ONLINE APPENDIX

A Details on *Global Universalism Survey*

A.1 Background on Gallup World Poll and Sampling Procedures

A.1.1 Data collection – Infrastructure and Selection of Countries

We implemented the "Global Universalism Survey" module as part of the 2020 wave of the Gallup World Poll. The Gallup World Poll is a probability based and nationally representative sample of the resident adult (aged 15 and older) population. The World Poll has been conducted nearly every year since 2005 through a global survey infrastructure that consists of a network of vendors.

Our survey module was implemented in 60 countries, with a median of 1,000 respondents in each country and a total of 66,233 respondents in all (63,788 of which answered at least one of our universalism questions). The countries were chosen to maximize the global representativeness of our sample. Interviews were mostly conducted over the phone, except in India and Pakistan where the interviews were face-to-face. The surveys were conducted between October 2020 and February 2021. Appendix Table A.1 contains the details of how and when the survey was conducted in each country.

A.1.2 Sampling

In countries where interviews are conducted by telephone, Gallup uses random-digit-dialing (RDD) or a nationally representative list of phone numbers. Gallup typically uses a dual sampling frame based on landline and mobile telephone numbers. In some countries, the sampling frame is mobile telephone only (for example, Libya and Finland). The split between landline and mobile is based on country-specific information from past surveys or other secondary data. One person, drawn at random, was interviewed in each sampled household through Gallup's network of survey providers. For respondents contacted by landline telephone, the interviewee was selected (among eligible respondents aged 15 and older) either by identifying the household member with the next upcoming birthday, or by using the interviewing program to randomly select an eligible household member. Mobile phone users were directly interviewed. According to the protocol, interviewers make several attempts to contact someone from a randomly identified household before moving on to another household.

Sampling in face-to-face interview countries occurs in three stages. First, depending on the granularity of the available population data, sampling units are constructed by either stratifying along population weights (if population information is available), or by

random sampling at the ward/village level. Next, the local survey vendors use a "random route procedure" to select a candidate household. Finally, an interviewee is selected from a list of household members by the computer program used to conduct and record the interviews. Similar to the telephone protocols, interviewers make several attempts to contact a selected household member before moving on to another household.

A.1.3 Sample Weights

Gallup provides probabilistic weights to make the survey data ex-post nationally representative. The weights are constructed to account for multiple sources of bias such as different household sizes, selection of primary sampling units, individuals owning both a landline and a mobile phone, and selection of telephone numbers from the respective frames. We use these weights to calculate the country-level averages of the universalism statistic and use this weighted mean in our country-level analyses.

A.1.4 Translation and Piloting

After the final survey instrument for the Universalism module was finalized in English, translations were made and tested in the field in four countries - Turkey, Brazil, Spain, and Kenya. These cognitive interviews tested the survey on a small sample of 10-20 persons with different income and education levels. The results from the field testing were used to refine the English version to improve comprehension for respondents. The final survey instrument was then translated into all the languages needed, and each translation was reviewed by native speakers of each language to ensure that the translations was comprehensible and that it matched the English version. Each translation was modified based on the research team's feedback. Interviewers were instructed to follow the interview script without deviations. For some languages that are in use in more than one country, multiple translations into localized versions were made (such as Arabic, French, and Spanish).

Table A.1: Survey Details

Country	Dates	Number	Mode	Languages	Exceptions
Algeria	Nov 20 - Dec 9, 2020	1062	Landline and Mobile	Arabic	
Argentina	Dec 2, 2020 - Feb 23, 2021	1003	Landline and Mobile	Spanish	
Australia	Sep 21 - Nov 1, 2019	1000	Landline and Mobile	English	
Bangladesh	Dec 8 - Dec 20, 2020	1054	Mobile	Bengali	
Bolivia	Nov 24 - Dec 24, 2020	1000	Mobile	Spanish	
Brazil	Dec 2, 2020 - Jan 27, 2021	1003	Landline and Mobile	Portuguese	
Cambodia	Dec 25, 2020 - Jan 15, 2021	1000	Mobile	Khmer	
Cameroon	Nov 23 - Dec 19, 2020	1024	Mobile	French, English, Fulfulde	
Canada	Oct 13 - Nov 24, 2020	1010	Landline and Mobile	English, French	Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut were excluded from the sample.
Chile	Dec 9, 2020 - Feb 24, 2021	1000	Landline and Mobile	Spanish	
China	Oct 28 - Dec 13, 2020	3502	Mobile	Chinese	Tibet was excluded from the sample. The excluded areas represent less than 1% of the population of China
Colombia	Nov 30, 2020 - Jan 27, 2021	1002	Landline and Mobile	Spanish	
Croatia	Nov 6 - Dec 2, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	Croatian	
Czech Republic	Dec 22, 2020 - Jan 25, 2021	1004	Landline and Mobile	Czech	
Ecuador	Dec 7, 2020 - Feb 11, 2021	1002	Landline and Mobile	Spanish	
Egypt	Dec 19 - Dec 30, 2020	1002	Landline and Mobile	Arabic	
Ethiopia	Dec 7 - Dec 31, 2020	1022	Mobile	Amharic, English, Oromo, Tigrinya	
France	Oct 19 - Nov 14, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	French	
Germany	Oct 19 - Nov 14, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	German	

Table A.1: Survey Details

Country	Dates	Number	Mode	Languages	Exceptions
Ghana	Dec 11 - Dec 31, 2020	1000	Mobile	English, Ewe, Twi, Hausa	
Greece	Dec 2 - Dec 30, 2020	1003	Landline and Mobile	Greek	
Hungary	Nov 25 - Dec 21, 2020	1002	Landline and Mobile	Hungarian	
India	Dec 26, 2020 - Feb 24, 2021	3300	Face-to-Face (HH)*	Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Odia, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu	Excluded population living in Northeast states and remote islands, and Jammu and Kashmir. The excluded areas represent less than 10% of the population.
Indonesia	Dec 4, 2020 - Jan 10, 2021	1011	Mobile	Bahasa Indonesia	
Iran	Nov 2 - Nov 8, 2020	1007	Landline and Mobile	Farsi	
Iraq	Jan 3 - Feb 28, 2021	1006	Mobile	Arabic, Kurdish	
Israel	Dec 19, 2020 - Jan 7, 2021	1059	Landline and Mobile	Hebrew, Arabic	
Italy	Nov 2 - Nov 25, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	Italian	
Japan	Oct 2 - Dec 3, 2020	1012	Landline and Mobile	Japanese	For landline RDD, excluded 12 municipalities near the nuclear power plant in Fukushima. These areas were designated as not-to-call districts due to the devastation from the 2011 disasters. The exclusion represents less than 1% of the population of Japan.
Jordan	Dec 21 - Dec 31, 2020	1005	Mobile	Arabic	
Kazakhstan	Dec 11 - Dec 25, 2020	1000	Mobile	Russian, Kazakh	

