Online Appendix

A Earnings Inequality Within Occupations

A.1 Decomposing Earnings Inequality Over Time: Within vs. Between Occupations

In this paper, we study how inequality among workers in the same occupation can affect unionization outcomes. In this section, we situate this inquiry within the broader context of rising U.S. income inequality over recent decades by tracing the evolution of within- and between-occupation disparities over time.

We explore this through a within- vs. between-occupation decomposition of earnings (annual labor income) inequality, using microdata from the March Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). To minimize confounding by compositional changes, we follow conventions in the inequality literature and focus on a group of full-year non-self-employed civilian male workers with age between 19-65 and earnings over half the full-time, full-year minimum wage. This minimum wage-based earnings threshold is used instead of a full-time filter due to inconsistencies in the reporting of hours over time. Due to changes in how ASEC handles top earnings over time, we further winsorize earnings above the 99th percentile as in Hoffmann et al. (2020). We use 2-digit 2010 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) definitions of occupations, which are standardized using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) crosswalk between the Census Occupational Classification (OCC) and SOC codes. Finally, we decompose the variance of log earnings (Y) within vs. between occupations using the following identity, which is shown in Figure A.1.

$$\mathbf{Var}[Y|Year=t] = \underbrace{\mathbf{E}[\mathbf{Var}[Y|Occ=j,Year=t]]}_{\text{within-occupation variance}} + \underbrace{\mathbf{Var}[\mathbf{E}[Y|Occ=j,Year=t]]}_{\text{between-occupation variance}} \tag{5}$$

Figure A.1: Decomposition of the Variance of Log Annual Earnings within and between Occupations



Notes: This figure presents the decomposition of the variance of log annual earnings into within-occupation and between-occupation components, at the 2-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) level. The source is authors' calculations based on microdata from the March Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The sample includes full-year non-self-employed civilian male workers with age between 19-65 and earnings over half the full-time, full-year minimum wage.

B Additional Details on Study I: Organizer Survey

B.1 Unrestricted Sample of Respondents

Our main sample of organizers includes only responses where the organizer left a valid email address at the end of the survey (N=182, Section 3.1). This restriction aims to ensure responses are from real organizers and are from our intended respondents. We investigate the consequences of this restriction and replicate our key results using the unrestricted sample of respondents (N=221). We find a similar gap in the median predicted vote share (8pp, $p<0.001$). The effects of the unequal environment on worker wage demands and exit are virtually identical in both samples (Appendix Figure B.1). Additionally, the effects of the unequal environment on organizing strategies are generally consistent with baseline results for decisions around pay transparency, campaign priorities, and bargaining unit size, although exact magnitudes vary (Appendix Figure B.2). In the unrestricted sample, 69% of respondents prefer to allocate resources to the equal environment, compared to 67% in the restricted sample.

B.2 Robustness to Vignette Order

We present organizers with questions about the equal and unequal environments in a random order. Here, we report results from the main sample separately for those who saw the equal environment first versus those who saw the unequal environment first, in order to confirm that the order in which organizers see vignettes does not drive our results. We find that the median predicted vote share is significantly lower in the unequal environment regardless of order. Those who saw the equal environment first predict 5pp lower support (p-value = 0.036) in the unequal environment, while those who saw the unequal environment first predict a 9pp decline (p-value=0.001). Results about worker demands, worker exit, and organizing strategies are directionally similar to the main results (Figures B.3 and B.4). The coefficients in the sample of respondents who saw the equal environment first are never statistically different from those in the sample of respondents who saw the unequal environment first, with the exception of the effect of the unequal environment on publishing pay information after the campaign (difference p-value = 0.061). However, we find similar negative effects of the unequal environment on organizers' decision to publish pay information during the campaign: the p-value of the difference in the combined coefficient on publishing pay information *either* after the campaign or never, as opposed to during the campaign, is 0.186.

Additionally, the magnitude of the shift in campaign priorities away from raising pay is larger among those who saw the unequal environment first (-14.6pp) than those who saw the equal environment first (-6.5pp), but not statistically different between the two groups (difference p-value = 0.302). Finally, shares choosing to allocate resources to the equal environment are 67% regardless of which vignette was seen first.

B.3 Recruitment Materials

We sent the following message for survey recruitment starting on July 2, 2024:

Dear [first name],

We are surveying labor organizers. As a token of appreciation, we offer $30 to survey takers in the form of a gift card. The goal of the survey is to better understand the barriers unions face when organizing a workplace (link below). We would be super appreciative if you could take 10 minutes to complete this - we don't want to lose your voice!

Here is the link to the survey: [personalized link]

We will share with respondents our aggregate insights. Participation in the survey will be anonymous and answers will be aggregated.

Important note on the project: We do not ask any questions on your strategies related to specific campaigns and we never ask organizers which campaigns they worked on. We take very seriously how important it is to keep organizing tactics at a given workplace private. The research is also not funded by any external grant agency: we are using our personal research fund to compensate organizers for their time.

Table B.1: Organizer Summary Statistics

	(1)
National Unions (%)	
AFL-CIO	23.6
	(3.2)
IATSE	9.3
	(2.2)
SEIU	9.9
	(2.2)
Industry (2-digit NAICS) (%)	
Educational Services	14.8
	(2.6)
Health Care and Social Assistance	14.3
	(2.6)
Transportation and Warehousing	12.1
	(2.4)
State (%)	
CA	11.5
	(2.4)
IL	7.7
	(2.0)
NY	8.2
	(2.0)
Individual Characteristics	
Lead Organizer (%)	66.5
	(3.5)
Average Years Experience	6.66
	(0.26)
Most Recent Organizing Experience	
New Union (vs. Existing) (%)	58.2
	(3.7)
Average Year	2022
	(0.34)
N Organizers	182

Notes: This table provides summary statistics about our sample of organizers, from the organizer survey described in Section 3. For three categories (union, industry, state), we report the share of organizers in each of the top 3 most common groups. We also report two individual characteristics of organizers: whether they have lead organizing experience and their average years of experience (responses are topcoded at 10 years). Finally, we report two characteristics regarding each organizers' most recent organizing experience: whether they were organizing a new union or an existing one, and the average year of the most recent organizing experience.

Figure B.1: Unrestricted Sample of Organizers: Worker Actions by Outside Option



Notes: This figure replicates Figure II using the unrestricted sample of 221 organizers. It shows how predicted worker actions vary across workers with different outside options when market wage inequality increases, from the organizer survey described in Section 3. In Panel A, *Equal Env. Mean* report the average predicted wage demands by group in the equal environment. In Panel B, *Equal Env. Mean* report the average share of workers, by group, that organizers expect to apply for jobs elsewhere during the union campaign in the equal environment. Estimates show the effect of moving from the equal environment to the unequal environment on each outcome by group. Point estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the organizer level. We test the null hypothesis that each coefficient equals zero and report p-values to the right of the plots.

Figure B.2: Unrestricted Sample of Organizers: Organizing Strategies



Notes: This figure replicates Figure III using the unrestricted sample of 221 organizers. It shows how organizers adapt their campaign strategies when market wage inequality increases, from the organizer survey described in Section 3. Under each outcome specified on the y-axis, *Equal Env. Mean* reports the average outcome in the equal environment, while plotted estimates show the effect of moving from the equal environment to the unequal environment. Specifically, coefficients under header *Pay Transparency* report whether organizers would publish market wage information from Figure I; coefficients under header *Campaign Priority* report which of the three issues organizers would prioritize during the campaign; the coefficient under header *Bargaining Units* reports whether organizers would pursue separate, smaller bargaining units for different worker types. Point estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the organizer level. We test the null hypothesis that each coefficient equals zero and report p-values to the right of the plot.

Figure B.3: Results by Vignette Order: Worker Actions by Outside Option



Notes: This figure replicates Figure II, split by which vignette organizers see first. It shows how predicted worker actions vary across workers with different outside options when market wage inequality increases, from the organizer survey described in Section 3. In Panel A, *Equal Env. Mean* report the average predicted wage demands by group in the equal environment. In Panel B, *Equal Env. Mean* report the average share of workers, by group, that organizers expect to apply for jobs elsewhere during the union campaign in the equal environment. Estimates show the effect of moving from the equal environment to the unequal environment on each outcome by group, split by vignette order. Point estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the organizer level. We test the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal between the two samples and report p-values to the right of the plots. Sample size is 182 organizers.

