SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

— For Online Publication —

A Additional Details on Data

Social Class Classification: Each record of the surveilled reports their profession. To map profession into social classes, we refer to Labini (1972), whose work provides a framework for classifying occupations in 1881 into classes as they were intended at the time. The author divides society into 4 large groups as described in Labini, 1972, p.105: upper class, urban middle class, rural middle class, special categories (military, clergy), and working class. For each class, a description and examples of professions are included. We aggregate these groups into 3 categories—upper, middle (including special categories), and working class.

We use this source as reference to classify each of the professions in our data into class using a large-language-model-based classifier (OpenAI GPT-4o, temperature 0.3). A temperature 0.3 entails the model has some flexibility to extrapolate beyond exact job titles, which is necessary since the historical reference we employ lists only some profession, while we have 14,780 unique occupations in the data. Nonetheless, 0.3 is still a limited amount of flexibility, allowing us to obtain reproducible results.

We adopt an iterative procedure from LLM to human coding and back. First, we feed a sample of 500 jobs and asked the model to map professions into classes based on the framework in Labini (1972). We manually review the output of each of these 500 jobs, correct errors, and feed the corrected sample back into the model along with a prompt for coding the entire sample of professions. To improve reliability, we asked the model to assign a confidence score (0–100) to each classification. After this second round of classification, we manually reviewed all entries with confidence score below 10, and correct them if needed. Finally, we define *Upper* as the top class in Labini, *Middle* as including urban middle and special categories, and rural middle and working as *Working* class.[14]

[14]Moving the rural middle class to the middle class returns very similar findings, available

Postal Offices: We digitized data on the presence of postal offices per municipality in Italy from the 1861 official postal bulletin published by Institute of postal studies "Aldo Cecchi". The bulletin reports the type and location of each postal office in that year. We merged this information with our main panel dataset based on municipality information.

Geographic and climatic variables: We collected data on elevation and monthly climate conditions. Elevation data are taken from the 1991 Census, while climate data are drawn from WorldClim. The climate variables include solar radiation, temperature (minimum, mean, maximum), precipitation, water vapor pressure, wind speed, and an index summarizing 19 "bioclimatic" variables. They refer to October averages over the period 1970–2000. We successfully matched this information to all but 269 municipalities in our sample.

LLM Classification of police narratives To uncover the individual traits the state considered important, we analyze the dossiers collected by Ciancarini (2019) and Carolini and Ecca (2015), which include the complete police reports of 1,254 surveilled. While unsupervised topic modeling, like Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) models, is useful for uncovering recurrent themes in text files, it is not well suited to our specific case. Topic models rely on patterns of frequent co-occurrence. In the biographies we have, the co-occurrence are dominated by the bureaucratic and political vocabulary of surveillance (e.g., judicial and legal process). By contrast, descriptions of individual personality traits tend to be highly heterogeneous in wording, and often embedded in narrative phrases rather than repeated technical terms. As a result, they do not cluster into coherent latent topics in the same way that institutional or political categories do. For this reason, dictionary-based, embedding, or supervised approaches are more appropriate for extracting information about how individuals' personal characteristics are portrayed in these reports.

To address this issue, we developed a pipeline to process the raw records and extract the relevant traits. First, each biography was split into sentences using spaCy and each was

upon request.

then classified with a large language model (OpenAI GPT-4o, temperature 0) to determine whether they described a personal trait, characteristic, or aspect of personality. We set the temperature to zero to reduce the margin for interpretation and maximize reproducibility, since we are coding an objective measure. For those that did, the trait descriptors were extracted and normalized through lemmatization to reduce variation across synonymous expression. Given the high heterogeneity of the resulting list, we grouped traits into broader clusters using a sentence-transformer model and agglomerative clustering to capture semantic similarity. Finally, a second large language model (OpenAI GPT-4o, temperature 0) was used to assign human-readable labels to each cluster. We then refined these results through a manual consolidation process. We exclude categories referring to a single record, and merge thematically overlapping categories that captured similar concepts, obtaining 12 categories (Table 1a). The merging process was based on conceptual similarity among underlying traits. In particular, we combine work ethic and other professional descriptors into "Professional"; physical and demographic characteristics into "Demographic"; decision-making and communication abilities into "Leadership"; and socioeconomic descriptors were grouped as "Socioeconomic". This two-step approach makes it possible to capture how police institutions framed individual traits systematically.