Table A.1: Survey Details

Country	Dates	Number	Mode	Languages	Exceptions
Kenya	Nov 13 - Nov 22, 2020	1000	Mobile	English, Swahili/Kishwahili	
Mexico	Nov 10 - Dec 20, 2020	1006	Landline and Mobile	Spanish	
Morocco	Dec 17, 2020 - Jan 6, 2021	1010	Landline and Mobile	Moroccan Arabic	
Netherlands	Oct 27 - Dec 19, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	Dutch	
Nigeria	Dec 9 - Dec 21, 2020	1019	Mobile	English, Hausa, Igbo, Pidgin English, Yoruba	
Norway	Oct 9 - Nov 9, 2020	1018	Landline and Mobile	Norwegian	
Pakistan	Jan 9 - Feb 5, 2021	1001	Face-to-Face (HH)*	Urdu	Did not include AJK, Gilgit-Baltistan. The excluded area represents approximately 5% of the population. Gender-matched sampling was used during the final stage of selection.
Peru	Nov 27, 2020 - Feb 4, 2021	1003	Landline and Mobile	Spanish	
Philippines	Nov 16 - Dec 19, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	Filipino, Iluko, Cebuano, Waray, Bicol	
Poland	Nov 20 - Dec 17, 2020	1002	Landline and Mobile	Polish	
Portugal	Nov 9 - Dec 10, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	Portuguese	
Russia	Dec 2, - Dec 28, 2020	2002	Mobile	Russian	
Senegal	Nov 4 - Nov 26, 2020	1017	Mobile	French, Wolof	
South Africa	Dec 14 - Dec 23, 2020	1001	Mobile	Afrikaans, English, Sotho, Xhosa, Zulu	

Table A.1: Survey Details

Country	Dates	Number	Mode	Languages	Exceptions
South Korea	Dec 12, 2020 - Jan 11, 2021	1005	Landline and Mobile	Korean	
Spain	Oct 19 - Nov 12, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	Spanish	
Sri Lanka	Dec 7, 2020 - Jan 31, 2021	1013	Mobile	Sinhala, Tamil	
Switzerland	Oct 19 - Nov 17, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	French, German, Italian	
Tanzania	Dec 15 - Dec 24, 2020	1000	Mobile	Swahili, Kishwahili	
Thailand	Dec 13, 2020 - Jan 25, 2021	1000	Mobile	Thai	
Turkey	Dec 18 - Dec 29, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	Turkish	
Uganda	Dec 18 - Dec 28, 2020	1000	Mobile	Ateso, English, Luganda, Runyankole	
Ukraine	Nov 26 - Dec 6, 2020	1006	Landline and Mobile	Russian, Ukrainian	
United Kingdom	Nov 2 - Nov 27, 2020	1000	Landline and Mobile	English	
United States	Oct 14 - Dec 8, 2020	1008	Landline and Mobile	English, Spanish	
Venezuela	Dec 10, 2020 - Jan 24, 2021	1020	Landline and Mobile	Spanish	
Vietnam	Dec 6 - Dec 20, 2020	1000	Mobile	Vietnamese	
Zambia	Dec 14, 2020 - Jan 20, 2021	1005	Mobile	Bemba, English, Lozi, Nyanja, Tonga	
Zimbabwe	Dec 14 - Dec 26, 2020	1002	Mobile	English, Shona, Ndebele	

A.2 Survey Questions

Each respondent is randomized into treatment *Baseline* or *Moral*, where the latter treatment was split evenly between two different sub-treatments. Each respondent in *Baseline* answers two randomly selected questions out of A-1 through A-5. Each respondent in *Moral* answers two randomly selected questions out of B-1 through B-5. Each respondent in a subtreatment of *Moral*, which we will here call *Deserving*, answers two randomly selected questions out of C-1 through C-5. In addition, each respondent answers A-6 / B-6 / C-6. Responses to these questions are either A. a currency value, B. "Do not know", or C. "Refused to answer". After each question, the interviewer repeats the response and asks for confirmation from the respondent.

Finally, all respondents answer two randomly selected questions out of D-1 through D-6. Responses to these questions are coded as either A. a value from 1 to 4 (with 1 indicating "Strongly agree" and 4 "Strongly disagree"), B. "Do not Know", or C. "Refused".

Treatment *Baseline*. Suppose you have earned $1,000, but you have to give away the money to two other people. You can't keep any of the money for yourself. Assume that these two people have the same standard of living.
A-1. How much of your $1,000 would you give to a person in your family, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
This means that you would give [VALUE FROM A-1] to a person in your family and [1,000 MINUS VALUE FROM A-1] to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME). Is this correct? → if No, repeat A-1.
All subsequent questions follow this same logic, whereby the interviewer verifies participant responses through a follow-up question.

A-2. How much of your $1,000 would you give to a friend of yours, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
A-3. How much of your $1,000 would you give to a person who lives in your neighborhood, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
A-4. How much of your $1,000 would you give to a person who shares your religious beliefs, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
A-5. How much of your $1,000 would you give to a person who shares your ethnic background, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
A-6. Suppose now that the two people are someone from (COUNTRY NAME) and someone from anywhere in the world. Again, assume that these two people have the same living standard. How much of your $1,000 would you give to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME), if the rest goes to a random stranger from anywhere in the world?

Treatment *Moral*. Suppose you have earned $1,000, but you have to give away the money to two other people. You can't keep any of the money for yourself. Assume that these two people have the same living standard.
B-1. If you were to do what you think is morally right, then how much of your $1,000 would you give to a person in your family, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
B-2. If you were to do what you think is morally right, then how much of your $1,000 would you give to a friend of yours, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
B-3. If you were to do what you think is morally right, then how much of your $1,000 would you give to a person who lives in your neighborhood, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
B-4. If you were to do what you think is morally right, then how much of your $1,000 would you give to a person who shares your religious beliefs, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
B-5. If you were to do what you think is morally right, then how much of your $1,000 would you give to a person who shares your ethnic background, if the rest goes to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME)?
B-6. Suppose now that the two people are someone from (COUNTRY NAME) and someone from anywhere in the world. Again, assume that these two people have the same living standard. If you were to do what you think is morally right, then how much of your $1,000 would you give to a random stranger from (COUNTRY NAME), if the rest goes to a random stranger from anywhere in the world?

Treatment *Deserving* (sub-treatment of *Moral* and pooled wih *Moral* in all analyses). Suppose you have earned $1,000, but you have to give away the money to two other people. You can't keep any of the money for yourself. Assume that these two people are equally good people and have the same living standard.
C-1 through C-6: Same questions as B-1 through B-6.

