

Electronic Supplementary Material of

Jackpot for Good: Can Lottery Matches Increase Charitable Giving?

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A Gender Analysis

We provide a brief sub-sample analysis aimed at identifying any potential gender effects on charitable giving and risk preferences. Table A1 provides an expanded look at the summary statistics provided in Table 4, Section 4 by gender. Overall, we see *Female* participants donate more with a total *average donation* of 4.89 tokens across treatments than *Males* with a total *average donation* of 4.69 tokens, however the difference is not statistically significant (MW $p = 0.1533$). *Male* participants, on average, donate the most (5.56 tokens) in the *1:1 Match*, the second most (4.82 tokens) in *1:0.5% of 100*, and the third most (4.72 tokens) in the *1:1% of 100* treatment. *Female* participants donate the most at 5.50 tokens in the *1:1% of 100*, second most with 5.14 tokens for *1:0.5% of 100*, and third most with 5.08 tokens for *1:10% of 10 tokens*. Interestingly, *Female* participants in the *1:1 Match* have the second lowest *average donation* at 4.68 tokens and only give less in the *No Match* condition.

We report Mann-Whitney tests to compare *average donations* by treatment and gender to *No Match* (Table A2) and *1:1 Match* (Table A3). When comparing *No Match* to our treatments, we see *Male* participants *average donations* are significantly higher ($p < 0.05$) in *1:1 Match*, while *Female* participants *average donations* are marginally higher ($p < 0.10$)

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Table A1: Summary Statistics of *Average Donation* by Treatment and Gender

		<i>Overall</i>			<i>Male</i>			<i>Female</i>		
		Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
	<i>No Match</i>	4.46	2.91	209	4.57	3.00	110	4.33	2.81	99
<i>EV=1</i>	<i>1:1 Match</i>	5.16	3.13	199	5.56	2.99	110	4.68	3.24	89
	<i>1:10% of 10</i>	4.79	3.17	204	4.50	3.17	103	5.08	3.16	101
	<i>1:1% of 100</i>	5.11	2.84	196	4.72	2.57	100	5.50	3.07	96
<i>EV=0.5</i>	<i>2:1 Match</i>	4.54	2.92	209	4.27	3.18	94	4.76	2.70	115
	<i>1:1% of 50</i>	4.51	2.91	197	4.28	2.98	99	4.76	2.84	98
	<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	4.99	2.93	188	4.82	2.95	91	5.14	2.92	97
	Total	4.79	2.98	1,402	4.69	3.00	707	4.89	2.97	695

in *1:10% of 10* and significantly higher ($p < 0.01$) in *1:1% of 100* treatments. When investigating treatments with a lower expected value ($EV=0.5$), we see *Females* donate marginally ($p < 0.10$) more in *1:0.5% of 100*. In Table A3 we compare *average donations* to the *1:1 Match* using a Mann-Whitney test. We find *Male* participants donate significantly ($p < 0.01$) less in *1:10% of 10* and both *Male* and *Female* participants have marginally ($p < 0.10$) different donations in the *1:1% of 100* with *Males* donating marginally less while *Females* donating marginally more. Looking at treatments with a lower expected value ($EV=0.5$), we see *Males* donating significantly less ($p < 0.01$) in *2:1 Match* and *1:1% of 50* treatments.

We present OLS Regressions on *average donation* with risk and gender interaction terms in Table A4⁴. Model 4 introduces gender and gender interaction terms to our OLS mode and indicates women donate significantly more ($\hat{\beta} = 0.993, p < 0.10$) in the *1:1% of 100* treatment. Model 5 introduces selected demographics and finds that older participants are donate significantly more ($\hat{\beta} = 0.016, p < 0.01$) and Hispanics donate less ($\hat{\beta} = -0.347, p < 0.10$). Similarly, Tobit regression models on *average donation* with Risk and Gender interactions are reported in Table A11.