Figure B.4: Results by Vignette Order: Organizing Strategies



Notes: This figure replicates Figure III, split by which vignette organizers see first. It shows how organizers adapt their campaign strategies when market wage inequality increases, from the organizer survey described in Section 3. Under each outcome specified on the y-axis, *Equal Env. Mean* reports the average outcome in the equal environment, while plotted estimates show the effect of moving from the equal environment to the unequal environment, split by vignette order. Specifically, coefficients under header *Pay Transparency* report whether organizers would publish market wage information from Figure I; coefficients under header *Campaign Priority* report which of the three issues organizers would prioritize during the campaign; the coefficient under header *Bargaining Units* reports whether organizers would pursue separate, smaller bargaining units for different worker types. Point estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the organizer level. We test the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal between the two samples and report p-values to the right of the plots. Sample size is 182 organizers.

C Evidence on the Labor Movement from National Administrative Datasets

C.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis

We present findings on the cross-sectional relationship between within-industry wage inequality and unionization outcomes at the economy-wide level. Section 3.6 discusses some of the key variables involved as well as qualitative interpretations of results; here we discuss in greater detail the data sources and steps involved in the cross-sectional analysis. While ideally inequality would be measured at the occupation level to align with our main analyses, our datasets on unionization lack occupational identifiers but include information on the employer's industry. Therefore, we map each union contract or unionized establishment to its corresponding industry cell and study the relationship between unionization outcomes and wage inequality within that cell.

The construction of outcome variables in Figures IV and C.1 have been discussed in Section 3.6. In short, Panel A and B of both figures analyze union contracts (formally "collective bargaining agreements") from the Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS) Online Disclosure Room database. The database contains 3,007 private-sector contracts. To match the availability of ACS data used to estimate wage ratios, we focus on 602 contracts with a start year between 2002-2022, of which 451 contain valid industry and state information. In Panel A, we define a fixed pay scale as one that explicitly sets pay levels for each position and level of experience. Using this definition, we classify each contract based on whether it includes such a scale. In Panel B, we break contracts into 100-word segments and assign textual topics for each segment using the Anchored Correlation Explanation (CorEx) model. In Panel C, we track sizes of bargaining units using Collective Bargaining Notice (F-7) data from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). The dataset covers 79,822 establishment-level bargaining units between 2015-2021 and contains information on both the size of the bargaining unit and the size of the establishment. For each unit, we calculate a "coverage rate" equal to the unit size divided by the establishment size.

Both the OLMS contract data and the FMCS F-7 data contain industry identifier of the employer, allowing us to map each contract/establishment to wage inequality in a particular industry cell. We define industry at the 2-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level. Our overarching goal is to estimate wage inequality (in the form of log p90-p50 ratio) at the industry X state X year level using the most reliable, available survey data for the time period in question, while striking a balance between

precision and noise when deciding the level of aggregation. As a result, individual panels of Figures IV and C.1 use somewhat different data sources and cell definitions, the rationales for which are discussed below.

Panel A and B of Figure IV estimate wage ratio using microdata from the American Community Survey (ACS) between 2002 and 2022. Individuals report annual labor earnings, weeks worked, and usual weekly hours in the ACS; however, weeks worked are reported in bins in some years, precluding a reliable calculation of hourly wage. Instead, we use the annual labor earnings among non-self-employed workers with at least 48 weeks worked and at least 30 hours per week (roughly "full-time, full-year workers") as a proxy. To reduce noise from limited sample size, we estimate the log p90-p50 ratio at the 2-digit NAICS X 3-year X Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) region level.

Panel C of Figure IV makes use of industry X state X year-level wage estimates from the Occupation Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) data, which is based on surveys of roughly half of all establishments in the U.S. The OEWS is far more precise than the ACS, but state-industry estimates are only available after 2012 (so it is not used in Panel A and B). OEWS estimates include both the 90th and the 50th percentile of hourly wages, allowing for a direct calculation of the log p90-p50 ratio.

Finally, to address the concern that the wage ratios used in Figure IV may be affected by the presence of unionized workers, Figure C.1 uses microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which contains information on union membership, to estimate wage ratios among nonunion members only. We use either directly reported wages for hourly workers or salaries divided by hours worked for salaried workers. The proportion of topcoded wages is much higher in the CPS than the ACS and exceeds 10% for many industry cells. Given this, we calculate the log p80-p50 ratio rather than log p90-p50 ratio and drop a handful of cells with topcoding rates over 20%. Again, to reduce noises from limited sample size, we estimate wage ratios at the 2-digit NAICS X 3-year X BEA region level.[54] The observed relationships are overall steeper in Figure C.1 than in Figure IV (due to less variation in the log p80-p50 ratio) and noisier (due to smaller sample sizes).

C.2 Longitudinal Analysis

We present findings on the relationship between economy-wide inequality and the focus of union campaigns over time. Section 3.6 describes the analysis in general and provides a qualitative interpretation of results; here we discuss in greater detail the steps involved.

[54] Since the CPS has even smaller sample sizes than the ACS, we also merge several tiny industry cells (NAICS 21 and 22 into 11, 53 into 52, and 72 into 71).

To obtain the topic shares used in Figure C.2, we collect and analyze text from the AFL-CIO News, the official newspaper of the national AFL-CIO union federation between 1955 and 1996. We break contracts into 200-word segments and assign textual topics for each segment using the CorEx model with the same anchor words and anchor strength as in our contract analysis. In other words, we run the model with 10 topics (3 main and 7 residuals) and anchor strength 5. The anchor words for the 3 main topics are "pay, salary, wage, pay raise, wage increase" for pay, "benefits, insurance, pension, retirement, vacation" for benefits, and "hours, safety, workplace, injury, hazards" for (working) conditions. (Note the anchor words are initialization inputs to the model and are not meant to be exhaustive for each topic.) Using the model output, we find the number of news segments each year that discuss "pay-related", "benefits-related", and "conditions-related" topics and calculate the relative shares of each topic out of the sum of the three. Finally, Panel A of Figure C.2 plots the pay-related topic share against two aggregate inequality measures: the top 10% income share and the Gini coefficient. We use these measures of inequality to mirror those in Farber et al. (2021). The numbers themselves are taken from the replication package that paper.

Figure C.1: Cross-sectional Relationships between Industry-Region Inequality (among Non-union Workers) and Union Organizing Outcomes

PANEL A: Share of Contracts with Pay Scales



PANEL B: Pay-related Topic Share in Contracts



PANEL C: Bargaining Unit Size (as Share of Establishment Employment)



Notes:: Each panel plots a binscatter of a union outcome against industry-state-year wage ratios, similar to Figure IV but using nonunion wages from the CPS and log p80-p50 ratios due to heavy topcoding. Panel A shows the pay scale status of 451 contracts between 2002-2022. Panel B shows the "pay-related" topic share in the same 451 contracts. Panel C shows the size of 79822 bargaining units as a share of establishment-level employment. In Panel C, observations in cells with topcoding rates over 20% are dropped from the analysis. The relationships are overall steeper (due to less variation in the log p80-p50 ratio) and noisier (due to smaller sample sizes) than in Figure IV. Standard errors are twoway clustered at the union and employer levels.

Figure C.2: Time-series Relationships between Coverage Focus of AFL-CIO News and Aggregate Inequality

PANEL A: Pay-related Topic Share vs. Aggregate Inequality



PANEL B: Topic Shares in AFL-CIO News Segments by Year



Notes: This figure explores how the focus of AFL-CIO news coverage evolved in relation to rising income inequality over the second half of the 20th century. Mirroring Figure 1 of Farber et al. (2021), Panel A plots the "pay-related" topic share in AFL-CIO News segments on union activities over time, juxtaposed against the top 10% income share (from Piketty et al. (2018)) and the Gini coefficient (using Social Security earnings from Kopczuk et al. (2010)). Panel B plots the evolution of topic shares for all three main topics over time. The topic shares are obtained by running the CorEx model, discussed in detail in Section 3.6.