Political Questions. We are now going to read a number of statements. In each case, we want you to say whether you Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, Strongly Disagree.
D-1. There are too many immigrants in the area you live in.
D-2. There are too many immigrants in (country).
D-3. The national government should focus on helping the poor in (country), rather than the poor elsewhere in the world.

D-4. The national government should focus on protecting the environment in (country), rather than protecting the global environment.
D-5. The national government should focus on having a strong military.
D-6. The national government should aim to reduce the economic differences between the rich and the poor in (country).

A.3 Main Covariates, Country Classifications and SE Clustering

A.3.1 Demographic Variables

Many of the analyses in the paper use demographic information to study heterogeneity or simply to control for variation driven by demographic characteristics. Below, we document how these variables are constructed.
Age (and age-squared): Continuous variables, recorded at the individual level in the survey.
Above Median Age: An indicator which is 1 if an individual is older than the country median age.
Religiosity: An indicator which is 1 if the respondent answers the question "What is your religion" with anything other than "Secular/Atheist/Non-religious/Agnostic".
Income: The income quintile relative to other respondents from the same country. In some of our analyses, we use an indicator that is 1 if the individual is in the top 2 income quintiles (i.e. top 40%).
Urban: An indicator that is 1 if the respondent indicates that they live in a large city. Other levels in the base variable are: rural area, small town/village, and suburbs.
Education: An indicator that is 1 if the respondent indicates that they have "Completed 4 years of education beyond high school and/or received a 4-year college degree".
Gender: Gallup codes all respondents as either male or female. We use an indicator = 1 if the respondent is male in our analyses.

A.3.2 Country Classification

Income levels. We use the World Bank's income classification schemes as one way of dividing countries into economically meaningful groups. The World Bank classifies countries as "High Income", "Middle Income" and "Low Income". We code an indicator $highincome = 1$ if a country is highincome, and 0 otherwise. The countries are: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Spain, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Greece, USA, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Italy, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Israel, Japan, South Korea and Poland.

WEIRD countries. In many of our analyses we study differences between "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic", i.e. WEIRD and non-WEIRD countries. We use the Maddison Project Database (MPD) to create an indicator $weird = 1$ if a country is in the "Western Europe" or "Western Offshoots" country groups in the MPD. The countries are: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Spain, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Greece, USA, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Italy.

Non-WEIRD and High Income countries. These are: Chile, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Poland.

Low and Middle Income countries. These are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cameroon, Colombia, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Cambodia, SriLanka, Morocco, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

A.3.3 Standard Errors

The individual level analyses presented in this paper are clustered by 530 "primary sampling units". These are essentially survey strata. In countries where telephonic interviews are conducted, these represent mobile providers (countries where landlines are a part of the sampling frame may have an additional regional component to the phone provider). In countries where face-to-face interviews are conducted, these represent administrative regions, split by urbanicity.

A.4 Sample Overview

Table A.2 provides an overview of the samples in each country. We provide the number of observations, fraction female, fraction religious, fraction living in a city, fraction having a college degree, median age and number of interview languages used.

A.5 Monetary Amounts Used in the Survey

We calculate the ratio of the PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of each country to the GDP of the United States using the latest available data from the World Bank WDI Database. We use the latest available exchange rate before the cutoff dates for the finalisation of the survey instruments. In the interest of simplicity consistency, we round down the amount from this conversion process to the first digit. Table A.3 lists the local currency amounts used in each country.

Table A.2: Sample overview

	Obs.	Female %	Religious %	City %	College %	Median age	Languages
Algeria	1048	.43	1	.51	.26	36	1
Argentina	978	.46	.83	.45	.22	43	1
Australia	965	.52	.68	.069	.42	63	1
Bangladesh	920	.39	1	.4	.15	26	1
Bolivia	922	.49	.98	.36	.25	31	1
Brazil	972	.5	.88	.5	.28	38	1
Cambodia	969	.43	1	.26	.28	32	1
Cameroon	1013	.51	.99	.48	.18	27	3
Canada	992	.54	.67	.34	.42	55	2
Chile	984	.59	.91	.52	.37	43	1
China	3410	.34	.	.34	.3	31	1
Colombia	997	.56	.88	.42	.19	34	1
Croatia	935	.62	.88	.38	.44	46	1
Czech Republic	982	.59	.32	.38	.29	46	1
Ecuador	921	.55	.94	.33	.19	32	1
Egypt	991	.45	1	.52	.31	33	1
Ethiopia	1021	.43	1	.61	.34	30	4
France	995	.51	.68	.24	.29	49	1
Germany	991	.48	.67	.35	.26	55	1
Ghana	989	.38	.99	.36	.26	27	3
Greece	1001	.45	.87	.45	.57	45	1
Hungary	968	.53	.82	.39	.45	48	1
India	2801	.47	1	.12	.089	32	11
Indonesia	904	.43	1	.21	.23	31	1
Iran	995	.49	.99	.53	.28	38	1
Iraq	988	.38	1	.53	.18	30	2
Israel	1055	.47	.99	.77	.36	45	2
Italy	997	.49	.84	.29	.27	53	1
Japan	983	.41	.34	.2	.35	59	1
Jordan	1001	.46	1	.48	.25	33	1
Kazakhstan	848	.52	.98	.57	.4	35	2
Kenya	996	.47	1	.14	.23	27	2
Mexico	941	.47	.89	.38	.35	38	1
Morocco	986	.43	.	.55	.13	32	1
Netherlands	980	.44	.48	.22	.54	57	1
Nigeria	1014	.43	1	.48	.05	30	5
Norway	1004	.48	.71	.21	.59	57	1
Pakistan	983	.5	.99	.26	.053	32	1
Peru	982	.48	.92	.46	.27	34	1
Philippines	1000	.57	1	.25	.19	31	5
Poland	972	.51	.85	.46	.6	46	1
Portugal	947	.55	.79	.23	.36	43	1
Russia	1980	.53	.81	.44	.5	40	1
Senegal	1011	.52	1	.42	.058	28	2
South Africa	1000	.58	.98	.2	.067	29	5
South Korea	999	.39	.47	.45	.4	53	1
Spain	996	.54	.75	.32	.13	48	1
Sri Lanka	930	.44	1	.084	.024	37	2
Switzerland	994	.53	.8	.15	.56	51	3
Tanzania	996	.45	1	.38	.15	29	1
Thailand	925	.55	.97	.36	.6	38	1
Turkey	952	.54	.99	.74	.29	28	1
Uganda	958	.42	1	.16	.039	26	3
Ukraine	955	.53	.89	.45	.57	38	2
United Kingdom	988	.46	.71	.21	.59	51	1
United States	1002	.47	.82	.2	.48	56	2
Venezuela	993	.55	.94	.32	.32	36	1
Vietnam	764	.41	.49	.58	.58	31	1
Zambia	1005	.48	1	.2	.3	26	5
Zimbabwe	999	.52	.98	.094	.14	31	3

Notes. Descriptive statistics for the respondent pool in each country.

