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A. Appendix Figures and Tables

Table A.1—: Binned Matching Design

	Republican Control			Democratic Control		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Avg Party Control Effect	-0.033 (0.101)	-0.212 (0.134)	0.197 (0.141)	-0.018 (0.042)	-0.009 (0.051)	-0.038 (0.050)
Sample	1968-2016	1968-1996	1998-2016	1968-2016	1968-1996	1998-2016
Party Control Bin x Decade FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Party	Rep	Rep	Rep	Dem	Dem	Dem
Treatments	29	12	17	37	28	9
Number of Observations	235	115	120	335	260	75

Note: Each column shows a different estimate for the average effect of a political party having legal control of the redistricting process after redistricting has occurred on the fraction of a state’s congressional representatives that are Republican. Columns 1-3 show estimates of the effect of Republican control of redistricting. Columns 4-6 show estimates of the effect of Democratic control of redistricting. Columns 1 and 4 are estimated with data from 1968-2016. Columns 2 and 5 are estimated with data from 1968-1996. Columns 3 and 6 are estimated with data from 1998-2016. All specifications are conditional on a unified legislature and include a fixed effect based on decade x probability bins of the governor matching the legislature. There are 10 probability bins for each political party, with each bin capturing 10 percentage points. All specifications limit the sample to observations with probability of partisan governors between 20% and 80%. Standard errors are clustered at the state-decade level.

Table A.2—: Alternate Treatment Definitions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. 1978 - 2006				
Rep Average Effect	0.101*** (0.029)	0.116** (0.045)	0.100** (0.040)	0.081* (0.045)
Dem Average Effect	-0.024 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.027)	0.002 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.029)
Number of Observations	635	585	585	635
R2	0.758	0.784	0.784	0.756
CKK Legal Control	X			
HF Plan Type		X		
HF Plan Type Include Courts			X	
HF Government Type				X

Note: Each column shows a different estimate for the average effect of a political party having legal control of the redistricting process after redistricting has occurred on the fraction of a state’s congressional representatives that are Republican. All specifications include state-decade and year fixed effects. The estimating sample, 1978-2006, is based on Holden-Friedman (2009). Column 1 is the baseline average estimate shown in the main table. Column 2 replaces our legal control treatment with Holden-Friedman’s definition of which political party had control of drawing a redistricting map. Column 3 additionally allows for redistricting plans that were imposed by the courts to be defined as political according to data provided by Holden. Column 4 replaces our legal control treatment with a classification of the type of government from data provided by Holden. Standard errors clustered by state-decade are in parentheses.

Table A.3—: Alternative Treatment Definitions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A. 1968 - 2016					
Rep Average Effect	0.035 (0.033)	0.035 (0.033)	0.031 (0.033)	0.034 (0.038)	0.002 (0.037)
Dem Average Effect	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.030)
Number of Observations	1060	1060	1060	905	1060
R2	0.778	0.778	0.778	0.762	0.778
Panel B. 1968 - 1996					
Rep Average Effect	-0.031 (0.059)	-0.031 (0.059)	-0.047 (0.061)	-0.055 (0.063)	-0.028 (0.060)
Dem Average Effect	-0.010 (0.038)	-0.011 (0.038)	-0.012 (0.038)	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.016 (0.041)
Number of Observations	640	640	640	570	640
R2	0.690	0.690	0.691	0.682	0.690
Panel C. 1998 - 2016					
Rep Average Effect	0.083** (0.036)	0.083** (0.036)	0.083** (0.036)	0.104** (0.045)	0.024 (0.046)
Dem Average Effect	0.005 (0.049)	0.005 (0.049)	0.005 (0.049)	0.020 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.036)
Number of Observations	420	420	420	335	420
R2	0.871	0.871	0.871	0.852	0.869
Legal Control	X				
Partisan Commissions Treated		X			
Advisory Commissions Control			X		
Exclude Commissions				X	
Legislature Supermajorities					X

Note.: Each column in this table represents coefficients from a single regression analysis. Panels A, B, and C use data from different periods: 1968-2016, 1968-1996, and 1998-2016, respectively. The treatment definition varies across columns. Column 1 uses the baseline definition of legal control. Column 2 considers non-advisory commissions where one party has a trifecta as a form of control. Column 3 redefines advisory commissions as never giving legal control. Column 4 omits states using redistricting commissions in their estimations. Column 5 assigns states with legislative veto-authority as treated. All specifications include state-decade and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by state-decade, are shown in parentheses. The coefficient change in Column 5 is attributable to a significant Republican shift in New Hampshire in 2010, transforming a Democratic legislature (55D-45R) to a predominantly Republican one (25D-75R), this wave affected congressional representation as well. This shift was reversed during the 2010 decade. Excluding this state-decade from the analysis yields an average estimate for Republican control of .060** (.0285).

Table A.4—: State Government Control in Non-Redistricting Years

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel B. 1968 - 2016						
Rep Average Effect	0.035 (0.033)	0.009 (0.037)	0.002 (0.040)	0.058* (0.035)	0.040 (0.040)	0.012 (0.032)
Dem Average Effect	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.011 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.018 (0.031)	0.005 (0.031)
Panel B. 1968 - 1996						
Rep Average Effect	-0.031 (0.059)	0.017 (0.067)	-0.035 (0.072)	0.079 (0.065)	0.098 (0.073)	0.014 (0.062)
Dem Average Effect	-0.010 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.036)	-0.022 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.042)	0.008 (0.046)	0.010 (0.040)
Panel C. 1998 - 2016						
Rep Average Effect	0.083** (0.036)	-0.000 (0.030)	0.027 (0.050)	0.046 (0.041)	-0.016 (0.043)	0.007 (0.030)
Dem Average Effect	0.005 (0.049)	-0.027 (0.046)	-0.010 (0.044)	0.002 (0.030)	-0.072** (0.029)	-0.006 (0.048)
Year of Control Basis	0	8	2	4	6	Random

Note: Each column presents coefficients from a single regression analysis. Panels A, B, and C utilize data from 1968-2016, 1968-1996, and 1998-2016, respectively. The state government elections used for determining treatment status differs across columns. Column 1 uses our baseline definition of legal control, considering state governments from elections ending in 0. Column 2 defines control based on unified state governments from elections ending in 8. Column 3 defines control with unified state governments from elections ending in 2. Column 4 defines control using unified state governments from elections ending in 4. Column 5 defines control according to unified state governments from elections ending in 6. Column 6 defines legal control based on a random selection of state governments within the decade, excluding those from elections ending in 0. All models include state-decade and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by state-decade, are noted in parentheses.