4. For robustness we report pooled OLS model in Table A6.

Table A2: *Average Donation for Treatments to No Match by Gender*

		Mann-Whitney Test P-Values			Difference in Means (Treatment - NM)		
		Overall	Male	Female	Overall	Male	Female
<i>EV=1</i>	<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.0325**	0.0203**	0.5843	0.70	0.99	0.35
	<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.3258	0.7313	0.0934*	0.33	-0.07	0.75
	<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.0199**	0.5330	0.0056***	0.65	0.15	1.17
<i>EV=0.5</i>	<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.8304	0.4393	0.2999	0.08	-0.30	0.43
	<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.7162	0.4851	0.2153	0.05	-0.29	0.43
	<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.0962*	0.5276	0.0750*	0.53	0.25	0.81

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A3: *Average Donation for Treatments to 1:1 Match by Gender*

		Mann-Whitney Test P-Values			Difference in Means (Treatment - 1M)		
		Overall	Male	Female	Overall	Male	Female
<i>EV=1</i>	<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.2582	0.0103***	0.3491	-0.37	-1.06	0.40
	<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.9764	0.0616*	0.0627*	-0.05	-0.84	0.82
<i>EV=0.5</i>	<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.0522*	0.0042***	0.6474	-0.62	-1.29	0.08
	<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.0582*	0.003***	0.7052	-0.65	-1.28	0.08
	<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.6221	0.1074	0.2906	-0.17	-0.74	0.46

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A4: OLS Regression Models on *Average Donation* with Risk and Gender Interactions

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Base		1 + Risk		2 + Risk Inter.		3 + Female Inter.		3 + Female Inter.	
Constant	4.458***	(0.201)	4.486***	(0.268)	4.367***	(0.484)	4.471***	(0.517)	3.685***	(0.576)
<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.706**	(0.299)	0.707**	(0.300)	0.380	(0.733)	0.636	(0.770)	0.677	(0.754)
<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.331	(0.300)	0.331	(0.300)	0.098	(0.726)	-0.450	(0.785)	-0.449	(0.780)
<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.648**	(0.286)	0.647**	(0.286)	1.050	(0.682)	0.439	(0.748)	0.288	(0.739)
<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.080	(0.285)	0.079	(0.285)	0.147	(0.697)	-0.219	(0.772)	-0.198	(0.767)
<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.057	(0.289)	0.057	(0.289)	0.304	(0.713)	-0.098	(0.789)	-0.193	(0.768)
<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.528*	(0.293)	0.529*	(0.294)	1.183	(0.731)	0.925	(0.773)	0.928	(0.777)
<i>Risk</i>			-0.005	(0.032)	0.017	(0.079)	0.019	(0.079)	0.023	(0.078)
<i>Risk x 1:1 Match</i>					0.057	(0.120)	0.062	(0.119)	0.054	(0.117)
<i>Risk x 1:10% of 10</i>					0.044	(0.121)	0.064	(0.120)	0.072	(0.120)
<i>Risk x 1:1% of 100</i>					-0.076	(0.110)	-0.052	(0.111)	-0.034	(0.109)
<i>Risk x 2:1 Match</i>					-0.012	(0.113)	-0.017	(0.112)	-0.013	(0.112)
<i>Risk x 1:1% of 50</i>					-0.045	(0.117)	-0.036	(0.117)	-0.016	(0.115)
<i>Risk x 1:0.5% of 100</i>					-0.116	(0.117)	-0.124	(0.118)	-0.111	(0.118)
<i>Female</i>							-0.248	(0.404)	-0.183	(0.394)
<i>Female x 1:1 Match</i>							-0.650	(0.601)	-0.704	(0.599)
<i>Female x 1:10% of 10</i>							0.907	(0.598)	0.796	(0.593)
<i>Female x 1:1% of 100</i>							0.993*	(0.577)	0.959*	(0.570)
<i>Female x 2:1 Match</i>							0.741	(0.578)	0.606	(0.574)
<i>Female x 1:1% of 50</i>							0.716	(0.582)	0.651	(0.571)
<i>Female x 1:0.5% of 100</i>							0.611	(0.589)	0.395	(0.589)
<i>Age</i>									0.016***	(0.005)
<i>Hispanic</i>									-0.347*	(0.208)
<i>Income</i>									-0.003	(0.005)
<i>Married</i>									-0.047	(0.183)
<i>Education</i>									0.022	(0.043)
<i>Children in the HH</i>									0.075	(0.189)
<i>N</i>	1402		1402		1402		1402		1402	

Omitted Comparison Group is *No Match*. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