B Descriptives

Figure B.1: Surveilled, in the records and geographically

(a) Example of a record of a surveilled



(b) Number of surveilled by municipality of birth



Figure B.2: Number of surveilled

(a) by date of surveillance



(b) by date of birth



Notes: (Left) Number of individuals surveilled by the year their file was opened. There are two peaks in surveillance, in correspondence with the founding of the socialist party and with the start of Fascism. The number of surveilled before the first peak is above zero (mean number of individuals starting surveillance in each year is 7.75). (Right) Number of individuals surveilled by year of birth. The blue solid line shows those born before 1896 (our sample), and the gray dashed line those born after. The Orlando law in 1904 raised the age for compulsory schooling to 12 in every municipality, removing the previous discontinuity between cities above and below 4,000 inhabitants. The absolute number of surveilled decreases because the data on surveillance stops with the end of Fascism, such that younger cohorts are not observed in this data unless they were active during Fascism.

Figure B.3: Jobs distribution within classes

(a) Working Class (b) Middle Class (c) Upper Class



Notes: The word clouds display the prevalence of occupations within each social class, with larger and bolder text representing occupations employing more workers.

Figure B.4: Number of surveilled

(a) by class and political ideology

(b) by gender



Notes: (Left) Histogram of number of individuals by class and by ideology (Right) Number of individuals surveilled by birth year and gender. In solid black, the number of male surveilled by date of birth (left axis). In dashed gray, the number of female surveilled by date of birth (right axis).

C Identifying Assumptions

Figure C.1: Manipulation Testing Plot



Notes: Manipulation test at the 4,000 inhabitants cutoff (p-value: 0.796), computed using the local polynomial density estimator in Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2018).

Table C.1: Balance Table on Geographic and Climatic Outcomes

	(1) Mean T	(2) Mean C	(3) Diff	(4) Std Diff
Minimum Elevation	182.184	159.508	-12.486	-0.095
	(171.413)	(167.527)	(64.936)	
Maximum Elevation	828.189	802.665	-162.232	-0.028
	(641.521)	(641.042)	(245.545)	
Solar radiation (kJ/m^2 day)	10,727.552	10,878.235	-448.329	0.083
	(1,248.738)	(1,327.522)	(490.641)	
Minimum Temperature (°C)	9.942	10.273	-0.477	0.092
	(2.588)	(2.521)	(0.981)	
Maximum Temperature (°C)	17.947	18.381	-0.203	0.125
	(2.475)	(2.436)	(0.941)	
Water Vapor Pressure (kPa)	1.248	1.276	-0.044	0.111
	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.068)	
Bioclimatic Variables	21.184	21.473	0.026	0.099
	(2.131)	(2.012)	(0.797)	
Precipitation (mm)	98.726	94.551	-6.775	-0.092
	(32.828)	(31.115)	(12.285)	
Average Temperature (°C)	13.944	14.327	-0.341	0.111
	(2.469)	(2.416)	(0.937)	
Wind Speed (m/s)	2.136	2.226	0.144	0.075
	(0.848)	(0.839)	(0.323)	
Observations	915	632	1,547	

Notes: Balance table on geographic and climatic outcomes (not influenced by the treatment). We show the average for treated (col 1) and control municipalities (col 2), their differences in means (col 3), and standardized differences (col 4). The analysis restricts to the optimal CCT bandwidth, controls for population in 1861 and an interaction term between the population and a dummy *Above4000*.