Table A.5—: Presidential Vote Share Efficiency Gap and Competitiveness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A. 1968 - 2016					
Rep Average Effect	-0.023 (0.033)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.032 (0.058)	0.046*** (0.011)	-0.009 (0.006)
Dem Average Effect	-0.016 (0.035)	0.017** (0.007)	-0.115** (0.057)	0.011 (0.011)	0.024*** (0.006)
Mean Control	-0.054	0.604	0.550	0.613	0.592
Number of Observations	424	424	424	276	368
R2	0.756	0.853	0.761	0.855	0.913
Panel B. 1968 - 1996					
Rep Average Effect	0.083 (0.053)	-0.011 (0.014)	0.030 (0.122)	0.008 (0.027)	-0.016 (0.010)
Dem Average Effect	-0.024 (0.046)	0.017* (0.009)	-0.100 (0.071)	0.026* (0.015)	0.023*** (0.008)
Mean Control	-0.097	0.605	0.550	0.610	0.600
Number of Observations	256	256	256	132	222
R2	0.668	0.815	0.706	0.796	0.890
Panel C. 1998 - 2016					
Rep Average Effect	-0.094*** (0.034)	0.015*** (0.005)	-0.079* (0.042)	0.054*** (0.011)	-0.003 (0.006)
Dem Average Effect	0.032 (0.037)	0.012 (0.008)	-0.145 (0.090)	-0.021 (0.013)	0.023*** (0.007)
Mean Control	0.008	0.603	0.550	0.615	0.580
Number of Observations	168	168	168	144	146
R2	0.899	0.941	0.873	0.924	0.951
E-gap	X				
Winning TWVS		X			
Prob(Win TWVS < .6)			X		
Winning Dem TWVS				X	
Winning Rep TWVS					X

Note: Each column presents coefficients from a single regression analysis, with Panels A, B, and C analyzing data from 1968-2016, 1968-1996, and 1998-2016, respectively. All specifications use a balanced panel and are based on presidential elections with a single pre and post-period. The outcome of interest varies by column. Column 1 shows results for the efficiency gap, defined by summing wasted votes in presidential elections at the district level; positive values indicate a higher number of wasted Republican votes compared to Democratic ones. Column 2 shows results for the average winning presidential twoway vote share (TWVS) in a district. Column 3 shows results using the share of districts with a winning twoway voteshare of less than 60%. Column 4 shows results using the average twoway voteshare in Democratic districts. Column 5 shows results using the average twoway voteshare in Republican districts. Standard errors, clustered by state-decade, are shown in parentheses.

Table A.6—: District Level Race Based Gerrymandering: Presidential Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. 1988 - 2016								
Rep Average Effect	0.078** (0.034)	0.061* (0.036)	0.019 (0.015)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.038** (0.018)	0.031* (0.016)	0.024* (0.013)	0.037*** (0.014)
Dem Average Effect	0.031 (0.038)	0.039 (0.042)	0.009 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.017 (0.016)
Mean Control Outcome	0.173	0.163	0.595	0.588	-0.007	-0.026	-0.028	-0.034
Number of Observations	124	124	124	124	124	124	126	126
R2	0.052	0.028	0.021	0.082	0.063	0.043	0.032	0.056
Panel B. 1998 - 2016								
Rep Average Effect	0.103** (0.039)	0.086** (0.042)	0.019 (0.018)	0.053*** (0.017)	0.034*** (0.011)	0.013 (0.009)	0.011 (0.008)	0.013* (0.007)
Dem Average Effect	0.052 (0.052)	0.028 (0.046)	0.017 (0.022)	0.014 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.018)	0.016 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013* (0.008)
Mean Control Outcome	0.163	0.148	0.594	0.613	0.019	0.015	0.006	0.012
Number of Observations	83	83	83	83	83	83	84	84
R2	0.106	0.065	0.027	0.142	0.120	0.047	0.030	0.076
Race	W	B	BM	BM	BM	WM	BS	WS
Share Moved	X	X						
Pre winning voteshare			X					
Post winning voteshare				X				
Post - pre voteshare					X	X	X	X

Note: Each column shows a different estimate for the difference in district based outcomes between Republican, Democratic and no political control states. Observations are at the state-decade level. Panel A presents coefficients over the sample from 1988-2016. Panel B presents coefficients over the sample from 1998-2016. In columns 1 and 2, the outcome is based on the percentage of population which changes districts defined using the maximum overlap of pre and post redistricting boundaries. In column 1 the sample population is white (W). In column 2 the sample population is black (B). In column 3 the outcome is the average vote share of the winning candidate, weighted by the black mover (BM) population, prior to redistricting. In column 4 the outcome is the average vote share of the winning candidate, weighted by the black mover (BM), after to redistricting. In columns 5-8 the outcome is the difference in the average vote share of the winning candidate after redistricting less the average vote share of the winning candidate prior to redistricting weighted by the population of black movers (BM), white movers (WM), black stayers (BS) and white stayers (WS). Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.