D Additional Details on Study II: Wisconsin's Act 10

D.1 Union Membership Data

To obtain information on individual-level union membership, we follow the method used by Foy (2024). This method involves the following steps.

1. **Clean the campaign contribution data**: We downloaded data on political contributions from the Wisconsin Campaign Finance Information System (WCFIS) website. We scraped all contributions records for all filing periods from 2016 to 2024 in which the Receiving Registrant is the Political Action Committee of the Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC) (the state chapter of the National Education Association, one of the two main teacher unions) or of one of the 13 regional branches. These data do not have an individual donor identifier, so we use names to identify each donor (we clean the names to account for inconsistencies, such as variations in middle name initials across time). Because donors may make more than one contribution during each time period, we sum all the contributions an individual makes in a given year to construct a dataset that is unique at the year and individual level.

2. **Clean the teacher records**: As in the rest of the paper, we use the All-Staff Files from the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) for 2009-2024. In keeping with Foy (2024), we restrict the sample to observations in which the salary is not equal to $0 and the FTE variable is not missing. Since individuals can appear more than once per year if they have multiple work assignments, we keep only the assignment with the highest FTE value so that my final dataset is unique at the individual-year level.

3. **Link the campaign contribution data to the teacher records**: The variables we want to use to link the two files above are name, year, and WEAC region. In the WCFIS contributions data, we observe all three of these variables. However, in the All-Staff records, we can see the district in which an individual works, but not the WEAC region that corresponds to that school district. Therefore, we scraped the WEAC region offices website to create a crosswalk between school districts and WEAC regional offices, which we merged by school district onto the All-Staff data. We then performed the merge in three steps:

   (a) **Strict Merge:** We first merge the datasets on name, year, and WEAC region.

   (b) **Fuzzy Merge by Year and Region:** For unmatched records, We perform a fuzzy merge on name within the same year and WEAC region.

   (c) **Fuzzy Merge by Year Only:** Finally, We conduct another fuzzy merge on name by year, without requiring a WEAC region match. This step accounts for cases where individuals are linked to multiple districts and may be incorrectly assigned to a region in the all-staff data.

   (d) **Constructing the union membership variable** Following Foy (2024), we assume that if a teacher appears in the contributions data, they are a union member for two reasons: (a) The majority of contributions in the WCFIS data are bunched at the $19.99 and $5.00 marks, which are the values that unions automatically redirect from member dues to their PACs. This is displayed in Figure D.1, where the top panel plots the distribution of political donations by teachers to the WEAC PAC and the bottom panel shows the distribution of donations to the regional chapters; (ii) it is uncommon for non-union members to donate to union-affiliated PACs.

D.2 CBA Expiration Dates

We collected information on each district's expiration date of the CBA in place when the reform passed. We use the dataset first compiled by Biasi (2021), constructed combining information from multiple sources, including union contracts, districts' employee handbooks, school board meeting minutes, and local news sources. Union contracts generally report the date of the expiration of the agreement. Post-Act 10 school board minutes typically mention whether a contract was set to expire in 2011. The presence of an early version of district employee handbooks is also useful to establish when the post-CBA pay regime was introduced (which typically coincides with the date of the earliest handbook at the latest). When available, the dataset prioritizes information from union contracts, school board minutes, and handbooks. In cases where these documents are unavailable, the records are complemented with information from online local news sources. The dataset contains information on 247 of the state's 428 districts, covering approximately 70% of all teachers. These data are described in Figure D.2.

D.3 Wisconsin School Districts, Commuting Zones, and Inequality Shocks

Our measure of inequality shock uses the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index of the local public teacher labor market to which each school district belongs to. We use commuting zones (CZs) as the relevant geographic labor market. Wisconsin had 421 school districts in 421, located in 19 commuting zones. Figure D.3 shows the location of CZs (marked by red lines) and school districts (marked by black lines) within the state. Darker colors denote a higher HHI, higher local labor market concentration, and a smaller inequality shock.

One key identifying assumption in our research design is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which requires no spillover or interference between treated and control units. In our design, SUTVA would be violated if teachers systematically moved between districts with and without a rise in inequality in response to the policy. To test the plausibility of this assumption, in Figure D.4 we perform an event study of each teacher's probability of moving across CZs with and without an inequality shock in a time window around the expiration of the CBA in each teacher's home district. We do so by re-estimating equation (4) of the paper on individual-level teacher data, using an indicator for teachers moving across districts as the dependent variable. Reassuringly, we find that in any given year, fewer than 1% of teachers move out of their commuting zone, and this mobility is similar across high- and low-HHI districts at all times, including after the reform.

D.4 Union Revenues Data

To compile a panel of union finance data, we use information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990 (the "Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax"), which most tax-exempt organizations, including labor unions, must file every year. We accessed a database of digitized Form 990s provided by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) of the Urban Institute and searched the name of Wisconsin teacher unions, as they appear in the records of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (available at `https://werc.wi.gov/`). We were able to link 99 districts to the records of 52 unions. For our analysis, we compute revenues per member dividing total revenues

(primarily from membership dues) by the total number of teachers in the districts represented by each union; we obtained the latter from the Staff Files of the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction.

In Figure D.5, we estimate equation (4) of the paper separately for districts in CZs with and without an inequality shock, additionally controlling for each district's share of teachers in each experience group in 2011.

Figure D.1: Distribution of Contributions to State and Regional PACs



Notes: The figure shows the distribution of annual donations to state political action committees (PACs) (top panel) and regional PACs (bottom panel) in Wisconsin by public-school teachers between 2016 and 2020, from the Wisconsin study described in Section 4.

Figure D.2: Distribution of Wards and Districts by CBA Expiration Dates



Notes: The figure plots the share of school districts by the year in which their collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) expired, from the Wisconsin study described in Section 4.

Figure D.3: Labor Market Concentration Across Wisconsin School Districts and Commuting Zones



Notes: The map plots the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) in teacher employment concentration in 2011, from the Wisconsin study described in Section 4. The HHI is calculated for each commuting zone using the distribution of teachers across school districts within the CZ, with higher values indicating greater concentration. Red lines denote commuting zone boundaries; black lines denote school district boundaries.

Figure D.4: Wage Inequality Shocks and Teacher Sorting Between High-HHI and Low-HHI CZs



Notes: The figure explores whether teacher mobility changes between CZs that did and did not experience a rise inequality, from the Wisconsin study described in Section 4. Estimates represent coefficients β_k from a modified version of equation (4) — instead of revenue, we regress *the share of teachers in a district moving to CZs of a different inequality shock type* on event-year dummies (relative to expiration of collective bargaining agreements) with district and year fixed effects. Blue series display mobility from CZs that experience an *inequality shock* to CZs that experience *no inequality shock*, while orange series display mobility in the other direction. We classify CZs with an inequality shock based on whether they have a community zone-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the state median. The estimate for the regression constant is added to all coefficients, which are displayed with 90% confidence intervals and using standard errors clustered at the CZ level.

Figure D.5: Wage Inequality Shocks and Union Revenues - Controlling for Shares of Teachers in Each Position



Notes: This figure replicates V while additionally controlling for the distribution of teacher positions in each district in 2011. It shows how wage inequality affects union revenues at the school district level, from the Wisconsin study described in Section 4. Estimates represent coefficients β_k from equation (4), which regresses log union revenues per teacher on event-year dummies (relative to expiration of collective bargaining agreements) with district and year fixed effects. We obtain and display separate coefficients for districts that experience an *inequality shock* (blue series) and those that experience *no inequality shock* (orange series). We classify districts as having an inequality shock districts based on whether they have a community zone-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the state median. Estimates are displayed with 90% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the district level.

