: uses the proportion of states in the closest third that have adopted minus the proportion of all states (excluding one's own) that have adopted.

Table A.6: Event studies

	Uni. st. gvnt.	Unified Republican state government				Unified Democratic state government				Loss of uni.
	(1) Diff.	(2) Right-lean. policy	(3) Left-lean. policy	(4) Diff. (2-3)	(5) Neutral policy	(6) Left-lean. policy	(7) Right-lean. policy	(8) Diff. (6-7)	(9) Neutral policy	(10) Diff.
Events during years 1950 to 1990										
4 years pre-event	-0.023 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)	-0.020 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.006)	0.015 (0.007)	-0.024 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.001 (0.006)
3 years pre-event	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.002 (0.012)	0.020 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.017 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.007)
2 years pre-event	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.017)	0.016 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.009)	0.004 (0.008)	0.006 (0.007)
1 year pre-event	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)
Year of event	0.002 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.019)	0.005 (0.012)	0.012 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	0.003 (0.009)	0.011 (0.008)	0.002 (0.009)
1 year post-event	0.002 (0.007)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.004 (0.014)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.003 (0.005)
2 years post-event	-0.004 (0.010)	0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.019)	-0.000 (0.014)	0.005 (0.007)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.009)
3 years post-event	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)
4 years post-event	0.002 (0.009)	0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.000 (0.011)	0.016 (0.020)	0.004 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)	0.002 (0.013)	0.046 (0.018)	0.000 (0.011)
Observations	104048	104048	104048	104048	104048	104048	104048	104048	104048	104663
Policies	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
Events	136	54	54	54	54	82	82	82	82	150
Events during years 1991 to 2020										
4 years pre-event	-0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.006 (0.017)	-0.000 (0.009)	0.000 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.005 (0.006)	0.017 (0.008)
3 years pre-event	-0.017 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.012)	0.015 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.007)	0.000 (0.005)	0.010 (0.008)
2 years pre-event	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.018 (0.009)	-0.024 (0.015)	0.019 (0.008)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.014 (0.007)
1 year pre-event	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)
Year of event	0.020 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	0.000 (0.006)	0.012 (0.010)	0.010 (0.011)	0.023 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.026 (0.009)	0.001 (0.007)	0.000 (0.010)
1 year post-event	0.024 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.014 (0.013)	0.009 (0.008)	0.021 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.031 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.010 (0.008)
2 years post-event	0.021 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.006)	0.014 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.013)	0.021 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.024 (0.012)	0.003 (0.007)	0.008 (0.009)
3 years post-event	0.014 (0.008)	0.008 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.013 (0.015)	0.004 (0.013)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.015 (0.011)	0.008 (0.010)	0.001 (0.007)
4 years post-event	0.027 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.010)	0.007 (0.014)	0.006 (0.010)	0.031 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.009)	0.052 (0.024)	0.017 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)
Observations	129265	129265	129265	129265	129265	129265	129265	129265	129265	129265
Policies	456	456	456	456	456	456	456	456	456	456
Events	113	49	49	49	49	64	64	64	64	99