The six principal findings of this paper are as follows: (1) crisis mortality accounted for less than 5 percent of total mortality in England prior to 1800 and the elimination of crisis mortality accounted for just 15 percent of the decline in total mortality between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. (2) The use of variations in wheat prices to measure variations in the food supply has led to gross overestimates of the variability of the food supply. (3) The famines that plagued England between 1500 and 1800 were manmade, the consequence of failures in the system of food distribution related to an extremely inelastic demand for food inventories, rather than to natural calamities or inadequate technology. (4) It was not only within the power of government to eliminate famines but in fact the food distribution policies of James I and Charles I succeeded in reducing the variability of annual wheat prices by over 70 percent. (5) A change in the government policy could not have eliminated chronic malnutrition. Elimination of chronic malnutrition required technological changes that permitted the per capita consumption of food to increase by about 50 percent. (6) Improvements in average nutritional status appear to explain nearly all of the decline in mortality rates in England, France, and Sweden between 1775-1875 but only about half of the mortality decline since 1875.

This paper estimates a cost of living index for 39 states of the United States and the District of Columbia, as well as for 70 individual cities and towns, for the year 1890. It gives an overall index in addition to seven commodity subindices (food, clothing, housing, fuel and lighting, furniture, liquor and tobacco, and other coITllTlCX1ities). The cost of housing is only provided for 21 of the states and 5 of the cities, however. separate overall indices are calculated with and without housing costs. The source is the Aldrich Report for all the prices except housing. Housing costs were derived from the 1889/90 U.S. Commissioner of Labor Survey and from the earlier work of Albert Rees on real wages in American manufacturing. These price indices constitute simple fixed-weight Lespeyres indices and are not "true" constant utility cost of living indices.

We present new evidence to support our earlier finding that there was no appreciable trend in the rate of retirement for American men between 1870 and 1930. The data suggests that Jon Moen's claim that retirement increased appreciably during this period is mistaken. Moen's critique of our earlier paper is also examined point by point. We demonstrate that his doubts about our procedures are unnecessary.

This paper investigates the characteristics of the early settlers on the midwestern farming frontier, the correlates of their geographic mobility, and the determinants of their wealth. Using evidence drawn from the manuscripts of the federal censuses of 1850-1870, we find average rates of growth of wealth over time that were considerably above the national average, a steeper cross-sectional relationship between wealth and age than those found for populations drawn more broadly from throughout the United States at the same time, and a substantial positive effect of early arrival on the frontier on wealth levels. These results suggest that very high levels of economic opportunity may have been a characteristic of the nineteenth-century farming frontier.

This paper examines homeownership and housing demand for a sample of approximately 6,800 urban, industrial workers in the United States for the period 1889/90. Using data from the Sixth and Seventh Annual Reports of the U.S. Commissioner of Labor, housing demand is viewed as a two part process: first, the "tenure choice" decision whether to own or rent; and, second, how much of either type of housing to purchase. Tenure choice and renter demand equations are estimated, using the concept of expected, rather than current income. Data limitations did not permit estimation of owner demand. The results indicate lower homeownership rates among American workers circa 1890 than later and significant effects on ownership of income, age of household head, region, industry, occupation, ethnicity, and family size and? composition. Rental prices and value/rent ratios had effects in the expected directions. Partial and full elasticities calculated for renter demand reveal downward biases if only current income is used to estimate housing demand. The results indicate that modern housing demand theory performs well with historical data.

This paper utilizes household-level budget data from the 1889/90 United States Commissioner of Labor survey to estimate the full Almost Ideal Demand System with demographic and other covariates. Price data were obtained from the Aldrich Report of 1892. The purpose is to make better use of the entire data set by incorporating demographic variation and then to examine whether the consumption patterns of immigrants and the native born were significantly different once the effects of total expenditure, prices, family composition, region of residence, industry, occupation, and age of household head were taken into account. Comparisons of Engel curves are also made to households in Great Britain and Germany. Results from estimation of Engel curves and the full model (with prices) for six commodity categories (food, housing, clothing, fuel and lighting, liquor and tobacco, and "Other" goods and services) revealed that differences across ethnic groups within the United States could be reduced but not eliminated by the effects of the covariates. The foreign born spent relatively more on food and on liquor and tobacco. Although differences by ethnicity existed, both British and German immigrants to the United States were closer in their consumption patterns to workers in the area of destination than in the area of origin. Inclusion of prices did reduce the regional effects (within the United States) found in the Engel curves. Demographic effects were important. Food, housing, and fuel and lighting appeared as necessities, while clothing, liquor and tobacco, and "Other" goods and services were luxuries.

The current view of U.S. economic growth before 1860 is based on the conjectural estimates of output made by Paul David (1967). This paper sets forth new estimates of the farm labor force for the period 1800 to 1860 and uses them to revise those conjectures about growth of per capita output. An additional conjectural estimate is produced based on recent evidence about manufacturing productivity. The new estimates lower the farm labor forces in the years before 1830 by 10 to 15 percent, while raising the figures for 1840, 1850, and 1860 by 5 to 9 percent. As a consequence the farm work force grew more rapidly than was previously believed, and farm productivity grew more slowly. The impact of the revisions varied by subperiod, and is concentrated almost entirely in the middle 20 years. Because the advance in farm productivity was the major determinant of change in the conjectural estimates of per capita output, that series shows a slower rate of growth as well, especially over the period 1820 to 1840. A refined estimate, which incorporates the recent evidence on manufacturing productivity, alters the picture somewhat, but still shows slower growth and more gradual acceleration of output per capita than is revealed in the David series.

This paper depicts and analyzes the wealth distribution and wealth mobility in a national sample of nearly 1,600 households matched in the 1850 and 1860 manuscript schedules of the census. Gini coefficients, a transition matrix, the Shorrocks measure, and a regression model of wealth accumulation are estimated from these data. The findings shed light on theories of the wealth distribution, life-cycle behavior, regional economic performance, and the empirical basis for critiques of capitalism. Blacks accumulated slowly but the foreign born performed remarkably well. The distribution of wealth was relatively unequal on the frontier but the region performed well in reducing propertylessness. Residents of eastern cities were less fluid than other residents of the rural North. Blue collar workers and the unskilled declined relative to farmers and white-collar workers during the decade, which suggests that other aspects of wealth determination may have outweighed stretching of the wage structure as an explanation of growing inequality during industrialization. Comparisons with data on net family assets collected by the National Longitudinal Survey in the 1960s and 1970s show that mid-nineteenth century households were less mobile at the lower end but more mobile at the upper end of the wealth distribution.

There has been considerable interest in recent years in historical experiments with "free banking." This paper examines once again the American experiments in the decades before the Civil War, and the recent literature on them. The lessons of this experience for four issues are considered: (1) the appropriate mechanism for controlling the monetary base, (2) the need for a lender of last resort, (3) the costs and benefits of a bank issued currency, and (4) the potential under a regime of free banking for wildcat banking.

We employ the 1860 Census of Manufactures to study rural antebellum manufacturing in the South and Midwest, and find that manufacturing output per capita was similar across regions in counties specialized in the same agricultural products. The southern deficit in manufactures per capita appears to have been largely attributable to the very low levels of output in counties specialized in cotton production. This implies that it was the South's capabilities for the highly profitable cotton production, not the existence of slavery per se, that was responsible for the region's limited industrial development -- at least in rural areas. The other major finding is that in both the South and the Midwest measured total factor productivity was significantly lower in counties specialized in wheat (the most seasonal of agricultural products as regards labor requirements). This is consistent with suggestions that agricultural districts where the predominant crops were highly seasonal in their requirements for labor were well suited to support manufacturing enterprise during the offpeak periods.

This paper brings together data from a variety of sources to create a portrait of net rates of return to capital in banking in the 1850s. The primary purpose is to provide estimates comparable to those developed by Lance Davis and many subsequent researchers for the post-bellum period. The conclusion that emerges is that the capital market in the developed regions of the U.S. was fairly well integrated in the 1850s, and that part of the wide divergence in rates observed in the 1870s was due to the disruptions caused by the Civil War.

The aim of this paper is to break open the stochastic component of a maj or political change and to show that what seems like the product of purely chance events is the particular conjunction of processes, each of which is definable in a systematic way, that provide collectively a favorable context in which purely chance events operate. It is only in a particular context that the purely chance events became decisive in bringing about a particular political outcome. Section 1 emphasizes that Lincoln's margin of victory in 1860 was so small that anyone of numerous chance events could have resulted in his defeat. Sections 2-4 outline the intergenerational, cohort, and period changes and events that created a context favorable for the political realignment of the l850s. Section 5 describes the key chance events of 1855 -1856, the absence of any of which could have prevented the formation of a major national Republican party in 1856, as well as the chance (or at least exogenous) events of 1857-1859, the absence of which could have led to splits in the Republican party that would have insured the victory of a proslavery candidate for the Presidency in 1860. Section 6 deals with the problems and advantages of turning the theory of the political realignment of the l850s implicit in sections 2-5 into an explicit, testable mathematical model. Section 7 explains why it is impossible to produce a general theory of political realignments that would have significant predictive power.

This paper examines 36.640 labor contracts signed between whalemen and the agents who organized 1,258 whaling voyages that departed from New Bedford, Massachusetts between January I. 1840 and December 31, 1858 and between January I and December 31, 1866. The contracts contain information on the whaleman's station (occupation) and on his lay (the fraction of output of the voyage that he was entitled to receive upon completion). The paper investigates the benefits associated with this unique contract. examines the occupational and spatial distribution of lays. and compares wages in whaling with those available in the merchant marine and those earned in shore based pursuits. It also attempts to assess the efficiency of this early labor market and to explore the relationship between the labor contract, crew quality. technical change. and productivity.

Using data from the 1900, 1910, 1940, and 1950 census public use samples, this paper examines the determinants of racial differences in employment (occupation and industry) in the South during the first half of the twentieth century. Had racial differences in the quantity and quality of schooling been smaller, more blacks would have entered non-farm occupations and industries in the South, thereby reducing the extent of racial segregation in employment and resulting in higher black-to-white earnings ratios. But I also find that black men were underrepresented in the growth of non-farm employment in the South before World War Two and that this increase in employment segregation cannot be explained by racial differences in schooling. Increases in non-farm labor demand caused an outflow of black labor from southern agriculture during the 1940s, and this outflow was associated with a rise in the earnings ratio. Yet despite the effects of the war, employment segregation in the south was higher in 1950 than at the turn of the century.

We know remarkably little about the length of the working day before the 1880s. In this paper, we summarize what is known about the trend in the length of the workday in American manufacturing industry from 1830 to 1890. We than develop estimates of the daily hours of work and form the basis for our on-going research into the performance and operation of the industrial labor market in America in the late nineteenth century. We conclude on the basis of our firm-level sample data that the average workday in American manufacturing industry in 1880 was almost exactly ten hours, placing the attainment of the ten-hour day almost a decade earlier than hitherto supposed. Despite the decline in hours to 1880, however, daily hours of work were still long enough that they would have required the use of artificial light in most factories during the winter. Our statistical analysis also reveals and documents small but statistically variations in hours between firms and industries and between regions and by location.

