

Online Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables

“Does Employment Shift Mothers’ Voting Behavior and Political Identity?”

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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures

Appendix B: Exploring the Correlation Between Working and Voting

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Table A.1: Summary Statistics (CPS and GSS Data)

Sample:	All Women				Unmarried Women			
	Mean (1)	Std Dev (2)	Min (3)	Max (4)	Mean (5)	Std Dev (6)	Min (7)	Max (8)
Panel A: 1976–2020 CPS Data								
Age	37.7	11.9	18.0	59.0	33.8	12.5	18.0	59.0
Married	0.58	0.49	0.0	1.0	0.00	0.00	0.0	0.0
Number of Kids	0.90	1.21	0.0	9.0	0.52	0.99	0.0	9.0
<12 Years Educ	0.12	0.32	0.0	1.0	0.13	0.34	0.0	1.0
=12 Years Educ	0.55	0.50	0.0	1.0	0.57	0.49	0.0	1.0
>12 Years Educ	0.33	0.47	0.0	1.0	0.30	0.46	0.0	1.0
White	0.82	0.38	0.0	1.0	0.75	0.43	0.0	1.0
Black	0.13	0.34	0.0	1.0	0.20	0.40	0.0	1.0
Other Race	0.05	0.21	0.0	1.0	0.05	0.22	0.0	1.0
Voted Last Pres. Election	0.59	0.49	0.0	1.0	0.51	0.50	0.0	1.0
Voted Last Midterm Election	0.49	0.50	0.0	1.0	0.40	0.49	0.0	1.0
Observations	780,035				307,445			
Panel B: 1975–2014 GSS Data								
Age	39.4	10.6	18.0	59.0	38.7	11.0	18.0	59.0
Married	0.62	0.49	0.0	1.0	0.00	0.00	0.0	0.0
Number of Kids	1.15	1.26	0.0	9.0	0.92	1.22	0.0	9.0
<12 Years Educ	0.16	0.37	0.0	1.0	0.19	0.39	0.0	1.0
=12 Years Educ	0.59	0.49	0.0	1.0	0.57	0.50	0.0	1.0
>12 Years Educ	0.25	0.43	0.0	1.0	0.24	0.43	0.0	1.0
White	0.78	0.42	0.0	1.0	0.66	0.47	0.0	1.0
Black	0.16	0.37	0.0	1.0	0.27	0.45	0.0	1.0
Other Race	0.06	0.24	0.0	1.0	0.06	0.24	0.0	1.0
Voted Last Pres. Election	0.65	0.48	0.0	1.0	0.61	0.49	0.0	1.0
Democrat	0.49	0.50	0.0	1.0	0.57	0.50	0.0	1.0
Republican	0.33	0.47	0.0	1.0	0.26	0.44	0.0	1.0
Liberal	0.25	0.43	0.0	1.0	0.30	0.46	0.0	1.0
Conservative	0.27	0.45	0.0	1.0	0.23	0.42	0.0	1.0
Observations	19,319				8,004			

Notes: Data sources: 1976–2020 November CPS data and 1975–2014 GSS data. November CPS data include 913,185 women ages 18–59, but when asked whether they voted in the last election, 133,150 have values of ‘refused,’ ‘don’t know,’ ‘no response,’ or ‘not in universe.’ I drop these women from the sample, but results are similar when some or all of these answers are interpreted as not voted. In GSS data, only 14,763 (6,329 unmarried) women have data on voting in last presidential election.

Table A.2: Summary Statistics (Roper Data)

	All Women (N=345,363)				All Mothers (N=168,472)			
	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Year	2008.6	5.61	1980	2017	2009.0	5.66	1980	2017
Age	40.3	12.2	18	59	40.3	10.2	18	59
White	0.76	0.43	0	1	0.75	0.43	0	1
Black	0.098	0.30	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1
HS Education or Less	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1
Some College	0.21	0.41	0	1	0.20	0.40	0	1
HS Education or Less	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1
Married	0.61	0.49	0	1	0.77	0.42	0	1
Employed	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.68	0.47	0	1
Any Kids	0.49	0.50	0	1	1	0	1	1
Democrat	0.31	0.46	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1
Republican	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.36	0.48	0	1
Independent	0.36	0.48	0	1	0.36	0.48	0	1
Liberal	0.21	0.41	0	1	0.19	0.39	0	1
Moderate	0.41	0.49	0	1	0.44	0.50	0	1
Conservative	0.37	0.48	0	1	0.37	0.48	0	1
Max Federal EITC	3026.1	2608.8	0	5885.1	5666.2	580.9	1301.1	5885.1
Max State EITC	237.0	511.2	0	2586.2	434.7	665.4	0	2586.2

Notes: 1980–2017 Roper data. Sample includes all women 18–59 years old. Max EITC in real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. Not all variables available in each dataset.

Table A.3: EITC's Effects on Voting Behavior, Alternate Controls (CPS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting (Mean=58.8)									
MaxEITC	-0.55 (0.09)	-0.77 (0.09)	-0.56 (0.09)	-0.51 (0.10)	-0.50 (0.10)	-0.47 (0.11)	-0.46 (0.11)	-0.44 (0.11)	-0.46 (0.17)
R-squared	0.079	0.178	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.187	0.189	0.189	0.185
Panel B: Effect by Marital Status (Married Mean=0.64, Unmarried Mean=0.51)									
MaxEITC × Married	-0.42 (0.10)	-0.51 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)	0.13 (0.10)	0.15 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.17)
MaxEITC × Unmarried	-0.96 (0.12)	-1.55 (0.13)	-1.49 (0.12)	-1.45 (0.13)	-1.45 (0.13)	-1.41 (0.14)	-1.40 (0.14)	-1.38 (0.14)	-1.17 (0.18)
R-squared	0.079	0.178	0.181	0.181	0.181	0.188	0.189	0.190	0.185
Observations	780,037	780,037	780,037	780,037	780,037	780,037	780,037	780,037	780,037
<i>Controls</i>									
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mar × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X	X
Mar. × State Factors					X	X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X	
Mar × St × Year FE							X	X	
State × #Kids FE								X	
Year × #Kids × Demog.								X	X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Column 5 denotes full set of controls used throughout the analysis. Demog. traits in column 9 include age, Black, White, three education indicators, and married (in panel A only).

Table A.4: EITC and Voting in Presidential or Midterm Elections, Alt. Controls (CPS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Voting in Presidential Elections (Mean=68)								
MaxEITC	-0.59 (0.12)	-0.77 (0.11)	-0.53 (0.11)	-0.52 (0.13)	-0.51 (0.13)	-0.46 (0.14)	-0.45 (0.14)	-0.43 (0.13)
R-squared	0.041	0.147	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.153	0.154	0.155
Observations	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047
Panel B: Voting in Midterm Elections (Mean=49)								
MaxEITC	-0.46 (0.13)	-0.74 (0.13)	-0.60 (0.13)	-0.54 (0.14)	-0.54 (0.14)	-0.52 (0.12)	-0.51 (0.12)	-0.49 (0.12)
R-squared	0.048	0.151	0.153	0.154	0.154	0.162	0.163	0.164
Observations	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988
<i>Controls</i>								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mar × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Mar. × State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Mar × St × Year FE							X	X
State × #Kids FE								X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Column 5 denotes full set of controls used throughout the analysis.

Table A.5: Little Association Between Working and Political Identity (GSS Data)

	All Women			White Women			Black Women		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Outcome = Democrat									
Working	0.012 (0.008)	0.000 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)	0.041 (0.015)	0.013 (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
R-squared	0.000	0.016	0.089	0.000	0.009	0.036	0.002	0.025	0.063
Panel B: Outcome = Republican									
Working	0.013 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.010 (0.008)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)
R-squared	0.000	0.029	0.092	0.000	0.019	0.041	0.000	0.008	0.031
Panel C: Outcome = Independent									
Working	-0.025 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.031 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.014)
R-squared	0.001	0.021	0.052	0.001	0.023	0.047	0.002	0.014	0.047
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
<i>Controls</i>									
None	X			X			X		
Age, Educ, Married		X			X			X	
Full Controls			X			X			X

Notes: Data source: 1980–2004 GSS data. See notes to Table 4.