E Additional Details on Study III: Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Inequality in Union Support

E.1 Additional Recruitment and Sample Details

Appendix Table E.1 reports characteristics of both our contact list and respondents. Using individual data from IMDb (IMDb, 2023), we link 4,373 WGA contacts to an IMDb profile, or 83% of the 5,244 total contacts (Column (1)). In Columns (2), we compare them to the 334 survey respondents we can also link to IMDb (84% of 400 complete responses) on observable characteristics. We report each individual's earliest credit year, total credits, and a breakdown of credit characteristics.

We additionally report the gender breakdown of contacts and respondents. Although respondents self-report their gender at the end of the survey, to classify the gender of contacts, we use data from the U.S. Social Security Administration which reports gender distributions of first names following Adukia et al. (2023). We analyze first names given to individuals born between 1920 and 2010, classifying a name as female if women comprise more than 50% of all people with that name during this period. We are able to classify the first names of 97% of contacts.

E.2 Additional Results

E.2.1 Demand and Uses for a Pay Report

In our baseline survey, we present respondents with an example of what a pay report could look like (Appendix Figure E.3). We display two types of such "example" reports: one showing aggregate pay distributions and one showing pay distributions split by gender. We randomize which example respondents see first. Results in this section focus on the aggregate report, and we discuss robustness to randomization order and focusing on the gender-split report (Appendix Section E.2.3).

Survey Questions We describe the information contained in a pay report as revealing the distribution of pay rates (Appendix Figure E.3, and then we ask, on a 5-point scale: "Do you think we should create such a report?" We align the respondents' incentive to answer truthfully by reminding

them that we would use their responses to decide whether to produce and circulate such a report.[55] We also measure willingness to pay (WTP) for the report following the incentive-compatible BDM procedure (Becker et al., 1964). We ask respondents to decide on 5 binary options between receiving the pay report and a financial reward, stating that we will randomly select a preferred option to fulfill for 10 participants if the report is produced.[56]

After eliciting interest in the report, we ask respondents: "How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply." This question is intended to investigate how pay information might impact respondents' actions. We present five potential uses (e.g., contract negotiation, labor organizing) and allow for write-ins.

Results Figure E.4 Panel A documents high demand for pay transparency: 87% of respondents express interest in a pay report (left panel), with an average WTP of $937 (right panel). Specifically, 32% are not willing to pay more than $12.50 and 52% are not willing to pay more than $87.50, while 27% are willing to pay at least $1,000. This heterogeneity is consistent with pay information being high-value for some respondents (e.g., those expecting to negotiate soon) but not others. In prior work, Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2022) find that one quarter of workers are willing to pay more than one week's earnings for information about their co-workers' pay. Panel B shows how respondents declare they would use the pay report. After informational reasons (80% would use the report "to know where they stand in the pay distribution"), the second most common answer is individual negotiation: 70% would use the report to negotiate their future contract (and 22% would use it to renegotiate their current contract). Only 33% would use it for labor organizing. In other words, writers are interested in their relative standing and to have data to improve their individual negotiations.

[55] We consider "Yes, I would value it significantly" or "Yes, I would be interested to see it" as affirmative interest when we report a binary measure of this question. The incentive compatible language states: "We are considering producing a report pertaining to writers' & directors' career negotiations at every level. Particularly during this historic renegotiation, we want to understand how providing currently inaccessible information may affect you for better or worse. We will use answers to this 10-minute survey to decide whether to pursue this project and whether to send you the report."

[56] The 5 choices are between the pay report and $25, $150, $500, $2,000, and $6,000. We set WTP inside each bin to the bin's mid-point and set the top bin to $6,000, following Andersen et al. (2006).

E.2.2 Baseline Survey: Frictions to Pay Information Access

Survey Questions Given high demand for greater pay transparency, we seek to understand what frictions writers face in accessing pay information. In particular, we document writers' reluctance to ask for this information. We mention that we are considering petitioning the Guild for pay data that would help us produce the pay report and ask respondents if we can include their expressed interests in our petition.[57] For half the subjects, we name the recipient of the petition as their Studio to establish a baseline willingness to request pay information from a third, arguably adversarial, party.[58]

Results Figure E.4 shows that private willingness to pay (Panel A) does not imply public willingness to petition for the report (Panel C). While 87% of respondents privately indicate interest in the report, only 34% (38%) are willing to make their request public to the Guild (Studios). This points to one plausible source of friction: writers are reluctant to ask the Guild or Studios for pay information. Further, our evidence suggests that the Guild and Studios are not providing adequate pay information to workers — as discussed above, 80% of WGA members declare they would use a pay report to know where they stand in the distribution. This potential reluctance to share information is consistent with the fact that members may use the report to individually negotiate their contracts, potentially raising costs for Studios and detracting from collective negotiations.

E.2.3 Robustness

We examine several alternate measures of these results, building on our baseline measures from Figure E.4. First, we document similar interest in the combined pay report only among WGA members who saw the combined pay report before the gender-split pay report (Appendix Figure E.5). Second, we show our measures of interest for the gender-split report (Appendix Figure E.6). There is little difference in demand for the overall and split pay reports, with 84% of respondents indicating interest in the split pay report and 87% indicating interest in the overall report.

[57] Specifically, their answer to the previous question about how much they would value the pay report along with their name; see Questions 12 and 18 in our survey instrument in Appendix F.2.

[58] Both the Studios and Guilds have access to detailed pay data. Indeed, in the process of collecting dues, which are a percentage of earnings, the Guilds typically require members to report all gross earnings, including base salary, overtime, residuals, deferments, percentage compensation, completion of assignment, vacation and holiday pay, profit participation, and fees of all kinds. Studios collect this information directly as contractors. However, neither the Studios nor the Guild publish pay reports beyond aggregate data.

Third, we show interest in a pay report among the full sample of survey respondents. So far, we focus on responses from WGA members given the high-stakes nature of the institutional context. However, we also recruited non-WGA writers as well as both members of the Directors Guild of America (DGA) — which represents 19,000 directors and members of the directorial team working in media such as film, television, news, and commercials (Sakoui, 2023) — and non-DGA directors. The DGA contract was up for renegotiation around the same time as the WGA's, and they reached a tentative agreement on June 3 that members ratified on June 23 (DGA, 2023). Our full contact list contained 19,916 writers and/or directors (our "contacts"). We received 1,048 complete responses in total, or 5.3% of all contacts, with 9.0% completing some fraction of the survey. The results are quantitatively very similar to the WGA-only sample: 83% value the report, with a median WTP of $1,008. In this sample, there is slightly more willingness to petition, as shown in Appendix Figure E.7.

E.3 Recruitment Materials

We sent the following email for baseline survey recruitment starting on June 15, 2023:

Dear [first name],

We are a team of professors from Harvard, MIT, and UBC, with expertise on negotiation. We are considering producing a report pertaining to writers' & directors' career negotiations at every level. Particularly during this historic renegotiation, we want to understand how providing currently inaccessible information may affect you for better or worse.

We will use answers to this 10-minute survey to decide whether to pursue this project and whether to send you the report. Your responses will remain confidential, unless you indicate otherwise when prompted during the survey.

If you would like to participate, please continue (accessible on mobile) here.

You can alternatively participate by copy-pasting the URL: [link]

We then sent the following recruitment email to writers on August 11, 2023 for the follow-up survey:

Dear [first name],

We are a team of professors from Harvard, MIT, and UBC, with expertise on negotiation. Thank you to those who completed our initial survey on pay in the screenwriting and TV writing industry.

As promised, we are following up with you to share our results and ask one question. Your participation is fully confidential.