Table A.7—: Mechanisms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1968 - 2016						
Rep Average Effect	0.035 (0.031)	0.011 (0.046)	0.072* (0.036)	0.037 (0.031)	0.034 (0.031)	0.066** (0.032)
Dem Average Effect	-0.002 (0.026)	-0.013 (0.039)	0.021 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.044)
Number of Observations	1060	715	345	1060	1060	1060
Panel B. 1968 - 1996						
Rep Average Effect	-0.031 (0.044)	-0.043 (0.067)	0.011 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.044)	-0.020 (0.044)	0.032 (0.052)
Dem Average Effect	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.040 (0.050)	0.055* (0.031)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.041 (0.049)
Number of Observations	640	425	215	640	640	640
Panel C. 1998 - 2016						
Rep Average Effect	0.083** (0.038)	0.064 (0.055)	0.086** (0.038)	0.084** (0.037)	0.079** (0.037)	0.088** (0.036)
Dem Average Effect	0.005 (0.055)	0.050 (0.075)	-0.111** (0.042)	-0.022 (0.048)	0.005 (0.054)	0.026 (0.068)
Number of Observations	420	290	130	420	420	420
Baseline	X					
2-9 Rep States Only		X				
10+ Rep States Only			X			
Republican Weights				X		
Democratic Weights					X	
Change in Legal Control						X

Note: Each column shows a different estimate for the average effect of a political party having legal control of the redistricting process after redistricting has occurred on the fraction of a state's congressional representatives that are Republican. Panel A presents coefficients over the full sample from 1968-2016. Panel B presents coefficients over the full sample from 1968-1996. Panel C presents coefficients over the full sample from 1998-2016. All specifications include state-decade and year fixed effects and unless otherwise stated treatment is defined as unilateral legal control of a political party over redistricting. Column 1 is the baseline average estimate shown in main table. Column 2 restricts the sample to include states with between 2 and 9 congressional representatives. Column 3 restricts the sample to include states with 10 or more congressional representatives. Column 4 applies Republican weights to estimates according to the fraction of Republican treatments in each panel's sample which come from small (2-9 representative) and large (10 or more representatives) states. Column 5 applies Democratic weights to estimates according to the fraction of Democratic treatments in each panel's sample which come from small (2-9 representative) and large (10 or more representatives) states. Standard errors clustered by state-decade are in parentheses.

Table A.8—: District Based Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A. 1968 - 2016			
Rep Average Effect	0.035 (0.032)	0.048** (0.022)	0.045* (0.024)
Dem Average Effect	-0.002 (0.030)	0.014 (0.021)	0.015 (0.022)
Number of Observations	1060	1060	10580
Panel B. 1968 - 1996			
Rep Average Effect	-0.031 (0.059)	-0.005 (0.029)	0.014 (0.034)
Dem Average Effect	-0.010 (0.038)	0.033 (0.025)	0.040 (0.027)
Number of Observations	640	640	6330
Panel C. 1998 - 2016			
Rep Average Effect	0.083** (0.035)	0.073** (0.028)	0.055* (0.033)
Dem Average Effect	0.005 (0.049)	-0.041 (0.035)	-0.051 (0.036)
Number of Observations	420	420	4250
State Averages	X		
Weighted		X	
District Level			X

Note: Each column presents a different estimate of the average effect of a political party’s legal control over the redistricting process post-redistricting. Columns 1 and 2 use the fraction of a state’s congressional representatives who are Republican. Column 2 applies analytic weights based on the number of representatives in each state. Column 3’s outcome is a binary variable, equal to 1 if a Republican candidate won a district. Panel A uses data from 1968-2016, Panel B from 1968-1996, and Panel C from 1998-2016. All specifications include state-decade and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by state-decade, are in parentheses.

Table A.9—: Transitions: Prior Decade

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Republican Treatments	7	4	2	7	15
Prior Decade:					
Republican	3	2	0	1	6
Democrat	1	0	0	2	3
Divided	3	2	2	4	6
Democratic Treatments	14	15	15	7	5
Prior Decade:					
Republican	0	1	0	0	0
Democrat	13	10	10	5	2
Divided	1	4	5	2	3

Note: Treatments are broken down by decade across columns and into Republican legal control treatments on top and Democratic legal treatments on the bottom. Subrows display the number of times treatment in a decade was preceded by Republican, Democrat and divided control in the prior decade.

Table A.10—: Average Effects: By Transition Type

	(1)	(2)	(3)
All Treatments Included			
Pre-Period Republican Effect	0.001 (0.033)	-0.014 (0.058)	0.013 (0.041)
Avg Republican Control Effect	0.035 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.059)	0.083** (0.035)
Pre-Period Democratic Effect	-0.052* (0.027)	-0.055* (0.033)	-0.045 (0.049)
Avg Democratic Control Effect	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.038)	0.005 (0.049)
Continuity in Partisan Alignment			
Pre-Period Republican Effect	0.006 (0.048)	-0.058 (0.045)	0.057 (0.072)
Avg Republican Control Effect	-0.026 (0.058)	-0.133 (0.097)	0.058 (0.055)
Pre-Period Democratic Effect	-0.064** (0.031)	-0.067* (0.036)	-0.067 (0.053)
Avg Democratic Control Effect	0.001 (0.035)	0.000 (0.042)	-0.014 (0.061)
Change in Partisan Alignment			
Pre-Period Republican Effect	-0.002 (0.040)	0.004 (0.086)	-0.006 (0.037)
Avg Republican Control Effect	0.067** (0.031)	0.026 (0.056)	0.096** (0.037)
Pre-Period Democratic Effect	-0.019 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.062)	-0.019 (0.081)
Avg Democratic Control Effect	-0.018 (0.044)	-0.044 (0.056)	0.034 (0.069)
Sample	1968-2016	1968-1996	1998-2016


Note: Within a panel, each column presents coefficients from a single regression with each observation representing a state-year. The first column employs data spanning 1968-2016. The second column uses data from 1968 to 1996. The third column utilizes data from 1998 to 2016. The treatment variable is the unilateral legal control of a political party over redistricting for election years ending in 2. Row estimates display the impact of a political party having legal control over the redistricting process during years ending in 2 on a state's proportion of congressional representatives who are Republican in election years ending in 2, 4, 6, and 8. Both the average effect and the pre-period effect are reported. The first panel shows estimates on the full sample, replicating results presented in Table 3. The second panel drops state-decades with legal control where the legal control status is different from the prior decade. Treated state-decades in this panel are thus ones where the same party had legal control in the prior decade. The third panel drop state-decades with legal control where the legal control status is the same as in the prior decade. Treated state-decades in this panel are thus ones where either a different party was in power or no party was in power in the prior decade.