Table A.3: Local currency amounts

Countries	Country code	Currency code	Local Currency Amount
Algeria	DZA	DZD	30,000
Argentina	ARG	ARS	20,000
Australia	AUS	AUD	1,000
Bangladesh	BGD	BDT	6,000
Bolivia	BOL	BOB	900
Brazil	BRA	BRL	1,000
Cambodia	KHM	KHR	300,000
Cameroon	CMR	XAF	40,000
Canada	CAN	CAD	1,000
Chile	CHL	CLP	300,000
China	CHN	CNY	2,000
Colombia	COL	COP	800,000
Croatia	HRV	HRK	3,000
Czech Republic	CZE	CZK	10,000
Ecuador	ECU	USD	200
Egypt	EGY	EGP	3,000
Ethiopia	ETH	ETB	900
France	FRA	EUR	700
Germany	DEU	EUR	800
Ghana	GHA	GHS	400
Greece	GRC	EUR	400
Hungary	HUN	HUF	100,000
India	IND	INR	9,000
Indonesia	IDN	IDR	3,000,000
Iran	IRN	IRR (toman)	1,000,000
Iraq	IRQ	IRD	300000
Israel	ISR	ILS	2,000
Italy	ITA	EUR	600
Japan	JPN	JPY	70,000
Jordan	JOR	JOD	100
Kazakhstan	KAZ	KZT	200,000
Kenya	KEN	KES	6,000
Mexico	MEX	MXN	6,000
Morocco	MAR	MAD	1,000
Netherlands	NLD	EUR	800
Nigeria	NGA	NGN	30,000
Norway	NOR	NOK	10,000
Pakistan	PAK	PKR	10,000
Peru	PER	PEN	800
Philippines	PHL	PHP	7,000
Poland	POL	PLN	2000
Portugal	PRT	EUR	500
Russia	RUS	RUB	30,000
Senegal	SEN	XOF	40000
South Africa	ZAF	ZAR	3,000
South Korea	KOR	KRW	700,000
Spain	ESP	EUR	600
Sri Lanka	LKA	LKR	40,000
Switzerland	CHE	CHF	1,000
Tanzania	TZA	TZS	100,000
Thailand	THA	THB	9,000
Turkey	TUR	TRY	3,000
Uganda	UGA	UGX	100,000
Ukraine	UKR	UAH	4,000
United Kingdom	GBR	GBP	600
USA	USA	USD	1,000
Venezuela	VEN	VES	50,000,000
Vietnam	VNM	VND	3,000,000
Zambia	ZMB	ZMW	900
Zimbabwe	ZWE	USD	50

Notes. Local currency amounts used in each country. The amounts are generated by scaling 1000 USD in the ratio of each country's GDP (PPP per capita) to US GDP, multiplying by the exchange rate and then rounding down to the first digit.

A.6 Data Considerations

Number of observations and questions. The data from Gallup contains 66,233 respondents from which we are able to use 63,788 respondents.

The biggest cause of lost observations are cases where responses to allocation questions are coded as "Don't Know" or "Refused to answer" (2,427 observations). These instances are not randomly distributed and are more frequent in some country-language combinations than in others. For example, nearly 50% of the respondents in Vietnam do not answer one or more allocation question.

Next, the survey protocol has a confirmation step in each allocation decision question. 647 allocations are "unconfirmed", of which more than half are from India. We have chosen to ignore this step of the protocol and include the "unconfirmed" allocations in the interest of maximizing the number of observations. Finally, we drop 18 respondents from Pakistan because none of the questions in our module were recorded.

In our final sample of 63,788, 7.5% of respondents have at least one allocation question missing. In those cases, we compute the summary statistics based on fewer questions. When either only domestic or only foreign universalism is available, we use this measure also for composite universalism.

Recording Errors. The raw data set contains 1,828 allocation decisions which we suspect have been incorrectly recorded and have attempted to correct. These fall into two categories. First, some allocation decisions recorded in Bangladesh, Uganda, Cambodia and Iraq clearly have allocation amounts with an incorrect number of zeroes – for example, an allocation decision of 6000:4000 was recorded as 6:4 in many Bangladeshi records. In these cases, we preserve the base information and adjust our universalism calculations to account for this problem.

Second, some observations in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom were incorrect in that the sum of the recorded allocations for the in- and out-groups did not add up to the allocation budget. For example, if the total amount to be allocated was 1000, then in some cases the sum of the in- and out-group allocations was less than 1000. We attributed this to a recording error as enumerators make a manual calculation when they record the amount allocated to the stranger (after soliciting the in-group allocation from respondents). We apply a correction to these allocations by preserving the in-group allocation as-is, and scaling the out-group allocation to match the total amount.

Missing questions. The survey questions on allocation to co-ethnics and attitudes on government policies were not asked in China due to local restrictions on data collection

(a) Age and allocations to in-group



(b) Male and allocations to in-group



Figure A.1: Local polynomial regression plots of demographics (age, gender) on allocation decisions. The figures reveal a "flipping" pattern where, for example, age is positively correlated with in-group allocations for in-group allocations ≥ 50 but negatively for in-group allocations ≤ 50.

or other issues beyond the control of the survey collection agency. These questions were replaced with other equivalent allocation decision or political view question.

A.7 Recoding of Some Allocation Decisions

20,338 out of 184,950 (11%) of all allocations in our data give strictly more to the stranger than the in-group member. In principle, it is of course perfectly plausible that a respondent wishes to allocate more money to a stranger than to e.g. someone from their neighborhood. Yet, 4.5% of respondents allocated more money to the stranger than to the in-group member in *all* questions, and various pieces of evidence strongly suggest that these cases reflect mistakes, confusion or systematic misrecordings by the enumerator. There are three such pieces of evidence:

1. A first piece of evidence is that the correlation between allocation decisions and demographics like age and gender *exactly flips* around 50%. For example, within the set of allocation decisions that allocate at least 50% to the in-group member, the correlation between in-group allocations and age is $\rho = 0.071$, suggesting that younger people are more universalist. Yet, within the set of allocation decisions that allocate at least 50% to the out-group member, the correlation between in-group allocations and age is $\rho = -0.045$, suggesting that older people are more universalist. An almost identical "flipping" pattern holds for gender, see Figure A.1. We interpret this as suggesting that an allocation of e.g. 80% to the stranger often reflects an intended allocation of 80% to the in-group.

2. A second piece of evidence is that the occurrence of the pattern that a respondent allocates more money to the stranger in *all* questions is predictably correlated with

Table A.4: Relationship between low in-group allocations and demographic variables.