If you'd like to see our results, please continue (accessible on mobile) here. You can also view by copy-pasting the URL to the Harvard Qualtrics platform: [link]

ref

Table E.1: Contact and Respondent Characteristics

	Baseline Survey		Follow-up Survey	
	(1) Contacts	(2) Respondents	(3) Contacts	(4) Respondents
% Male	64.3	64.1	63.6	57.5
	(0.7)	(2.6)	(0.8)	(3.1)
Earliest Credit Year	2005	2007	2005	2007
	(0.2)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(0.7)
Total Credits	38.8	39.5	40.1	38.9
	(1.3)	(7.0)	(1.4)	(6.9)
Credit Type				
% Writing	79.8	83.2	80.4	80.0
	(0.5)	(1.5)	(0.5)	(1.9)
% Directing	12.0	9.0	11.5	12.5
	(0.4)	(1.2)	(0.4)	(1.6)
% Producing	8.2	7.8	8.1	7.5
	(0.3)	(1.0)	(0.3)	(1.1)
Credit Medium				
% TV	80.6	83.5	82.7	82.5
	(0.5)	(1.6)	(0.5)	(1.8)
% Movie	11.5	7.6	10.0	7.5
	(0.4)	(1.0)	(0.3)	(1.1)
Credit Genre				
% Drama	50.8	53.3	51.8	52.4
	(0.6)	(2.2)	(0.6)	(2.5)
% Comedy	45.5	44.5	46.3	46.8
	(0.6)	(2.3)	(0.7)	(2.6)
Total Individuals	5,244	400	4,785	310
Individuals with Credit Data	4,373	334	3,980	261

Notes: This table summarizes characteristics of Writers Guild of America (WGA) members contacted for the baseline and follow-up surveys, as well as those who responded, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section 5. Columns (1)–(2) describe the baseline survey, while Columns (3)–(4) describe the follow-up. Data come from IMDb (2023). Statistics are restricted to individuals successfully linked to the IMDb data. *Total Individuals* reports the total population in each group. *Individuals with Credit Data* indicates how many of them are matched to IMDb data, have complete IMDb information, and have first names that allow gender classification using Social Security Administration data. To obtain *% Male*, we classify first names from the contact list by gender. *Credit Type* breaks down the types of credits (writing, directing, producing), which are not mutually exclusive on a given project. *Credit Medium* shows percentages of credits in television and film, which together compose 87% of all credits. *Credit Genre* shows percentages of credits in the two most common genres: drama and comedy.

Figure E.1: Own Pay vs. Prediction of Typical Pay



Notes: This figure plots a binscatter of the relationship between a writer's self-reported percent above scale and their prediction of the typical percent above scale for other writers in similar positions, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section 5. Sample size is 400 WGA members.

Figure E.2: Heterogeneity in Perception of WGA Demands with Position Fixed Effects



Notes: This figure explores heterogeneity in the effect of the pay report on writers' perceptions of the WGA's demands, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section 5. We replicate Figure IX, adding position fixed effects (measured by most recent IMDb credit title). Coefficients report the effect of having seen the pay report on answers to the question "Do most writers think the WGA demands will meet the needs of all WGA members?", using the 1-5 scale shown in Figure VIII (1 = Not at all, 5 = Almost entirely). The sample is 251 WGA members with available credit, experience, and gender data. Respondents are grouped by three characteristics: (1) *Above Median Credits* vs. *Below Median Credits* based on median IMDb credits among individuals from our WGA contact list with the same most recent credit title (e.g., "Story Editor"); (2) *Above Median Tenure* vs. *Below Median Tenure*, based on median years since first IMDb credit among individuals from our WGA contact list with the same most recent credit title; (3) *Male* vs. *Female*, self-reported or otherwise imputed based on first names as described in Section 5.2. Each regression controls for the other two characteristics, out of the three, that are not being tested. Point estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals, using robust standard errors. We test the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal across groups and report the difference-in-difference p-values to the right of the plot.

Figure E.3: Proposed Reports

PANEL A: (Mock) Overall Report



PANEL B: (Mock) Split Pay Report

Notes: This figure shows the mock report we included in the baseline survey as an example of what information respondents may receive in the followup, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section 5. This version was shown to film writers; we showed analogous versions to TV writers. The survey included a disclaimer that these reports were made using fake data. For full survey details, see Appendix F.2.

Figure E.4: Baseline Hollywood Survey: Interest in a Pay Report



Notes: This figure summarizes writers' interest in and demand for a pay report, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section 5. Panel A shows the share of respondents interested in receiving a pay report and their average willingness to pay, elicited using the incentive-compatible BDM procedure (Becker et al., 1964). Panel B shows respondents' intended uses for a pay report; respondents are allowed to select multiple uses. Panel C shows the share of respondents willing to publicly petition for pay data from either the WGA or the Studios. Estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals. Sample size is 400 WGA members.

Figure E.5: Baseline Hollywood Survey: Interest in a Pay Report Among Those Who Saw the Overall Pay Report First



Notes: This figure replicates Figure E.4, restricting to 199 respondents who see the (mock) overall pay report before the (mock) gender-split report. It summarizes writers' interests and demands for a pay report, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section 5. Panel A shows the share of respondents interested in receiving a pay report and their average willingness to pay. Panel B shows respondents' intended uses for a pay report, allowing multiple selections. Panel C shows the share of respondents willing to publicly petition for pay data from either the WGA or the Studios. Estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals.

Figure E.6: Baseline Hollywood Survey: Interest in a Gender-Split Pay Report



Notes: This figure replicates Figure E.4 using questions regarding the gender-split report. It summarizes writers' interests and demands for a pay report, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section 5. Panel A shows the share of respondents interested in receiving a pay report and their average willingness to pay. Panel B shows respondents' intended uses for a pay report, allowing multiple selections. Panel C shows the share of respondents willing to publicly petition for pay data from either the WGA or the Studios. Estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals. Sample size is 400 WGA members.

Figure E.7: Baseline Hollywood Survey: Interest in a Pay Report Among All Writers and Directors



Notes: This figure replicates Figure E.4, expanding the sample to all complete responses, including writers and directors, WGA members and non-WGA members. It summarizes writers' interests and demands for a pay report, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section 5. Panel A shows the share of respondents interested in receiving a pay report and their average willingness to pay. Panel B shows respondents' intended uses for a pay report, allowing multiple selections. Panel C shows the share of respondents willing to publicly petition for pay data from either the WGA or the Studios. Estimates are shown with 90% confidence intervals. Sample size is 1,048 respondents.

F Survey Instruments

F.1 Organizer Survey Instrument

Introduction

We are a team of professors studying worker bargaining power. We want to better understand the barriers organizers are facing to unionizing. We are sending this survey to top organizers and former organizers across the U.S. and Canada.

If you decide to participate, we will share with you our aggregated results so you can access insights on strategies used by other unions.

All individual responses will remain anonymous.

This survey takes 10 minutes. As a token of appreciation, we will transfer you $30 (as a gift card).

You can only take this survey once.

Here are more details about the study:

Research details:

- Purpose and procedures: You are being invited to participate in a research survey that seeks to understand the factors that facilitate union organizing. The survey takes about 10 minutes to complete.
- Compensation: You will receive a $30 USD gift card, which will be delivered to you within 10 days of completing the survey.

Confidentiality: Your participation is voluntary. Subjects may decline to answer any or all questions and may decline further participation, at any time, without adverse consequences. Identifiable data linking you to your response (i.e., your email) will be kept in a secure server and will not be made available to anyone other than the researcher. Your email will only be retained for payment purposes and will be deleted following confirmation of payment. De-identified data (meaning that it contains no identifying information about you) may be shared with academic journals as part of their open access policies.

Who to contact with questions or concerns:
Nina Roussille
nroussil@mit.edu

If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects at MIT at couhes@mit.edu.

Do you consent to participate?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Eligibility

Q1

Are you, or have you ever been, a union organizer in any capacity?

◯ I am currently an organizer
◯ I have been an organizer in the past but am not currently one
◯ No, I have never been a union organizer

Q2

Condition: Are you, or have you ever been, a union organizer in any capacity? = No, I have never been a union organizer

Are you sure? For the purposes of this study, a union organizer is anyone who has been involved in an effort to organize a workplace or participated in contract renegotiations at a unionized workplace.

◯ I am currently an organizer
◯ I have been an organizer in the past but am not currently one
◯ No, I have never been a union organizer

Vignettes

We are now going to present you with two different hypothetical scenarios. After each scenario, we will ask you a few questions about organizing these workplaces.

Each respondent sees Factory A and Factory B in a randomized order. Each block starts with the Factory A or Factory B introduction, as seen below, and continues with a series of questions that are the same between factories.