Table A.11—: District Changes from the Prior Election Period (Weighted)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Republican Control: Effect on District Change				
Control x Election Ending in 2	0.059*** (0.021)	0.001 (0.023)	0.108*** (0.029)	0.084** (0.036)
Control x Election Ending in 4	0.009 (0.038)	-0.071** (0.029)	0.051 (0.047)	0.070 (0.050)
Control x Election Ending in 6	0.002 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)	0.016 (0.016)	0.029* (0.016)
Control x Election Ending in 8	-0.004 (0.011)	0.013 (0.008)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.015)
Democrat Control: Effect on District Change				
Control x Election Ending in 2	0.022 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.018)	0.103** (0.044)	0.061* (0.036)
Control x Election Ending in 4	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.007 (0.011)
Control x Election Ending in 6	0.019 (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.026)
Control x Election Ending in 8	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.017)
Sample	1968-2016	1968-1996	1998-2016	1998-2016
Outcome Basis	Land	Land	Land	Pop
Number of Observations	1060	640	420	420
R2	0.741	0.731	0.787	0.798


Note: Each column provides estimates for the impact of political control over redistricting in various elections on district changes from the previous election. Analytic weights are applied based on the number of representatives in each state. The term *Control x Election Ending in t* calculates the influence of a political party's control over redistricting for election years ending in t on district alterations between the election years ending in t and t-2. In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the proportion of land within a state that has shifted districts since the previous election. Column 4 utilizes the percentage of a state's population that changes districts as the dependent variable. The estimates for the effects of Republican and Democratic control are calculated simultaneously and depend on state-decade and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by state-decade, are noted in parentheses. Observations are weighted by number of representatives in a state.

Figure A.1. : Redistricting In Non-Redistricting Years




Note: This figure shows the distribution of percentages of land whose district changed in a state since the prior federal election. The top panel shows changes over the entire sample period. The bottom panel restricts the sample to the 1998-2016 time period. Graphs on the left show the distribution of changes for federal election years ending in 2; graphs on the right show the distribution of changes for federal elections ending in all other years.

Figure A.2. : Distributions of Idiosyncratic and State-Decade Shocks




Note: Figure plots the distribution of idiosyncratic and state-decade shocks as estimated in Equation 4.

Figure A.3. : Gubernatorial RD Estimates: Bandwidth Robustness




Note: This figure displays the average Republican and Democratic gubernatorial regression discontinuity estimates and the corresponding 95% confidence interval, using state's with a unified Republican (Democratic) legislature under varying bandwidths. These bandwidths increment by 1 percentage point, ranging from 5% to 20%, and also include 25%, 30%, and 35%. Additionally, a dashed line depicts the quantity of state-decades utilized for each specified bandwidth.

Figure A.4. : Democratic Gubernatorial RD Conditional Upon Unified Democratic Legislature




Note: Figure shows estimates from the Democratic gubernatorial regression discontinuity, using states with unified Democratic legislatures. Panels A and C present regression discontinuity estimates based on election outcomes four years prior to redistricting (years ending in 8), representing a pre-period effect. Panels B and D display average estimates based on election outcomes two to six years post-redistricting (years ending in 2, 4, and 6). Estimates in Panels A and B are derived from data spanning 1968-2016, while those in Panels C and D are based on data from 1998-2016. Each scatter-point represents a single state-decade.

Figure A.5. : Republican Gubernatorial RD Conditional Upon Unified Republican Legislature




Note: Figure shows estimates from the Republican gubernatorial regression discontinuity, using states with unified Republican legislatures. Panels A and C present regression discontinuity estimates based on election outcomes four years prior to redistricting (years ending in 8), representing a pre-period effect. Panels B and D display average estimates based on election outcomes two to six years post-redistricting (years ending in 2, 4, and 6). Estimates in Panels A and B are derived from data spanning 1968-2016, while those in Panels C and D are based on data from 1998-2016. Each scatter-point represents a single state-decade.

Figure A.6. : Probability Scatter of Democratic vs. Republican Legal Control by State-Decade




Note: Figure plots the computed probability that a state's redistricting government would be Democrat (on the y-axis) or Republican (on the x-axis). Reference lines are included at 25% and 75%.

Figure A.7. : Effects on Average District Winning Vote Share: 1968-1996




Note: Figure shows the average effects of political control on district average winning vote share from 1968 to 1996 following redistricting by Republicans and Democrats. The district average winning vote share is calculated using the two-way vote share in congressional districts for presidential candidates, using the presidential election before and after redistricting, creating a balanced panel. The graph presents regression coefficients reflecting the post-period impact of redistricting for both Republicans and Democrats. Panel A depicts the influence of Republican-controlled redistricting in districts with at least 50% Republican two-way presidential vote share. Panel B highlights the impact in districts with at least 50% Democratic vote share under the same Republican control. Conversely, Panels C and D showcase the effects of Democratic-controlled redistricting on districts with a minimum of 50% Republican and Democratic vote shares, respectively. The panels further distinguish effects based on varying levels of competitiveness: regressions closer to 0.5 focus on the most competitive districts, while those closer to 0.8 encompass the majority of districts, the vote share cutoff increases by .005 for each regression. Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval, with standard errors clustered at the state-decade level.