	Dependent variable: 1 if all in-group allocations < 50%			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Above med. age	0.011***			0.011***
	(0.002)			(0.002)
College education		-0.008***		-0.005***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Top 40 income			-0.009***	-0.008***
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.081	0.081	0.081	0.082
Observations	63788	63423	63788	63423

Notes. OLS results from regressing an indicator of whether an allocation to the out-group is more than 50 on indicators for whether an individual is above median age (1), college educated (2), is in the top 40% of income in the country, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.

individual demographics that plausibly proxy for lower cognitive skills, such as low education, low income and high age, see Table A.4.

3. A third piece of evidence is that the occurrence of in-group allocations of less than 50% is concentrated in certain survey strata. Figure A.2 shows a histogram of the fraction of decisions in a given survey stratum that allocate strictly less than 50% to the in-group. The figure shows that for the vast majority of survey strata this fraction is relatively small, but for some it is very large. This suggests either systematic misrecordings by the enumerators, language barriers or other structural problems.

These patterns suggest a tradeoff. On the one hand, we do not desire to leave the reader with the impression that we arbitrarily recode individual observations to "manufacture" certain results, in particular because our pre-analysis plan did not foreshadow such a procedure. On the other hand, we anticipate that this rich dataset may be used more widely by the research community going forward, and we feel it is incumbent upon us to suggest the most productive way to interpret and code the data. As a result, we opt for a balanced strategy. We recode allocations to the in-group of $x < 50\%$ as $100\% - x$ if and only if two arguably conservative criteria were satisfied: the respondent in question allocates (i) weakly more than 50% to the stranger in *all* questions and (ii) strictly more than 50% to the stranger in at least half of all decisions (which in practice usually means at least two out of three).



Figure A.2: Histogram showing the distribution of the fraction of allocations that are less than 50 to the in-group within each survey strata. The figure shows that a few survey strata seem to have a large number of these allocations.

This procedure affects 4,328 respondents and 10,318 allocation decisions. To illustrate how conservative this recoding procedure is, consider the distribution of universalism (before recoding) for the observations that we recode (Appendix Figure A.3). For example, the top right panel shows the distribution of the unadjusted composite universalism measure in the subset of respondents for which at least one of the respondent's allocation decisions get recoded. The main takeaway is that the universalism scores that we recode are often *very* extreme. In fact, the modal individual has an unadjusted composite universalism score of 100, meaning that the modal individual for whom we recode at least one decision allocates the entire budget to the socially more distant individual in all decisions.

For transparency, Appendix A.7 replicates all results in this paper using the original coding, with similar results. Also for transparency, our published dataset will include both the recoded and the original allocation decisions.



Figure A.3: Universalism patterns in recoded observations. Each panel shows the distribution of the *unadjusted* composite universalism statistic, as a function of whether or not we eventually recode at least one of the respondent's allocation decisions.

B Additional Figures



Figure B.1: Histograms of allocations to the in-group across the six survey questions, The number of allocations ranges from 23,073 to 25,360 in the first 5 panels. The last panel shows the histogram of 61,753 allocations.



Figure B.2: "Ranking" of in-groups across countries implied by the allocation decisions, pooled across treatments, excluding the Compatriot-Foreigner allocation question. Each section of a bar represents a rank (1 to 5, 1 being the most favored) for that in-group. The size of each section is proportional to the number of countries that assign that rank to the in-group.



Figure B.3: Distribution of composite universalism across individuals, split by treatment (*Baseline* and *Moral*), $N = 31,670$ and $32,118$ respectively.



Figure B.4: Distribution of domestic, foreign and foreign - domestic universalism across individuals, separately by treatment (Baseline and Moral).



Figure B.5: Global variation in domestic universalism



Figure B.6: Global variation in foreign universalism



Figure B.7: Global variation in difference between domestic and foreign universalism

(a) USA (b) India (c) China



Figure B.8: Average composite, domestic and foreign universalism by state/sub-national region in USA / India / China. 0 means that all money is shared with the in-group, 50 equal splits, and 100 that all money is shared with the socially more distant stranger. Composite universalism occasionally doesn't equal the average of domestic and foreign universalism because of missing domestic or foreign universalism data (see footnote 2 and Appendix A.6 for details).



Figure B.9: Domestic universalism and demographics. OLS coefficients from regressions of domestic universalism on demographics, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects. Each coefficient reflects the results of a separate regression and can be interpreted as the percentage point change in universalism. The demographic variables here are indicators; Median age and income quintiles are computed for each country separately. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level.



Figure B.10: Foreign universalism and demographics. OLS coefficients from regressions of foreign universalism on demographics, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects. Each coefficient reflects the results of a separate regression and can be interpreted as the percentage point change in universalism. The demographic variables here are indicators; Median age and income quintiles are computed for each country separately. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level.

(a) Age and universalism by country



(b) Universalism and college education by country



Figure B.11: Composite universalism and age / education by country. The figures show the country-specific OLS coefficients of regressions of composite universalism age (top panel) / a college education dummy (bottom panel), controlling for treatment fixed effects. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors.

(a) Universalism and religiosity by country



(b) Universalism and income (top 40%) by country



Figure B.12: Composite universalism and religiosity / high income by country. The figures show the country-specific OLS coefficients of regressions of composite universalism a religiosity dummy (top panel) / a dummy $\bar{1}$ if the individual's household income is above the 60th percentile (bottom panel), controlling for treatment fixed effects. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors.



Figure B.13: OLS coefficients from individual-level regressions of universalism on different indicator variables, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects In the first panel, the indicator equals one if the respondents reports any religious denomination and zero if they report being an atheist. In the second through fifth panel, the sample is restricted to respondents who report a specific religious denomination. The indicator variable equals one if the respondent reports that religion plays an important part in their life and zero otherwise. For example, in the first panel, the sample is restricted to people who report belonging to a Christian denomination, and the regression coefficient shows how much more (or less) universalist those Christians are who report that religion plays an important role in their life. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors.



Figure B.14: Universalism and prosocial behaviors. Each panel shows a binned scatter plot that, for a given level of universalism, computes the average probability of (a) having donated to charity and (b) volunteered time. Both panels are constructed controlling for country and treatment FE.



Figure B.15: Domestic / foreign universalism and indicators for Civic engagement / community attachment. OLS coefficients from regressions of indicators of civic engagement / community attachment on domestic and foreign universalism, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects. Each coefficient reflects the results of a separate regression. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level.



Figure B.16: Composite universalism and political views in the entire sample, city dwellers and college-educated individuals, and the sample of individuals who neither live in a city nor are college educated. OLS coefficients are from regressions of political attitudes on composite universalism, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects. Each coefficient reflects the results of a separate regression. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level.

(a) Domestic universalism

(b) Foreign universalism



Figure B.17: Domestic / foreign universalism and log GDP per capita. 0 means that all money is shared with the in-group, 50 equal splits, and 100 that all money is shared with the socially more distant stranger.