D Robustness to the Main Result

Figure D.1: Effect of the Education Reform, during (white) and after (grey) the Discontinuity Applies on Surveilled in 100,000 (Extended Event Study)



Notes: Event study estimates from Equation 1 as in Figure 3a for each year of birth from 1816 to 1929 (rather than stopping at cohort 1896). From cohort 1896 (first cohort affected by the new 1904 reform), mandatory education applies to all municipalities and the Casati Law discontinuity stops applying. The 1904 reform affected only children aged eight or younger (those born in 1896 or later, who would have been completing third grade) because an earlier reform, introduced in 1877, had already raised the requirement to third grade, thereby reducing the discontinuity for municipalities above 4,000 inhabitants from two additional years of schooling to just one. As in the main specification, the reference cohort is 1853. The regression includes municipality, and reign×birth-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table D.1: Robustness: functional forms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Share Surveilled in 100,000					
	Calendar-year	Annexed later	Region FE	Poisson	Order 1	Order 2
Post × Above4000	3.335*	3.275***	3.211***	1.251***	3.515***	3.173***
	(1.980)	(0.284)	(0.312)	(0.0123)	(0.318)	(0.425)
Observations	617,040	701,600	617,040	425,520	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth FE	-	-	-	Y	-	-
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	-	-	Y	Y
Region x Birth FE	-	-	Y	-	-	-
Mean DV	5.499	4.830	5.499	5.499	5.499	5.499

Notes: Robustness to DDRD results as in Equation 1. Column (1) controls for the number of individuals in each cohort who begin surveillance in a given decade. Specifically, for each decade from 1869 to 1947, we control for a variable equal to the number of individuals from that cohort who start surveillance during that decade. Column (2) includes areas that were annexed to the Kingdom of Italy after 1861 and that implemented the Casati Law following their annexation, using a staggered version of treatment (Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto, and the province of Mantova enacted the law in 1866; Lazio in 1870. We exclude Trieste, which was annexed in 1954). Column (3) introduces region times birth-year fixed effects instead of reign times birth-year. Column (4) considers a Poisson specification. Columns (5)-(6) consider first and second-order polynomials for the interaction of population, treatment, and post. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table D.2: Robustness: Alternative Dependent Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Surveilled		
	Share	Any	N	N Winsor	Ln
Post × Above4000	3.261***	0.276***	0.00788	0.367***	0.208***
	(0.301)	(0.0145)	(0.200)	(0.0307)	(0.0342)
Post	-0.747***				
	(0.149)				
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign FE	Y	-	-	-	-
Reign x Birth FE	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	0.111	0.00320	0.160	0.147	0.0980

Notes: Column (1) reports DDRD results as in Equation 1 removing flexible controls for date of birth to estimate the effect of the reform in both treatment (*Post* × *Above*4000) and control (*Post*) municipalities post-treatment. Columns (2)-(5) report robustness to DDRD results as in Equation 1 where we vary the definition of the dependent variable. Column (2) considers a dummy equal to 1 if a city has at least one surveilled born in that cohort; column (3) the absolute number of surveilled; column (4) the winsorized number of surveilled in the top and bottom first percentile; column (5) the natural logarithm of the number of surveilled. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure D.2: Placebo

(a) Population Cutoffs



(b) Cohorts Cutoffs



Notes:*(a)* DDRD results as in Equation 1 in municipalities at placebo population cutoffs below 4,000. We restrict the sample to municipalities with less than 4,000 inhabitants to avoid overlap with the actual treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. *(b)* DDRD results as in Equation 1 at (placebo) cohorts born before the first treated cohort (1854). We consider as treated cohorts between the placebo threshold and that threshold plus 10 (e.g. for placebo cohort 1838, we consider as treated cohorts born between 1832 and 1848), unless they overlap with actual treatment (e.g. for placebo cohort 1850 we consider as treated cohorts born between 1850 and 1853). Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table D.3: Effect of the education reform, DiD, Double DDRD and RD