Figure A.8. : Effects on Average District Winning Vote Share: 1998-2016




Note: Figure shows the average effects of political control on district average winning vote share from 1998 to 2016 following redistricting by Republicans and Democrats. The district average winning vote share is calculated using the two-way vote share in congressional districts for presidential candidates, using the presidential election before and after redistricting, creating a balanced panel. The graph presents regression coefficients reflecting the post-period impact of redistricting for both Republicans and Democrats. Panel A depicts the influence of Republican-controlled redistricting in districts with at least 50% Republican two-way presidential vote share. Panel B highlights the impact in districts with at least 50% Democratic vote share under the same Republican control. Conversely, Panels C and D showcase the effects of Democratic-controlled redistricting on districts with a minimum of 50% Republican and Democratic vote shares, respectively. The panels further distinguish effects based on varying levels of competitiveness: regressions closer to 0.5 focus on the most competitive districts, while those closer to 0.8 encompass the majority of districts, the vote share cutoff increases by .005 for each regression. Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval, with standard errors clustered at the state-decade level.

Figure A.9. : Effects of Legal Control on Republican Seat Shares:
By Delegation Size (Two Groups)



Note: Figure shows the average effect of political control post-redistricting for Republicans and Democrats, categorized by the number of representatives in a state. It displays two estimates for two groups of states: those with 2-9 representatives and those with 10 or more representatives. The x-axis corresponds to the average number of representatives within a bin which includes Republican, Democratic and control state-decades. Scatter-points represent the average effect (left-axis), while bars indicate the share of political control treatments for a political party (right-axis). Estimates are provided for two time periods: 1968-1996 and 1998-2016.

Figure A.10. : Effects of Legal Control on Republican Seat Shares:
By Delegation Size (Seven Groups)



Note: Figure shows the average effect of political control after redistricting for Republicans and Democrats, segregated based on the number of representatives in each state. It offers two estimates across seven groups of states, categorized as those with 2-3, 4-5, 6-8, 9-10, 11-13, 14-19, and 20 or more representatives. The x-axis corresponds to the average number of representatives within a bin which includes Republican, Democratic and control state-decades. Scatter-points denote the average effect (left-axis), and bars reflect the proportion of political control treatments for each political party (right-axis). The estimates cover two distinct periods: 1968-1996 and 1998-2016.


B. Randomization Inference Appendix

Table B.1—: Randomization Inference P-values

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1968 - 2016						
Rep Average Effect	0.035 [0.160]	0.023 [0.398]	-0.116 [0.800]	0.035 [0.153]	0.023 [0.440]	-0.116 [0.802]
Dem Average Effect	-0.002 [0.479]	-0.011 [0.479]	-0.054 [0.221]	-0.002 [0.472]	-0.011 [0.412]	-0.054 [0.266]
Panel B. 1968 - 1996						
Rep Average Effect	-0.031 [0.716]	-0.058 [0.723]	-0.401 [0.952]	-0.031 [0.673]	-0.058 [0.757]	-0.401 [0.969]
Dem Average Effect	-0.010 [0.425]	-0.030 [0.368]	-0.042 [0.312]	-0.010 [0.404]	-0.030 [0.342]	-0.042 [0.293]
Panel C. 1998 - 2016						
Rep Average Effect	0.083** [0.025]	0.109** [0.048]	0.197 [0.115]	0.083*** [0.007]	0.109** [0.045]	0.197 [0.116]
Dem Average Effect	0.005 [0.528]	-0.001 [0.513]	-0.079 [0.237]	0.005 [0.512]	-0.001 [0.526]	-0.079 [0.257]
Specification	TWFE	SIMUL	RD	TWFE	SIMUL	RD
RI Type	1	1	1	2	2	2
Replications	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000

Note: Each column shows a different estimate for the average effect of a political party having legal control of the redistricting process after redistricting has occurred on the fraction of a state’s congressional representatives that are Republican. Monte carlo based randomization inference p-values are shown in brackets for 3 different time periods, 3 different regression specifications, and 2 different ways of randomizing treatment. Panel A presents coefficients over the full sample from 1968-2016. Panel B presents coefficients over the full sample from 1968-1996. Panel C presents coefficients over the full sample from 1998-2016. Columns 1 and 4 use specification TWFE, which corresponds to our twoway fixed effects estimates. Columns 2 and 5 use specification SIMUL, which corresponds to our simulated matching estimates. Columns 3 and 6 use specification RD, which corresponds to our conditional Gubernatorial regression discontinuity estimates. Columns 1-3 use randomization type 1, which randomly re-assigns the Republican and Democratic treatment, holding fixed the aggregate number of treatments. Columns 4-6 use randomization type 2, which randomly re-assigns the Republican and Democratic treatment, holding fixed the aggregate number of treatments within each panels time period. In all cases, randomization inference is based on 10,000 replications.

Figure B.1. : Randomization Inference: Full Randomization



Note: Figure displays the distribution of coefficients from the first randomization inference procedure using 10,000 replications. In this specification, Republican and Democratic treatments are randomly reassigned while maintaining the fixed number of each treatment across the relevant sample. Estimates correspond to the average effect of Republican and Democratic control as per Equation 1. The p-value is determined by calculating the percentage of placebo coefficients that exceed the estimates from Table V. The mean and standard deviation of the placebo coefficients are reported in the top right corner of each panel.

C. Institutional Background Appendix

In the United States, drawing district maps in order to influence elections goes back to the period before the Constitution when the Articles of Confederation were law. Patrick Henry and other anti-Federalists purportedly altered Virginia's 5th Congressional District in an attempt to prevent the Federalist, James Madison, from returning to Congress (Labunski, 2006). This highlighted a period where states oscillated between using single-member districting and at large general elections (elections which produce a single party winning the entirety of a state's delegates). It wasn't until the Apportionment Act of 1842 that Congress required states use single-member districts, although states were slow to abide. This led to a period of relative district stability in the early 19th century, where redistricting changes were rare and largely driven by changes in state population leading to an increase or decrease in delegates²⁴. During this period, there were no rules governing the size of districts. By the 1960s urban population centers had begun to outpace rural population growth, resulting in district populations that were terribly lopsided. In 1964, the Supreme Court established the one-person, one-vote standard requiring districts to be of equal size. Combined with Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution, this has formed the basis of modern redistricting.