Figure B.18: Economic, Social and Political correlations: Results from OLS regressions of composite universalism on each of various country level variables, controlling for GDP. All country characteristics other than universalism are standardized into z-scores. As a result, the coefficients show by how much universalism changes (descriptively) when a country characteristic increases by one standard deviation conditional on the other variables.



Figure B.19: Country-wise variation in exposure to democracy. Each plot shows the distribution of the average democracy (score from 0 to 10) experienced by an individual in our sample from that country.



Figure B.20: Foreign minus domestic universalism and demographics. OLS coefficients from regressions of domestic universalism on demographics, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects. Each coefficient reflects the results of a separate regression and can be interpreted as the percentage point change in universalism. The demographic variables here are indicators; Median age and income quintiles are computed for each country separately. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level.

C Additional Tables

Table C.1: Pearson correlations among allocation decisions

	Family	Friend	Neighbor	Co-religionist	Co-ethnic	Compatriot
Family	1.00	0.52	0.33	0.21	0.28	0.25
Friend	0.52	1.00	0.45	0.30	0.35	0.28
Neighbor	0.33	0.45	1.00	0.35	0.41	0.27
Co-religionist	0.21	0.30	0.35	1.00	0.45	0.26
Co-ethnic	0.28	0.35	0.41	0.45	1.00	0.30
Compatriot	0.25	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.30	1.00

Notes. Pairwise correlations, pooled across treatments.

Table C.2: Spearman rank correlations among allocation decisions

	Family	Friend	Neighbor	Co-religionist	Co-ethnic	Compatriot
Family	1.00	0.55	0.37	0.23	0.28	0.26
Friend	0.55	1.00	0.46	0.31	0.34	0.28
Neighbor	0.37	0.46	1.00	0.36	0.41	0.27
Co-religionist	0.23	0.31	0.36	1.00	0.44	0.25
Co-ethnic	0.28	0.34	0.41	0.44	1.00	0.30
Compatriot	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	1.00

Notes. Spearman rank order pairwise correlations, pooled across treatments.

Table C.3: Treatment effects on universalism

	Composite Universalism		Domestic		Foreign	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Moral	0.604***	0.518***	0.394***	0.374**	0.773***	0.617***
	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.185)	(0.183)
Constant	36.280***	36.742***	37.369***	37.166***	35.650***	36.205***
	(0.338)	(0.541)	(0.343)	(0.558)	(0.403)	(0.739)
Country FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Demog. controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.000	0.073	0.000	0.066	0.000	0.056
Observations	63788	57769	63230	57353	61753	56016

Notes. OLS results from regressing recoded universalism on an indicator for the *Moral* treatment, controlling for demographic and country characteristics. Controls are a person's age, square of the age and indicators for the country of residence and whether the person is male, college educated, religious, lives in a city, is in the top 40% of the income distribution in the country sample. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.4: Composite universalism and Demographics: Full Sample

	Dependent variable: Universalism						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Above med. age	-1.922***						-1.779***
	(0.168)						(0.177)
Male		-2.075***					-2.000***
		(0.169)					(0.185)
Top 40 income			-0.499***				-0.276*
			(0.154)				(0.160)
College education				-0.696***			-0.687***
				(0.179)			(0.183)
City dweller					-0.111		-0.135
					(0.183)		(0.191)
Religious						-1.162***	-1.155***
						(0.256)	(0.255)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.087	0.087	0.084	0.083	0.083	0.063	0.071
Observations	63788	63788	63788	63423	63516	58302	57769

Notes. Estimates from OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 5. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.5: Composite universalism and Demographics: WEIRD countries

	Dependent variable: Universalism						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Above med. age	-2.399***						-2.209***
	(0.320)						(0.312)
Male		-1.748***					-1.873***
		(0.295)					(0.301)
Top 40 income			-0.371				-0.292
			(0.267)				(0.259)
College education				0.692**			0.644*
				(0.336)			(0.341)
City dweller					0.664*		0.437
					(0.348)		(0.352)
Religious						-1.901***	-1.631***
						(0.346)	(0.346)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.010	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.019
Observations	12852	12852	12852	12784	12803	12668	12564

Notes. Estimates from OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 5. The sample is restricted to individuals from WEIRD countries. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.6: Composite universalism and Demographics: High income, non-WEIRD countries

	Dependent variable: Universalism						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Above med. age	-2.172***						-2.214***
	(0.534)						(0.530)
Male		-1.943***					-2.021***
		(0.469)					(0.493)
Top 40 income			-0.390				-0.412
			(0.446)				(0.504)
College education				-0.284			-0.483
				(0.400)			(0.414)
City dweller					0.664		0.567
					(0.517)		(0.499)
Religious						-0.671	-0.488
						(0.596)	(0.576)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.041	0.040	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.045
Observations	7878	7878	7878	7847	7863	7694	7653

Notes. Estimates from OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 5. The sample is restricted to individuals from high income countries that are not classified as WEIRD. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.7: Composite universalism and Demographics: LMICs

	Dependent variable: Universalism						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Above med. age	-1.735***						-1.501***
	(0.205)						(0.222)
Male		-2.198***					-2.051***
		(0.219)					(0.248)
Top 40 income			-0.557***				-0.183
			(0.198)				(0.206)
College education				-1.360***			-1.404***
				(0.232)			(0.245)
City dweller					-0.460**		-0.443*
					(0.229)		(0.245)
Religious						-0.204	-0.419
						(0.446)	(0.447)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.114	0.116	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.083	0.092
Observations	43058	43058	43058	42792	42850	37940	37552

Notes. Estimates from OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 5. The sample is restricted to individuals from Low- and Middle-income countries. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.8: Decomposition of demographic differences in universalism

	Dependent variable: Composite Universalism					
	Baseline		*Moral*		Full sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Above median age	-2.30***	-2.37***	-1.55***	-1.61***	-1.55***	-1.60***
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Male	-2.44***	-2.42***	-1.72***	-1.80***	-1.77***	-1.84***
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)
College education		-0.82***		-0.51**		-0.40*
		(0.26)		(0.23)		(0.23)
City dweller		-0.00		-0.21		-0.14
		(0.24)		(0.22)		(0.21)
Religious		-0.30		0.11		-0.09
		(0.29)		(0.29)		(0.27)
Top 40% income						-0.30
						(0.19)
Above median age × *Baseline*					-0.75***	-0.78***
					(0.26)	(0.27)
Male × *Baseline*					-0.62**	-0.50*
					(0.26)	(0.27)
College × *Baseline*						-0.41
						(0.31)
City × *Baseline*						0.11
						(0.26)
Religious × *Baseline*						-0.05
						(0.26)
Top 40% income × *Baseline*						0.08
						(0.25)
Baseline					0.14	0.19
					(0.22)	(0.33)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09
Observations	31670	28726	32118	29241	63788	57967