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Share Surveilled in 100,000							
		DiD			Double DDRD			RD
Post × Above4000	3.128***	3.013***	2.435***	3.729***	3.605***	3.514***		
	(0.258)	(0.251)	(0.216)	(0.359)	(0.350)	(0.318)		
Above4000							3.729***	3.831***
							(0.359)	(0.365)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	323,946	323,946
Municipality FE	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	-	-
Birth FE	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	-	Y	-
Reign x Birth FE	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
Mean DV	5.499	5.499	5.499	5.499	5.499	5.499	5.499	5.499

Notes: Columns (1)-(3) report DiD results of the effect of the reform on the number of surveilled per 100,000 inhabitants in a municipality-cohort. We do not control flexibly for population around the cutoff as in the main specification in Equation 1. Columns (4)-(6) show a "double" DDRD results: in addition to the controls in Equation 1, we flexibly control for the impact of treatment across cohorts just-exposed and just-unexposed to the reform. Columns (7)-(8) report RD results showing the effect of being above the 4,000 population discontinuity on the number of individuals surveilled in the post-period only, flexibly controlling for the impact of population around the discontinuity. Estimates are computed with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

E Results on Working Classes

Table E.1: Effect of the Education Reform on Surveillance, by Class (Dummy)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Any Surveilled		
	Working class	Middle class	Upper class
Post × Above4000	0.239***	0.0415***	0.00357
	(0.0142)	(0.0114)	(0.00371)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	0.108	0.0153	0.00340
H_0: Working class <=		0	0

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 where the dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if a municipality has at least one surveilled born in that year who is from a given class. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table E.2: Effect of the Education Reform on Intensive Surveillance, by class

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Share under Intensive Surveillance in 100,000			
	Overall	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Post × Above4000	0.867***	0.748***	0.108***	0.0107
	(0.0969)	(0.0897)	(0.0187)	(0.00849)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	1.598	1.441	0.131	0.0284
H_0: Working Class <=			0	0

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 where the dependent variable is the number of individuals under intensive forms of surveillance (*monitoring movements across borders, notice of good conduct, forced relocation*) in 100,000 inhabitants by class. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table E.3: Effect of the Education Reform on Non Intensive Surveillance, by class

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Share under Intensive Surveillance in 100,000			
	Overall	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Post × Above4000	2.711***	2.172***	0.482***	0.0577***
	(0.261)	(0.230)	(0.0472)	(0.0181)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	3.948	3.374	0.431	0.0946
H_0: Working Class <=			0	0

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 where the dependent variable is the population share of individuals surveilled but not under intensive forms of surveillance. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table E.4: Effect of the Education Reform on Duration of Surveillance, by class

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Number of years subject to surveillance			
	Overall	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Post × Above4000	5.185***	4.397***	0.824***	0.0714
	(0.317)	(0.300)	(0.233)	(0.0805)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	2.086	1.737	0.287	0.0639
H_0: Working Class <=			0	0

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 where the dependent variable is the number of years a municipality-cohort spends under surveillance. Column (1) shows the results for the entire sample; Columns(2)-(4) by class. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. The average number of years under surveillance includes municipalities-cohorts with zero surveillance. For reference, the mean surveillance conditional on at least someone being surveilled in a cohort is 18.26 years in the full sample. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table E.5: Effect of the Education Reform on quantity of information collected, by class

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Share Surveilled with biographical file in 100,000			
	Overall	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Post × Above4000	1.361***	1.096***	0.234***	0.0308**
	(0.134)	(0.116)	(0.0282)	(0.0129)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	1.169	0.935	0.196	0.0441
H_0: Working Class <=			0	0

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 where the dependent variable is the number of individuals surveilled with recorded biographical information in 100,000 inhabitants. Column (1) shows the results for the whole sample; columns (2)-(4) by class. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table E.6: Effect of the Education Reform on Surveillance, by ideology