The first Congress had 105 members and an average of approximately 33,000 individuals per representative, the size of Congress grew over time with population growth until it was capped in 1911 at 435 representatives²⁵. This cap was reauthorized in 1929 and has been in place continuously since then except for a temporary increase in 1959 when Alaska and Hawaii joined the United States and the number of representatives rose temporarily to 437.

For example, in Georgia, the largest districts had 2-3 times the population of the smallest districts²⁶. In the early 1960s, the Warren court handed down three rulings. First, in 1962, *Baker v. Carr* established that redistricting was subject to judicial review. Then, in 1964, *Wesberry v. Sanders* mandated equal population in federal Congressional districts. *Reynolds v. Sims*, also decided in 1964, then extended equal representation to state legislative districts. In subsequent decisions (*Karcher v. Daggett*, 1983; *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 2003), the Supreme Court clarified that Congressional Districts should be exactly equal in size to the degree possible whereas for state legislative districts deviations of up to 10% across districts have been allowed (*Brown v. Thomson*, 1983) (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2008).

²⁴For instance Connecticut's redistricting map in 1912 lasted until 1962 and Louisiana's 1912 map last until 1966

²⁵This followed the addition of the states of Arizona and New Mexico to the United States in 1912.

²⁶Imbalance across state legislative districts was even larger. One state house district in Tennessee represented 2,340 people and another in the same state represented 42,298 people. The worst example of representational imbalance was in the Nevada state legislature where one district contained 568 voters and another approximately 127,000.

D. Data Appendix

We compile a novel data set on the legal rules that states use to create Congressional district lines from 1968 to 2012. We coded types of legal systems for redistricting across states over 5 decades. We grouped state-decades into one of six categories: (1.) Single district states not eligible for redistricting, (2.) States where redistricting bills are passed by state legislatures and are not subject to a gubernatorial veto, (3.) States where redistricting bills are passed by state legislatures but where the Governor has veto rights, (4.) States where potentially-partisan advisory commissions (i.e. commissions that are not appointed in a bi-partisan or non-partisan manner) draw the maps but the legislature needs to pass a redistricting bill in order for it to become law, (5.) States where advisory commissions, appointed in a non-partisan or balanced partisan manner, draw the maps but the legislature needs to pass a redistricting bill in order for it to become law, and (6.) States with an independent commission which is appointed in a non-partisan or balanced partisan manner and which has the legal authority to implement a redistricting plan without legislative or gubernatorial approval.

In the 2000+ time period, we rely upon descriptions from Justin Levitt’s website (now maintained by Doug Spencer): <https://redistricting.lls.edu/2010districts.php>. In the pre-2000 period, we rely upon a combination of sources. First, the National Conference of State Legislatures has documented all historical commissions. Second, we rely upon state legislative documents for each non-single-district state. Third, we rely on law.justia.com. Finally, we also make use of academic articles in some cases. Our sources are documented in greater detail in: <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nZuugxJe09PfCHVIsLyXjGx5cn1KTVnvtDYivDNFdiM/edit?usp=sharing>.

In this document, we point out general patterns, a few anomalies and coding decisions. Most states are of the legislative + gubernatorial veto type. Only Connecticut and North Carolina do not allow for a gubernatorial veto. In addition, two states, Connecticut and Maine, set a 2/3 majority threshold for passage of a redistricting bill. Five states are one-district states throughout the five-period decade spanning our data. Two others, Montana and South Dakota, start as 2-district states and change to a 1-district state during our time span, while Nevada starts as a 1-district state and eventually reaches 4-districts in our time span. Some states transition to commission states during the time period spanned by our data. However, no states revert from a commission back to legislative redistricting. Montana does transition from a commission state to a 1-district state. For our main specification, we code any state with an independent commission (type 6) as not having legal control by either party. In column 2 of Table A.3, we show robustness to redefining independent commissions (type 6) to partisan legal control if the state-decade has a trifecta. In column 3 of the same table, we go in the opposite direction and recode all advisory commissions as non-partisan.

For all states, we estimate an intention to treat estimate. Thus, we code based upon the law for the decade that was in place in years ending in 1 when redistricting normally happens. Hawaii, in 1968, passed a constitutional amendment which called for redistricting in 1969, 1973 and then every ten years starting in 1981. It also called for a commission system as of 1973. We thus code Hawaii in the 1970s as a commission state.

Table D.1—: State-Level Congressional Redistricting Laws By Decade

State	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Alabama	3	3	3	3	3
Alaska	1	1	1	1	1
Arizona	3	3	3	6	6
Arkansas	3	3	3	3	3
California	3	3	3	3	6
Colorado	3	3	3	3	3
Connecticut	2	2	2	2	2
Delaware	1	1	1	1	1
Florida	3	3	3	3	3
Georgia	3	3	3	3	3
Hawaii	6	6	6	6	6
Idaho	3	3	3	6	6
Illinois	3	3	3	3	3
Indiana	3	3	3	3	3
Iowa	3	5	5	5	5
Kansas	3	3	3	3	3
Kentucky	3	3	3	3	3
Louisiana	3	3	3	3	3
Maine	3	5	5	5	5
Maryland	3	3	3	3	3
Massachusetts	3	3	3	3	3
Michigan	3	3	3	3	3
Minnesota	3	3	3	3	3
Mississippi	3	3	3	3	3
Missouri	3	3	3	3	3
Montana	6	6	1	1	1
Nebraska	3	3	3	3	3
Nevada	1	3	3	3	3
New Hampshire	3	3	3	3	3
New Jersey	3	3	3	6	6
New Mexico	3	3	3	3	3
New York	3	4	4	4	4
North Carolina	2	2	2	2	2
North Dakota	1	1	1	1	1
Ohio	3	3	4	4	4
Oklahoma	3	3	3	3	3
Oregon	3	3	3	3	3
Pennsylvania	3	3	3	3	3
Rhode Island	3	3	3	3	4
South Carolina	3	3	3	3	3
South Dakota	3	1	1	1	1
Tennessee	3	3	3	3	3
Texas	3	3	3	3	3
Utah	3	3	3	3	3
Vermont	1	1	1	1	1
Virginia	3	3	3	3	3
Washington	3	3	6	6	6
West Virginia	3	3	3	3	3
Wisconsin	3	3	3	3	3
Wyoming	1	1	1	1	1