Table A.6: Decomposing Politically Informed (from Table 4 Column 9)

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Interested in Politics?	Ever Dem- onstrated?	Attended a Rally?	Boycott? Media?	Political Cause?	Donated to Political Cause?	Discuss Political Views?	Share Political Views?	Signed Petition?	How Int. in Politics?	Politically Informed?
MaxEITC	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
R-squared	0.758	0.063	0.081	0.111	0.072	0.069	0.115	0.076	0.075	0.090	0.096
Observations	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399
Mean Dep Var	0.095	0.010	-0.010	0.033	-0.023	0.002	-0.036	-0.037	-0.005	-0.070	-0.060

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Outcomes all measured in standard deviations.

Table A.7: Working, Politically Informed, and Political Identity: Alternate Controls (GSS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Outcome = Democrat (Mean = 0.49)								
MaxEITC	-1.8 (0.4)	-1.6 (0.4)	-1.4 (0.4)	-1.6 (0.3)	-1.6 (0.3)	-1.4 (0.4)	-1.4 (0.4)	-1.5 (0.4)
R-squared	0.035	0.091	0.098	0.099	0.099	0.151	0.194	0.201
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel B: Outcome = Republican (Mean = 0.33)								
MaxEITC	1.0 (0.3)	1.0 (0.3)	0.9 (0.3)	1.0 (0.3)	1.0 (0.3)	1.2 (0.3)	1.2 (0.4)	1.4 (0.4)
R-squared	0.037	0.093	0.098	0.099	0.100	0.153	0.194	0.200
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel C: Outcome = Working (Mean = 0.65)								
MaxEITC	1.1 (0.3)	1.3 (0.4)	1.0 (0.4)	0.9 (0.4)	0.9 (0.4)	0.9 (0.4)	0.8 (0.4)	1.0 (0.4)
R-squared	0.043	0.093	0.104	0.105	0.106	0.153	0.197	0.203
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel D: Outcome = Politically Informed (Units are Standard Deviations)								
MaxEITC	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
R-squared	0.722	0.724	0.733	0.734	0.735	0.752	0.767	0.778
Observations	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399
<i>Controls</i>								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married \times (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Married \times Annual State Factors					X	X	X	X
State \times Year FE						X	X	X
Married \times State \times Year FE							X	X
State \times Number of Kids FE								X

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Politically informed discussed in Table 4 notes.

Table A.8: Summary Statistics (CES Data)

	All Women		All Mothers	
	Mean (1)	S.D. (2)	Mean (3)	S.D. (4)
Any Kids	0.34	0.47	1	0
Age	42.6	13.7	37.9	9.78
Married	0.50	0.50	0.65	0.48
HS Dropout	0.036	0.19	0.043	0.20
HS Graduate	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.46
Some College	0.68	0.47	0.66	0.47
White	0.69	0.46	0.64	0.48
Black	0.14	0.35	0.16	0.37
Hispanic	0.099	0.30	0.13	0.34
Other Race	0.072	0.26	0.067	0.25
Max Possible EITC (1,000s)	2.46	2.69	6.19	0.72
Liberal	0.31	0.46	0.26	0.44
Moderate	0.31	0.46	0.33	0.47
Conservative	26.5	44.1	27.2	44.5
Observations	215,462		72,554	

Notes: 2008–2020 CES data. Sample includes all mothers 18–59 years old. All dollars are real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. CES does not have number of kids. Political party affiliation is only available for a small subset of observations so I focus on political views.

Table A.9: EITC Expansions and Political Views (2008–2020 CES Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Outcome = Liberal				
MaxEITC	-1.08 (0.28)	-0.60 (0.28)	-0.70 (0.28)	-0.65 (0.32)
R-squared	0.020	0.064	0.061	0.070
Panel B: Outcome = Conservative				
MaxEITC	0.70 (0.26)	0.34 (0.26)	0.50 (0.26)	0.48 (0.30)
R-squared	0.014	0.056	0.046	0.063
Panel C: Outcome = Moderate				
MaxEITC	0.14 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.29)	-0.09 (0.29)	-0.12 (0.33)
R-squared	0.003	0.009	0.009	0.016
Observations	215,462	215,462	215,462	215,462
<i>Controls</i>				
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X
Demographics		X	X	X
Demographics × Year			X	X
State-Year FE, State-Year-Married FE				X

Notes: Data: 2008–2020 CES data. Sample is all women 18–59 years old. Since CES data does not have number of kids (only whether respondents have any kids), I assign two children to women with children to impute the value of *MaxEITC*. Results are similar when I assign one or three children to these women.

Table A.10: Summary Statistics (ANES Data)

	All Women		All Mothers	
	Mean (1)	S.D. (2)	Mean (3)	S.D. (4)
Number of Kids	1.09	1.22	1.93	1.01
Age	36.8	11.3	35.1	9.76
Married	0.62	0.49	0.68	0.47
HS Dropout	0.18	0.39	0.21	0.40
HS Graduate	0.40	0.49	0.43	0.50
Some College	0.41	0.49	0.36	0.48
White	0.78	0.42	0.76	0.43
Black	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.35
Hispanic	0.070	0.26	0.075	0.26
Other Race	0.021	0.14	0.020	0.14
Max Possible EITC (1,000s)	1.13	1.25	1.67	1.24
Voted Last Election	54.0	49.8	51.8	50.0
Liberal	18.1	38.5	16.2	36.9
Moderate	26.3	44.1	26.9	44.3
Conservative	24.8	43.2	24.2	42.8
Democrat	52.4	49.9	52.0	50.0
Independent	14.4	35.1	15.7	36.3
Republican	32.4	46.8	31.6	46.5
Observations	8,052		5,052	

Notes: 1974–2004 ANES data. Sample includes all mothers 18–49 years old. All dollars are real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars.

Table A.11: EITC's Effects on Voting and Political Affiliation (ANES Data)

Outcome:	Voting (1)	Liberal (2)	Moderate (3)	Conservative (4)	Democrat (5)	Independent (6)	Republican (7)
Panel A: Demographics Controls							
MaxEITC	-0.35 (0.97)	-1.02 (0.83)	-0.10 (0.99)	0.61 (0.94)	-0.91 (1.08)	-1.16 (0.72)	2.04 (1.04)
R-squared	0.204	0.083	0.032	0.071	0.106	0.064	0.109
Observations	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052
Panel B: Add Control for State-Year FE							
MaxEITC	-0.45 (1.00)	-1.09 (0.87)	-0.03 (1.03)	0.79 (0.98)	-0.77 (1.10)	-1.21 (0.75)	2.16 (1.06)
R-squared	0.257	0.137	0.079	0.117	0.164	0.121	0.165
Observations	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052
Mean Dep Var	54.0	18.1	26.3	24.8	52.4	14.4	32.4

Notes: Data source: 1974–2004 ANES data. Sample includes all women 18–59 years old. Demographics refer to controls in Table A.3 columns 1–2.

Table A.12: Impact of State EITCs on Political Identity (GSS Data)

Outcome:	Democrat		Republican		Independent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Stacking Each EITC State with All Non-EITC States						
Any Kids \times State EITC	-0.27		0.17		0.10	
	(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)	
Any Kids \times State EITC \times Rep. Governor		-0.28		0.14		0.13
		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.08)
Any Kids \times State EITC \times Dem. Governor		-0.24		0.31		-0.06
		(0.22)		(0.20)		(0.18)
R-squared	0.100	0.100	0.103	0.103	0.066	0.066
Observations	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407
Equal Effects (P-Value)		0.89		0.46		0.35
Panel B: Among EITC States Only						
Any Kids \times State EITC	-0.21		0.08		0.14	
	(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.10)	
Any Kids \times State EITC \times Republican Governor		-0.22		0.06		0.16
		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.10)
Any Kids \times State EITC \times Dem. Governor		-0.15		0.17		0.01
		(0.28)		(0.26)		(0.23)
R-squared	0.101	0.101	0.097	0.097	0.074	0.074
Observations	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826
Equal Effects (P-Value)		0.81		0.70		0.54
Full Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Panel A sample includes only the 31 states (including D.C.) with an EITC. Panel B sample includes 31 “stacks”, where each EITC state is compared to the 20 non-EITC states, following the approach in [Cengiz et al. \(2019\)](#). While some states change policy more than once, I focus on the first time a state changes its policy. Figure shows similar effects of state EITC expansions, regardless of the governor’s political party when the state EITC was implemented. State EITC defined in 10-percentage-point units, as a match of federal EITC rate.