B Pooled OLS Regressions

Table A5: Pooled OLS Regression Models on 3 Charitable Donations

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Base		Base + Risk		Base + Demographics	
Constant	4.458***	(0.201)	4.486***	(0.267)	3.565***	(0.387)
<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.706**	(0.299)	0.707**	(0.299)	0.683**	(0.297)
<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.331	(0.299)	0.331	(0.299)	0.323	(0.295)
<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.648**	(0.286)	0.647**	(0.285)	0.572**	(0.283)
<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.080	(0.285)	0.079	(0.285)	0.039	(0.281)
<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.057	(0.289)	0.057	(0.289)	0.040	(0.283)
<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.528*	(0.293)	0.529*	(0.293)	0.494*	(0.291)
<i>Risk</i>			-0.005	(0.032)	0.008	(0.032)
<i>Female</i>					0.188	(0.160)
<i>Age</i>					0.017***	(0.005)
<i>Hispanic</i>					-0.379*	(0.205)
<i>Income</i>					-0.002	(0.005)
<i>Married</i>					-0.014	(0.182)
<i>Education</i>					0.020	(0.043)
<i>Children in the HH</i>					0.093	(0.187)
<i>N</i>	4206		4206		4206	

Omitted Comparison Group is *No Match*. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on participants. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table A6: Pooled OLS Regression Models on 3 Charitable Donations with Risk and Gender Interactions

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Base		1 + Risk		2 + Risk Inter.		3 + Female Inter.		3 + Female Inter.	
Constant	4.458***	(0.201)	4.486***	(0.267)	4.367***	(0.483)	4.471***	(0.514)	3.685***	(0.573)
<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.706**	(0.299)	0.707**	(0.299)	0.380	(0.731)	0.636	(0.766)	0.677	(0.749)
<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.331	(0.299)	0.331	(0.299)	0.098	(0.724)	-0.450	(0.782)	-0.449	(0.776)
<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.648**	(0.286)	0.647**	(0.285)	1.050	(0.679)	0.439	(0.745)	0.288	(0.734)
<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.080	(0.285)	0.079	(0.285)	0.147	(0.694)	-0.219	(0.768)	-0.198	(0.762)
<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.057	(0.289)	0.057	(0.289)	0.304	(0.711)	-0.098	(0.785)	-0.193	(0.764)
<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.528*	(0.293)	0.529*	(0.293)	1.183	(0.728)	0.925	(0.769)	0.928	(0.773)
<i>Risk</i>			-0.005	(0.032)	0.017	(0.079)	0.019	(0.079)	0.023	(0.077)
<i>Risk x 1:1 Match</i>					0.057	(0.120)	0.062	(0.119)	0.054	(0.117)
<i>Risk x 1:10% of 10</i>					0.044	(0.121)	0.064	(0.120)	0.072	(0.119)
<i>Risk x 1:1% of 100</i>					-0.076	(0.110)	-0.052	(0.110)	-0.034	(0.109)
<i>Risk x 2:1 Match</i>					-0.012	(0.112)	-0.017	(0.112)	-0.013	(0.111)
<i>Risk x 1:1% of 50</i>					-0.045	(0.117)	-0.036	(0.117)	-0.016	(0.114)
<i>Risk x 1:0.5% of 100</i>					-0.116	(0.117)	-0.124	(0.117)	-0.111	(0.117)
<i>Female</i>							-0.248	(0.402)	-0.183	(0.392)
<i>Female x 1:1 Match</i>							-0.650	(0.599)	-0.704	(0.595)
<i>Female x 1:10% of 10</i>							0.907	(0.596)	0.796	(0.589)
<i>Female x 1:1% of 100</i>							0.993*	(0.574)	0.959*	(0.567)
<i>Female x 2:1 Match</i>							0.741	(0.575)	0.606	(0.571)
<i>Female x 1:1% of 50</i>							0.716	(0.580)	0.651	(0.567)
<i>Female x 1:0.5% of 100</i>							0.611	(0.586)	0.395	(0.585)
<i>Age</i>									0.016***	(0.005)
<i>Hispanic</i>									-0.347*	(0.206)
<i>Income</i>									-0.003	(0.005)
<i>Married</i>									-0.047	(0.182)
<i>Education</i>									0.022	(0.043)
<i>Children in the HH</i>									0.075	(0.188)
<i>N</i>	4206		4206		4206		4206		4206	

Omitted Comparison Group is *No Match*. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on participants. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

CoTree Examples

We provide screenshot examples from our online experiment below.