The modern secular decline in mortality in Western Europe did not begin until the 1780s and the first wave of improvement was over by 1840. The elimination of famines and of crisis mortality played only a secondary role during the first wave of the decline and virtually none thereafter. Reductions in chronic malnutrition Were much more important and may have accounted for most of the improvement in life expectation before 1875. Chronic malnutrition were much more important and may have accounted for most of the improvement in life expectation before 1875. Chronic malnutrition could not have been eliminated merely by more humane national policies, but required major advances in productive technology. Although there Were some improvements in the health, nutritional status, and longevity of the lower classes in England and France between 1830 and the end of the nineteenth century, these advances were modest and unstable, and included some reversals. An even larger reversal occurred among the lower classes in the United States. Although the technological progress, industrialization, and urbanization of the nineteenth century laid the basis for a remarkable advance in health and nutritional status during the first half of the twentieth century their effects on the conditions of life of the lower classes were mixed at least until the 1870s or 1880s. The great gains of the lower classes were concentrated in the sixty-five years between 1890 and 1955. Improvement in nutrition and health may account for as much as 30 percent of the growth in conventionally measured per capita income between 1790 and 1980 in Western Europe, but for a much smaller proportion in the United States.

Around the turn of the century, Southern blacks lost the right to vote and discrimination against them by local government officials intensified. This paper argues that, in the case of the de jure segregated public schools attended by black children, the ability of Southern blacks to ''vote with their feet" placed limits on local government discrimination.

Microeconomic evidence reveals that the incidence and duration of unemployment in the 1930s varied significantly within the labor force. Long-term unemployment, which was especially high by historical standards, may have been exacerbated by federal relief policies.

The purpose of this paper is to survey recent research on wages and prices in the united States before the civil War. The basic conclusion is that, while much progress has been made in documenting regional, temporal and occupational differentials, further insights will require a large amount of new evidence, particularly on retail prices. The paper also uses existing regional data on wholesale prices to construct new regional indices of real wages for artisans and unskilled labor from 1821 to 1856. The new indices suggest that real wage growth was less than previously thought in the 1930s and that growth was, by comparison with later periods in American history, very erratic in the short-run. The erratic nature of real wage growth was a consequence of persistent effects of price and real shocks.

In nineteenth century America, most employment, particularly that in agriculture, was highly seasonal. Thus the movement of labor from outdoor to indoor must have increased labor hours and days per year, thereby resulting in higher national income and greater economic growth. We provide the means to understand two additional dimensions to the decrease in seasonal employment. The first is the reduction in seasonality within each of the sectors. The second is the possibility that employment in the two sectors dovetailed, and that peak-load demands in agriculture were met by the release of labor from manufacturing enterprises. We find an increase to the 1880's and a subsequent decrease in the number of farm laborer per farm and in the harvest premium paid to farm laborers, suggesting that, within agriculture, peak-load employment was reduced. We also find distinct seasonal pattern to manufacturing employment in 1900, with decreases in both summer and winter, hinting that industrial workers may have found summer employment in nearby farming communities. But we conclude, for various reasons, that dovetailing of agricultural and industrial employment in the nineteenth century was slight. Seasonality was reduced during the nineteenth century largely because sectoral shifts transferred laborers from agriculture to manufacturing and because the influence of climate was reduced within each sector.

One of the principal types of wealth accumulation in the United States has been real property, especially in the form of homes as the society became more urban and less agricultural. At present, almost two-thirds of all American households reside in owner-occupied structures. The present paper explores this phenomenon for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from the standpoint of property accumulation over the life course. Age patterns of homeownership for urban and rural non-farm households are the central concern. Drawing on micro samples of the 1865 New York State census and the 1900 united States census, micro data on the 6,809 worker families residing in the united States in the 1889/90 U.S. Commissioner of Labor Survey, and published data from the 1890 and 1930 united States censuses, the incidence of homeownership by age of household head is described. The level of the ownership curve (by age) has risen over time, and its shape has changed. Differences by region and rural-urban residence are shown to have existed. Differentials between native and foreign-born whites narrowed from the late nineteenth century to circa 1930, but those by race (black versus white) persisted.

Earlier work has established a strong positive relationship between a household's wealth and its duration in the local economy. This paper explores the possible connection between the magnitude of this wealth/duration relationship and the community's precedence rate--the percentage of households in a given year (1870) present in the same locale in an earlier year (1860). We hypothesize that a low precedence rate will be associated with a high return to the household's duration in the local economy, controlling for the size of the local population. This hypothesis is tested and tentatively confirmed for the counties of Utah in 1870. We also find that a low precedence rate is associated with increased inequality.

The nineteenth century was a period of expansion and transformation of American agriculture. While much is known about the process, the exact pace and timing of agricultural productivity change is still unresolved. The traditional view is one of continued progress in which output and productivity increased steadily, accelerating over the period. The Civil War is seen as a convenient turning point, and perhaps an episode of greater consequence. More recent work has raised doubts about this picture of steady and accelerating success. The extant statistics on farm output and its labor force indicate that the period before the Civil War had the superior record and experienced particularly rapid productivity growth between 1820 and 1840. This paper presents new estimates of agricultural output per worker, based on revised statistics of the farm labor force and farm gross product. These new figures present a picture of agricultural progress more like the traditional view. Farm productivity grew noticeably faster after the Civil War than before, and important changes appear to have occurred during the Civil War decade.

This paper briefly reviews the literature on the evolution of approaches to living standards and then applies the methodology discussed for stature to the United States from the late 18th through the early 20th centuries. Part I of the paper emphasizes two major strands of the subject: national-income accounting and related measures, developed by economists and government policy makers, and anthropometric measures (particularly stature), developed by human biologists, anthropologists, and the medical profession. I compare and contrast these alternative approaches to measuring living standards and place anthropometric measures within the context of the ongoing debate over the system of national accounts. Part II examines the relationship of stature to living standards beginning with a discussion of sources of evidence and the growth process. A statistical analysis explores the relationship of stature to per capita income and the distribution of income using 20th century data. Part III presents evidence on time-trends, regional patterns, and class differences in height. The major phenomena discovered to date are the early achievement of near-modern stature, the downward cycle in stature for cohorts born around 1830 to near the end of the century, the height advantages of the West and the South, and the remarkably small stature of slave children. The secular decline in height is puzzling for economic historians because it clashes with firm beliefs that the mid-nineteenth century was an era of economic prosperity. I establish a framework for reconciling these conflicting views on the course of living standards and discuss possible explanations for the height patterns noted in the paper.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was considerable interest among the scientific and business communities in the relationship between work, fatigue, health and productivity. Study after study not only documented well-known relationships between occupation and disease such as mercury poisoning among "mad hatters" but also an increasing body of evidence suggested a causal chain between fatigue induced by long hours of work, specific occupational characteristics and weakened resistance to diseases, especially viral diseases such as tuberculosis that posed specific public health, as well as private health, hazards. This evidence first persuaded the Courts to allow limitations upon the hours of work for women on the grounds of protecting the "weaker sex" and the health of future generations as a public health regulation. Eventually such limits were extended to all workers. In this paper, we analyze the data from an 1892 California Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of 3,493 wage-earners that provides some evidence on the relationship between hours of work and time in a job and worsening health or days of absence from work as a result of ill-health. We conclude that these data support the hypothesis that long hours of work each day in hot and poorly ventilated workshops performing physically or mentally exhausting work at a pace set by inanimate machines was bad for employee health. However, it is hard to make a convincing case for the public regulation of hours and conditions in the workplace as a public, as opposed to a private, health question, except in the case of children, including children in utero, or communicable diseases such as tuberculosis.

The aim of this paper is to describe the full dimensions of a new and rapidly growing research program that uses new data sources on food consumption, anthropometric measures, genealogies, and life-cycle histories to shed light on secular trends in nutritional status, health, mortality, and the process of aging. The exploitation of these types of data involves integration of analytical procedures in medicine and economics with those of demography. The discussion is divided into four parts. Part one deals with sources on food consumption and with methods of exploiting these sources that involve the integration of energy cost accounting with techniques for the analysis of income distributions. The second part is concerned with sources of anthropometric information and with techniques that may be utilized to relate such information to the assessment of health and mortality. Part three involves the more complex problem of relating socioeconomic and biomedical stress suffered by individuals early in life to their work levels, health and mortality rates at middle and late ages. The final section discusses the uses of genealogies by themselves and in combination with the preceding data sources.

Data from the public use sample of the 1900 census are used to study the proper labor force classification of older male Americans experiencing 6 months or more of unemployment in the previous year ("long-term unemployed"). In terms of their personal characteristics, the long-term unemployed were similar in many respects to persons with a gainful occupation. Because the probability of re-employment, conditional on unemployment, appears to have declined with age, the probability of experiencing long-term unemployment rose as persons aged. Census data are consistent with the view that the older an individual was upon entering the status of long-term unemployment, the greater the likelihood the person would leave the labor force in a short period of time. I conclude, however, that this is insufficient reason to exclude the long-term unemployed from the count of gainful workers in 1900, as has recently been advocated.

This paper studies how well labor markets operated, and industrial workers fared, during early American industrialization. The principal bodies of evidence examined are four cross-sections of manufacturing firm data from 1820 to 1860, and newly-constructed price indexes for classes of products in different locales. The central findings are that real wages rose substantially over time for all segments of the manufacturing labor force. Workers responded flexibly to changing circumstances, and benefited almost immediately from the rapid expansion of the 1820s. Impressive growth in compensation was maintained until the late 1840s or early 1850s, when progress was slowed by heavy immigration and the mechanization of a number of previously labor intensive industries. Of course, these gains were not continuous, but the evidence bears against the view that the difficult years were due to poorly-functioning markets, rapid changes in technology, or other aspects of industrialization. On the contrary, the chief deviations from the upward trend in real wages seem to be attributable to supply-side shocks originating in the agricultural sector or in unusually large immigration flows, rather than to the path of industrial development.

The Meat Inspection Act of 1891 and the Sherman Act of 1890 are shown to be closely tied. This link makes clearer Congress' intent in enacting the legislation. Both laws were products of conditions in the economy after 1880, and they reflected in part, a common concern about the Chicago packers, or Beef trust. The concerns of local slaughterhouses, which were being displaced by new, low-cost refrigerated beef, and of farmers, who sold their livestock to the large Chicago packers, were echoed elsewhere by other small businesses and farmers, who feared for their competitive positions during a time of structural change in the economy.