Table A.13: Net Effect on Partisan Voting (GSS Data)

Outcome:	Voted		Democrat		Voted	Independent		Voted	Republican	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
		for Dem.	× Voted	× Not Voted	for 3rd Prty	× Voted	× Not Voted	for Rep.	× Voted	× Not Voted
Panel A: Full Sample of Women, Ages 18–59										
MaxEITC	-0.03 (0.38)	-1.46 (0.59)	-1.44 (0.41)	-0.31 (0.33)	0.28 (0.23)	0.40 (0.23)	0.18 (0.26)	1.18 (0.61)	0.98 (0.35)	0.14 (0.22)
R-squared	0.159	0.183	0.099	0.059	0.077	0.019	0.071	0.180	0.106	0.042
Observations	16,578	11,532	16,578	16,578	11,532	16,578	16,578	11,532	16,578	16,578
Mean Dep Var	69.0	51.6	36.0	13.3	6.02	6.58	9.39	42.4	26.2	8.14
Panel B: Younger Sample of Women, Ages 18–45										
MaxEITC	-0.76 (0.48)	-1.24 (0.64)	-1.91 (0.50)	-0.31 (0.46)	-0.00 (0.31)	0.33 (0.26)	0.45 (0.34)	1.24 (0.59)	0.75 (0.36)	0.60 (0.33)
R-squared	0.153	0.190	0.099	0.059	0.090	0.019	0.074	0.187	0.108	0.044
Observations	11,203	7,351	11,203	11,203	7,351	11,203	11,203	7,351	11,203	11,203
Mean Dep Var	64.4	51.1	33.3	15.0	6.54	6.02	10.9	42.4	24.9	9.51

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Voted in GSS data refers to last presidential election. Outcomes in columns 2, 5, and 8 are self-reported. I construct outcomes in columns 3–4, 6–7, and 9–10 by interacting voting with political party affiliation.

Table A.14: EITC's and Welfare Reform's Effects on Being Registered to Vote (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Registered to Vote	Registered and Voted	Registered and Didn't Vote	Registered to Vote	Registered and Voted	Registered and Didn't Vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.51 (0.10)	0.41 (0.08)			
State Welfare Waiver × 2+ Kids				-0.75 (0.76)	-0.95 (0.82)	0.20 (0.46)
R-squared	0.139	0.180	0.053	0.136	0.177	0.046
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	477,340	477,340	477,340

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. *MaxEITC* is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Figure 9 notes. *MaxEITC* and *Waiver* decreased being registered to vote by an insignificant 0.10 and 0.75 percentage points. These policies also decreased being registered and voting, and increased being registered and not voting. Not being registered therefore explains at most a small fraction of the decrease in voting. If not registering contributes to lower turnout, states could mitigate this by making registration easier. Election Day Registration (EDR) allows eligible voters to register and vote on the same day, simplifying the voting process by removing the need to register in advance (Xu, 2017). EDR was implemented by Maine in 1973, Minnesota in 1974, Wisconsin in 1975, Idaho in 1994, Wyoming in 1994, New Hampshire in 1996, Montana in 2006, Iowa in 2008, and Connecticut in 2012. Effects of working on voting are nearly identical for states with and without EDR, using OLS or IV approaches, suggesting registration barriers are not the primary mechanism driving the turnout decline.

Table A.15: Summary Statistics (ATUS Data)

	All Women		All Mothers	
	Mean (1)	S.D. (2)	Mean (3)	S.D. (4)
Number of Kids	1.20	1.25	1.86	1.10
Age	33.8	9.26	35.1	8.72
Birth Year	1976.5	10.5	1975.1	9.85
Married	0.52	0.50	0.64	0.48
HS Graduate	0.89	0.32	0.86	0.34
Some College	0.63	0.48	0.58	0.49
College Graduate	0.33	0.47	0.29	0.45
Black	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.34
Hispanic	0.17	0.38	0.20	0.40
Employed	0.71	0.45	0.67	0.47
Individual Earnings (1,000s)	25.8	30.6	23.5	30.1
Household Income (1,000s)	65.8	48.2	66.1	48.6
Max Possible EITC (1,000s)	3.34	2.47	4.86	1.68
EITC Benefit Eligibility (100s)	6.68	15.2	10.2	17.9
EITC Eligible	0.24	0.43	0.34	0.47
Observations	58,090		43,685	

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 18–49 years old. All dollars are real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. EITC benefits calculated using TAXSIM. Table is similar to Table B.1 in [Bastian and Lochner \(2022\)](#).

Table A.16: Weekly Hours Spent Working and on Civic Participation (ATUS Data)

Outcome:	Work Hours			Civic Participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	0.81 (0.43)	0.82 (0.49)	1.45 (0.48)	-0.21 (0.06)	-0.22 (0.07)	-0.25 (0.07)
R-squared	0.061	0.066	0.109	0.014	0.016	0.046
Observations	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090
Mean Dep Var	26.1	26.1	26.1	1.96	1.96	1.96
<i>Controls</i>						
State FE, Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X
Interactions		X	X		X	X
State-Year FE			X			X

Notes: Data source: 2003–2018 ATUS data. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Columns 1–2 control for state FE, year FE, and demographics; columns 3–4 add controls for marital status interacted with demographics; and columns 5–6 add state-year FE and state-year-married FE. These three sets of controls are equal to those in Tables A.3 and A.7 columns 2, 3, and 7.

Table A.17: Decomposing Government Policy (from Table 9 Column 1)

Gov Policy:	Welfare	Jobs for All	Reduce Income Ineq.	Health-Care for All	Help Elderly	Help Unemp.	Cut Spend.	Less Bus. Reg.	Reduce Income Ineq.	Income Too High	Taxes on Rich High	Middle Inc. Too High	Rich Should Pay More Taxes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
MaxEITC	0.8 (1.2)	5.0 (2.4)	5.3 (2.6)	6.3 (3.7)	1.3 (2.7)	4.4 (2.8)	6.4 (3.2)	0.8 (2.6)	2.5 (2.1)	2.4 (3.3)	1.0 (2.2)	5.0 (4.2)	0.7 (4.3)
R-squared	0.106	0.172	0.099	0.131	0.108	0.159	0.117	0.069	0.102	0.064	0.113	0.075	0.068
Obs.	10,312	2,925	2,411	1,575	1,974	1,962	1,593	1,588	3,736	1,879	1,783	1,513	1,328
Unique Years	27	7	6	4	5	5	4	4	7	4	4	3	3
Mean D.V.	-4.05	-12.2	-9.86	-8.27	-13.1	-6.25	-11.4	-13.5	-12.0	-5.92	1.30	5.12	0.17

Notes: See notes to Table 4.

Table A.18: Decomposing Feminism (from Table 9 Column 2)

Attitude about Women:	Should Take Care of Home (1)	Should Not Work (2)	Would Vote Female Pres. (3)	Not Suited for Politics (4)	Should Help Husband's Career (5)	Kids Suffer if Mom Works (6)	Should Tend Home (7)	Divorce Laws (8)
MaxEITC	-0.5 (1.3)	0.9 (1.3)	0.3 (1.0)	-0.1 (1.3)	-0.3 (1.5)	0.5 (1.2)	2.0 (0.9)	-2.3 (1.0)
R-squared	0.129	0.058	0.056	0.086	0.181	0.076	0.110	0.102
Observations	7,587	7,638	8,499	10,939	5,659	9,629	9,604	11,442
Mean Dep Var	-16.6	-11.7	-11.6	-11.7	-25.8	-23.7	-23.1	-4.35

Notes: See notes to Table 4.

Table A.19: Decomposing Race Views (from Table 9 Column 3)

Attitudes:	Whites Hurt by Affirm. Action (1)	No Black Affirmative Action (2)	Gov't Shouldn't Help Blacks (3)	Racial Outcome Gaps Not due to Discrimination (4)	Racial Outcome Gaps due to Lack of Will (5)	Banning Interracial Marriage (6)
MaxEITC	0.4 (1.8)	4.6 (4.1)	1.0 (1.4)	1.1 (1.9)	3.1 (1.3)	1.5 (1.2)
R-squared	0.084	0.149	0.177	0.092	0.076	0.188
Observations	5,527	5,687	10,402	9,226	9,168	8,631
Unique Years	12	11	21	19	19	18
Mean Dep Var	-1.76	-5.35	-5.19	-5.65	-9.95	0.0097

Notes: See notes to Table 4.