Charity: Action Against Hunger

Action Against Hunger is a global humanitarian organization which is committed to ending world hunger, reaching 28 million people each year. The organization helps malnourished children and provides communities with access to safe water and sustainable solutions to hunger.

Please select the row which corresponds to how much of your 10 token endowment you would like to allocate to You and how much you would like to allocate to Action Against Hunger.

For each token you allocate to Action Against Hunger the charity will receive one bonus ticket.

The value of each bonus ticket is:

- 10 bonus tokens with a chance of 1 in 10
- 0 bonus tokens with a chance of 9 in 10

Each bonus ticket is resolved independently using a lottery wheel that will be shown to you later.

Please read each row carefully. Remember, one round will be selected randomly for payment at the end of the study. So treat each round as if it could be the one that determines your payment.

Allocated to You	Allocated to Charity	Your Choice
10 Tokens	0 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
9 Tokens	1 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
8 Tokens	2 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
7 Tokens	3 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
6 Tokens	4 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
5 Tokens	5 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
4 Tokens	6 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
3 Tokens	7 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
2 Tokens	8 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
1 Tokens	9 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>
0 Tokens	10 Tokens	<input type="radio"/>

Click "NEXT" when you are ready to continue.

Next

Figure A1: Example of Decision Allocation from oTree Survey

Action Against Hunger was randomly selected for realization.

You had 10 Tokens and you allocated 5 Tokens to the charity and 5 Tokens to yourself.

Click "NEXT" to continue

Next


Figure A2: Example of Binding Charity from oTree Survey

Bonus Ticket 1

You have 5 bonus ticket(s) with a 1 in 10 chance of an additional 10-token match by the experimenter.

You will now spin the lottery wheel to determine the value of your bonus tickets.

Click on your bonus ticket to spin the wheel. You will be alerted to the bonus won when the spinning stops.



Click "NEXT" to move on

Next

Figure A3: Example of Lottery Match Wheel from oTree Survey

D Tobit Models

Table A7: Tobit Regression on *Average Donation*

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Base		Base + Risk		Base + Demographics	
Constant	4.435***	(0.242)	4.460***	(0.327)	3.443***	(0.465)
<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.879**	(0.356)	0.880**	(0.356)	0.855**	(0.355)
<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.395	(0.360)	0.395	(0.360)	0.389	(0.355)
<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.729**	(0.335)	0.728**	(0.335)	0.647*	(0.334)
<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.091	(0.341)	0.090	(0.341)	0.046	(0.337)
<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.009	(0.348)	0.009	(0.348)	-0.009	(0.342)
<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.610*	(0.349)	0.611*	(0.349)	0.576*	(0.348)
<i>Risk</i>			-0.005	(0.039)	0.009	(0.039)
<i>Female</i>					0.172	(0.191)
<i>Age</i>					0.019***	(0.006)
<i>Hispanic</i>					-0.457*	(0.247)
<i>Income</i>					-0.001	(0.006)
<i>Married</i>					-0.060	(0.213)
<i>Education</i>					0.016	(0.051)
<i>Children in the HH</i>					0.168	(0.220)
σ^2	12.107***	(0.553)	12.107***	(0.553)	11.926***	(0.549)
<i>N</i>	1402		1402		1402	
Uncensored	1170		1170		1170	
Left-Censored	101		101		101	
Right-Censored	131		131		131	

Omitted Comparison Group is *No Match*. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table A8: Marginal Effects for Model 1

