The Latest NBER Working Papers http://www.nber.org/new.html Real estate has long been central to China’s growth model, yet since 2018 its contribution has declined sharply, turning the sector from a key engine of expansion into a major drag on economic activity. While policy tightening might have triggered the downturn, it reflects deeper structural imbalances in a sector that, together with its upstream and downstream linkages and infrastructure, accounts for nearly one-third of aggregate demand. With housing comprising nearly 70 percent of household wealth, the ongoing price correction has generated sizable negative wealth effects, amplifying the contraction through depressed consumption, investment, and sentiment. We document the macroeconomic propagation of China’s real estate downturn and assess the risks of prolonged stagnation should the sector continue to deteriorate. To provide perspective, we compare China’s experience with Japan’s real estate collapse in the 1990s, uncovering striking parallels in investment dynamics and consumption responses despite profound institutional differences. Our findings highlight the importance of real-side channels, including alternative amplification mechanisms (in addition to banking), in generating persistent output losses following real estate busts. https://www.nber.org/papers/w35054#fromrss https://www.nber.org/papers/w35054#fromrss We argue that severe credit crunches in the banking system contributed to the Great Stagflation of the 1970s. The credit crunches were due to Regulation Q, a banking law that capped deposit rates. Under Reg Q, Fed tightening triggered large deposit outflows that led banks to contract lending. The credit crunches line up closely with stagflation in the time series. To explain this, we add Reg Q to a standard model where firms use bank loans to finance working capital. When Reg Q binds and credit contracts, working capital becomes more expensive, leading firms to raise prices and shrink output. The model implies an augmented Phillips curve where monetary tightening reduces aggregate supply in addition to demand. The impact on supply is increasing in the severity of the credit crunches, firms' external finance dependence, and their working capital intensity. We test all three predictions in the cross section of manufacturing industries. In each case, we find that more exposed industries raise prices and cut output relative to others. Our results imply that under severe financial frictions monetary policy affects aggregate supply and not just demand. https://www.nber.org/papers/w35057#fromrss https://www.nber.org/papers/w35057#fromrss Bank regulation supports financial stability, but might constrain economic activity. This paper estimates the macroeconomic effects of bank regulation using a high-frequency identification approach. We measure market surprises in a bank stock price index during a narrow time window around Federal Reserve speeches that discuss the US banking system and its regulation. We then develop a sign restriction procedure to elicit the variation in these market surprises that can be interpreted as news about bank regulation. News that bank regulation will be tighter than expected mitigates risk in the banking sector, but reduces economic activity by increasing banks' funding costs and tightening loan supply. A 10 basis point regulation-induced peak reduction in bank risk premiums is accompanied by a 15 basis point peak increase in the unemployment rate. Compared to previous studies, these magnitudes suggest a relatively high macroeconomic cost of tightening bank regulation, at least in the short run. https://www.nber.org/papers/w35071#fromrss https://www.nber.org/papers/w35071#fromrss We elicit reservation wage premia for relocating to two Ukrainian cities, using a household survey conducted in mid-April to mid-July 2024 during the Russian invasion of Ukraine: high-risk Kharkiv (near the frontline) and moderate-risk Kyiv. Risk tolerance is a strong predictor of willingness to move to Kharkiv—the most risk-averse have roughly half the odds of the most risk-tolerant—but matters much less for Kyiv. This asymmetry is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that risk tolerance merely proxies for general mobility preferences. Separately estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS≈0.04), we find that including it renders risk tolerance insignificant for Kyiv but not for Kharkiv—a pattern illuminated by the Epstein-Zin separation of risk aversion and the EIS: risk aversion adds predictive power only when danger is high, while the EIS operates equally for both cities as a common relocation-cost channel. The very low EIS implies that relocation incentives structured as future benefits may be ineffective; front-loaded subsidies are more likely to influence behavior. https://www.nber.org/papers/w35072#fromrss https://www.nber.org/papers/w35072#fromrss