Table A.20: Decomposing Other Hot Button Issues (from Table 9 Column 4)

Attitude:	Anti Pro-Choice (1)	Anti Gay Rights (2)	Anti Gun Permits (3)
MaxEITC	0.5 (0.6)	0.7 (1.3)	-0.2 (0.4)
R-squared	0.099	0.209	0.052
Observations	12,118	10,979	11,701
Unique Years	24	23	24
Mean Dep Var	57.9	-12.4	16.9

Notes: See notes to Table 4.

Table A.21: Decomposing Religious (from Table 9 Column 5)

Religious Outcome:	Attendance (1)	Fundamentalism (2)	Prayer (3)	Faith Over Science (4)
MaxEITC	-1.7 (1.0)	-0.3 (0.9)	0.8 (1.1)	-0.8 (4.5)
R-squared	0.083	0.166	0.104	0.127
Observations	17,483	18,537	10,950	1,936
Unique Years	27	27	19	4
Mean Dep Var	-0.64	0.11	-0.064	-0.56

Notes: See notes to Table 4.

Table A.22: Regression-Adjusted Correlation Between Working and Political Identity, Non-White vs. White Women (GSS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Outcome = Democrat (Mean = 0.49)								
Working × White	-5.0 (1.5)	-4.6 (1.4)	-3.8 (1.4)	-3.9 (1.4)	-3.9 (1.4)	-3.8 (1.4)	-3.4 (1.6)	-3.4 (1.5)
R-squared	0.074	0.091	0.097	0.099	0.099	0.151	0.193	0.200
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel B: Outcome = Republican (Mean = 0.33)								
Working × White	3.5 (1.3)	4.3 (1.3)	3.6 (1.2)	3.7 (1.2)	3.7 (1.3)	3.7 (1.3)	3.6 (1.5)	3.8 (1.5)
R-squared	0.084	0.093	0.098	0.099	0.100	0.153	0.194	0.200
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
<i>Controls</i>								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Married × Annual State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Married × State × Year FE							X	X
State × Number of Kids FE								X

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Politically informed discussed in Table 4 notes.

Table A.23: Ind. of Newly Working Women (CPS Data), Political Identity by Ind. (GSS Data)

Description: Data:	Prob(Entering Ind.)			Workers' Political Identity by Ind.					
	CPS Data			GSS Data (Alt. Sample Years Below)					
	Sample of Women			1975–2013		1990–2013		2000–2013	
Occupation	All	White	Black	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Arts, Entertainment	-0.055	-0.053	0.114	0.500	0.324	0.469	0.352	0.457	0.363
Education	-0.025	0.035	0.135	0.502	0.375	0.484	0.380	0.479	0.367
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	-0.015	-0.016	0.208	0.422	0.434	0.350	0.467	0.328	0.438
Real Estate, Rental, Leasing	0.009	0.016	0.183	0.433	0.408	0.414	0.403	0.424	0.375
Utilities	0.019	0.024	0.189	0.424	0.435	0.389	0.442	0.393	0.425
Construction	0.020	0.025	0.219	0.441	0.383	0.399	0.405	0.384	0.393
Mining, Oil and Gas	0.020	0.024	0.197	0.532	0.351	0.376	0.458	0.321	0.518
Accommodation, Food Services	0.047	0.041	0.296	0.492	0.292	0.459	0.300	0.456	0.284
Information	0.062	0.072	0.178	0.498	0.386	0.492	0.400	0.479	0.401
Professional, Technical Services	0.072	0.032	0.536	0.416	0.450	0.409	0.450	0.412	0.437
Other Services	0.076	0.039	0.368	0.496	0.332	0.440	0.362	0.418	0.352
Transportation, Warehousing	0.088	0.084	0.284	0.498	0.329	0.459	0.354	0.452	0.340
Public Administration	0.088	0.082	0.237	0.486	0.397	0.445	0.427	0.421	0.447
Wholesale Trade	0.100	0.113	0.235	0.408	0.426	0.375	0.443	0.361	0.422
Retail Trade	0.105	0.079	0.297	0.451	0.387	0.432	0.388	0.432	0.362
Administrative, Support Services	0.169	0.160	0.501	0.463	0.345	0.441	0.357	0.430	0.341
Manufacturing	0.310	0.408	-0.085	0.481	0.370	0.440	0.393	0.417	0.399
Finance and Insurance	0.366	0.401	0.343	0.417	0.456	0.409	0.451	0.415	0.432
Health Care, Social Assistance	0.368	0.286	0.977	0.514	0.330	0.501	0.331	0.489	0.326

$\sum_{i=1}^{19} (Prob(\text{Entering Industry } i) \times \text{Political Identity of Industry } i)$ reveals that:

White women enter industries that are:

46.6% Democrat and 38.4% Republican (using columns 2 and 4–5)

44.0% Democrat and 39.6% Republican (using columns 2 and 6–7)

43.0% Democrat and 38.8% Republican (using columns 2 and 8–9)

Black women enter occupations that are:

47.5% Democrat and 36.4% Republican (using columns 3 and 4–5)

45.5% Democrat and 37.1% Republican (using columns 3 and 6–7)

44.7% Democrat and 36.0% Republican (using columns 3 and 8–9)

Relative to Black women, White women enter occupations where coworkers are:

5.4% more Republican and 2.0% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 4–5)

6.5% more Republican and 3.3% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 6–7)

7.6% more Republican and 3.9% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 8–9)

Notes: 1976–2020 November CPS data used for columns 1–3. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. 1975–2014 GSS data used for columns 4–9. Standard errors suppressed for space but shown in Figures A.13 and A.14. Columns 1–3 are in percentage points and are estimates of *MaxEITC* in equation (2).

Table A.24: Occ. of Newly Working Women (CPS Data), Political Identity by Occ. (GSS Data)

Description: Data:	Prob(Entering Occ.)			Workers' Political Identity by Occ.					
	CPS Data			GSS Data (Alt. Sample Years Below)					
	Sample of Women			1975–2013		1990–2013		2000–2013	
Occupation	All	White	Black	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Education & Training	-0.065	-0.038	-0.011	0.540	0.383	0.543	0.373	0.572	0.328
Arts, Design, Entertainment	-0.026	-0.029	-0.030	0.493	0.389	0.482	0.394	0.476	0.390
Protective Service	0.003	-0.004	0.001	0.536	0.290	0.515	0.291	0.504	0.294
Food Preparation & Serving	0.004	0.006	0.012	0.439	0.429	0.387	0.479	0.356	0.490
Transportation & Moving	0.005	0.050	-0.035	0.534	0.297	0.484	0.317	0.434	0.327
Installation & Repair	0.007	0.011	-0.013	0.484	0.329	0.426	0.346	0.406	0.321
Legal	0.008	0.010	0.007	0.541	0.336	0.535	0.341	0.525	0.334
Farming, Fishing, Forestry	0.019	0.013	0.060	0.464	0.384	0.449	0.382	0.455	0.356
Community & Social Service	0.021	0.015	0.015	0.520	0.350	0.542	0.324	0.537	0.310
Life, Physical Sciences	0.025	0.033	-0.005	0.358	0.506	0.327	0.529	0.307	0.546
Armed Forces	0.029	0.023	0.034	0.496	0.311	0.449	0.330	0.426	0.320
Architecture & Engineering	0.031	0.037	-0.002	0.405	0.464	0.393	0.472	0.382	0.472
Production	0.035	0.035	-0.021	0.482	0.342	0.428	0.366	0.422	0.351
Management	0.046	0.051	0.045	0.380	0.516	0.372	0.521	0.380	0.514
Personal Care & Service	0.053	-0.027	0.343	0.563	0.246	0.496	0.260	0.476	0.243
Computer & Math	0.061	0.065	0.068	0.417	0.476	0.400	0.481	0.402	0.456
Sales & Related	0.124	0.098	0.077	0.483	0.323	0.454	0.334	0.428	0.321
Healthcare Support	0.149	0.095	0.393	0.455	0.423	0.456	0.412	0.464	0.396
Healthcare Practitioners	0.151	0.115	0.325	0.501	0.354	0.503	0.362	0.500	0.373
Business & Finance	0.153	0.190	-0.022	0.431	0.450	0.434	0.443	0.445	0.421
Building & Maintenance	0.180	0.198	0.289	0.510	0.277	0.478	0.274	0.452	0.276
Office & Admin Support	0.260	0.274	0.150	0.425	0.427	0.403	0.434	0.396	0.420
Construction & Extraction	0.551	0.629	0.132	0.479	0.385	0.459	0.392	0.449	0.382

$\sum_{i=1}^{23} (Prob(\text{Entering Occupation } i) \times \text{Political Identity of Occupation } i)$ reveals that:

White women enter occupations that are:

46.4% Democrat and 38.9% Republican (using columns 2 and 4–5)

44.6% Democrat and 39.4% Republican (using columns 2 and 6–7)

43.7% Democrat and 38.4% Republican (using columns 2 and 8–9)

Black women enter occupations that are:

48.9% Democrat and 35.2% Republican (using columns 3 and 4–5)

46.7% Democrat and 35.6% Republican (using columns 3 and 6–7)

45.8% Democrat and 34.8% Republican (using columns 3 and 8–9)

Relative to Black women, White women enter occupations where coworkers are:

10.5% more Republican and 5.1% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 4–5)

10.7% more Republican and 4.5% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 6–7)

10.3% more Republican and 4.6% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 8–9)

Notes: 1976–2020 November CPS data used for columns 1–3. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. 1975–2014 GSS data used for columns 4–9. Standard errors suppressed for space but shown in Figures 12 and 13. Columns 1–3 are in percentage points and are estimates of *MaxEITC* in equation (2).