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Share Surveilled in 100,000				
	Anarchists	Anti-Fascists	Communists and Socialists	Republicans	Others
Post × Above4000	0.836***	0.418***	2.065***	0.162***	0.0526*
	(0.148)	(0.0568)	(0.161)	(0.0410)	(0.0285)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	1.169	0.875	3.303	0.138	0.204

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 subsetting by ideology of the surveilled. The category *Others* is a residual group that includes surveilled individuals whose ideology is recorded as anti-nationalists, syndicalists, masons, and other affiliations. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure E.1: Robustness: by ideology



Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 subsetting by ideology of the surveilled. The category *Communists* includes both Communists and Socialists. The category *Communists (Not Working Class)* includes both Communists and Socialists that were not part of the working class. The category *Others* is a residual group that includes surveilled individuals whose ideology is recorded as anti-nationalists, syndicalists, masons, and other similar affiliations. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table E.7: Effect of the Education Reform on Surveillance, by governing party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Share Surveilled Historical Right				Share Surveilled Historical Left			
	Overall	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class	Overall	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Post × Above4000	0.186***	0.149***	0.0301***	0.00655*	0.763***	0.656***	0.105***	0.00222
	(0.0415)	(0.0390)	(0.00905)	(0.00386)	(0.0884)	(0.0773)	(0.0213)	(0.0113)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	0.284	0.253	0.0287	0.00430	0.751	0.623	0.102	0.0317
Birth FE			Y	Y			Y	Y
H_0: Working Class >			0.999	0.000135			0.00144	0.000135

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 subsetting by governing party at the start of surveillance. Columns (1)-(4) focus on individuals who begin surveillance under the historical right (1862–1876; 1896; 1906; 1910); columns (5)-(8) on individuals who begin surveillance under the historical left (1877–1895; 1899–1905; 1899-1905; 1907–1909; 1911–1914). Individuals who begin surveillance under coalition governments are not included. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Results for individuals who begin surveillance during the fascist period is reported in columns (5)-(8) in Table E.8.

E.1 Additional Heterogeneities

Table E.8: Effect of the Education Reform on Surveillance, by Democracy and Dictatorship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Share Surveilled before 1922				Share Surveilled after 1922			
	Overall	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class	Overall	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Post × Above4000	1.831***	1.540***	0.267***	0.0240	1.683***	1.333***	0.307***	0.0433***
	(0.199)	(0.178)	(0.0344)	(0.0148)	(0.164)	(0.147)	(0.0317)	(0.0120)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	470,493	470,493	470,493	470,493
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	2.019	1.696	0.252	0.0534	3.373	2.991	0.308	0.0676
H_0: Working Class <=			0	0			0	0

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 subsetting by start of surveillance. Columns (1)-(4) focus on individuals who begin surveillance before 1922; columns (5)-(8) on individuals who begin surveillance after 1922 –included. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Table E.7 reports the results by governing party before 1922.

Table E.9: Heterogeneity by state capacity and technology

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Share Surveilled in 100,000					Surveilled Post Wiretapping -
	Post Offices		North	Center	South	Surveilled Pre Wiretapping
Post × Above4000	2.855***	2.866***	5.279***	8.502***	1.651***	0.177
	(0.359)	(0.335)	(0.521)	(1.094)	(0.243)	(0.170)
Post × Above4000 × Any Post Office	1.203***					
	(0.427)					
Post × Above4000 × N Post Offices		1.185***				
		(0.441)				
Observations	617,040	617,040	351,920	65,120	200,000	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
Mean DV	5.077	5.077	7.211	10.97	2.590	1.742