The United States differed dramatically from Britain in the way manufacturing was organized during early industrialization. Even before widespread mechanization, American production was almost exclusively from centralized plants, whereas the British and other European economies were characterized by extensive cottage manufacture. This paper argues that this contrast was rooted in a salient disparity between the land-to-labor ratios of the two countries. Together with its later settlement, the relative abundance of land in the U.S. led its agricultural sector to be much less concentrated in grain than was British agriculture. Since the labor requirements of grain production were much more seasonal than were those of the other major agricultural products of the era (dairy products, livestock, wood, and cleared land), and agriculture was the dominant sector in both economies, there were more seasonal fluctuations in British labor markets than in the American. We argue that this difference in the extent of seasonality is crucial, because cottage manufacture had a relative advantage in the use of offpeak or part-time labor. Quantitative evidence and a general equilibrium model are employed to present the analysis, and subject it to tests of consistency with the empirical record .

This paper illustrates the application of indirect techniques of fertility and mortality estimation to historical census data, both in published form and as micro census samples derived from the original enumerators' manuscripts. There are many instances in which census data exist but adequate vital registration data do not, such as in the United States prior to 1933, when the Birth and Death Registration Areas finally covered the entire nation. Since the United States has taken decennial censuses since 1790, and since all the original population schedules except those for 1890 have been preserved, it is possible to apply these indirect methods. For example, the censuses of 1900 and 1910 asked questions on children ever born, children surviving, and duration of current marriage, but this information was never tabulated or used for 1900 and only partly tabulated for 1910. The Public Use Samples of the 1900 and 1910 censuses make possible the utilization of those data to estimate levels, differentials, and even recent trends in childhood mortality. Application of own-children methods to samples of the censuses since 1850 permits estimation of age-specific overall and marital fertility rates. Finally, the use of the 1900 Public Use Sample in conjunction with published data on parity from the 1910 census (or tabulations from the 1910 Public Use Sample) allows application of the two-census, parity increment method of birth rate estimation.

Why did international capital flows rise to such heights in the late 19th century, the years between 1907 and 1913 in particular? Britain placed half of her annual savings abroad during those seven years, and 76 percent of it went to the New World countries of Canada, Australia, the USA, Argentina and the rest of Latin America. The resource abundant New World was endowed with dual scarcity, labor and capital. The labor supply response to labor scarcity took the form of both immigration and high fertility. This served to create much higher child dependency burdens in the New World than in the Old. Econometric analysis shows that these dependency burdens served to choke off domestic savings in the New World, thus creating an external demand for savings. The influence was very large. Indeed, it appears that the vast majority of those international capital flows from Old World to New can be explained by those dependency rate gaps. As a consequence, it is appropriate to view those large international capital flows as an intergenerational transfer.

After sketching various ways in which economic issues influenced the political realignment of the 1850s, the paper concentrates on five questions: (1) the timing of the economic issues and the disjunctions in economic developments across regions and classes; (2) the size of the nonagricultural male labor force of the North toward the end of the 1850s and the ethnic and residential distributions of these workers; (3) changes in the ethnic composition of the northern electorate and the sharp shift in the partisan affiliations of "Old Americans," especially between 1852 and 1860; (4) problems in measuring the ups and downs in the standard of living of northern nonagricultural workers between 1840 and 1860 and provisional estimates of the decline in their real wages between 1848 and 1855; (5) a provisional estimate of the excess supply of labor during 1854-1855 created by the unfortunate phasing of three cycles (the collapse of a long cycle in construction, the coincident trough of a relatively mild trade cycle, and the continued upswing of a long cycle in immigration).

After sketching various ways in which economic issues influenced the political realignment of the 1850s, the paper concentrates on five questions: (1) the timing of the economic issues and the disjunctions in economic developments across regions and classes; (2) the size of the nonagricultural male labor force of the North toward the end of the 1850s and the ethnic and residential distributions of these workers; (3) changes in the ethnic composition of the northern electorate and the sharp shift in the partisan affiliations of "Old Americans," especially between 1852 and 1860; (4) problems in measuring the ups and downs in the standard of living of northern nonagricultural workers between 1840 and 1860 and provisional estimates of the decline in their real wages between 1848 and 1855; (5) a provisional estimate of the excess supply of labor during 1854-1855 created by the unfortunate phasing of three cycles (the collapse of a long cycle in construction, the coincident trough of a relatively mild trade cycle, and the continued upswing of a long cycle in immigration).

It has been argued that Gresham's Law, bad money (money with a low value in non-monetary uses) drives out good, often fails because one money can circulate at its market value. Various cases involving the U.S. dollar in the nineteenth century have been cited as possible violations of the law resulting from nonpar circulation of the dollar. This paper analyzes these cases, and finds to the contrary that a "93 percent version" of Gresham's law held in all them. Evidently, there were high transactions costs associated with using good money at a premium or bad money at a discount.

Debate over the economic convergence of currently industrialized nations has suffered a number of shortcomings. First, the underlying data base has typically been limited to Agnus Maddison's GNP and GNP per worker hour. This paper offers a new data base, purchasing-power-parity adjusted real wage rates for unskilled labor. Second, the debate has typically focused on end points from the 19th century to the present, paying little attention to differential behavior in four distinct regimes: 1830 to the late 1850s, the 1850s to World War I, the interwar decades, and the post-World War II experience. Third, with some recent exceptions, the search for explanations has focused primarily on technological advance, while ignoring the potential role of global factor and commodity market integration (and disintegration). The new real wage data base confirms some old stylized facts and offers some new ones. It also points out how these four regimes differed. They differed enough to suggest that different explanations will be necessary to account for the convergence over the past century and a half.

Due primarily to transport improvements, commodity prices in Britain and America tended to equalize 1870-1913. This commodity price equalization was not simply manifested by the great New World grain invasion of Europe. Rather, it can be documented for intermediate primary products and manufactures as well. Heckscher and, Ohlin, writing in 1919 and 1924, thought that these events should have contributed to factor price equalization. Based on Williamson's research reported elsewhere, Anglo-American real wages did converge over this period, and it was part of a general convergence between the Old and New World. This paper applies the venerable Heckscher-Ohlin trade model to the late 19th century Anglo-American experience and finds that they were right: at least half of the real wage convergence observed can be assigned to commodity price equalization. Furthermore, these events also had profound influences on relative land and capital scarcities. It appears that this late 19th century episode was the dramatic start of world commodity and factor market integration that is still ongoing today.

This paper summarizes a collaborative project designed to create a public-use tape suitable for a prospective study of aging among a random sample of 39,616 men mustered into 331 companies of the Union Army. The aim of the project is to measure the effect of socioeconomics and biomedical factors during childhood and early adulthood on the development of specific chronic disease at middle and late ages, on labor force participation at these later ages, and on elapsed time to death. This paper surveys the nature of and quality of the data and data sources to be included in the study, discusses the characteristics of a subsample of recruits from 20 companies recently recruited, looks at questions of representativeness of Union Army recruits to the Northern white male population, and finally examines several issues involving questions of possible selection bias due to linkage failure.

This paper uses height data recorded on Convict Indents to study temporal patterns and regional differences in living standards in pre-famine Ireland. The approach is explicitly comparative and makes use of information from America and other parts of Europe. The Irish attained roughly the 16th centile of modern height standards and, though smaller than contemporary North Americans, were among the tallest in Europe, including the wealthier English. We suggest that: a nutritious diet and epidemiological isolation were important factors in the high nutritional living standards of the Irish.

This paper surveys recent research on the labor force in the nineteenth century. I examine trends in the aggregate size, demographic, occupational and industrial composition of the labor force; short-run and long-run movements in nominal and real wages; hours of work; the development of the factory system; the growth of unions; and government regulation of labor markets, specifically protectionist legislation. Although my survey is deliberately broad in scope, there is an underlying emphasis on those aspects of change that had a direct bearing on the evolution of the labor force in the twentieth century. In keeping with this theme, the paper concludes with a brief comparison of labor markets at the turn of the century with labor markets today.

The 1920s marked the end of a century of mass migration from Europe to the New World. This paper examines analytically this pre-quota experience. The discussion is divided into two parts. The first deals with the character and dimensions of overseas emigration from Europe chiefly from the mid 19th century to World War I. The second discussions the effects of these migrations on both sending and receiving countries. The traditional literature has far more to say about the first than the second. Here we deal with the evolution of global labor markets, first as they were directly influenced by the migrations, and second as they interacted with the evolution of world commodity and capital markets. The paper argues that the impressive economic convergence which took place between 1870 and World War I can be largely explained by these forces of economic integration, rather than by technological convergence or differential human capital growth.

The growth in inventive activity during early American industrialization is explored by examining the careers of 160 inventors credited with important technological discoveries. Analysis of biographical information and complete patent histories through 1865 indicates that these 'great inventors' were entrepreneurial and responded systematically to market demand. Their inventions were procyclical and originated disproportionately from localities linked with extensive markets. Although not exceptional in terms of schooling or technical skills, they vigorously pursued the returns to their inventions, redirected their inventive activity to meet emerging needs, and were distinguished by high geographical mobility towards districts conducive to invention.

This paper examines the determinants of overseas mass migration from eleven European countries in the late 19th century. They typically passed through something like a half-century life-cycle: a steep rise in emigration rates from low levels in preindustrial decades, followed by a plateau of very high emigration, and then a subsequent fall during more mature stages of industrialization. Using a new real wage data base, we are able to isolate the impact of economic and demographic forces (associated with the industrial revolution) on this emigration experience. The steep rise in emigration rates was driven mainly by fertility boom and infant mortality decline, events early in the demographic transition which, with a two decade lag, tended to glut the age cohort most responsive to wage gaps between the labor-abundant Old World and the labor-scarce New World. The steep fall in emigration rates was driven mainly by the forces of convergence and catching up -- more rapid real wage growth at home encouraged an increasingly large share to stay at home. Since we show elsewhere that these mass migrations contributed significantly to an impressive late 19th century economic convergence, they can be viewed as an important part of a long run equilibrium adjustment manifested by an evolving global labor market.

The "Great Compression" of the 1940s produced a substantial narrowing in wage differentials in the United States. This paper examines the role of the Great Compression in fostering black-white wage convergence in the 1940s. Using data from the 1940 and 1950 census public use samples, I show that between half and two-thirds of black white wage convergence at the sample means can be attributed to shifts in wage structure associated with the Great Compression. I also demonstrate that, by (temporarily) boosting the incomes of black parents. the Great Compression led to greater increases in schooling levels among black teens between 1940 and 1950 than would have occurred otherwise.

We revisit a famous controversy in labor economics: the debate between W.S. Woytinsky and Clarence Long over "added" and "discouraged" worker effects in the late 1930s. According to Woytinsky, the Depression created large numbers of added workers, persons who entered the labor force when the head of the household became unemployed. Long, on the other hand, believed that the number of added workers was trivial compared with the number of discouraged workers, and subsequent research has largely supported Long. Using a sample of married women drawn from the public use sample of the 1940 census, we show that added worker effect was alive and well in the late 1930s, but that its viability was muted by the operation of work relief. Wives whose husbands held "public emergency work relief" jobs with the Works Progress Administration (WPA) or related agencies were far less likely to participate in the labor force than wives whose husbands were employed in a private sector or non-relief government job, or whose husbands were unemployed, so much so that the added worker effect disappears in the aggregate if the impact of work relief is ignored.