Factory A Introduction

Hypothetical scenario: You are trying to get support for the creation of a union at Factory A

Some workers are interested in unionizing, and the employer is known to be hostile to organizers.

To investigate, you've done some research on hourly market pay for workers with similar experience. Workers market rates can vary because local demand for certain skill sets can vary, as well as other reasons. In Factory A, all the workers market rates are approximately $48. But, the firm pays them $40. Each assignment makes up one-third of the factory's workers.

The table below shows pay inside and outside the factory.

Assignments	Hourly Wage	Research on Market Wage
Quality control (1/3rd)	$40	$48
Metal Worker (1/3rd)	$40	$48
Pipefitter (1/3rd)	$40	$48

Factory B Introduction

Hypothetical scenario: You are trying to get support for the creation of a union at Factory B

Some workers are interested in unionizing, and the employer is known to be hostile to organizers.

To investigate, you've done some research on hourly market pay for workers with similar experience. Workers market rates can vary because local demand for certain skill sets can vary, as well as other reasons. In Factory B, the workers market rates are varied but everyone is currently paid the same wage. Each assignment makes up one-third of the factory's workers.

The table below shows pay inside and outside the factory.

Assignments	Hourly Wage	Research on Market Wage
Quality Control (1/3rd)	$40	$30
Metal Worker (1/3rd)	$40	$48
Pipefitter (1/3rd)	$40	$66

Q3

In the absence of more information, workers generally think that everyone earns what they do for similar work. You have the option to share the pay data you collected with workers.

Would you share this pay information with workers?

Order of choices randomly flipped

◯ Yes, I would publish the pay information **during** the union campaign

◯ Yes, I would publish the pay information **after** the union campaign

◯ No, I would not publish the pay information

Q4

Now assume all the wage data become known to all workers.

What hourly wage increase (in the first year of the new contract) would each of the following groups demand for themselves in order to ratify the CBA?

	+$0 (no increase)	+$2	+$4	+$6	+$8	+$10	+$12	+$14	+$16	+$18	+$20 or more
Quality Control	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Metal Worker	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Pipefitter	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q5

How easy would it be for all workers to agree on pay scale demands?

For instance, this would imply that Metal Workers approve of the pay raises demanded by Pipefitters, and vice versa.

◯ Difficult

◯ Somewhat difficult

◯ Somewhat easy

◯ Easy

Q6

What share of each of the following groups at Factory{A/B} do you think will apply for a job elsewhere during the union campaign?

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Quality Control	▽										
Metal Worker	▽										
Pipefitter	▽										

Q7

What hourly wage increase (in the first year of the new contract) could you reasonably expect the employer to agree on?

	+$0 (no increase)	+$2	+$4	+$6	+$8	+$10	+$12	+$14	+$16	+$18	+$20 or more
Quality Control	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Metal Worker	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Pipefitter	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q8

Please share your best guess: After all the details are hammered out, what percent of workers at Factory{A/B} would you expect to pro-actively vote yes to ratify a contract?

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Percent of Workers	▽										

Q9

At this factory, the employer does not provide the workers with predictable hours.

The employer also has thus far refused to sign the Open to All business pledge: a commitment to maintaining a welcoming and safe environment for people — including team members, visitors, customers, vendors and clients — regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, immigration.

To maximize support for the union, which of the following issues would be better to focus on during the campaign?

Options presented in a randomized order

- ◯ Raising pay
- ◯ Guaranteed predictable hours
- ◯ Signing the Open to All pledge (a commitment to maintaining a welcoming and safe environment)

Q10

Would you advise separate bargaining units for these three groups of workers?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Factory Comparison

Q11

With limited resources, which factory would you attempt to organize?

We will direct a significant donation to an organization (not participating in this survey) focused on organizing a workplace closest to Factory A or Factory B, based on the answers we receive.

- ◯ Factory A
- ◯ Factory B

Q12

You told us that you would attempt to organize Factory{Q11 ANSWER} before{Q11 UNSELECTED}.

Could you explain your reasoning?

_____

_____

_____

Q13

When asked what you would prioritize (Raising pay, Guaranteed predictable hours, or Signing the Open to All pledge), you told us you would prioritize{Q9 ANSWER, FACTORY A} at A and {Q9 ANSWER, FACTORY B} at B.

Could you explain your reasoning?

_____

_____

_____

Descriptive Questions

Q14

Do you agree with this statement? One central reason workers seek out unions is for greater pay transparency

- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Somewhat agree

◯ Somewhat disagree

◯ Disagree

Q15

Consider the workplace that you are currently organizing or most recently organized.

Which of the following best describes that organizing effort?

◯ Organizing a new union

◯ Organizing an existing union

Q16

What was the year in which you most recently tried to organize a workplace?
Choice: FROM Before 1990, 1990 ... TO 2023, 2024

Q17

What was the industry?
Choice: NAICS 2-digit industries descriptions (e.g., Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, Retail Trade)

Condition: Text depends on{*Q1 ANSWER*} *and*{*Q18 ANSWER*}
For the following questions, please consider the{workplace/union} you{currently organize/most recently organized}.

Order of the following 2 sections randomized

Worker Priority

Q18

When thinking about the amenities of the job in the workplace you currently organize or most recently organized, how important was pay to workers?

If helpful, you can think back to any worker survey you ran at the time.

◯ The top priority

◯ A secondary priority

◯ A tertiary priority

◯ Not in the top 3 priorities

Campaign Descriptives

Q19

What were the **three main issues** the union focused on during the campaign?

◯ Union Recognition

◯ Health and Safety/PPE

◯ Forced Overtime

◯ Wages

◯ Respect and Dignity

◯ Fairness

◯ Health Insurance

◯ Pensions

◯ Discrimination

◯ Too many hours

◯ Not enough hours

◯ Working Conditions

◯ Power

◯ Representation

◯ Just Cause

◯ Grievance

◯ Scheduling

◯ Contract

◯ Service and Product Quality

◯ Job Security

◯ Staffing

◯ Training

◯ Technological Change

◯ Surveillance

◯ Sexual Harassment

◯ Broken Promises

- ◯ Employer Behavior
- ◯ Paid Time Off
- ◯ Paid Leave
- ◯ Childcare
- ◯ Pay Transparency
- ◯ Immigrant Rights
- ◯ Promotional Opportunity
- ◯ Voice
- ◯ Tuition
- ◯ Other: _____

Q20

Please rank three main issues you selected from most important (1) to least important (3).
Choices: Issues selected in{*Q19*}

Q21

Condition: Text depends on{*Q15 ANSWER*}

Did you collect pay information relevant to{workers/union members}?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q22

Condition:{*Q21 ANSWER*} = *Yes*

How do you access pay information?

This could be information about the pay of{workers/union members} or those at similar establishments.

_____

_____

_____

Q23

Condition:{*Q21 ANSWER*} = *Yes*

Did you publish all the anonymized pay data you collected? (eg. report in a newsletter, publish on website, membership-wide email)

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q24

What (if any) pay information did you communicate?

_____

_____

_____

Q25

How many years have you worked as an organizer?
Choice: FROM Less than 1 year, 1 year ... TO 9 years, 10+ years

Q26

Do you have experience as the lead organizer on a campaign?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q27

Which country do you have more experience working in?

- ◯ U.S.
- ◯ Canada

Conclusion

Q28

Please share any feedback, comments, or questions here, or let us know if anything in the survey was unclear.

_____

_____

_____

F.2 Hollywood Guilds Survey Instrument

Introduction

We are a team of professors from Harvard, MIT, and UBC, with expertise on negotiation. We are considering producing a report pertaining to writers' & directors' career negotiations at every level. Particularly during this historic renegotiation, we want to understand how providing currently inaccessible information may affect you for better or worse.

We will use answers to this 10-minute survey to decide whether to pursue this project and whether to send you the report. All responses will be stored on a secure server and your name will never be released unless you indicate otherwise.

By clicking "Yes" below, you consent to participate in the survey.

Do you want to participate?