Note: Numbers represent different legal systems for redistricting: 1: Single District - The state was apportioned a single congressional district and thus there was no need for districting. 2: Legislature Only - The State Legislature has full control over the redistricting process with no possibility of a Gubernatorial veto. 3: Legislature and Governor: The State Legislature is in charge of developing a Congressional Redistricting plan but the Governor has veto rights. 4: Advisory Commission: An advisory commission draws redistricting maps and presents them to the legislature for passage. Advisory commissions of this type are appointed in a manner that lacks partisan balance. 5: Non-Partisan Advisory Commission: An advisory commission which is appointed in a non-partisan manner or on a bi-partisan basis so as to maintain partisan balance on the commissions. 6: Independent Commission - Independent commissions are appointed on a non-partisan basis and have the legal authority to draw and implement a redistricting plan without gubernatorial or legislative approval. For the 2000s and 2010s redistricting cycles data was collected from a website by Justin Levitt. For the 1980s and 1990s cycles the majority of the data came from court cases whose summaries were aggregated by the National Conference of State Legislatures website. The full documentation of the cases were then examined, often via law.justia.com. For the 1970s redistricting cycle, a variety of sources were used. The primary ones were state specific sites either documenting the history of redistricting in the state or documenting historical state constitutional amendments as well as a paper on the 1970s redistricting cycle in which the processes were characterize

E. Jeong and Shenoy (2024) Discussion Appendix

The paper most similar to ours is Jeong and Shenoy (2024) (henceforth JS2024). In this appendix, we discuss the differences between our paper and theirs. JS2024 estimate the impact of political control over the lower house of a state legislature on subsequent seat shares. They use a two party seat share RD. They find similar sized estimates. However, they find effects are temporary. By contrast, we find permanent effects but only for one party and only in recent decades. In this Appendix, we account for the different results across the two papers and attribute them largely to differences in estimation strategy. We also argue that there are fundamental differences in the main parameter that we estimate and in the main parameter that they estimate.

As can be seen in Appendix Figure E.1, Democratic legal control is zero percent to the left of the discontinuity but state-decades with marginal legislative control over the lower chamber only have approximately a 20% probability of having Democratic partisan legal control. This is sensible since the states with a bare majority in the lower house are unlikely to be heavily partisan and thus unlikely to satisfy their states' requirements for partisan legal control.

Figure E.1. : Two Party Dem Seat Share RD: Impact on Dem Legal Control Over Redistricting



Note: Figure plots the percentage of state-decades with Democratic legal control against the Lower House Democratic seat share. Estimates are binned using 1 percentage point increments, ranging from 30% (-20) to 70% (+20) Democratic seat share.

A second difference between our specifications and the JS2024 specification is in the construction of the counterfactual. By using a seat share RD for the lower house only, state-decades to the left of the discontinuity include all state-decades with less

than a 50% two party Democratic seat share. This includes both state-decades with Republican legal control as well as other state-decades without partisan legal control. Similarly, to the right of the discontinuity, state-decades are either under Democratic legal control or neither party has legal control. The fraction of Republican legal control just to the left of the seat share discontinuity is also around 20%. Thus, the JS2024 estimator estimates:

$$(E.1) \quad \lim_{v \rightarrow .5^-} \omega \beta_{Rep} + [1 - \omega] \beta_{None} - \lim_{v \rightarrow .5^+} \omega \beta_{Dem} - [1 - \omega] \beta_{None} \\ = \omega [\beta_{Rep} - \beta_{Dem}]$$

where ω is the fraction of state-decades with partisan legal control, β_{Rep} is the effect on the subsequent seat share in the House of Representatives of Republican legal control, β_{Dem} is the similar effect of Democratic legal control, β_{None} is the effect of no partisan legal control, and v is the Democratic two party vote share.


From Equation E.1, we see that the effect of no partisan legal control cancels out across the discontinuity. This is because the fraction with no partisan legal controls does not change across the discontinuity. The JS2024 estimator thus effectively estimates the impact of Republican legal control using a counterfactual of Democratic legal control. As an estimate of the effect of partisan legal control, the use of the seat share RD produces an upward bias because the control group incorporates the effect of partisan legal control by the other party. However, the estimator is also weighted by the fraction of marginal partisan legal control (20%) which attenuates the estimate. On net, the sign of the bias is unclear. In E.2, we show the fraction of Democratic and Republican legal control on each side of the discontinuity. Though derived from theory, we show in Figure E.2 that the share of states without legal control does not change across the discontinuity.

A third difference between our paper and JS2024 is that we use stateXdecade and year effects, a gubernatorial RD conditional upon a unified legislature, and our SBBM estimator which estimates the impact of partisan legal control relative to states with a similar ex-ante probability of partisan legal control. The comparison group for Democratic legal control, therefore, is not Republican legal control but rather state-decades without legal control. In the case of the gubernatorial and SBBM estimators, we further restrict the comparison group to be state-decades without partisan legal control who nearly had legal control but didn't due to random vote shocks. We think that these comparisons, particularly the latter two face substantially lower endogeneity concerns than comparing Democratic legal control to Republican legal control²⁷.