This paper augments the new historical literature on factor price convergence. The focus is on the late nineteenth century, when economic convergence among the current OECD countries was dramatic; and the focus is on the convergence between Old World and New, by far the biggest participants in the global convergence during the period; and the focus is on land and labor, the two most important factors of production in the nineteenth century. Wage-rental ratios boomed in the Old World and collapsed in the New, moving the resource-rich and labor scarce New World closer to the resource-scarce and labor-abundant Old World. The paper uses both computable general equilibrium models and econometrics to identify the forces causing the convergence. These include: commodity price convergence and the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem of factor price equalization; migration, capital-deepening and frontier disappearance, factors stressed by Malthus, Ricardo, Wicksell and Viner; and factor-saving biases associated with induced-innovational theory, an endogenous response to relative factor scarcities.

The Latin countries -- Italy, Portugal and Spain -- were industrial late-comers and only experienced mass emigration late in the 19th century. When they did join the European mass migration, they did so in great numbers. The fact that they joined the mass migrations late, that they were poor by West European standards, and that so many went to Latin America, has generated a number of debates on both sides of the Atlantic. This paper uses a late 19th century panel data set (including purchasing-power-parity adjusted real wages) for twelve European countries to find that Latin emigration behavior was no different than that of northwestern Europe: for example, Latin emigrant labor supplies were not relatively elastic, contrary to the hypothesis made famous by Sir Arthur Lewis. What made Latin experience different was the underlying economic and demographic fundamentals driving the experience.

As part of a process that has been at work since 1850, real wages among the current OECD countries converged during the late 19th century. The convergence was pronounced as that which we have seen in the post World War Il period. This paper uses computable general equilibrium models to isolate the sources of that economic convergence by assessing the relative performance of the two most important economies in the Old World and the New -- Britain and the USA. It turns out that between 1870 and 1910, the convergence forces that mattered were those that generated by commodity price convergence, stresses by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, and mass migration, stressed by Knut Wicksell. It turns out that offsetting forces were contributing to late 19th century divergence, a finding consistent with economic historians' traditional attention to Britain's alleged failure and America's spectacular rise to industrial supremacy. The convergence forces, however, dominated for most of the period.

From 1885 to 1902 manufacturers and distributors in the American bromine industry cooperated to increase prices and profits. Like many sectors of the American economy at the time, the bromine industry was made up a large number of small manufacturers and a small number of national distributors. The manufacturers agreed to pool their output and sell only to two distributors. The distributors accumulated excess inventories rather than let the market price fall, but then used those inventories as a threat to deter cheating and new entry. Industry participants designed contracts to balance fluctuations in the costs and benefits from cheating. These contracts succeeded in stabilizing collusion until the entry of new, vertically integrated, mass production firm led to its demise.

Bromine producers colluded to raise prices and profits during most of the period between 1885 and 1914. Collusion was punctuated by price wars in which prices fell sharply. The characteristics of these price wars are compared with those in the Green-Porter and Abreu- Pearce-Stachetti models. Some of the bromine price wars resulted from the imperfect monitoring problems in these models. Those price wars were short and mild. More severe price wars were part of a bargaining process, in which firms tried to force a renegotiation to a new collusive equilibrium with a different distribution of rents.

I investigate why workers' probability of leaving unemployment has fallen since 1900 by estimating the impact of a large government transfer, the first major pension program in the United States, covering Union Army veterans of the Civil War. The pension, because of the program's rules, was a strict income transfer and these rules create a natural experiment to identify the effects of pensions and health on labor supply. Pensions exerted a large impact on the probability of long-term, but not of short-term unemployment. Estimated hazards suggest that, consistent with a job search model, pensions affected the probability of both entering and exiting unemployment. But, pensions mainly lowered the probability of leaving unemployment. The findings suggest that explanations for the secular rise in long-term unemployment should focus on factors such as the secular increase in wealth and the increased availability and generosity of unemployment benefits.

The quality of the money stock declined during the banking crises of the early 1930s. Bank deposits did not serve as a secure short- term store of purchasing power for use in an emergency as well as they had previously, and during the periods of restricted deposits in late 1932 and early 1933, bank deposits could not fulfill their basic function of being a medium of exchange. This paper presents some evidence to show that the decline in the quality of the money stock contributed to the severity of the contraction.

The substantial shifts in the sectoral and geographic location of economic activity that took place in the late nineteenth-century United States required the reallocation of large quantities of labor. This paper examines the response of labor market institutions to the challenges of unbalanced growth. Based on previously unexploited descriptive evidence from the reports of the Immigration Commission it argues that employer recruitment was crucial to the adjustment of labor markets to shifting patterns of supply and demand. Because individual employers could capture only a fraction of the benefits of recruitment, however, investment in this activity may have been less than would have been socially optimal, suggesting a possible explanation for the persistence of large geographic wage differentials.

This paper argues that the secular decline in mortality, which began during the eighteenth century, is still in progress and will probably continue for another century or more. The evolutionary perspective presented in this paper focuses not only on the environment, which from the standpoint of human health and prosperity has become much more favorable than it was in Malthus's time, but also on changes in human physiology over the past three centuries which affect both economic and biomedical processes. A great deal of emphasis is placed on the interconnectedness of events and process over the life cycle and, by implication, between generations.

Explanations for the decline in labor force participation rates of older men prior to 1950 have focused on the sectoral shift from agriculture to manufacturing. Labor force participation rates of men living in farm households have been consistently higher than those of men living in non-farm households. The decline in the size of the agricultural sector has coincided with the rise in male retirement rates. Using a new, longitudinal data set I argue that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, men who were farmers were no less likely to retire than men who were not farmers. Past researchers, who examined cross-sectional data, were misled because retired farmers often migrated from their farms. The findings have implications for the secular decline of fertility.

In the 130 years from the first federal census of the United States in 1790, the American population increased from about 4 million men to almost 107 million persons. This was predominantly due to natural increase, early driven by high birth rates and moderate motrality levels and after the Civil War by declining death rates. In addition, over 33 million recorded immigrant arrivals increased the growth rate. By the two decades prior to World War I, about one third of total increase originated in net migration. A number of unusual features characterized the American demographic transition over the `long' nineteenth century. The fertility transition was early (dating from at least 1800) and from very high levels. The average woman had over seven livebirths in 1800. The crude birth rate declined from about 55 in 1800 to about 25 in 1920. This occurred before 1860 in an environment without widespread urbanization and industrialization in most of the nation. Mortality levels were moderate, and death rates began their sustained decline only by the 1870s, long after the fertility transition had begun. This constrast to the more usual stylization of the demographic transition in which mortality decline precedes or accompanies the fertility transition. Internal migration in the United States was also distinctive. Over most of the 19th century flows followed east-west axes although this began to weaken as rural-urban migration began to supplant westward rural migration in importance. International migra- tion proceeded in waves and changed its character as the `new' migration from eastern and southern Europe replaced `old' migration from western and northern Europe.

A new state-level series on secondary-school data demonstrates that graduation and enrollment rates increased greatly in the 1920s and 1930s in most regions. An 18-year old male in 1910 had just a 10% chance of having a high school diploma but by the mid-1930s the median 18-year old male was a high school graduate. This Appendix describes the procedures used to construct the state-level secondary school enrollment and graduation numbers contained in the NBER Working Paper `How America Graduated from High School: 1910 to 1960.'

The study of the labor market across the past hundred years reveals enormous progress and also that history repeats itself and has come full circle in some ways. Progress has been made in the rewards of labor -- wages, benefits, and increased leisure through shorter hours, vacation time, sick leave, and earlier retirement. Labor has been granted added security on the job and more safety nets when unemployed, ill, and old. Progress in the labor market has interacted with societal changes. Women's increased participation in the paid labor force is the most significant. The virtual elimination of child and full-time juvenile labor is another. Two of the most pressing economic issues of our day demonstrate that history repeats itself. Labor productivity has been lagging since the 1970s. It was equally sluggish at other junctures in American history, but the present has unique features. The current slowdown in the United States has been accompanied by a widening in the wage structure. Rising inequality is a far more serious problem because of the coincidence. The wage structure was as wide in 1940 as today but there is, to date, no hard evidence when it began its upward trend. The wage structure has, therefore, come full circle to what it was more than a half century ago. Union strength has also come full circle to that at the turn of this century.

This paper presents three sets of estimated life tables by sex for the total and white populations of the United States for the second half of the nineteenth century. The first set uses the Brass [1975] two parameter logit model with the 1900/02 Death Registration Area life tables as the standards. Available empirical American life tables for the period 1830-1911 are used to establish the relationship between the level and structure of mortality. Data on deaths for the ages 5-19 in the year prior to the census (from the decennial federal censuses of 1850-1900) are actually used to obtain the national tables. The second set of life tables also uses the census mortality data for the ages 5-19 but fits Coale and Demeny [1966] West Model life tables. Both these sets of life tables were derived following procedures in Haines [1979]. The third set of life tables was estimated from the public use micro-sample of the 1900 U.S. census from data on the number of children ever born, the number of children surviving, and the age structure of surviving children to women aged 14-34. Given the lack of national life tables for the United States prior to the early twentieth century, it is hoped that these tables will be of value in research on mortality and on issues for which mortality and survival probabilities by age, sex, and race are used. The overall results confirm that the sustained modern mortality transition in the United States did not begin until approximately 1880. Prior to that time, it appears that mortality was not under control.

Much of Argentina's decline in relative economic performance can be attributed to deleterious conditions for capital accumulation after 1913. In the first phase (pre-1913), the success of the Belle ?poque was due to spectacular rates of accumulation. In the second phase (1913-1930s), low domestic savings rates constrained the rate of capital accumulation. In the third phase (1930s-1950s), import- substitution policies were implemented and the relative price of key imported capital goods rose sharply. Retardation ensued: at first because of insufficient saving; later because price disincentives channeled funds away from investment activities which are the precursor of growth.

Recent studies of late nineteenth century labor market integration have found that despite high rates of geographic mobility relatively large inter- and intra-regional differentials in real wages persisted with little tendency toward convergence. These results point to the absence of a unified national labor market, but the scope of these studies is limited by their reliance on comparisons of wage quotations for narrowly defined occupations. Such data are available for only a small and possibly unrepresentative segment of the labor force, and cover only a limited sample of cities and time periods. This paper uses an alternative source of data--average annual earnings calculated from the Census of Manufactures--to extend the examination of labor market integration to all male manufacturing workers in 114 cities from 1879 through 1919. In contrast to earlier research, the average earnings data indicate that a well integrated labor market had emerged in the Northeast and North Central regions of the country by 1879. They also reveal a strong tendency toward earnings convergence within the South Atlantic and South Central regions, suggesting the emergence of a unified southern labor market. Large and persistent North-South, and West-East differentials in earnings indicate, however, that despite the integration of regional labor markets after the Civil War, a unified national labor market had not yet developed.