Notes: Heterogeneity to DDRD results as in Equation 1. Columns (1) and (2) subset by the presence of a post office. *Any Post Office* is equal to 1 if there is at least one working post office in that municipality in 1861; *N Post Offices* is a continuous variable that corresponds to the number of working post offices in that municipality. Columns(3)-(5) subset by the geographical area a surveilled is born in. In columns (6) the dependent variable is the difference in share surveilled in 100,000 before and after the introduction of wiretapping technology. As wiretapping introduction in 1916 affected all cohorts, we examine the effect on differential surveillance rates, comparing the same cohorts before and after 1916 to isolate how this technological change interacted with the education reform. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table E.10: Heterogeneity by pre-reform level of surveillance

	(1)	(2)
	Share Surveilled in 100,000	
Post × Above4000	2.892***	7.158***
	(0.336)	(0.566)
Post × Above4000 × HighSurveillance	4.083***	
	(0.788)	
Post × Above4000 × NoSurveillance		-4.895***
		(0.544)
Observations	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y
Mean DV	0.0824	0.0824

Notes: Heterogeneity to DDRD results as in Equation 1 by pre-reform levels of surveillance. *HighSurveillance* takes value 1 if a municipality has a high level of surveillance before the reform. A municipality is classified as having a high level of pre-reform surveillance if its average surveillance level before the reform is greater than or equal to the median pre-reform surveillance level. *NoSurveillance* takes value 1 if there were no individuals surveilled from untreated cohorts in a municipality. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

F Results on Political Engagement

Figure F.1: Effect of the education reform on political engagement (RD)

(a) Voter Turnout

(b) Individuals in Politics



(c) Protests

(d) Partisans

(e) Banditism



Notes: RD (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2015) results showing the effect of being above the 4,000 cutoff for the cohorts affected by the reform (i.e. born after 1854) on: (a) the (log) share of votes in 1,000 inhabitants in 1861; (b) the (log) share of notable individuals in politics; (c) the (log) share of protests in 100,000; (d) the (log) share of partisans in 100,000 inhabitants; (3) the (log) share of bandits in 100,000 inhabitants. Estimates are computed with triangular weighting kernel, data-driven optimal bandwidth selection and default binning. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table F.1: Effect of the education reform on votes in national elections (RDD and DDRD)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	RDD		DDRD	
	Share	Total	Share	Total
Above4000	3.363	11.997		
	(4.729)	(11.094)		
Post × Above4000			-42.19***	-28.04
			(6.724)	(125.4)
Observations	189,422	189,422	224,529	224,529
Bandwidth	921.56	3470.96		
N Left	148538	148538		
N Right	40884	40884		
Robust P-val	0.830	0.180		
Election Year FE	Y	Y	-	-
Reign FE	Y	Y	-	-
Municipality FE	-	-	Y	Y
Reign x Election Year FE	-	-	Y	Y
Mean DV	75.94	281.6	75.94	281.6

Notes: RD (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2015) and DDRD results. Columns (1) and (3) show the effect for the share of votes per 1,000 inhabitants; columns (2) and (4) for the absolute number of votes . In columns (1)-(2), we subset the analyses to election years from 1880 onward, when the first treated cohort gained voting rights (Figure F.3 shows there is no effect in the pre-period). The regressions include year and region fixed effects. Estimates are computed with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection. In columns (3)-(4), we use the same DDRD specification as in Equation 1, but with election-year as time variable. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table F.2: Effect of the Education Reform on notable individuals from Wikidata

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall		Non Politics		Politics	
	Share	Total	Share	Total	Share	Total
Post × Above4000	-0.294*	-0.0869**	-0.110	-0.0866**	-0.184**	-0.000292
	(0.159)	(0.0361)	(0.131)	(0.0341)	(0.0805)	(0.00310)
Observations	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	0.800	0.0192	0.517	0.0122	0.271	0.00620