Fig. A.1. **Number of Annual Roper Datasets and Observations**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1980–2017 Roper data. Sample includes all women 18–59 years old. Many Roper datasets do not have survey weights and may not be nationally representative.






Fig. A.2. Unadjusted Female Voting Trends by State and Year

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.



Panel A: Unadjusted Trends



Panel B: Unadjusted and Regression-Adjusted Trends, Relative to 1990

Fig. A.3. Unadjusted and Adjusted Voting Trends by Number of Kids (CPS Data)

Notes: See notes in Figure 2. Panel B normalizes the gap to 1990 levels, and shows unadjusted and regression-adjusted annual trends with the full set of controls. Since presidential and midterm elections are combined, this figure is jumpier than Figure 2.



Fig. A.4. Voting Trends by Number of Children

Notes: Author's calculation from 1980–2020 November CPS data.






Fig. A.5. State EITC Rates (as a Fraction of Federal Benefits) Over Time


Notes: Source: [Bastian and Lochner \(2022\)](#).




(a) Age




(b) White




(c) Non-White




(d) <12 Years Education




(e) 12-15 Years Education



(f) 16+ Years Education



(g) Married



(h) Unmarried

Fig. A.6. Trends in Demographic Traits by Number of Children.

Notes: Each panel shows trends in demographic characteristics by number of children using CPS data. Values are sample means by year for women ages 18–59 by number of children.






Fig. A.7. **Effects from the 2009 Federal EITC Expansion, on Moms with 3+ Kids**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1998–2020 November CPS data. Unadjusted trends shown. Voting gap between groups is normalized to 2008 levels.



Panel A: Unadjusted Voting Trends vs. Women without Kids, Among EITC States Only



Panel B: Unadjusted Voting Trends vs. Women without Kids, Stacking Each EITC State with All Non-EITC States

Fig. A.8. State EITC Expansions and Unadjusted Event Time Voting Trends by Number of Kids

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data. Full set of controls used, listed in Figure 9 notes. Panel B normalizes the gap in panel A to event time -2 levels. Post years begin in event time 0. CPS voting data is only available every two years. For expansions during odd years, I normalize to year $t-1$. While this figure could be normalized to year $t=0$ for each state, this results in different states represented in even and odd years, yielding similar but noisier figures.





Fig. A.9. Political Identity by Weekly Work Hours (GSS Data)

Notes: Author's calculation from 1984–2014 GSS data. See notes to Table 4.




Fig. A.10. **Fraction of Women Voting by Weekly Work Hours (CPS Data)**

Notes: Author’s calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. Sample described in Table 1 notes. Women without kids do not face the same working-and-voting constraints as mothers (panel C).




Fig. A.11. Effects of EITC on Political Party Affiliation

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Panels B and D replicate Table 4.




Fig. A.12. Religious

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Figure A.12 looks at four measures of religiosity: religious attendance, religious fundamentalism, whether one believes in a God, how often one prays, and whether society relies too much on science and not enough on faith. Panels A and B show that each \$1,000 in *MaxEITC* decreases never/rarely attending church, increases sometimes attending church, and has no effect on weekly attendance. Panel C shows suggestive evidence of being less religiously liberal, and more religiously moderate. Panel D shows little effect on believing in a God. Panel E suggests some decrease in how often one prays. Panel F shows little effect on whether society relies too much on science and not enough on faith.




Fig. A.13. Newly Working Black and White Women Enter Different Industries

Notes: 1980–2020 CPS ASEC data. See notes in Figure 9 for sample and list of full set of controls.




Fig. A.14. Newly Working White Women Enter More-Republican Industries

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Sample includes all adults (men and women) to calculate average partisanship by industry.

Appendix B: Exploring the Correlation Between Working and Voting

Between 1980 and 2020, the percentage of women voting in presidential elections rose 20 percentage points, from about 60% to 80%, while the percentage working increased 15 points, from about 45% to 60% (Figure B.1). This figure also shows trends for women who worked and voted, worked but did not vote, did not work but voted, and neither worked nor voted. The largest increase was among the working-and-voting group, rising from about 30% to 50%, while the working-and-not-voting group remained steady at about 30%. Women who either voted without working or neither worked nor voted declined from about 20% to 10%.

Figure A.10 panel A shows that voting rates are lowest for non-working women (58%), highest for those working fewer than 20 hours per week (62%), and slightly lower for women working over 50 hours per week (60%). Overall, working women vote more than non-working women, but conditional on working, those who work more hours vote less. This pattern is consistent for mothers, unmarried women, and all education levels (panels B, D, E, and F). The negative relationship between work hours and voting is strongest for mothers (panel B). Notably, voting rates for women without kids (panel C) do not vary by work hours, suggesting that working mothers may face greater constraints in balancing work and voting.

Do these patterns reflect the effect of working or differences in group composition? Table B.1 compares the unadjusted and demographics-adjusted association between working and voting. Columns 1–2 show the bivariate association is positive (evident in Figure A.10), but negative when adjusting for demographics.² These correlations suggest that group composition explains why workers vote more than non-workers.

State-Level Changes in Working and Voting: I now examine whether state-level associations between working and voting corroborate the individual-level associations discussed above. Figure B.3 compares 1976–1988 and 2000–2020 state-level changes in working, voting, and political identity. Bivariate regressions suggest that each percentage-point increase in female employment is associated with a 0.4 percentage-point decline in voting (panel A) and a 0.9 percentage-point increase in identifying as a Republican.³ While descriptive, these trends may foreshadow the causal effect of working on voting and political identity.

²The working-voting relationship has evolved over time with the composition of female workers. Figure B.2 shows that the association between working and voting has become more positive over time (both the unadjusted and demographics-adjusted association). Working women were 1.5 percentage points less likely to vote in the 1970s, and this association has increased by 0.2–0.6 percentage points per decade. Columns 3–14 in Table B.1 show a similar positive-then-negative pattern among married, unmarried, higher- and lower-education women, and non-mothers. Notably, the pattern for mothers and lower-education women is negative and stable, with and without controls, suggesting that children and education are important reasons that the unadjusted and demographics-adjusted working-voting association is opposite signed.

³I weight by the 1980 state female population; unweighted estimates are similar: -0.7 (0.3) and 0.9 (0.7).




Fig. B.1. Unadjusted Trends in Female Working and/or Voting, Over Time

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. This figure focuses on voting in presidential elections.




Fig. B.2. Correlation Between Female Working and Voting, Over Time

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. Regression adjusted trend uses demographics controls in Table A.3 columns 1–2.





Fig. B.3. State Changes in Female Employment, Voting, GOP (CPS & GSS Data)

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data (panel A) and 1975–2014 GSS data (panel B). I compare state averages in 1976–1988 with years after 2000. Since GSS sample is small, both panels use CPS estimates of change in female working and weights. Figure weights by the 1980 state female population. Unweighted estimates are similar: -0.7 (0.3) and 0.9 (0.7). Circle sizes reflect 1980 state female population. These bivariate regressions are descriptive and not causal.