This history of the Great Depression was prepared for The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. It describes real and imagined causes of the Depression, bank failures and deflation, the Fed and the gold standard, the start of recovery, the first New Deal, and the second New Deal. I argue that adherence to the gold standard caused the Depression, that abandoning gold started recovery, and that several of the New Deal measures adopted in the recovery lasted in good order for half a century.

Dissatisfaction with the high transaction costs of compensating workers for their injuries led seven states in the 1910s to enact legislation requiring that employers insure their workers' compensation risks through exclusive state insurance funds. This paper traces the political-economic history of the success of compulsory state insurance in three states in the 1910s -- Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington. State insurance gained broad support in these states because a coalition of progressive legislators took control of their respective legislatures, bringing with them the idea that government had the unique ability to correct market imperfections. The political environment in which state insurance thrived in the 1910s provides important insights into the growth of government in the 1930s and 1960s. The major social insurance programs of the New Deal and the Great Society were widely supported at the time because the private market was seen as unable to solve a particular problem, such as unemployment compensation or poverty in old-age. This paper argues that the government's dramatic expansion after the 1932 federal election was not unprecedented; in fact, the ideological roots of New Deal activism were planted during the debates over compulsory state insurance and workers' compensation in the 1910s.

Dissatisfaction with the high transaction costs of compensating workers for their injuries led seven states in the 1910s to enact legislation requiring that employers insure their workers' compensation risks through exclusive state insurance funds. This paper traces the political-economic history of the success of compulsory state insurance in three states in the 1910s -- Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington. State insurance gained broad support in these states because a coalition of progressive legislators took control of their respective legislatures, bringing with them the idea that government had the unique ability to correct market imperfections. The political environment in which state insurance thrived in the 1910s provides important insights into the growth of government in the 1930s and 1960s. The major social insurance programs of the New Deal and the Great Society were widely supported at the time because the private market was seen as unable to solve a particular problem, such as unemployment compensation or poverty in old-age. This paper argues that the government's dramatic expansion after the 1932 federal election was not unprecedented; in fact, the ideological roots of New Deal activism were planted during the debates over compulsory state insurance and workers' compensation in the 1910s.

In October 1993, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics to Robert William Fogel and Douglass Cecil North `for having renewed research in economic history.' The Academy noted that `they were pioneers in the branch of economic history that has been called the þnew economic history,þ or þcliometricsþ.' In this paper I address what this cliometrics is and how these two Nobel Prize winners furthered the discipline of economics.

Many scholars are concerned with why the U.S. and Canada have been so much more successful over time than other New World economies. Since all New World societies enjoyed high levels of product per capita early in their histories, the divergence in paths can be traced back to the achievement of sustained economic growth by the U.S. and Canada during the 18th to early 19th centuries. This paper highlights the relevance of differences in the degree of inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power in accounting for the variation in the records of growth, and suggest that the roots of inequality lay in differences in the initial factor endowments of the respective colonies The large concentration of Native Americans, and the suitability of cultiva- ting sugar and other crops were key in generating extreme inequality. This encouraged the evolution of societies where small elites of European descent held highly disproportionate shares of the wealth, human capital and political power, and dominated the population economically and politically. Absent from the nearly all-inclusive list of New World colonies with these conditions were the British settlements in the northern part of the North American continent. Next, we discuss the tendencies of government policies to maintain these conditions along the respective economy's path of development. Finally, we explore the effects of inequality on the evolution of institutions conducive to participation in the commercial economy, markets and technological change during this specific era, and suggest that their greater equality in wealth, human capital, and political capital and power may have predisposed the U.S. and Canada toward earlier realization of sustained economic growth.

In this paper we compare the performance of the U.S. and Canadian banking systems from 1870-1925 in terms of stability and efficiency. In an earlier study we found that the Canadian banking system, based on nationwide branch banking, dominated the U.S. system, based on unit banking, on both criteria in the period 1920-1980. In this study we find that there is little significant difference between the two systems in the preceding 50 years. The difference between the two periods we attribute to the merger movement in Canada after 1900 which allowed the Canadian banking system to evolve from a system with incomplete regional diversification, and hence subject to a significant risk of an occasional failure by a large bank, to one characterized by national diversification and greater stability. The greater stability in turn allowed the financial structure of the banking system to evolve in a more efficient direction.

The Argentine economy was transformed in the late nineteenth century by the mass migration of millions of Europeans. Various ideas have surfaced concerning the likely impact of this labor inflow: that it favored the wheat revolution on the pampas; that it promoted urbanization and the rapid growth of Buenos Aires; that it paved the way for Argentine industrialization; that it caused slack in the labor markets, lowering wages. This paper attempts an analysis of the impact of migration on the scale and structure of the Argentine economy and tries to resolve various competing hypotheses. The paper presents a new social accounting matrix (SAM) for Argentina, and uses it to calibrate a CGE model. Both tools show promise for further exploration of growth and structural change during and after the Belle ?poque.

This paper makes use of hitherto untabulated data from the censuses of manufacturing for 1870 and 1880 to investigate the extent to which firms operated at less than their full capacity year round in these census years and thus provides some evidence of the extent to which workers may have faced temporary or permanent lay-off. We conclude that firms nationwide operated for the equivalent of 254 days (out of, perhaps, 309 working days) during the 1870 census year from the end of May, 1869 to the beginning of June, 1870 and 261 days during the 1880 census year from the beginning of June 1879 to the end of May, 1880. Workers put in the equivalent of slightly more days of work in each of these years in their customary industrial employment because larger firms were more likely to operate for more days per year. There were, however, significant regional and industry differences. Although our estimates are broadly consistent with independent estimates and are generally in accord with expectations, they raise important questions about economic performance in the late nineteenth century which remain unanswered here.

This paper analyzes a five percent systematic sample of households from the manuscripts of the New York State Census of 1865 for seven counties (Allegany, Dutchess, Montgomery, Rensselaer, Steuben, Tompkins, and Warren). The sample was selected to provide a diversity of locations, settlement dates, and types of agricultural economy. Two substantial urban areas (the cities of Troy and Poughkeepsie) are in the sample. This census was the first in the United States to ask a question on children ever born. These parity data, along with own-children estimates of age-specific overall and marital fertility rates, are used to examine the relation of fertility with rural-urban residence, occupation, ethnicity, literacy, and location within the state. Singulate mean ages at first marriage and other nuptiality measures are also estimated. The parity data provide direct evidence of fertility decline in the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century. Township data are added to the individual records to provide contextual variables. The issue of ideational versus socioeconomic and structural factors in fertility is discussed.

Though the geographic, occupational, and financial mobility of average Americans were important aspects of nineteenth century U.S. economic development, the extent and correlates of this economic mobility have remained open to debate in the absence of individual- level longitudinal data. This essay describes a new sample of 4,837 individuals linked from the 1850 Public Use Micro Sample of the federal census of population to the 1860 federal census manuscript schedules, using the new national 1860 federal census index. The linked sample provides information on occupation, wealth, family structure, and location in both 1850 and 1860. The construction of the sample is described in detail, along with tests of its representativeness and examples of potential uses.

Sectoral wage gaps for workers of comparable skill are central to issues in economic development and economic history. This paper presents new archival evidence on the farm-nonfarm wage gap for the United States just prior to the American Civil War. Measured at the level of local labor markets, the wage gaps are small and not very persistent over time. Aggregated to reflect the geographic distribution of farm and nonfarm labor, the gaps are larger than previously thought. I also show that investment in manufacturing capital between 1850 and 1860 responded to labor market inefficiencies indicated by the gaps: counties with relatively low farm wages experienced above-average investment.

Using the census survival method to calculate net flows across employment states between 1900 and 1910, we find that approximately one-fifth of all men who reached the age of 55 eventually retired before their death. Many of these retirees appear to have planned their withdrawal from paid employment by accumulating assets, becoming self-employed, and then liquidating their assets to provide a stream of income to finance consumption in old age. This `modern' retirement behavior, we argue, has important implications for the economic history of capital and labor markets, of saving and investment, of insurance and pensions, and of the family economy.

We argue that the enumerators' occupational returns from the important census of 1880 were heavily edited prior to publication. The effect was to substantially reduce the number of individuals reported with an occupation. For youthful and older males and all women the editing was so substantial as to qualitatively affect the apparent trend in labor force participation for these groups over time. The stylized facts regarding labor market dynamics during the period of American industrialization and the historical stories constructed around them will now need to be reexamined. We contend that the editing was secretly authorized by Francis Amasa Walker, Superintendent of the Tenth Census of 1880 and one of the most prominent and decorated economists, statisticians, and public servants in America at this time. While other scholars have identified potential sources of bias in census figures, no one has heretofore suggested that the official statistics of the United States were covertly altered to present a picture different from information collected by census enumerators. If we are correct, the sociology of official nineteenth-century American statistics will require rethinking.

Percentiles of modern height standards are useful in historical research because children differ systematically in height by age, and differences in growth potential exist by gender and might exist across some ethnic groups. Modern height standards are needed to make relative comparisons of nutritional status in these circumstances. The standards are also used to assess progress or deprivation against a level that we know is attainable under good environmental circumstances. Historical researchers in need of modern height standards encounter several problems, including the choice of standards, manipulation of those standards to meet the requirements of historical data, and calculation of percentiles. Following a discussion of criteria used in selecting standards, which lead to the choice of NCHS heights as a reference, the paper gives percentiles calculated in line with the requirements of historical data. Results are given in centimeters and inches and by age at last birthday and age at nearest birthday.

We present evidence showing that the course of economic growth and of health, as measured by stature, Body Mass Index (BMI), mortality rates, or the prevalence of chronic conditions, diverged in the nineteenth century and converged in the twentieth. To analyze the change in welfare resulting from changes in health, we estimate a Human Development Index and a Borda Ranking and we calculate Usher- adjusted incomes and the willingness to pay for a reduction in mortality risk. Prior to the Civil War the increase in income was insufficient to compensate for the decline in health, whereas improvements in health outpaced economic growth in the twentieth century. We identify numerous possible causes of the nineteenth century decline in health, including greater exposure to disease, hardship created by the Civil War, and rising inequality. Our evidence on trends in waist-hip ratio, BMI, and the prevalence of chronic conditions at older ages suggests that early life conditions may exert an impact on mortality and morbidity that is not manifest until older ages. The dramatic twentieth century improvement in early life conditions implies that cohorts who are now approaching their sixties will experience a much greater rate of increase in health and longevity than past generations.

This paper examines the U.S. economy in World War II. It argues that the mobilization must be viewed as a rapidly evolving historical process rather than, as is often the case a single undifferentiated event. For example, the employment of unemployed resources, a factor often cited to explain the success of the mobilization, was important during the national defense period, but was relatively unimportant during the period of active U.S. involvement. On the financial side, money creation was more important during the first year of active involvement than in subsequent years. The most significant legacy of the war, viewed in relation to the prosperous era that followed, may have been the change in the macroeconomic regime. The paper also discusses the limitations of the basic time series.