	$\frac{\partial E[Bid^* x]}{\partial x}$		$\frac{\partial E[Bid x]}{\partial x}$		$\frac{\partial E[Bid Bid>0,x]}{\partial x}$		$\frac{\partial Pr[Bid>0 x]}{\partial x}$	
Constant	4.435***	(0.242)						
<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.879**	(0.356)	0.745**	(0.301)	0.456**	(0.184)	0.004	(0.005)
<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.395	(0.360)	0.335	(0.305)	0.205	(0.186)	0.005	(0.005)
<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.729**	(0.335)	0.618**	(0.284)	0.378**	(0.174)	0.005	(0.005)
<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.091	(0.341)	0.077	(0.288)	0.047	(0.176)	0.002	(0.006)
<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.009	(0.348)	0.007	(0.294)	0.005	(0.180)	0.000	(0.007)
<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.610*	(0.349)	0.517*	(0.296)	0.316*	(0.181)	0.005	(0.005)
Uncensored	1170		1170		1170		1170	
Left-Censored	101		101		101		101	
Right-Censored	131		131		131		131	

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table A9: Marginal Effects for Model 2

	$\frac{\partial E[Bid^* x]}{\partial x}$	$\frac{\partial E[Bid x]}{\partial x}$	$\frac{\partial E[Bid Bid>0,x]}{\partial x}$	$\frac{\partial Pr[Bid>0 x]}{\partial x}$
Constant	4.435*** (0.242)			
<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.879** (0.356)	0.746** (0.301)	0.456** (0.184)	0.004 (0.005)
<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.395 (0.360)	0.334 (0.305)	0.204 (0.186)	0.005 (0.005)
<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.729** (0.335)	0.618** (0.284)	0.378** (0.174)	0.005 (0.005)
<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.091 (0.341)	0.076 (0.288)	0.046 (0.176)	0.002 (0.006)
<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.009 (0.348)	0.008 (0.294)	0.005 (0.180)	0.000 (0.007)
<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.610* (0.349)	0.518* (0.296)	0.317* (0.181)	0.005 (0.005)
<i>Risk</i>		-0.004 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.000 (0.000)
Uncensored	1170	1170	1170	1170
Left-Censored	101	101	101	101
Right-Censored	131	131	131	131

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table A10: Marginal Effects for Model 3

	$\frac{\partial E[Bid^* x]}{\partial x}$	$\frac{\partial E[Bid x]}{\partial x}$	$\frac{\partial E[Bid Bid>0,x]}{\partial x}$	$\frac{\partial Pr[Bid>0 x]}{\partial x}$
Constant	4.435*** (0.242)			
<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.879** (0.356)	0.725** (0.300)	0.446** (0.185)	0.003 (0.005)
<i>10% of 10</i>	0.395 (0.360)	0.330 (0.301)	0.203 (0.185)	0.004 (0.004)
<i>1% of 100</i>	0.729** (0.335)	0.549* (0.283)	0.338* (0.175)	0.005 (0.004)
<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.091 (0.341)	0.039 (0.285)	0.024 (0.175)	0.001 (0.006)
<i>1% of 50</i>	0.009 (0.348)	-0.007 (0.289)	-0.005 (0.178)	-0.000 (0.006)
<i>0.5% of 100</i>	0.610* (0.349)	0.488* (0.295)	0.301* (0.182)	0.005 (0.004)
<i>Risk</i>		0.008 (0.033)	0.005 (0.021)	0.000 (0.000)
<i>Female</i>		0.146 (0.162)	0.090 (0.100)	0.001 (0.001)
<i>Age</i>		0.016*** (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.000* (0.000)
<i>Hispanic</i>		-0.387* (0.208)	-0.238* (0.128)	-0.005 (0.004)
<i>Income</i>		-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Married</i>		-0.051 (0.181)	-0.031 (0.111)	-0.000 (0.001)
<i>Education</i>		0.014 (0.043)	0.009 (0.026)	0.000 (0.000)
<i>Children in the HH</i>		0.143 (0.186)	0.088 (0.114)	0.001 (0.001)
Uncensored	1170	1170	1170	1170
Left-Censored	101	101	101	101
Right-Censored	131	131	131	131

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table A11: Tobit Regressions on *Average Donation* with Risk and Gender Interactions