Table B.1: Exploring the Working-Voting Correlation, with and without Demographic Controls (CPS Data)

Sample of Women	All		Mothers		Non-Mothers		Married		Unmarried		≤12 Yrs Ed		≥13 Yrs Ed	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Weekly Work Hours (10 Hour Units)	0.48 (0.16)	-0.97 (0.15)	-0.55 (0.21)	-0.41 (0.16)	1.46 (0.20)	-1.00 (0.22)	0.34 (0.17)	-0.39 (0.17)	1.21 (0.36)	-0.95 (0.33)	-0.39 (0.19)	-1.36 (0.19)	0.20 (0.22)	-0.25 (0.19)
R-squared	0.000	0.182	0.000	0.202	0.000	0.171	0.000	0.176	0.000	0.168	0.000	0.145	0.000	0.125
Observations	493,048		231,437		261,611		302,051		190,997		332,802		160,246	

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. Controls include demographic controls from Table A.3 column 2.

Appendix C: Instrumental Variable Approach with Working As the Channel Driving Changes in Voting and Identity

C.1. Impact of Working on Voting

So far, OLS results show EITC expansions and welfare reform increased work and reduced voting, consistent with the employment and voting trends in Figures 6 and 2. While suggestive, I now investigate this causal relationship with an IV approach. I instrument for working in three ways: with *MaxEITC*, the EITC’s phase-in rate, and welfare reform.

While the OLS approach above could reflect effects from both employment and income (e.g., EITC benefits for already-working women), an IV approach focuses on newly working women. However, it could still reflect increased employment and income for those on the margin of working, complicating the interpretation that employment is the primary channel. However, prior research shows these pro-work policies lead to increases in earnings that are largely offset by decreases in public assistance.⁴ Moreover, Figure 8 shows that voting and income are uncorrelated below \$150,000. Since EITC recipients typically earn below \$50,000, the IV approach should primarily reflect changes in employment rather than income. To be clear, the sample does not restrict by income.

Table C.1 uses the full set of controls and shows that working reduces voting for the marginal worker by 1.0–1.4 percentage points. I present nine results based on combinations of the three IVs and the three employment measures from Tables 1–3. The first-stage estimates align with the work estimates in these tables, with Wald F-statistics ranging from 12.1 to 24.0 for the EITC IVs and a weaker 3.6 to 6.8 for the welfare-waiver IV. These first-stages are weaker than many econometricians recommend (Lee et al., 2022). Various IV approaches indicate that working is the mechanism through which voting behavior is affected.

C.2. Impact of Working on Political Identity

Using GSS and Roper data, I follow the IV approach discussed in section C.1 to estimate the impact of working on political identity for women on the margin of working, instrumenting with *MaxEITC* and using the full set of controls. Panel A in Table C.2 shows

⁴Bollinger et al. (2009) finds that increased earnings from EITC expansions and welfare reform were more than offset by decreased transfers. Hoynes and Patel (2018) and Bastian and Jones (2021) find that each \$1 in EITC-led earnings is offset by about \$0.50 of decreased transfers. These results do not simply reflect 1990s welfare reform as effects hold for state EITC expansions too (see Table A.1 in Bastian and Jones (2021)).

that the first stage estimate is 0.012 (0.004), with a first stage F-statistic of 12.3. Working decreases identifying as a Democrat and a liberal (-1.4 and -1.0 percentage points); and increases identifying as a Republican, Independent, conservative, and moderate (0.9, 0.5, 0.5, and 0.2 percentage points). Roper data in Table 5 panels E and F yield broadly similar effects: working decreases identifying as Democrat, Independent, and liberal (-0.4, -0.4, and -0.7 percentage points); increases identifying as a Republican and moderate (0.9 and 1.0 percentage points); and has an insignificant effect on being conservative (-0.1 percentage points). Various IV approaches suggest working is the mechanism affecting political identity.

C.3. White Women Show Larger Conservative Shift

I now use an IV approach with GSS and Roper data to estimate the causal effect of working on the political identity of White and non-White women on the margin of working.⁵

For White women, Table C.2 panel B uses GSS data and shows working reduces voting, and identifying as Democrat and liberal (-1.1, -1.7, and -1.1 percentage points), while increasing identifying as Republican, Independent, conservative, and moderate (1.1, 0.5, 0.6, and 0.2 percentage points). I find similar effects using Roper data and two sets of controls: Table 5 panels E and F shows that working reduces identifying as Democrat and liberal (by 0.53–0.63 and 0.78–1.77 percentage points), increases Republican and moderate (0.96–1.45 and 0.63–1.06 percentage points), and has largely insignificant effects on Independent and conservative (-0.18 to -0.43 and -0.13 to 0.03 percentage points).

In contrast, I find smaller, largely insignificant effects on non-White women. Using GSS data, Table C.2 panel C shows that the IV estimate for voting is actually positive (1.1 percentage points), while estimates on Democrat, Republican, liberal, and conservative are negative (-0.07, -0.52, -0.55, and -0.29 percentage points), and estimates on Independent and moderate are positive (0.69 and 0.80 percentage points). Using Roper data, Table 5 panels G and H show insignificant effects on Democrat (-0.10 to -0.15 pp), Independent (-0.18 to -0.45 pp), Republican (0.28 to 0.60 pp), and conservative (-0.08 to 0.03), and marginally significant effects on liberal (-0.54 to -1.50 pp) and moderate (0.63 to 1.94).

Table C.2 columns 8–9 use an IV approach to examine how working affects social and political views. Employment increases White women’s conservatism on government policy and race (0.015 and 0.021 standard deviations), with small insignificant effects for Black women (0.006 and 0.007 standard deviations). OLS and IV approaches consistently show

⁵Table C.2 Panel C focuses on Black women, as including non-White-Non-Black women yields a noisier first stage. The first-stage point estimates are similar for both groups, but sample sizes and first-stage F-statistics are smaller for Black vs. White women (3,266 vs. 14,884 and 1.9 vs. 10.7).

that working has a significant impact on White women's political identity.

Table C.1: Using Labor Supply as an Instrument for Voting (CPS Data)

Instrument:	<i>MaxEITC</i>			EITC's Phase-In Rate			Welfare Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Employed	-1.29 (0.33)			-1.33 (0.42)			-1.39 (1.14)		
LFP		-1.21 (0.31)			-1.28 (0.41)			-1.04 (0.68)	
Pos. Earnings			-1.08 (0.29)			-1.02 (0.28)			-1.30 (0.92)
Full controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	411,241			411,241			279,898		
Kleibergen-Paap rk									
LM statistic	16.5	10.2	12.0	8.0	8.4	11.0	2.7	2.8	1.7
Kleibergen-Paap rk									
Wald F-statistic	18.4	17.9	24.0	12.8	12.1	21.7	4.2	6.8	3.6
First-Stage Estimate	0.34 (0.08)	0.36 (0.09)	0.40 (0.09)	0.48 (0.13)	0.50 (0.14)	0.62 (0.13)	1.15 (0.59)	1.44 (0.74)	1.07 (0.75)

Notes: Sample for columns 1–6 described in Table 1; sample for columns 7–9 described in Table 3. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Phase-in rate in 10 percentage point units, and equal to federal plus state rate. *MaxEITC* is highly correlated with the EITC's phase-in rate. Full set of controls used, listed in Figure 9 notes. Welfare waivers are described in Appendix D.

Table C.2: Voting & Political Identity: *MaxEITC* as IV for Employment (CPS & GSS Data)

Data:	CPS		GSS						
Outcome:	Voting	Democrat	Indep	Repub- lican	Liberal	Moderate	Conser- vative	Gov. Policy	Race
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: All Women									
Employed	-1.29 (0.33)	-1.44 (0.53)	0.50 (0.25)	0.89 (0.40)	-0.97 (0.36)	0.19 (0.29)	0.48 (0.44)	1.67 (0.93)	2.16 (1.44)
Observations	411,241	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	14,242	16,909
Mean Dep Var	60.1	0.49	0.17	0.33	0.25	0.36	0.27	-0.055	-0.027
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 8.6 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic = 12.3 First-Stage Estimate of Employed on <i>MaxEITC</i> = 0.012 (0.003)									
Panel B: White Women									
Employed	-1.12 (0.27)	-1.65 (0.55)	0.49 (0.26)	1.11 (0.48)	-1.08 (0.41)	0.21 (0.33)	0.55 (0.49)	1.45 (0.82)	2.11 (1.37)
Observations	345,202	14,884	14,884	14,884	14,884	14,884	14,884	11,060	13,128
Mean Dep Var	60.4	0.43	0.17	0.40	0.24	0.36	0.29	0.048	0.083
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 7.4 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic = 10.7 First-Stage Estimate of Employed on <i>MaxEITC</i> = 0.013 (0.004)									
Panel C: Black Women									
Employed	1.21 (2.20)	-0.07 (0.75)	0.69 (0.84)	-0.52 (0.75)	-0.55 (1.04)	0.80 (1.16)	-0.29 (0.78)	0.57 (1.61)	0.74 (1.56)
Observations	47,711	3,266	3,266	3,266	3,266	3,266	3,266	2,382	2,801
Mean Dep Var	60.9	0.77	0.13	0.083	0.30	0.35	0.21	-0.50	-0.53
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 1.8 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic = 1.9 First-Stage Estimate of Employed on <i>MaxEITC</i> = 0.011 (0.008)									

Notes: MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Figure 9 notes. The first stage estimate and statistics refer to columns 2–7 using GSS data. The first and second stage estimates in panel A column 1 is identical to column 1 in Table C.1. The point estimates for the first stage in column 1 in panels B and C are similar to that in panel A, but noisier and with smaller Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics (especially panel C). In columns 2–9, N=1,169 for non-White-non-Black women and the estimated impact on this group is noisy and insignificant, so I do not show these results. Combining these non-White-non-Black women with Black women results in noisier results than Black women alone.