Between the middle of the nineteenth century and the beginning of World War I improvements in transportation and communication encouraged increasing interregional and international economic integration. This paper traces and analyzes the progress of increasing labor market integration in the United States during this period of `globalization.' It argues that although the falling cost and increasing speed of transportation and communication in this period initiated a substantial expansion of labor market boundaries, the pattern of increasing integration was strikingly uneven. By the end of the nineteenth century, labor markets in the northern United States were part of a tightly integrated regional labor market that was in turn closely linked with labor markets in northern Europe. But this regional and international integration coincided with the persistent failure of integration between northern and southern labor markets within the United States. The importance of this finding is two-fold. First, it suggests that the forces shaping the determination of wages, the evolution of wage structure, and the growth of unions cannot be understood at either a purely local, or a purely national level. Second, it shows that the process of market integration was complex, depending on the interaction between historically determined market institutions and falling transportation and communication costs.

The history of the financing of the American corporation can be described along many dimensions. One dimension of that history that underlies various measures of historical change in corporate finance is the range of feasible relationships between corporations and intermediaries. Intermediaries (including commercial banks, investment banks, pensions, insurance companies, mutual funds, venture capitalists, and commercial paper dealers) provide alternative mechanisms for reducing `frictions' -- communicating information, controlling the use of funds, and physically transacting with corporations -- all of which arise from a corporation's financing needs. The menu of financial relationship choices available to firms has varied over time. That changing menu has been the driving force behind the history of American corporate finance. Changes in potential relationships have sometimes been dictated by conscious regulatory policy, and sometimes by `induced' private financial innovations. The peculiar fragmentation of financial intermediation in the United States has been a costly feature of American corporate finance history, which is traceable to regulatory distortions that limited particular kinds of relationships. In large part, the history of institutional change and financial innovation in the United States has been the history of attempts to work around costly restrictions on relationships not faced by corporations in most other countries.

Marriage in colonial North America was notable for being early (for women) and marked by low percentages never marrying. This was different from the distinctive northwest European pattern of late marriage and high proportions never married late in life. But the underlying neolocal family formation behavior was the same in both colonial North America and the areas of origin of this population. Thus, Malthus was correct. Abundant resources rather than basic behavioral differences made early and extensive marriage possible in the colonies. Between 1800 and the present there have been long cycles in nuptiality. Since about 1800, female age at first marriage rose from relatively low levels to a peak around 1900. Thereupon a gradual decline commenced with a trough being reached about 1960 at the height of the baby boom. There then began another rapid upswing in female marriage age. Proportions never married at ages 45-54 replicated these cycles with a lag of about 20-30 years. Since 1880 (when comprehensive census data became available), male nuptiality patterns have generally paralleled those of women. Male marriage ages were higher than those of females with proportions never marrying also usually higher. Considerations of differentials by race and ethnicity are important in looking at the American experience over time. Black ages at marriage have, for example, moved from being lower to being higher than those for whites. More work is needed in the period 1800 to 1880 when we lack comprehensive census, vital, and other data.

There are two views of the British Industrial Revolution in the literature today. The more traditional description, represented by the views of Ashton and Landes, sees the Industrial Revolution as a broad change in the British economy and society. This broad view of the Industrial Revolution has been challenged by Crafts and Harley who see the Industrial Revolution as a much narrower phenomenon, as the result of technical change in a few industries. This paper presents a test of these views using the Ricardian model of international trade with many goods. British trade data are used to implement the test and discriminate between the two views of the Industrial Revolution.

Antebellum critics of slavery argued that it was responsible for the relative inefficiency of free southern farms. We examine this issue, employing a stochastic production function, which allows us to distinguish between technological superiority and technical inefficiency, and controlling for crop mix, which we treat as endogenous. We find that although large plantations enjoyed a technological advantage, slave farms were less efficient than free northern farms but more efficient than free southern farms. In addition, free southern farms were significantly less efficient than comparable northern farms.

According to most standard accounts of the mobilization of the U.S. economy in World War II, things started out badly because the agency nominally in charge, the War Production Board, lacked sufficient authority and relied on faulty techniques. But then the War Production Board installed the famous Controlled Materials Plan, a form of central planning, which solved the major problems and turned disaster into triumph. Here we re-examine the Plan and argue that it was too little and too late to account for the success of the mobilization. As an alternative we argue that the delay in the flow of munitions may simply have been the inevitable result of time-to-build and that a good deal of coordination happened through the market. The appropriate historical analogy may not be form of European central planning, but rather the American gold rush of 1849.

The 1970s were America's only peacetime inflation, as uncertainty about prices made every business decision a speculation on monetary policy. In magnitude, the total rise in the price level from the spurt in inflation to the five-to-ten percent per year range in the 1970s was as large as the jumps in prices from the major wars of this century. The truest cause of the 1970s inflation was the shadow of the Great Depression. The memory left by the Depression predisposed the left and center to think that any unemployment was too much, and eliminated any mandate the Federal Reserve might have had for controlling inflation by risking unemployment. The Federal Reserve gained, or regained, its mandate to control inflation at the risk of unemployment during the 1970s as discontent built over that decade's inflation. It is hard to see how the Federal Reserve could have acquired such a mandate without an unpleasant lesson like the inflation of the 1970s. Thus the memory of the Great Depression meant that the U.S. was highly likely to suffer an inflation like the 1970s in the post-World War II period þ maybe not as long, and maybe not in that particular decade, but nevertheless an inflation of recognizably the same genus.

This paper estimates child mortality by race and nativity for the U.S. as a whole and the Death Registration Area based on the public use micro- samples of the 1900 and 1910 censuses. We compare indirect estimates to mortality rates and parameters based on published census and vital statistics data. The censuses of 1900 and 1910 both asked adult women about children ever born and children surviving which, when tabulated by age or marriage duration can be used to estimate probabilities of their children dying at various ages up to 25. Data on children ever born for 1910 were partially tabulated and published in conjunction with the 1940 federal census but the information on children surviving was never tabulated and published; nor was information from 1900. The public use micro samples of the 1900 census permit the application of these well-established indirect methods. This paper applies the basic indirect age and marriage duration methods, and a method using the backward projection of age distribution of surviving own-children of younger adult women. The results match well to life tables calculated from aggregaed census and vital statistics for the total white, native white and foreign-born white populations. The results are less definite for African-Americans but it seems that mortality was substantialy better than indicated by the widely cited Glover life tables for 1900/02, 1901/10, and 1909/11 for the original the original Death Registration Area of 1900. Overall, however, it appears that calculated life tables from published vital statistics and census popula- tions for the Death Registration Areas of 1900 and 1910 describe the remainder of the population relatively well.

Improvements in transportation and communication combined with technological changes in key manufacturing industries substantially increased competitive pressures in American labor markets during the last half of the nineteenth century. One manifestation of these changes was the widespread use of strikebreakers. In this paper I examine the extent and pattern of strikebreaking in the United States using data from a sample of over 2,000 individual strikes between 1881 and 1894 drawn from reports compiled by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor. Consistent with other evidence of increasing geographic integration at this time, I find that the use of strikebreakers did not vary substantially across regions or by city size. On the other hand, I find that employers in smaller cities and in regions other than the northeast were more likely to have to turn to replacements recruited at a distance, underscoring the important role that employer recruitment played in establishing an integrated labor market. Pronounced variations in the likelihood of strikebreaking across industries suggests, however, that the impact of increasing integration differed for different groups of workers and employers. Finally, the strike data confirm the importance of labor market integration on the outcomes of labor conflict in this period. After controlling for other strike characteristics the use of strikebreakers had a large and negative impact on workers' ability to win strikes.

This paper reviews the evidence regarding the main trends in the height of the British population since the early eighteenth century. We argue that the average heights of successive birth cohorts of British males increased slowly between the middle of the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Average heights fell during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, before rising from the 1850s onwards. This analysis is supported by an examination of the main trends in children's heights during the twentieth century. Our findings are compared with the results of an alternative method of measuring human welfare - a modified version of the United Nations' Human Development Index. The main trends in human development reinforce the conclusions drawn from our own interpretation of the anthropometric evidence.

This study examines the occupational mobility of antebellum immigrants as they entered the U.S. White collar, skilled, and semi-skilled immigrants left unskilled jobs more rapidly after arrival than farmers and unskilled workers. British and German immigrants fared better than the Irish; literate immigrants in rapidly growing counties and places with many immigrants fared best. These findings have implications for (1) the accuracy of estimates of immigrant occupational mobility; (2) the size of the human capital transfer resulting from antebellum immigration; and (3) the causes of the difficulty experienced by some immigrant groups in transferring their skills to the U.S.

Recent research by Joshua Angrist and Alan Krueger has used information on exact dates of birth in the 1960 to 1980 federal censuses to study the impact of compulsory schooling laws on school attendance. This paper modifies their methodology to analyze similar data in the 1900 federal census to measure the impact of turn-of-the-century compulsory schooling laws. Using data on 14-year olds from the 1900 census public use microdata sample we compare attendance rates of children born after January 1, 1900 with those born before, across states with and without compulsory schooling laws. In states that combined school-leaving with child labor laws, we find that compulsion significantly raised attendance rates.

During the New Deal the federal government initiated a policy of massive grants to states for support of social welfare and other programs. Since that time grants have come to be an integral part of the American fiscal system, and scholars have continued to debate whether the allocation of federal grants between the states is motivated primarily by political or social and economic objectives. This paper shows that, during the 1930s, both political and economic effects were important determinants of grant allocation, but that the Congressional factors considered by Anderson and Tollison are not important while the Presidential factors considered by Wright are. When the analysis is extended to the years 1932 to 1982, however, Congressional influences do seem important. On the other hand, the dominant influence on federal grant policy over the larger sample appears to be state government expenditures, while both political and economic influences play a smaller role.

We present new archival evidence on the price of vacant land in New York City between 1835 and 1900. Before the Civil War, the price of land per square foot fell steeply with distance from New York's City Hall located in the central business district. After the Civil War, the distance gradient flattened and the fit of a simple regression of land price on distance from the CBD declined markedly. Average nominal land prices at the CBD increased at an average annual rate of over 3 percent per year between 1835 and 1895 before declining as the century came to an end.

The 1850s witnessed one of the earliest American history. During the decade the proportion of individuals receiving public assistance -- increased from 5.8 in 1850 to 10.2 in 1860, an increase of 76 percent. Previous attempts to explain the increase in antebellum pauperism have been hampered by the available published data, which are too aggregated to be of much use. This paper explores the determinants of antebellum pauperism using previously unexploited archival data drawn from the manuscript censuses of social statistics. These records provided detailed evidence on the incidence of pauperism at the county level. We find that about half of the increase in pauperism can be attributed to falling real wages during the decade. Contributing factors were increased immigration and urbanization.