Here is some key information about the study:

- We are asking you to take part in a research study because you might be a writer or director, or part of the directing team.
- If you agree to be in this study you will be asked to complete a 10-minute online survey.
- We don't believe there are any risks from participating in this research. All responses will be stored on a secure server and your name will never be released. The study would only use aggregate data.
- We cannot promise any benefits to others from your taking part in this research. However, possible benefits to you include helpful career information.
- Your participation is completely voluntary. You can choose not to participate, or you can agree to participate and change your mind later and your decision will not be held against you. Your refusal to participate will not result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive.
- The identified data collected in this survey and IMDb will be exclusively shared among the co-PIs on the study team.

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC[59] Office of Research Ethics at 604-822-8598 or if long distance e-mail RSIL@ors.ubc.ca or call toll free 1-877-822-8598. Taking part in this survey is entirely up to you. If you decide to take part, you may choose to stop filling the survey at any time.

◯ Yes, I want to participate

Introductory Questions

First, we have some questions to determine which report would be most relevant for you.

Q1

Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply.

- ☐ Writer
- ☐ Director or Directing Team
- ☐ Producer
- ☐ Actor
- ☐ Other

Q2

Do you primarily work in TV or film?

- ◯ TV
- ◯ Film

Q3

Which type of studio provides a more important source of income for you?

- ◯ Streaming service
- ◯ Traditional studio

[59] A previous co-author was at UBC hence the UBC IRB language here and in survey recruitment messaging.

Q4

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Director or Directing Team

Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income?

- ◯ Director
- ◯ Unit Production Manager
- ◯ First Assistant Director
- ◯ Key Second Assistant Director
- ◯ 2nd Second Assistant Director
- ◯ Additional Second Assistant Director
- ◯ Associate Director

Q5

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = TV
And Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writer

Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income?

- ◯ Staff Writer
- ◯ Story Editor
- ◯ Executive Story Editor
- ◯ Co-producer
- ◯ Producer
- ◯ Co-executive Producer
- ◯ Showrunner

Q6

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = TV
And Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writer

Which type of pay structure for TV writing provides a more important source of income for you?

- ◯ Weekly
- ◯ Episodic

Q7

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = Film
And Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writer

Which type of film provides a more important source of income for you?

- ◯ Low budget
- ◯ High budget

Block:{Film Writer/TV Writer/Director}

Conditional on{Q1 ANSWER} and{Q2 ANSWER} there will be different phrasing of the questions based on position,{Film Writer/TV Writer/Director}, and some additional questions for TV Writers and Directors.

As an example, questions Q8-Q27 are phrased in this sample for Film Writers (also referred to as screenwriters), but there were analogous versions for TV writers and directors.

For Film Writers, we use{Q7 ANSWER} for questions about earnings.

For TV Writers, we use a combination of{Q5 ANSWER} and{Q6 ANSWER} for questions about earnings.

For Directors, we use{Q4 ANSWER} for questions about earnings.

We randomize the order in which the two pay reports (overall vs. split) are displayed. This means half of the sample see questions Q8-Q13 and EQ1-EQ2 first (about the overall report) followed by Q14-Q17 and EQ3-EQ4 (about the split report), and the other half see the opposite order.

Q8

We will ask you about two reports. Please consider the proposed report showing earnings in the screenwriting industry based on screenwriter contracts in the past year.

Here is an example of what we would report about screenwriters:

WGA-Member Compensation
Relative to MBA Minimums for{Q7 ANSWER} Screenplays at{Q3 ANSWER}s (2023)



(Note: this example uses fake data.)

Do you think we should create such report? The report would be shared with other screenwriters, and we will use your opinion to decide whether to pursue this project. Your response will be strictly confidential.

- ◯ Yes, I would value it significantly
- ◯ Yes, I would be interested to see it
- ◯ Neutral, I would not pay too much attention.
- ◯ No, I would not be interested in such a report.
- ◯ No, such a report would be harmful to me.

Q9

Instead of creating a report, we could use the same resources to transfer rewards to survey respondents.

Below, we will ask you about 5 hypothetical scenarios. In each scenario, you will be presented a choice between accessing the report on pay OR receiving money.

We will randomly choose 10 survey respondents. If you are one of these 10 lucky respondents, we will randomly select one of your 5 choices to send to you if the report is produced.

As a result, it is in your best interest to respond honestly to these scenarios. Please make your choices below, and at the end of the survey you will find out if you are selected.

Between the following two options in each scenario, which one would you prefer?

	Receive Pay Report	Receive Cash
Pay report or $25 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $150 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $500 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $2000 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $6000 Cash Payment	◯	◯

Q10

How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

Options presented in a randomized order

- □ To personally know where I stand in the pay distribution
- □ To decide where to work
- □ To negotiate new contracts
- □ To re-negotiate existing contracts
- □ For labor organizing
- □ I wouldn't use it
- □ Other

Q11

Condition: If How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not incl... = I wouldn't use it

For which reasons do you think this information would have limited scope? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

Options presented in a randomized order

- □ I already can access the information about pay that I need
- □ Reports like this do not affect compensation or employment
- □ The proposed report is missing crucial information (e.g., demographics)
- □ Other

Q12

Condition: randomized treatment – half of the sample see a question about Guild, half of the sample see a question about Networks

You previously said{Q8 ANSWER} about a report on overall screenwriter pay distributions.

We are considering sending a petition to the{Guild/Networks} that would ask for the data they have on pay to complement our own pay data collection for the purpose of understanding and reporting on overall pay.

Would you allow us to include your name and private answer above as part of this public petition?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q13

Condition:{Q12 ANSWER} = No

What is the main reason why you would refuse to sign this petition?

_____

_____

_____

EQ1 (TV Writers Only)

Condition: only shown one of two bracketed questions

{Which of the position titles below should we produce a report for? So far we have considered gathering data on{Q5 ANSWER}s. But we could produce a similar report for any of the other positions listed below, and we are trying to decide which of these positions the report should cover. The report would be accessible to all. We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

OR

{Which other groups of writers should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings? We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

Select all that apply.

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Staff Writer

- ☐ Staff writers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Story Editor

□ Story editors

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Executive Story Editor

□ Executive story editors

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Co-producer

□ Co-producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Producer

□ Producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Co-executive Producer

□ Co-executive producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Showrunner

□ Showrunners

EQ2 (Directors Only)

Condition: only shown one of two bracketed questions

{Which of the position titles below should we produce a report for? So far we have considered gathering data on{Q4 ANSWER}s. But we could produce a similar report for any of the other positions listed below, and we are trying to decide which of these positions the report should cover. The report would be accessible to all. We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

OR

{Which other groups of the directing team should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings? We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

Select all that apply.

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Director

□ Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Unit Production Manager

□ Unit Production Managers

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != First Assistant Director

☐ First Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Key Second Assistant Director

☐ Key Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != 2nd Second Assistant Director

☐ 2nd Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Additional Second Assistant Director

☐ Additional Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Associate Director

☐ Associate Directors

Q14

We would like to ask you the same questions about one alternative report.

We can create a different report displaying pay distributions separately for each gender, using the same data on recent contracts.

Here is an example of what we would report about screenwriters:

WGA-Member Compensation
Relative to MBA Minimums for{Q7 ANSWER} Screenplays at{Q3 ANSWER}s (2023)

(Note: this example uses fake data for each graph. To preserve anonymity, we would include non-binary individuals in both distributions.)

Do you think we should create such report? The report would be shared with other screenwriters, and we will use your opinion to decide whether to pursue this project. Your response will be strictly confidential.

- ◯ Yes, I would value it significantly
- ◯ Yes, I would be interested to see it
- ◯ Neutral, I would not pay too much attention.
- ◯ No, I would not be interested in such a report.
- ◯ No, such a report would be harmful to me.

Q15

Below you are presented with 5 more hypothetical scenarios, now about the pay disparities report.

Between the following two options in each scenario, which one would you prefer?