Table C.3: EITC and Political Identity (Roper Data)

Outcome:	Political Party Affiliation				Political Ideology		
	Working (1)	Democrat (2)	Independent (3)	Republican (4)	Liberal (5)	Moderate (6)	Conservative (7)
Panel A: Average Effect of MaxEITC, IV, No Controls							
Working	–	-0.45 (0.18)	-0.39 (0.19)	0.84 (0.20)	-0.72 (0.27)	0.95 (0.30)	-0.09 (0.16)
Panel B: Average Effect of MaxEITC, IV, Demographic Controls							
Working	–	-0.39 (0.19)	-0.57 (0.22)	0.96 (0.23)	-0.75 (0.25)	1.04 (0.29)	-0.15 (0.15)
Panel C: Effect of MaxEITC by Race, IV, No Controls							
Working	–	-0.63 (0.30)	-0.81 (0.34)	1.45 (0.37)	-1.77 (1.00)	2.44 (1.24)	-0.30 (0.43)
Working × White	–	-0.15 (0.29)	-0.45 (0.33)	0.60 (0.36)	-1.50 (0.94)	1.94 (1.16)	-0.08 (0.41)
Panel D: Effect of MaxEITC by Race, IV, Demographic Controls							
Working	–	-0.53 (0.18)	-0.43 (0.20)	0.96 (0.20)	-0.78 (0.28)	1.06 (0.32)	-0.13 (0.16)
Working × White	–	-0.10 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.17)	0.28 (0.18)	-0.54 (0.24)	0.63 (0.27)	0.03 (0.14)
Working × Non-White	–						
Observations	276,257	276,257	276,257	276,257	245,462	245,462	245,462
Mean Dep Var	68.3	31.3	34.2	34.5	21.2	41.5	37.1

Notes: While Figure 4 uses 775 datasets from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research (Roper data) spanning 1980 to 2020, I restrict to the 546 datasets that have consistent outcome and demographic variables (marital status is the most commonly missing variable). Liberal, moderate, and conservative outcomes are available in 524 datasets. Since state is often missing in Roper data, I define *MaxEITC* based on the federal EITC only. Since number of kids is only available in about a third of Roper datasets, I assign *MaxEITC* values to all mothers based on having two kids. Many Roper datasets do not have survey weights and may not be nationally representative.

Appendix D: Welfare Reform

Up through the late 1980s, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits were available to low-income families with children. Benefits varied by state and number of children, and phased-out with earned income. While benefits varied by household size and number of children, the majority of the variation in welfare benefits can be explained by differences by state (65 percent) rather than differences by number of children (20 percent).⁶ Most AFDC recipients were unmarried mothers with children. Benefits were paid out every month and there was no time limit on how long households could receive AFDC benefits.

Starting in 1992, states began to implement welfare waivers and limit access to welfare benefits. There were six types of waivers: (1) Time limits on how long families could receive welfare benefits, ranging from 24 to 60 months. (2) Work requirements that went into effect after recipients had received welfare for a specified length of time. (3) Requirements that individuals participate in education, training, and job search activities after recipients had received welfare for a specified length of time. (4) Allowing families with young children (e.g. under age three) to be exempted from waivers #2 and #3; (5) Capping welfare benefits at a certain number of children. (6) Increasing the earnings disregard, in an attempt to reduce the labor supply disincentive. See Table C.2 for details on when states approved and implemented each type of waiver.⁷

In August 1996, AFDC was completely overhauled through Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and was renamed Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). This reform included the six waivers discussed above. Under TANF, states had to follow some federal guidelines, but still had the ability to design their own TANF program. For example, benefit generosity had no limit, but time limits could be no more than 60 months.

Figure D.1 Panels A-D show trends in welfare generosity and caseloads between 1980 and 2018. Panel A shows trends in the state monthly welfare benefits for a family of four. States have steadily decreased welfare generosity over time. The average maximum in state welfare benefits fell from \$960 in 1980, to \$780 in 1990, to \$660 in 2000, to \$570 in 2010, to \$540 in 2018. The figure also shows trends for the most and least generous states, as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles. Benefits in the most generous state fell from about \$1,660 to \$1,060, and from about \$330 to \$190 in the least generous state. Panel B shows trends in the fraction of a state's population receiving welfare benefits. The average fraction fell from 4.2% in 1980, to 4.0% in 1990, to 1.9% in 2000, to 1.2% in 2010, to 0.6% in 2018. In the

⁶Estimates come from the R-squared from regressing maximum welfare benefits on state FE or number of kids FE, using the main sample.

⁷Source for Table C.2: Health and Human Services (1999). <https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/state-implementation-major-changes-welfare-policies-1992-1998>.

states with the highest and lowest fraction receiving welfare, the fraction fell from 13.3% to 2.0% and 2.1% to 0.1%, respectively. Panels C and D show similar trends for the absolute number of welfare recipients. Overall, welfare benefit generosity has steadily decreased over time, while caseloads also steadily decreased over time, except for a sharp and temporary increase in the early 1990s.




Fig. D.1. Trends in State Welfare Benefits and Welfare Recipients

Notes: 1980–2018 welfare data from University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research: <http://ukcpr.org/resources/national-welfare-data>.

Table D.1a: Approval and Implementation Dates of AFDC Waivers Policies, 1992-1996

State	Termination/reduction time limit		Changes in JOBS work exemptions		JOBS sanctions	
	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented
Alabama						
Alaska						
Arizona	5/22/95	11/1/95			5/22/95	11/1/95
Arkansas						
California						
Colorado						
Connecticut	12/8/95	1/1/96	8/29/94	1/1/96	8/29/94	1/1/96
Delaware	5/8/95		5/8/95		5/8/95	
Dist. of Columbia						
Florida			6/26/96			
Georgia					11/1/93	1/1/94
Hawaii	8/16/1996	2/1/1997	6/24/94	2/1/97		
Idaho			8/19/96		8/19/96	
Illinois		2/1/96	9/30/95		9/30/95	10/1/95
Indiana	12/15/94		12/15/94	5/1/95	12/15/94	5/1/95
Iowa	8/13/93	10/1/93	8/13/93	10/1/93	8/13/93	10/1/93
Kansas						
Kentucky						
Louisiana						
Maine			6/10/96			
Maryland			8/16/96	10/1/96	8/16/96	10/1/96
Massachusetts			8/4/95	11/1/95	8/4/95	11/1/95
Michigan			10/6/94	10/6/94	10/6/94	10/6/94
Minnesota						
Mississippi						
Missouri					4/18/95	6/1/95
Montana			4/18/95		4/18/95	
Nebraska	2/27/95		2/27/95		2/27/95	
Nevada						
New Hampshire			6/18/96		6/18/96	
New Jersey			7/1/92	10/1/92	7/1/92	10/1/92
New Mexico						
New York						
North Carolina	2/5/96	7/1/96	2/5/96	7/1/96	2/5/96	7/1/96
North Dakota						
Ohio	3/13/96				3/13/96	7/1/96
Oklahoma						
Oregon	3/28/96	7/1/96	7/15/92	2/1/93	3/28/96	7/1/96
Pennsylvania						
Rhode Island						
South Carolina	5/3/96		5/3/96		5/3/96	
South Dakota					3/14/94	6/1/94
Tennessee	7/25/96		7/25/96	9/1/96	7/25/96	9/1/96
Texas	3/22/96		3/22/96	6/1/96	3/22/96	6/1/96
Utah			10/5/92	1/1/93	10/5/92	6/1/96
Vermont			4/12/93	7/1/94	4/12/93	7/1/94
Virginia	7/1/95		7/1/95		7/1/95	
Washington	9/29/95	1/1/96				
West Virginia					7/31/95	2/1/96
Wisconsin			8/14/95	1/1/96	8/14/95	1/1/96
Wyoming			51			