Notes. OLS estimations of composite universalism on demographic variables and their interactions with an indicator for the *Moral* treatment. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the sampling unit level. The demographic variables are indicators with a value of 1 indicating whether an individual has the attribute. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.9: Composite universalism and civic engagement / community attachment

	Dependent variable:			
	Help a Stranger		Move away	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Universalism / 100	0.116***	0.120***	0.042***	0.033**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Above med. age		-0.033***		-0.084***
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Male		0.038***		0.024***
		(0.005)		(0.004)
College education		0.023***		0.004
		(0.005)		(0.004)
City dweller		0.023***		-0.003
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Top 40 income		0.014***		-0.006
		(0.005)		(0.004)
Secular/Atheist		-0.001		0.021***
		(0.007)		(0.005)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.105	0.115	0.091	0.111
Observations	63450	57490	61199	55452

Notes. OLS estimates of various indicators of civic engagement on composite universalism and demographic indicators. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the sampling unit level. Universalism is divided by 100 for expositional ease. (1)-(4): Indicators for social engagement are coded such that 0 indicates "No" to each question. All regressions control for country and treatment fixed effects. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.10: Composite universalism and political views

	Dependent variable:					
	Reduce	Prioritize global vs. domestic		Pro immigrants		Weak
	Inequality	poor	environment	in area	in country	military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Universalism / 100	0.171***	0.409***	0.316***	0.047	0.203***	0.204***
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.048)
Age	0.001*	-0.000	-0.004***	0.001**	-0.000	-0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	-0.049***	-0.003	-0.020	-0.004	0.054***	-0.006
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
College education	0.004	0.069***	0.120***	0.148***	0.142***	0.163***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.017)
City dweller	0.035**	-0.000	0.016	-0.158***	-0.010	0.053***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income quintile	-0.004	0.012***	0.011**	0.009	0.008	0.013**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.065	0.151	0.158	0.146	0.200	0.253
Observations	19225	19424	19167	22124	21745	19100

Notes. Estimates from OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. Universalism is divided by 100 for expositional ease. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.11: Composite universalism and political views: Controlling for Religiosity

	Dependent variable:					
	Reduce	Prioritize global vs. domestic		Pro immigrants		Weak
	Inequality	poor	environment	in area	in country	military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Domestic universalism / 100	0.18***	0.08**	0.09**	0.23***	0.07	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Foreign universalism / 100	-0.00	0.34***	0.23***	-0.01	0.23***	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
College education	0.00	0.07***	0.12***	0.14***	0.15***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income quintile	-0.01	0.01**	0.01*	0.01*	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religious	-0.04*	-0.04	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.18***	-0.28***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.066	0.156	0.166	0.163	0.220	0.267
Observations	17985	18074	17875	17682	17471	17897

Notes. Estimates from OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. Universalism is divided by 100 for expositional ease. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.12: Political Views and Composite Universalism in sub-samples

	Dependent variable: Focus on reducing inequality (inverted)			
	Full sample	WEIRD	HIC, Non-WEIRD	LMIC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Universalism / 100	0.169***	0.466***	0.186*	0.055
	(0.043)	(0.085)	(0.101)	(0.054)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.063	0.046	0.102	0.060
Observations	19753	4335	2621	12797

Notes. Estimates from OLS of responses to survey questions on political views (coded from 1 to 4, coded such that 4 is the predicted correlation with universalism) on universalism, controlling for treatment and country effects with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 9. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.13: Political Views and Composite Universalism in sub-samples

	Dependent variable: Focus global vs local poor			
	Full sample (1)	WEIRD (2)	HIC, Non-WEIRD (3)	LMIC (4)
Universalism / 100	0.414***	0.749***	0.469***	0.279***
	(0.040)	(0.094)	(0.082)	(0.047)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.146	0.071	0.110	0.041
Observations	19942	4364	2570	13008

Notes. Estimates from OLS of responses to survey questions on political views (coded from 1 to 4, coded such that 4 is the predicted correlation with universalism) on universalism, controlling for treatment and country effects with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 9. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.14: Political Views and Composite Universalism in sub-samples

	Dependent variable: Focus global vs local environment			
	Full sample (1)	WEIRD (2)	HIC, Non-WEIRD (3)	LMIC (4)
Universalism / 100	0.329***	0.807***	0.383***	0.143**
	(0.047)	(0.095)	(0.127)	(0.056)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.150	0.036	0.117	0.052
Observations	19700	4229	2529	12942

Notes. Estimates from OLS of responses to survey questions on political views (coded from 1 to 4, coded such that 4 is the predicted correlation with universalism) on universalism, controlling for treatment and country effects with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 9. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.15: Political Views and Composite Universalism in sub-samples

	Dependent variable: Too many immigrants in area			
	Full sample	WEIRD	HIC, Non-WEIRD	LMIC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Universalism / 100	0.022	0.509***	0.107	-0.133*
	(0.057)	(0.102)	(0.135)	(0.072)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.137	0.103	0.220	0.075
Observations	22619	4144	2586	15889

Notes. Estimates from OLS of responses to survey questions on political views (coded from 1 to 4, coded such that 4 is the predicted correlation with universalism) on universalism, controlling for treatment and country effects with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 9. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.16: Political Views and Composite Universalism in sub-samples

	Dependent variable: Too many immigrants in country			
	Full sample	WEIRD	HIC, Non-WEIRD	LMIC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Universalism / 100	0.175***	0.932***	0.361**	-0.073
	(0.053)	(0.109)	(0.138)	(0.060)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.192	0.137	0.270	0.121
Observations	22225	4215	2482	15528

Notes. Estimates from OLS of responses to survey questions on political views (coded from 1 to 4, coded such that 4 is the predicted correlation with universalism) on universalism, controlling for treatment and country effects with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 9. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.17: Political Views and Composite Universalism in sub-samples

	Dependent variable: Focus on strong military			
	Full sample	WEIRD	HIC, Non-WEIRD	LMIC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Universalism / 100	0.186***	0.499***	0.496***	-0.013
	(0.049)	(0.107)	(0.150)	(0.051)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.240	0.157	0.165	0.131
Observations	19628	4205	2593	12830

Notes. Estimates from OLS of responses to survey questions on political views (coded from 1 to 4, coded such that 4 is the predicted correlation with universalism) on universalism, controlling for treatment and country effects with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. The coefficients and standard errors here are used in plotting the values in figure 9. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D Results Without Recoding of Allocation Decisions

D.1 Figures



Figure D.1: Mean money allocations to the in-group by treatment. Each bar indicates how much of the budget was given to the in-group. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on clustering at the sampling unit level.