	Receive Pay Report	Receive Cash
Pay report or $25 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $150 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $500 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $2000 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $6000 Cash Payment	◯	◯

Q16

How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

Options presented in a randomized order

- □ To personally know where I stand in the pay distribution
- □ To decide where to work
- □ To negotiate new contracts
- □ To re-negotiate existing contracts
- □ For labor organizing
- □ I wouldn't use it
- □ Other

Q17

Condition: If How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not incl... = I wouldn't use it

For which reasons do you think this information would have limited scope? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

Options presented in a randomized order

- ☐ I already can access the information about pay that I need
- ☐ Reports like this do not affect compensation or employment
- ☐ The proposed report is missing crucial information
- ☐ It would detract from the purpose of collective bargaining
- ☐ Other

EQ3 (TV Writers Only)

Condition: only shown one of two bracketed questions

{Which of the position titles below should we produce this report on pay disparities for? So far we have considered gathering data on{Q5 ANSWER}. But we could produce a similar report on pay disparities for any of the other positions listed below, and we are trying to decide which of these positions the report should cover. The report would be accessible to all. We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

OR

{Which other groups of writers should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings? We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

Select all that apply.

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Staff Writer

- ☐ Staff writers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Story Editor

- ☐ Story editors

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Executive Story Editor

- ☐ Executive story editors

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Co-producer

- ☐ Co-producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Producer

- ☐ Producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Co-executive Producer

- ☐ Co-executive producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Showrunner

- ☐ Showrunners

EQ4 (Directors Only)

Condition: only shown one of two bracketed questions

{Which of the position titles below should we produce this report on pay disparities for? So far we have considered gathering data on{Q4 ANSWER}. But we could produce a similar report on pay disparities for any of the other positions listed below, and we are trying to decide which of these positions the report should cover. The report would be accessible to all. We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

OR

{Which other groups of the directing team should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings? We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

Select all that apply.

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Director

- ☐ Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Unit Production Manager

- ☐ Unit Production Managers

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != First Assistant Director

- ☐ First Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Key Second Assistant Director

☐ Key Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != 2nd Second Assistant Director

☐ 2nd Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Additional Second Assistant Director

☐ Additional Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Associate Director

☐ Associate Directors

Q18

Condition: randomized treatment – half of the sample see a question about Guild, half of the sample see a question about Networks

You previously said{Q14 ANSWER} about a report on screenwriter pay distributions by gender.

We are considering sending a petition to the{Guild/Networks} that would ask for the data they have on pay to complement our own pay data collection for the purpose of understanding and reporting on pay disparities.

Would you allow us to include your name and private answer above as part of this public petition?

◯ Yes
◯ No

Q19

Condition:{Q18 ANSWER} = No

What is the main reason why you would refuse to sign this petition?

_____
_____
_____

Q20

What do you think is the most relevant MBA minimum for a typical screenwriter in the Guild writing{Q7 ANSWER} films at{Q3 ANSWER}s in the first half of 2023, in dollars?

$ _____

Q21

What percent above the MBA minimum do you think a typical screenwriter in the Guild writing {Q7 ANSWER} films earns at a{Q3 ANSWER} for one script in the first half of 2023?

Percent above the MBA minimum

Choice: FROM Less than the minimum, 0% more (at the minimum), 1% more, ... TO 100% more

Q22

During your most recent project, do you think you earned a higher, lower, or the same percent above the MBA minimum as the typical screenwriter in the Guild writing{Q7 ANSWER} films working at a{Q3 ANSWER}?

- ◯ Higher
- ◯ The same
- ◯ Lower

Q23

How confident are you in your knowledge of what the typical screenwriter writing for{Q3 ANSWER} in the Guild earns?

- ◯ Not confident at all
- ◯ Slightly confident
- ◯ Somewhat confident
- ◯ Very confident
- ◯ Extremely confident

Q24

What percent above the MBA minimum do you typically earn writing{Q7 ANSWER} films at {Q3 ANSWER}s for one script in 2023?

Percent above the MBA minimum

Choice: FROM Less than the minimum, 0% more (at the minimum), 1% more, ... TO 100% more

Q25

Among screenwriters in the Guild writing{Q7 ANSWER} films working at{Q3 ANSWER}s, do you think women earn a higher, lower, or the same percent above the MBA minimum as men?

- ◯ Higher
- ◯ The same
- ◯ Lower

Q26

Condition: If Among screenwriters in the Guild writing{Q7 ANSWER} films working... = {Lower/Higher}

You said that you think that among{Q7 ANSWER} films, women earn a{Lower/Higher} percent above the MBA minimum than men.

What percent more do{men/women} make than{women/men}?

Percent more

Choice: FROM 1% more – TO 100% more or more

Q27

How confident are you in your knowledge of the differences in pay between men and women screenwriters in the Guild?

- ◯ Not confident at all
- ◯ Slightly confident
- ◯ Somewhat confident
- ◯ Very confident
- ◯ Extremely confident

Concluding Questions

Q28

We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demographics we are considering.

Which, if any, breakdowns would you be interested in seeing? Select all that apply.

- ☐ Gender

- ☐ Race
- ☐ Age
- ☐ LGBTQ+
- ☐ Main genre
- ☐ Networks/streaming services
- ☐ Other
- ☐ None of the above

Q29

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... != None of the above
And Q28 has more than 1 selected options

Please rank the demographics breakdowns you selected above by dragging them from the one you would be most interested in seeing at the top of the list to the one you would be the least interested in seeing at the bottom of the list.

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Gender

- ☐ Gender

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Gender

- ☐ Gender

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Race

- ☐ Race

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Age

- ☐ Age

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = LGBTQ+

- ☐ LGBTQ+

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Main genre

□ Main genre

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Networks/streaming services

□ Networks/streaming services

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Other

□ Other

Q30

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = TV

Out of all the episodes you've worked on in the last year, for what percent did you receive formal credit? (0% = none, 100% = all)

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Percent of episodes						▽					

Q31

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = Film

Out of all the films you've worked on in the last year, for what percent did you receive formal credit? (0% = none, 100% = all)

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Percent of films						▽					

Q32

How would a report on true pay distributions by gender compare to the current views of producers & pay-setting executives?

◯ It would reveal more pay inequality than they expect

◯ It would reveal less pay inequality than they expect

◯ It would be the same pay inequality as what they expect

Q33

What is your gender identity?

- ◯ Man
- ◯ Woman
- ◯ Non-binary
- ◯ Other

Q34

How would you describe your race/ethnicity? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ American Indian or Alaska Native
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Black or African American
- ☐ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
- ☐ White
- ☐ Hispanic/Latino
- ☐ Other
- ☐ Prefer not to disclose

Q35

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writer

Are you a member of the WGA?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q36

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Director or Directing Team

Are you a member of the DGA?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q37

Condition: If Are you a member of the WGA? = Yes

Do you hold an official role in the WGA?

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes, Committee Chair/Vice Chair
- ◯ Yes, Committee Member
- ◯ Yes, Involved but no official position
- ◯ Yes, Prior leadership role
- ◯ Yes, Other

Q38

Condition: If Are you a member of the DGA? = Yes

Do you hold an official role in the DGA?

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes, Committee Chair/Vice Chair
- ◯ Yes, Committee Member
- ◯ Yes, Involved but no official position
- ◯ Yes, Prior leadership role
- ◯ Yes, Other

Q39

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writers

Is the WGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No
- ◯ Not sure

Q40

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Director or Directing Team

Is the DGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No
- ◯ Not sure

Q40

Condition: If Is the WGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you? = No
Or Is the DGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you? = No

What information do they collect that would be useful to make available?

_____
_____
_____

Feedback

Thank you for finishing this survey. Please leave any feedback you have here.

_____
_____
_____

Compensation

Would you prefer a $20 Amazon gift card or a donation of your choice as a token of appreciation for your time?

If you select donation, please specify which organization you would like us to donate to.

- ◯ $20 Amazon gift card
- ◯ $20 donation

Randomization Outcome

Condition: For participants who were not randomly selected

According to the randomization procedure, any hypothetical questions you answered during this survey will remain hypothetical.

Condition: For 10 randomly selected participants

You have been randomly selected among the 10 participants who will have one of their scenarios implemented. We will be in touch once a determination has been made about the report and no later than July 15th.