Table D.1b: Approval and Implementation Dates of AFDC Waivers Policies, 1992-1996

State	Increased earnings disregard		Family Cap		Work requirement time limit	
	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented
Alabama						
Alaska						
Arizona			5/22/95	11/1/95		
Arkansas			4/5/94	7/1/94		
California	10/29/92	12/1/92	8/19/96	9/1/97	9/11/95	9/11/95
Colorado						
Connecticut	8/29/94	1/1/96	12/18/95	1/1/96		
Delaware	5/8/95		10/1/95		5/8/95	10/1/95
Dist. of Columbia						
Florida			6/26/96			
Georgia	6/24/94		11/1/93	1/1/94		
Hawaii	8/16/1996	2/1/1997				
Idaho						
Illinois	11/23/93	11/23/93	9/30/95	12/1/95		
Indiana			12/15/94	5/1/95		
Iowa	8/13/93	10/1/93				
Kansas						
Kentucky						
Louisiana						
Maine						
Maryland	8/16/96	10/1/96	8/14/95	3/1/96		
Massachusetts	8/4/95	11/1/95	8/4/95	11/1/95	8/4/95	11/1/95
Michigan	8/1/92	10/1/92			8/1/92	
Minnesota						
Mississippi			9/1/95	10/1/95		
Missouri					4/18/95	
Montana	4/18/95				4/18/95	2/1/96
Nebraska	2/27/95		2/27/95	11/1/96		
Nevada						
New Hampshire	6/18/96				6/18/96	
New Jersey	7/1/92		7/1/92	10/1/92		
New Mexico						
New York						
North Carolina			2/5/96	7/1/96		
North Dakota						
Ohio	3/13/96	7/1/96				
Oklahoma						
Oregon						
Pennsylvania						
Rhode Island						
South Carolina			5/3/96			
South Dakota					3/14/94	6/1/94
Tennessee	7/25/96	9/1/96	7/25/96			
Texas						
Utah	10/5/92					
Vermont	4/12/93	7/1/94				
Virginia	7/1/95		7/1/95	7/1/95	7/1/95	7/1/95
Washington						
West Virginia						
Wisconsin			6/24/94	1/1/96	9/30/96	9/30/96
Wyoming			5/2			

Appendix E: Additional Robustness Checks

Voting: Table E.1 shows the impact of *MaxEITC* using different sample periods. Columns 1–5 use 1976–2020 (the full sample), 1976–1992, 1982–1992, 1988–1998, and 2000–2020. While magnitudes differ a bit, results consistently show that EITC expansions over time decrease voting, with effects concentrated among unmarried women.

I also run separate regressions on the samples of married and unmarried women. Columns 1 and 3 use the full set of controls, and columns 2 and 4 use the additional controls used in Table A.3 column 8. Table E.2 shows significant effects of *MaxEITC* on unmarried women (-0.49 and -0.51 percentage points), and largely insignificant effects on married women (-0.19 and -0.08 percentage points).

Table E.3 uses four measures of the EITC: *MaxEITC* defined by federal, state, and federal plus state, as well as the federal plus state EITC phase-in rate. Each measure shows EITC expansions decrease voting (panel A) with effects concentrated among unmarried women (panel B). Logit and probit specifications yield *MaxEITC* estimates similar to OLS (Table E.4). Figure E.1 shows a double residual regression, where two sets of residuals are created for each individual, averaged into centiles, and plotted against each other (Cleveland, 1979). One set of residuals comes from regressing voting on the full set of controls (excluding *MaxEITC*); and the other comes from regressing *MaxEITC* on the full set of controls. This locally weighted non-parametric regression down-weights observations with larger residuals. Panel A shows relatively linear effects of *MaxEITC* on voting, except for the endpoints, which are often noisy with this approach.

I also estimate a version of equation (2) that interacts *MaxEITC* with indicators for all 50 states and D.C. Figure E.2 illustrates the distribution of *MaxEITC* estimates from this regression, with a mean of -0.5 and 25th and 75th percentiles of -0.9 and -0.1.

Political Identity: Table E.5 demonstrates that logit and probit specifications yield estimates similar to OLS. Figure E.1 panels B–D present double residual regressions, with locally weighted regressions indicating quite linear effects of *MaxEITC* on identifying as a Democrat, Republican, or liberal.

Table E.1: EITC and Voting: Alternate Sample Years (CPS Data)

Sample Years	1976–2020 (1)	1976–1992 (2)	1982–1992 (3)	1988–1998 (4)	2000–2020 (5)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting					
MaxEITC	-0.51 (0.10)	-1.27 (0.44)	-1.16 (0.47)	-0.40 (0.19)	-0.52 (0.41)
R-squared	0.180	0.174	0.176	0.176	0.187
Observations	780,035	354,509	234,503	211,378	327,689
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status					
MaxEITC × Married	0.07 (0.09)	0.64 (0.53)	0.65 (0.48)	0.18 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.42)
MaxEITC × Unmarried	-1.45 (0.13)	-4.14 (0.51)	-3.78 (0.54)	-1.59 (0.26)	-1.36 (0.43)
R-squared	0.181	0.176	0.178	0.177	0.188
Observations	780,035	354,509	234,503	211,378	327,689

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Figure 9 notes.

Table E.2: Restricting Sample by Marital Status (CPS Data)

Sample:	Unmarried Women		Married Women	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MaxEITC	-0.51 (0.18)	-0.49 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.12)
R-squared	0.163	0.173	0.179	0.187
Observations	307,445	307,445	472,590	472,590
<i>Controls</i>				
Full Controls	X	X	X	X
State × Year FE		X		X
State × #Kids FE		X		X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Controls in columns 1 and 3 correspond to controls in Table A.3 column 5; controls in columns 2 and 4 correspond to controls in Table A.3 column 8.

Table E.3: EITC and Voting: Alternate EITC Measures (CPS Data)

	Total MaxEITC (1)	Federal MaxEITC (2)	State MaxEITC (3)	EITC Phase- In Rate (4)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting				
EITC	-0.50 (0.10)	-0.55 (0.13)	-0.89 (0.42)	-0.84 (0.21)
R-squared	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status				
EITC × Married	0.08 (0.09)	0.11 (0.13)	0.43 (0.38)	0.27 (0.21)
EITC × Unmarried	-1.45 (0.13)	-1.56 (0.15)	-3.99 (0.67)	-2.19 (0.24)
R-squared	0.181	0.181	0.181	0.181
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Phase-in rate units are 10 percentage points. Full set of controls used, listed in Figure 9 notes.

Table E.4: EITC and Voting: Alternate Specifications (CPS Data)

Specification	OLS		Logit		Probit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	-0.51 (0.10)		-0.60 (0.10)		-0.57 (0.10)	
MaxEITC × Married		0.07 (0.09)		0.00 (0.09)		0.02 (0.09)
MaxEITC × Unmarried		-1.45 (0.13)		-1.46 (0.13)		-1.43 (0.13)
R-squared	0.180	0.181				
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Figure 9 notes.

Table E.5: EITC and Political Identity: Alt. Specifications (GSS Data)

Specification	Democrat		Republican		Liberal		Conservative	
	Logit (1)	Probit (2)	Logit (3)	Probit (4)	Logit (5)	Probit (6)	Logit (7)	Probit (8)
MaxEITC	-1.61 (0.34)	-1.58 (0.34)	0.95 (0.32)	0.95 (0.31)	-1.31 (0.36)	-1.32 (0.35)	0.66 (0.53)	0.66 (0.52)
Observations	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317

Notes: See notes to Table 4.




Fig. E.1. Double Residual Regression: Locally Linear Regression

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data and 1975–2014 GSS data. Panel A uses CPS data and panels B–D use GSS data. A bandwidth of 0.8 is used, as is running-line least squares smoothing, and a tricube weighting function. I do not show conservative for space reasons: conservative as an outcome yields a relatively flat negative pattern.




Fig. E.2. State-Specific Estimates of *MaxEITC*

Notes: Author's calculation from 1998–2020 November CPS data. Estimates come from a single regression that interacts *MaxEITC* with indicators for all 51 states and D.C.