Immigrants who arrived in the U.S. before the Civil War were less likely to reside in locations with high immigrant concentrations as their time in the U.S. increased. This is contrary to the experience of recent immigrants who show no decrease in concentration after arrival. The reduced isolation of antebellum immigrants was not due to their own movement to places with fewer immigrants but due to the movement of the native-born into places (particularly cities) with large immigrant concentrations. The isolation of contemporary immigrants even after several years in the U.S. thus results more from the reluctance of the native-born to relocate to places with many immigrants than from immigrants' reluctance to move to places with fewer immigrants. Contemporary immigrants had greater success than antebellum immigrants avoiding unskilled jobs as they entered the U.S. job market, though they moved out of unskilled jobs less often than antebellum immigrants when comparing their occupations at two points in time after arrival. Improvements in occupational mobility between antebellum and recent immigrants were most apparent among those in other than unskilled jobs. These findings suggest the need to reevaluate some of the premises upon which the concerns about the economic performance of recent immigrants are based.

This paper examines one of the central hypotheses of the New Institutional Economics: that the reform of institutions--the rules and regulations enforced by the State that both permit and bound the operation of markets--is crucial for the process of economic growth. It examines this hypothesis by estimating the productivity gain afforded to Brazilian textile firms by the reform of the regulations governing Brazil's securities markets in 1890. This analysis is based on panel data regressions on 18 firm-level censuses covering the period 1866-1934, which permit me to decompose total factor productivity growth. These censuses cover both limited liability joint stock corporations as well as privately owned firms. I also analyze corporate financial statements and stock market data for publicly held firms covering the period 1895-1940. The paper argues that the reform of the regulations pertaining to limited liability and mandatory disclosure permitted the widespread use of Brazil's debt and equity markets to mobilize capital for industry. This meant that the capital constraints faced by firms prior to the 1890's were relaxed. The result was an increased rate of investment, a decline in industrial concentration, and accelerated rates of growth of productivity.

Although workers, employers, and insurance companies by 1910 supported the adoption of workers' compensation, they fiercely debated the specific features of the legislation. In this paper we examine how workers' compensation benefit levels were determined in the political process of forging compromises across interest groups, and even within individual groups. A quantitative analysis of the benefit levels in each state between the time of adoption and 1930 shows several important trends. Employers in dangerous industries effectively imposed limits on accident benefits, while organized labor and the commissions that administered the laws were instrumental in achieving higher expected benefit levels. Political reformers that gained control of state legislatures in the early twentieth century aided organized labor in achieving their goal of improving workers' compensation accident benefits. The paper also presents case-studies of the political struggle over benefits that occurred in" three states -- Ohio, Minnesota, and Missouri. These qualitative descriptions of the fight over benefit levels provide a more detailed picture of the political process through which workers' compensation was created because the cross-state quantitative study largely abstracts away from the political nuances that shaped workers' compensation legislation.

This paper uses extensive micro-level data from Argentine agriculture circa 1880-1914 to explore various hypotheses relating to the supposed unusual and favored position enjoyed by the owner-operated large scale estates (latifundia) on the pampas as compared to small-scale units operated by cash tenants and sharecroppers. I have access to several data sets which allow me to explore whether tenancy and scale mattered as determinants of technique and efficiency in the rural estates of Buenos Aires province at the turn of the century, and I obtain some surprising results. Tenants did not seem disadvantaged in terms of access to land. Accumulation of land in and of itself produced no direct gain in terms of augmented land prices (due to say, scale economies or monopoly power). And tenancy status appears to have mattered very little as a determinant of investment choices. I conclude that the case against the latifundia, and the pessimistic conventional view of tenant farming on the pampas rests, at present, on little firm quantitative evidence.

During the 1820s and 1830s, American state governments made large investments in canals, banks, and railroads. In the early 1840s, nine states defaulted on their debts, four ultimately repudiated all or part of their debts, and three went through substantial renegotiations. This paper examines how the states got into the debt crisis and, as a result of their earlier history, how they responded to fiscal pressure in the debt crisis. The explanation is built around revenue structures. States along the developed eastern seaboard were able to avoid politically costly property taxes, while states along the frontier were forced to rely heavily on property taxes. When faced with fiscal pressures, two of the defaulting states -- Maryland and Pennsylvania -- were able to resume debt payments, with back interest, as soon as a property tax was enacted. The other defaulting states, however, already had high property taxes. Without access to new revenue sources, these states were forced to default, and then either renegotiate or repudiate their debts.

Recent scholarly literature explains the spread of in-house research labs during the early 20th century by pointing to the information problems involved in contracting for technology. We argue that these difficulties have been overemphasized and that in fact a substantial trade in patented inventions developed over the course of the 19th century, much of it the form of transactions conducted at arms-length through the market. This expansion of trade in technology made possible a growing division of labor, as inventors increasingly took advantage of their greater ability to sell of rights to patented technologies and focused their energy and resources on invention itself. Firms responded to the expansion of this trade by developing ways to to learn about and assess externally generated inventions. Although large firms were beginning to invest in their internal inventive capabilities, in doing so they faced many significant problems. They had to overcome resistance to contracts requiring employees to sign over patents to their employers, and they had to reduce the high turnover rates that made such requirements effectively unenforceable. The increased costs of inventive activity and the greater risks borne by independent inventors by the early 20th century helped firms make their case. But there was a lot of organizational learning to do. Hence where other scholars have emphasized the difficulties of contracting for technology in the market and the relative ease of integrating invention and production within the firm, we reverse the story. Economic actors at that time had a lot of experience contracting for new technological ideas in the market; what they had to spend a great deal of time and energy learning was managing creative individuals within the firm.

We model the relationship between local agricultural surpluses, nutritional status, and height, and we test the hypothesis that adult height is positively correlated with the local production of nutrition in infancy. We test the hypothesis on two samples of Union Army recruits - one consisting of white recruits and the other black recruits. The white sample shows that a local protein surplus one standard deviation above the mean yielded an additional 0.10 inches in adult height, and a similar deviation in surplus calorie production yielded an additional 0.20 inches. For blacks, however, the effect was probably negligible.

We employ the 1860 Census of Manufactures to study rural antebellum manufacturing in the South and Midwest, and find that manufacturing output per capita was similar across regions in counties specialized in the same agricultural products. The southern deficit in manufactures per capita appears to have been largely attributable to the very low levels of output in counties specialized in cotton production. This implies that it was the South's capabilities for the highly profitable cotton production, not the existence of slavery per se, that was responsible for the region's limited industrial development -- at least in rural areas. The other major finding is that in both the South and the Midwest measured total factor productivity was significantly lower in counties specialized in wheat (the most seasonal of agricultural products as regards labor requirements). This is consistent with suggestions that agricultural districts where the predominant crops were highly seasonal in their requirements for labor were well suited to support manufacturing enterprise during the offpeak periods

The California Gold Rush was an unexpected shock of tremendous size that prompted the costly re-allocation of labor to a frontier region. Using newly-collected archival data, this paper presents estimates of nominal and real wages in Gold Rush California. Consistent with a simple dynamic model of labor market adjustment, real wages rose sharply during the early years of the Rush (1848-1852), declined abruptly following massive in-migration 1850s. However, although the Rush itself was a transitory event, it left California wages permanently higher. Estimates based on census data suggest that the supply of labor into Gold Rush California was about half as elastic as the supply of labor into Alaska during the Pipeline Era.

Sears Roebuck and Co. faced similar challenges in the 1920s and the 1980s. On the strength of the early period's strategic investment decisions, the company grew into the nation's largest retailer and a pervasive factor in the economy. In the later period, unanswered challenges nearly destroyed the company. We analyze the elements that contributed to the success in the 1920s and to the near disaster in the 1980s and place them in a broader and more systematic context. We argue that successful innovations combine a focus on an attractive market with an exploitation and even enhancement of a firm's existing competitive strengths.

This paper examines the performance of the Boston stock market, the nation's premier market for industrials, between 1835 and 1869, developing new indexes of price performance, dividend yields and total holding period returns for bank stocks and industrial equities using annual data from Martin (1871). Using these new series and a set of VAR models we conclude that disturbances in the banking sector, as manifested by declines in total stockholder returns, led to increases in short-term lending rates which in turn led to declines in the price performance of traded manufacturing firms. There is no evidence of feedback from manufacturing returns to bank stock prices via lending rates. The findings are consistent with a key role for banks in nineteenth century business fluctuations.

This paper replicates a classic study of the American business elite. The older study done a half-century ago, reported the composition of business leaders a century ago. I have" drawn a sample of business leaders today to discover how much the composition of the" American business elite has changed. As in the earlier study, the business elite is compared to a" sample of political leaders. I find that democratization of the business elite has progressed only" slightly in the past century, nowhere near as much as democratization of the political elite. " Despite the myriad things that have changed in America in the last century the business elite appears recognizably the same.

The American economy at the turn of the century offers an excellent opportunity to study the functioning of relatively unregulated labor markets. The essay surveys the economic history literature to determine how well labor markets operated in the early 1900s. After examining the mobility of workers, the integration of geographically dispersed labor markets of the extent of employer monopsony, we examine the extent to which workers received compensating differentials for workplace disamenities and the extent to which competition among employers reduced discrimination. During this period institutions like the company town company union, and share cropping developed. These institutions are reexamined to determine the extent to which they were exploitative or helped resolve problems with transactions costs. Finally, reformers pushed for legislation during the progressive era to correct perceived market failures. We examine the impact of progressive legislation and discuss the political economy of its passage.

This paper highlights the distinctive features of the theoretical approach taken by scholars" who analyzed the impacts of the mass migration into the United States in the two decades" preceding World War I. Broadly speaking, this literature was couched in terms of the "aggregate" production function, productivity change in factor proportions. Attention was focused on the close interrelatedness among the many" diverse elements in the economy. A notable difference between the historical studies and the recent literature on the impacts" of immigration is the propensity of the current literature to concentrate only on the first-round" consequences. It is easy to show that these will be harmful to resident workers who face direct" competition. Economic historians writing about the earlier period of high immigration went" beyond the first-round effects. Taking a long-run perspective, they identified many aspects of" the mass immigration that were beneficial from the point of view of the resident population."

The Antebellum Puzzle' describes the situation of declining stature and pos mortality in the three decades prior to the American Civil War (1861-65). It is this period was one of rapid economic growth and development in the United State the debate has centered on whether the American diet, both in terms of protein a deteriorated in the middle of the 19th century. But the mortality environment a have worsened (or at least did not improve), connected with factors such as urba commercialization, and increased geographic mobility. This paper uses data on t Union Army recruits as an indicator of the standard of living of Americans durin Particular attention is paid to New York State and comparisons to the rest of th York State, mortality was not improving in the antebellum period and was deterio York City. For the United States and for New York State, urbanization was negat heights, as was the census death rate in 1850 and a measure of mobility (proport population foreign born). Although, New York State's agriculture was rapidly co in this era and specializing in dairy products, its nutrition may have been dete with substantial local variation. Mortality was also not improving and worsened Both contributed to a decline in this biological indicator of the standard of li both New York and the whole United States were experiencing Smithian' economic g (induced by transport improvements and widening markets) with negative externali York State was an area in advance of much of the nation in terms of both urban/i agricultural development in the antebellum period.