A fourth difference is that the JS2024 reliance upon a seat share RD restricts them to more competitive states where the lower house is under contention. Our gubernatorial RD is similar in that regard. However our panel estimator and our SBBM estimator both estimate effects over a broader swathe of states and we find a surprising amount of similarity in the estimates. In fact, JS2024 note that the literature should try to estimate effects over a broader cross-section of states in their suggestions for the literature.

²⁷Interestingly, the probability of legal control does not increase much with an increase in the lower house seat share as can be seen in both Appendix Figure E.2 and Appendix Figure E.1.

Figure E.2. : Two Party Dem Seat Share RD: Impact on Any Legal Control Over Redistricting



Note: Figure plots the percentage of state-decades with either Democratic or Republican legal control against the lower house Democratic seat share. Estimates are binned using 1 percentage point increments, ranging from 30% (-20) to 70% (+20) Democratic seat share.

A fifth difference is also due to the use of a seat-share RD. Since the counterfactual for Democratic control over the lower house is Republican control over the lower house, inherently, it is impossible to separately estimate effects of control by party. In contrast, in each of our specifications, the control group consists of state-decades without partisan legal control. As a result, we *are* able to separately estimate effects by party.

There are a number of other differences between our specification and that of JS2024. In Appendix Table E.1 below, we replicate the main estimate from Jeong and Shenoy (2024) and compare our estimates. We estimate three basic ways: using our stateXdecade and year fixed effects model, using their lower house seat share RD, and using an upper house seat share RD. These results are presented in columns 1, 2, and 3. For our specification, we can and do separately estimate effects for Democrats and Republicans. In columns, 2 and 3, we are using chamber-specific seat share RDs and thus we do not estimate effects separately by party. In the first super row, we alter our timing to match that of JS2024. This adds the years from 1962 to 1966 to our sample. In super row 3, we drop commission state-decades from the sample. In super row 4, we estimate at the district-year level rather than the state-year level. This gives much higher weight to large states. In super row 5, we estimate at the district level and additionally exclude all uncontested races. Finally, in the last super row, we estimate the JS2024 model in its entirety. In other words, we consider all the changes

simultaneously.

Table E.1—: Transition Table: Main Effects

		(1)	(2)	(3)
CKK Method	Rep Effect	0.035 (0.032)		
	Dem Effect	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.060 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.065)
Alternate Timing	Rep Effect	0.052** (0.026)		
	Dem Effect	0.003 (0.021)	-0.068 (0.044)	0.072* (0.038)
Exclude Commissions	Rep Effect	0.030 (0.036)		
	Dem Effect	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.066 (0.061)	-0.032 (0.071)
District Outcome	Rep Effect	0.041* (0.023)		
	Dem Effect	-0.019 (0.025)	-0.077* (0.039)	-0.050 (0.041)
District Outcome ¹	Rep Effect	0.059** (0.025)		
	Dem Effect	0.001 (0.026)	-0.039 (0.046)	-0.046 (0.047)
All Changes	Rep Effect	0.067*** (0.021)		
	Dem Effect	-0.033* (0.017)	-0.105*** (0.036)	0.004 (0.030)
Treatment Definition		Control	LH RD	UH RD

Note Each cell presents an estimate for political control using various treatment specifications, sample, and panel constructions. Every specification incorporates state-decade and year fixed effects. The first column displays estimates using the baseline definition of legal control. The second column employs a Lower House seat share regression discontinuity design for estimates. The third column utilizes an Upper House seat share regression discontinuity design. Rows represent changes in sample or panel construction. The CKK method applies to the 1968-2016 sample from Table 3. Alternate timing measures effects for the first election post-redistricting, specifically elections ending in 2, as opposed to results from elections concluding in 8, 0, and 6. The exclusion of commissions omits any state with any form of redistricting commission. District outcome switches the outcome of interest to a binary variable at the district level, indicating whether a Republican won (1) or not (0). District Outcome¹ omits districts lacking one Democrat and one Republican candidate. All changes encompass alternate timing, commission exclusion, district outcomes, and the exclusion of uncontested elections. Standard errors, clustered by state-decade, are shown in parentheses.

Most of the changes do not yield large, statistically significant results in the two way fixed effects model over the full sample. Using district-level outcomes does as this weights large states much more heavily and large states have larger sized effects. Estimating at the district level and dropping uncontested races yields the largest coefficient in our panel estimator. However, the decision not to field a candidate is endogenous to the redistricting decision. If, for example, Democrats pack Republican voters into non-competitive districts which subsequently don't field Democratic candidates, the seat share of the remaining districts will be higher even if the overall seat share is

unchanged. Most of the estimates are robust though not statistically different from zero with the lower house RD model. However, the upper House seat share RD yields small and statistically insignificant results in all but one specification including the full JS2024 specification. The one statistically significant result is of the wrong sign. It estimates that winning the upper chamber reduces a party's seat share by 7.2 percentage points.

JS2024 also looks at racial gerrymandering as do we. They show that majority black census tracts are more likely to be moved in the redistricting process. By contrast, our method finds that both Whites and Blacks are more likely to be moved across districts as a part of redistricting with Republican legal control because in general Republican legal control entails more shifting of land (and people). However, we do not see a differences across races in the probability of a Black versus a White individual being moved. We do, by contrast, see that Black voters are more likely to be moved to more extreme districts where their votes will be less pivotal under Republican legal control. We do not find this to be true for Whites nor for Democratic legal control.

Finally, though there are a large number of other differences between our respective papers, we focus on one other major difference. Since we find large partisan differences as well as differences over time in the effect of partisan legal control, we devote the latter portion of the paper to providing evidence on mechanisms as to why we see differences across the parties in political behavior.