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 where the dependent variable is the number of notable individuals included in Wikidata per 100,000 inhabitants. Columns 1-2 report the effect on all notable individuals. Columns 3-4 focus on non-political occupations. Columns 5-6 consider political occupations (see Section A for variable construction). We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table F.3: Effect of the 4,000 cutoff on Protests (RDD)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Protests					
	Share		Total Winsorized		Ln	
Above4000	-106.0	-120.0*	-0.267	-0.291	-0.0213	-0.0269
	(65.50)	(71.35)	(0.358)	(0.358)	(0.0590)	(0.0593)
Observations	291,609	291,609	294,872	294,872	294,872	294,872
Bandwidth	1450.315	2448.452	2059.210	4122.847	2081.756	4125.588
N Left	256055	256055	259318	259318	259318	259318
N Right	35554	35554	35554	35554	35554	35554
Robust P-val	0.160	0.046	0.405	0.473	0.624	0.683
Mean DV	25.56	25.56	.87	.87	.176	.176
Polynomial	1	2	1	2	1	2

Notes: RD (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2015) results showing the effect of being above the 4,000 population discontinuity on the number of protests. Columns (1)-(2) shows the effect for the number of protests in 100,000 inhabitants; columns (3)-(4) the winsorized total number of protests; columns (5)-(6) the natural logarithm of the total number of protests. We report the mean of the dependent variable in the sample in municipalities with population above 4,000 inhabitants in 1861. Estimates are computed with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table F.4: Effect of the Education Reform on partisan activity (RDD and DDRD)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	RDD		DDRD	
	Share	Total	Share	Total
Above4000	-0.087	-0.006		
	(0.273)	(0.010)		
Post × Above4000			-0.0973	-0.0723***
			(0.151)	(0.0258)
Observations	323,946	323,946	617,040	617,040
Bandwidth	1762.076	2051.634		
N Left	272412	272412		
N Right	51534	51534		
Robust P-val	0.931	0.719		
Conventional P-val	0.751	0.565		
Municipality FE			Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	5.425	0.0407	1.304	0.0407

Notes: RD (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2015) and DDRD results as in Equation 1. In Columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is the share of partisans in 100,000; in Columns (2) and (4) is the total number of partisans. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Estimates are computed with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table F.5: Effect of the Education Reform on notable individuals from Wikidata, by surveillance level before the reform

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall		Non Politics		Politics	
	Share	Total	Share	Total	Share	Total
Post × Above4000	-0.301*	-0.0907**	-0.112	-0.0904**	-0.189**	-0.000252
	(0.160)	(0.0386)	(0.132)	(0.0365)	(0.0807)	(0.00326)
Post × Above4000 × HighSurveillance	0.0470	0.0254	0.0169	0.0257	0.0300	-0.000271
	(0.0917)	(0.0173)	(0.0658)	(0.0161)	(0.0512)	(0.00333)
Observations	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	0.738	0.0183	0.486	0.0117	0.253	0.00590

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 where the dependent variable is the number of notable individuals included in Wikidata per 100,000 inhabitants. Columns (1)-(2) report the effect on all notable individuals. Columns (3)-(4) focus on non-political occupations, while columns (5)-(6) consider political occupations (see Section A for variable construction). *HighSurveillance* takes value 1 if the median number of individuals surveilled before the start of treatment in a municipality is larger than the median at the national level. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table F.6: Effect on notable individuals from Wikidata, by no pre-reform surveillance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall		Non Politics		Politics	
	Share	Total	Share	Total	Share	Total
Post × Above4000	-0.144	-0.0949*	-0.0171	-0.103*	-0.127	0.00763
	(0.172)	(0.0558)	(0.142)	(0.0530)	(0.0853)	(0.00500)
Post × Above4000 × NoSurveillance	-0.202***	0.0108	-0.125**	0.0215	-0.0771**	-0.0106***
	(0.0722)	(0.0274)	(0.0538)	(0.0258)	(0.0359)	(0.00389)
Observations	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480	328,480
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	1.164	0.0292	0.710	0.0190	0.394	0.00960