Figure D.2: Universalism and demographics. OLS coefficients from regressions of composite universalism on demographics, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects. Each coefficient reflects the results of a separate regression and can be interpreted as the percentage point change in universalism. Median age and income percentiles are computed separately for each country based on the sample. All demographics are coded to be binary. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level.

(a) Universalism and gender by country



(b) Universalism and urban residence by country



Figure D.3: Composite universalism and gender / urban residence by country. The figures show the country-specific OLS coefficients of regressions of composite universalism on a male dummy (top panel) / a city dummy (bottom panel), controlling for treatment fixed effects. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage point change in universalism. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level.

(a) Helped a stranger in need



(b) Likely to move away



Figure D.4: Universalism and civic engagement / community attachment. Each panel is constructed based on 63450 to 61199 respondents and shows a binned scatter plot that, for a given level of universalism, computes the average probability of (a) having helped a stranger and (b) saying it is likely that one will move away in next year. Both panels are constructed controlling for country and treatment FE.



Figure D.5: Composite universalism and political views. The figures show binned scatter plots that average support for a given policy for a given level of universalism. The figures are constructed controlling for country and treatment FE. All variables are (re-)coded such that our pre-analysis plan predicts a positive relationship, and the panel captions indicate the meaning of the correlation. The sample size varies between $N = 18,735$ and $N = 21,724$ across panels.



Figure D.6: Composite universalism and political views in different sub-samples. OLS coefficients from regressions of political attitudes on composite universalism, controlling for country and treatment fixed effects. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals, computed based on robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level.



Figure D.7: Composite universalism and log GDP per capita. 0 Universalism means full in-group favoritism, 50 equal splits between the in- and out-groups, and 100 full out-group favoritism.

(a) Democracy score



(b) Christian share



(c) Ancestral kinship tightness



(d) Longitude



Figure D.8: Added variable plots of the cross-country relationships between composite universalism and democracy (Panel a), Christian share (Panel b), ancestral kinship tightness (Panel c) and longitude (Panel d). Each panel is constructed controlling for log per capita income. 0 Universalism means full in-group favoritism, 50 means equal splits between the in- and out-groups, and 100 means full out-group favoritism.

D.2 Tables

Table D.1: Decomposition of demographic differences in universalism

	Dependent variable: Composite Universalism					
	Baseline		*Moral*		Full sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Above median age	-0.91***	-0.90***	-1.01***	-1.05***	-0.78	-0.74
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.48)	(0.49)
Male	-2.33***	-2.21***	-1.40***	-1.25***	-3.13***	-3.05***
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Above median age × *Moral*					-0.12	-0.16
					(0.31)	(0.31)
Male × *Moral*					0.84***	0.88***
					(0.32)	(0.32)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Treatment FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.09
Observations	31670	30863	32118	31317	63788	62180

Notes. OLS estimations of composite universalism on demographic variables and their interactions with an indicator for the *Moral* treatment. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the sampling unit level. Controls include college degree, urban residence, and income quintile fixed effects. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.2: Universalism and political views

	Dependent variable:					
	Reduce	Prioritize global vs. domestic		Pro immigrants		Weak
	Inequality	poor	environment	in area	in country	military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Domestic universalism / 100	0.13***	0.07**	0.03	0.06	0.03	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Foreign universalism / 100	-0.05	0.33***	0.16***	-0.18***	0.08*	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
College education	-0.00	0.08***	0.12***	0.15***	0.15***	0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income quintile	-0.01	0.01***	0.01**	0.01	0.01*	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.065	0.156	0.162	0.149	0.204	0.258
Observations	18528	18676	18478	21248	20951	18430

Notes. Estimates from OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit level. Universalism is divided by 100 for expositional ease. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.3: Exposure to democracy and universalism: Variation across country-age-cohorts

	Dependent variable:						
	Universalism						
	Composite			Domestic		Foreign	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Lifetime average democracy score	0.11	0.12	0.05	0.16	0.13	0.10	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Lifetime average log GDP p/c		1.64	1.24	-0.14	-0.42	2.94**	2.41*
		(1.09)	(1.14)	(1.08)	(1.12)	(1.34)	(1.41)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.11
Observations	55323	55323	53826	54867	53391	53765	52332

Notes. OLS estimates of universalism on democracy exposure with robust standard errors, clustered at the level of 3,468 country-age cells. Exposure to democracy is constructed by taking the mean of the Democracy score time series in the Polity V database over the respondent's lifetime. Demographic controls include gender, income quintile fixed effects, college degree and an indicator for whether an individual lives in a big city. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.4: Exposure to democracy and universalism: Variation across migrants

	Dependent variable:						
	Universalism						
	Composite			Domestic		Foreign	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Democracy score in home country	0.23*	0.33**	0.30**	0.48***	0.49***	0.15	0.09
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Log GDP p/c in home country		-0.20	-0.06	0.00	-0.07	-0.40	-0.15
		(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.63)	(0.67)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08
Observations	2741	2451	2412	2424	2387	2398	2363

Notes. OLS estimates of universalism on democracy in a migrant's country of origin. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 151 countries of origin. Demographic controls include gender, income quintile fixed effects, college degree and an indicator for whether an individual lives in a big city. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E Variable Descriptions for Country-Level Variables

Kinship score: The Kinship tightness variable from Enke (2019) which captures the strength of ancestral kinship ties at the country level.

Family ties: Constructed using the methodology described in Alesina and Giuliano (2013). Using data from the 3rd and 4th waves of the World Values Survey, we focus on the three questions represented by the variables V4, V13, V14. The final variable is the first principal component of these three variables, averaged at the country level.

Democracy: This is a score from 0 to 10 with 10 being the most democratic (insofar as that can be defined and indexed). The elements of this index are: Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Constraint on Chief Executive and Competitiveness of Political Participation. Taken from Polity V dataset.

Gini index: This is the Gini index, using the most recent value that is available for each country in the World Bank WDI database.

Share Christians This is the share of Christians in a country. Data taken from Barro (2003).

Development Aid: Official Development Assistance as a percent of Gross National Income. Data from OECD/WDI. This variable is only available for a few countries in the sample.

Environmental Indices: Environmental health, Ecological Vitality and the Environmental Performance Index are drawn from the 2020 release of the Environmental Performance Index.

Property Rights: We use measures of property rights and other governance indicators from the Quality of Governance data set (2021 release).

Years of Schooling: We use the data collected by Barro and Lee (2012).

Family Ties: We construct a measure of family ties by collating various waves of the World Values Survey. Following the procedure in Alesina and Giuliano (2013), our measure is the first principal component of V4 (Importance of family), V13 (Respect and love for parents) and V14 (Parents responsibilities to their children).

Government transfers: We use the transfers series from the World Development Indicators.

Religion: We use the country shares of each religion from the Barro (2003) data set.