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Base		1 + Risk		2 + Risk Interaction		3 + Female Interact		4 + Demographics	
Constant	4.435***	(0.242)	4.460***	(0.327)	4.318***	(0.606)	4.467***	(0.643)	3.597***	(0.708)
<i>1:1 Match</i>	0.879**	(0.356)	0.880**	(0.356)	0.469	(0.911)	0.747	(0.956)	0.801	(0.940)
<i>1:10% of 10</i>	0.395	(0.360)	0.395	(0.360)	0.047	(0.912)	-0.554	(0.980)	-0.550	(0.973)
<i>1:1% of 100</i>	0.729**	(0.335)	0.728**	(0.335)	1.322	(0.830)	0.596	(0.897)	0.422	(0.884)
<i>2:1 Match</i>	0.091	(0.341)	0.090	(0.341)	0.124	(0.853)	-0.377	(0.959)	-0.352	(0.951)
<i>1:1% of 50</i>	0.009	(0.348)	0.009	(0.348)	0.319	(0.875)	-0.128	(0.968)	-0.255	(0.946)
<i>1:0.5% of 100</i>	0.610*	(0.349)	0.611*	(0.349)	1.389	(0.900)	1.085	(0.949)	1.080	(0.951)
<i>Risk</i>			-0.005	(0.039)	0.022	(0.098)	0.025	(0.097)	0.028	(0.096)
<i>Risk x 1:1 Match</i>					0.072	(0.148)	0.076	(0.147)	0.066	(0.145)
<i>Risk x 1:10% of 10</i>					0.066	(0.152)	0.085	(0.150)	0.093	(0.150)
<i>Risk x 1:1% of 100</i>					-0.112	(0.133)	-0.085	(0.134)	-0.064	(0.132)
<i>Risk x 2:1 Match</i>					-0.006	(0.136)	-0.011	(0.136)	-0.007	(0.135)
<i>Risk x 1:1% of 50</i>					-0.056	(0.143)	-0.048	(0.144)	-0.022	(0.141)
<i>Risk x 1:0.5% of 100</i>					-0.138	(0.143)	-0.147	(0.143)	-0.130	(0.142)
<i>Female</i>							-0.358	(0.483)	-0.300	(0.473)
<i>Female x 1:1 Match</i>							-0.699	(0.709)	-0.758	(0.706)
<i>Female x 1:10% of 10</i>							1.027	(0.715)	0.910	(0.708)
<i>Female x 1:1% of 100</i>							1.206*	(0.672)	1.169*	(0.664)
<i>Female x 2:1 Match</i>							1.001	(0.692)	0.859	(0.688)
<i>Female x 1:1% of 50</i>							0.821	(0.698)	0.756	(0.684)
<i>Female x 1:0.5% of 100</i>							0.716	(0.698)	0.480	(0.697)
<i>Age</i>									0.019***	(0.006)
<i>Hispanic</i>									-0.420*	(0.248)
<i>Income</i>									-0.002	(0.006)
<i>Married</i>									-0.097	(0.213)
<i>Education</i>									0.020	(0.051)
<i>Children in the HH</i>									0.142	(0.221)
σ^2	12.107***	(0.553)	12.107***	(0.553)	12.073***	(0.551)	11.953***	(0.548)	11.801***	(0.545)
<i>N</i>	1402		1402		1402		1402		1402	
Uncensored	1170		1170		1170		1170		1170	
Left-Censored	101		101		101		101		101	
Right-Censored	131		131		131		131		131	

Omitted Comparison Group is *No Match*. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

E Additional Tables

Table A12: Donations by charity and overall for 1:1 and low probability of high match lottery treatments

	1:1 Match	1% of 100	0.5% of 100
Action Against Hunger			
Donation by Individual	\$ 157.00	\$ 125.00	\$ 152.00
Match	\$ 157.00	\$ 300.00	\$ 100.00
Total to Charity	\$ 314.00	\$ 425.00	\$ 252.00
Feeding America			
Donation by Individual	\$ 162.00	\$ 184.50	\$ 160.50
Match	\$ 162.00	\$ 100.00	\$ 50.00
Total to Charity	\$ 324.00	\$ 284.50	\$ 210.50
Meals on Wheels			
Donation by Individual	\$ 185.50	\$ 166.50	\$ 161.50
Match	\$ 185.50	\$ -	\$ -
Total to Charity	\$ 371.00	\$ 166.50	\$ 161.50
Total			
Donation by Individual	\$ 504.50	\$ 476.00	\$ 474.00
Match	\$ 504.50	\$ 400.00	\$ 150.00
Total to Charity	\$ 1,009.00	\$ 876.00	\$ 624.00
N	199	196	188