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 where the dependent variable is the number of notable individuals included in Wikidata per 100,000 inhabitants. Columns (1)-(2) report the effect on all notable individuals. Columns (3)-(4) focus on non-political occupations, while columns (5)-(6) consider political occupations (see Section A for variable construction). *NoSurveillance* takes value 1 if there were no individuals surveilled before the start of treatment in a municipality. We report the mean of the dependent variable for cities with population just below 4,000 in 1861. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Figure F.2: Effect of the 4,000 cutoff on Protests (RDD), by year



Notes: RD (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2015) results showing the effect of being above the 4,000 population discontinuity on the share of protests in 100,000 (left) and on the number of protests (left). All regressions include region fixed effects. Estimates are computed with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Figure F.3: Effect of the 4,000 cutoff on voter mobilization before the education reform, 1861 national election (RDD)



Notes: RD Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2015) results showing the effect of being above the 4,000 population discontinuity on the absolute number of votes cast before the education reform, in the 1861 national election. Individuals who were 7 years or younger at the time of the reform voted for the first time in 1880. Estimates are computed with triangular weighting kernel, data-driven optimal bandwidth selection and default binning. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

G Alternative Explanations

Table G.1: Effect of the Education Reform on non-migrants and migrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Share Surveilled in 100,000								
	Stayers			Movers			Movers To Control Cities		
Post × Above4000	2.100***	2.036***	2.075***	1.479***	1.429***	1.433***	1.550***	1.488***	1.416***
	(0.218)	(0.212)	(0.194)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.108)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Mean DV	2.694	2.694	2.694	1.980	1.980	1.980	1.764	1.764	1.764

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 subsetting by non-migrants, individuals for which the registered birth and residence locations are the same (columns 1-3) and migrants (columns 4-9), for which the registered birth and residence locations differ. Columns 4-6 present the effect for migrants to any city and columns 7-9 to cities with population below 4,000 in 1861. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table G.2: Placebo Reform - More Bureaucrats but Not More Schools

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Share Surveilled in 100,000		
Post × Above5000	8.896	8.894	8.894
	(5.454)	(5.454)	(5.454)
Observations	95,827	95,827	95,827
Municipality FE	N	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	-
Reign x Year FE	N	N	Y
Mean DV	7.301	7.301	7.301

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 of the effect of the Crispi reform enacted in 1890 in municipalities above 4,000 inhabitants on the share of surveilled in 100,000. The database is at the municipality and year of start of surveillance level. *Post* is a dummy equal to one after 1890. Municipalities with less than 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 are not included in the analysis. We report the mean of the dependent variable for cities with population just below 5,000 in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table G.3: Effect of the Education Reform, by different professions

	(1) N Teachers	(2) Share Teachers	(3) Share Shop Owners	(4) Share Lawyers	(5) Share Tailors
Post × Above4000	-0.000823	0.00474***	0.00376***	0.00700***	0.00720***
	(0.00263)	(0.000499)	(0.000382)	(0.000587)	(0.000535)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	0.00160	0.00140	0.00150	0.00130	0.00290

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1 on the share of surveilled in 100,000 by profession. Column (1) considers the absolute number of teachers; column (2) the share of teachers in 100,000; columns (3)-(5) the share of other professions (shop owners, lawyers and tailors) surveilled at similar rates than teachers pre-reform. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table G.4: Effect of the Education Reform, by age

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Share Surveilled in 100,000				
	0-17	18-25	26-35	36-45	45 and more
Post × Above4000	0.00261***	0.0635***	0.105***	0.106***	0.0743***
	(0.000896)	(0.00757)	(0.0107)	(0.0110)	(0.00926)
Observations	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040	617,040
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reign x Birth FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean DV	0.00250	0.0582	0.128	0.183	0.161

Notes: DDRD results as in Equation 1on the share of surveilled in 100,000 by age. We report the mean of the dependent variable for municipalities with population just below 4,000 inhabitants in 1861 after the reform. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.