The average height of a population has become a familiar measure of that population's nutritional status. This paper extends the use of anthropometric data in the study of history by exploring published evidence on the weight, as well as the height, of British populations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and by computing the Body Mass Index of those populations. The results confirm a fall in mean height in the middle of the nineteenth century and show that this was paralleled by a fall in weight. Subsequent increases in weight and BMI lagged behind those in height. The data show no evidence of inequalities in nutritional status within families. Earlier findings of a period of declining height in the mid-nineteenth century have been attacked because of an apparent inconsistency with real wage data. The evidence for decline is now confirmed by further anthropometric and mortality data, while recent research into real wages has confirmed that a check to growth occurred and has thus removed the apparent inconsistency.

This paper uses newly collected archival evidence to examine various aspects of the geographic performance of American labor markets before the Civil War. Much of the paper addresses the evolution of regional differences in real wages, of interest to economic historians because they speak to the formation of a national labor market.' In the North, real wages followed a pattern of convergence: wages were highest initially on the frontier -- the Midwest -- but tended to decline relative to real wages in settled regions -- the Northeast -- as labor migrated to the frontier. In the South, regional wage gaps were generally smaller than in the North, but real wages in the South fell significantly below Northern levels beginning in the 1830's. In addition to regional differences, I also examine wage convergence at the level of local labor markets, proxied by counties, using manuscript census data for 1850 and 1860. I find strong evidence of regression to the mean: high wage counties in 1850 were far less likely to be high wage in 1860. Such evidence is consistent with the view that antebellum local labor markets were spatially integrated.

This paper begins the task of explaining why the American business elite has remained white, male and mostly native-born Protestants for a century, as verified in a previous paper (Temin, 1997). I argue that the evidence is inconsistent with the hypotheses that the stability is due to discrimination on the job or to principal-agent factors. The most likely explanation is that this demographic group makes the best business managers. I suggest that this in turn is not because they are inherently superior, but because they have had access to superior education, a result of past discrimination.

The recent demography of the Hispanic population of the United States has received considerable attention, but historical perspective is more elusive partly due to data limitations. A nationally representative sample of the Hispanic population of the United States, based on the manuscripts of the 1910 census, now exists that includes 71,500 Hispanic-origin persons plus another 24,000 of their non-Hispanic neighbors. We estimate childhood mortality for 1890 to 1910, using indirect demographic methods of estimation and find infant and child mortality in the Hispanic population that was higher than for the non-Hispanic whites but slightly lower than for nonwhite, non-Hispanics (mostly African Americans). Hispanic rural, farm populations in California, Texas, and Arizona did the best, though still experiencing high mortality. The usual advantage of rural residence at the turn of the century holds outside of New Mexico and Florida.

Historians often portray Native Americans as merely unfortunate victims of European disease and aggression, with lives in disarray that followed the arrival of Columbus and other explorers or conquerors. The data we analyze on human stature show, in contrast, that some Native Americans such as the equestrian Plains nomads, were remarkably ingenious and adaptive in the face of exceptional demographic stress. Using anthropometric data originally collected by Franz Boas, we show that the Plains nomads were tallest in the world during the mid-nineteenth century. We link this extraordinary achievement to a rich and varied diet, modest disease loads other than epidemics, a remarkable facility at reorganization following demographic disasters, and egalitarian principles of operation. The analysis provides a useful mirror for understanding the health of Euro-Americans.

This paper provides an account of the complex changes taking place within New England in the years from 1880 to 1940. After 1880, technological changes and market shifts undermined the sources of comparative advantage that had promoted the concentration of textile and footwear production within the region and propelled regional economic growth. Despite the decline of these industries after 1880, New England's history after 1880 can hardly be characterized as one of economic decline. Regional economic growth did slow in the wake of these events, but the impact of this slowdown on living standards was moderated, by market driven adjustments in resources away from declining sectors, and by the region's increasing integration within national and international labor and financial markets. Within the region's traditional industries, manufacturers shifted product lines to take advantage of the areas in which they could still compete. At the same time, the growth of other manufacturing activities and an increasingly robust service sector created new employment opportunities that laid the foundation for the region's post-World War II recovery. The responsiveness of international and interregional labor migration moderated the growth of regional labor supplies in response to diminishing opportunities. Meanwhile, financial market integration enabled New Englanders to share in the benefits of more rapid growth elsewhere in the country.

This paper surveys the economy of New England in the half-century following 1830. It begins by discussing reasons why manufacturing grew in the United States and especially in New England. The paper surveys the outputs of New England industry, particularly machine tools and textiles. It then discusses the inputs to industry. Women formed an important part of the New England labor force; the histories of Boston and Lowell illustrate the increasing urbanization of the labor force. Capital for industry was raised both through formal credit instruments (for large enterprises) and through local banks (for smaller ones).

This paper uses a new pre-1940 Third World data base documenting real wages and relative factor prices to explore their determinants. There are three possibilities: external price shocks, factor endowment changes, and technological change. As the paper's title suggests, technological change is an unlikely explanation. The paper lays out an explicit econometric agenda for the future, although more casual empiricism suggests that external price shocks were doing most of the work, and declining-transport-cost-induced commodity price convergence in particular. Real wages in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America never showed any signs of catching up with the European industrial leaders prior to 1914 hold their own. The ratio of wages to land rents, on the other hand, declined up to World War I and so did the ratio of wages to GDP per capita. The trend reversed thereafter. These relative factor price movements help sharpen our understanding of the sources of growth (or lack of it) in Asia and Latin America prior to 1940. They also offer strong hints about changes in income distribution there.

Conventional wisdom has it that global financial markets were as well integrated in the 1890s as in the 1990s, but that it took several post-war decades to regenerate the connections that existed before 1914. This view has emerged from a variety of tests for world financial capital market integration ranging from the correlation of saving and investment aggregates to the dispersion of security prices and real interest rates. Presumably, we care about global capital market integration because it can have an impact on accumulation performance and the global distribution of the capital stock. Oddly enough however, the relative price of capital goods, an important component of the user cost of capital has never been incorporated into studies of capital market integration and almost never in comparative studies of pre-1950 economic growth. This could be an important omission. This paper explores the issue with a panel data base 1870-1950 for eleven OECD countries. It turns out that capital goods prices have been central to accumulation, and therefore to growth and convergence. They have also been as important to the evolution of global capital markets as have been interest rates and other financial costs.

The rapid growth of equity markets in emerging economies over the past decade has prompted economists to raise important questions about their macroeconomic impact. Although the relative brevity of this expansion has made it challenging to perform such an evaluation, there remains a strong notion that liquidity promotes participation in equity markets and is thus central to their deepening. Interestingly the first U.S. market for industrial equities arose in Boston more than 150 years ago, when capital flows were considerably less volatile than those associated with today's emerging markets. This difference makes it possible to gain insights about the long-run effects of growing sophistication in equity markets by studying the full period of Boston's emergence. From primary sources hitherto unused for scholarly investigations, namely the running annual worksheets of securities price fluctuations which underlie Boston broker Joseph Martin's volumes on the history of the Boston stock market, this paper formulates and presents broad-based indices of annual prices and returns for banking and industrial equities traded from 1854 to 1897 as well as measures of overall market capitalization in these sectors. A set of vector autoregressive models then relates increases in liquidity, as measured by the falling par values of industrial shares to rising prices and capitalizations of firms traded in the Boston market. Increases in liquidity and the real market value of equity capital in banks and industrials are also linked to higher annual earnings among the region's industrial workers. The results support the view that share liquidity was a key factor in the rise of the U.S. as a classic case of finance-led industrialization

This essay discusses recent progress that has been made in understanding the connection between health and industrialization in 8 developed countries. Because earlier efforts have been stymied by lack of reliable measures of mortality, the most recent work utilizes average height obtained from military records. Average heights measure a population's history of net nutrition during the growing years. Based on this measure, health improved uniformly during industrialization in Sweden, but it actually declined for several decades in two countries and generally improved with interruptions in others. Health was inversely correlated with the degree of urbanization across countries and rising urbanization led to health deterioration, especially in England, Australia, and Japan. Public health policy, diets, and business cycles were also important for health during industrialization.

This essay is the companion piece to about 550 individual data series on education to be included in the updated Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition (Cambridge University Press 2000, forthcoming). The essay reviews the broad outlines of U.S. educational history from the nineteenth century to the present, including changes in enrollments, attendance, schools, teachers, and educational finance at the three main schooling levels -- elementary, secondary, and higher education. Data sources are discussed at length, as are issues of comparability across time and data reliability. Some of the data series are provided, as is a brief chronology of important U.S. educational legislation, judicial decisions, and historical time periods.

Using data from samples of probate inventories we construct a series of slave prices for Low Country South Carolina and Georgia covering the period 1722-1815. Using these data we examine variations in slave prices by age and sex, as well as geographic variations between and within the two colonies/states. Nominal slave prices more than doubled between 1722/29 and 1810/15. In real terms, however, there was essentially no change in slave prices deflated either by a general consumer price index, or the price of rice. Low Country slave prices were well above those in the West Indies and Maryland prior to the 1740s, but were converging toward the level of prices in these regions. After 1740 the three series moved roughly in parallel.

This paper examines variations in stature and the Body Mass Index (BMI) across space for the United States in 1917/18, using published data on the measurement of approximately 890,000 recruits for the American Army for World War I. It also connects those anthropometric measurements with an index of childhood mortality estimated from the censuses of 1900 and 1910. This index is taken to be an indicator of early childhood environment for these recruits. Aggregated data were published for states and groups of counties by the Surgeon General after the war. These data are related to regional data taken primarily from the censuses of 1900 and 1910. The results indicate that early childhood mortality was a good (negative) predictor of height and the body mass index, while it is also possible to predict early childhood experience from terminal adult height. Urbanization was important, although the importance declined over time. Income apparently had little effect on health in this period.

This paper assembles new data and new methods for studying wealth inequality trends in industrializing America. Records of household heads from the census matched with real and personal property tax records for Massachusetts reveal that the Theil entropy measure of inequality approximately doubled over the period from 1820 to 1910, a gain that was divided about evenly between the antebellum and the postbellum periods. A surge between 1870 and 1900 dominated the growth in inequality following the Civil War. Decompositions of changes in the Theil entropy measure reveal that during both periods, inequality was increasing due to the shift of the population out of rural areas and agriculture into urban areas where wealth was less equally distributed. But the increases in inequality were also due to increasing inequality within population groups. Between 1870 and 1910, inequality was growing within occupations, age groups, and the native-born population. Proposed labor market explanations, including sectoral shift that led to higher wages in non-agricultural relative to agricultural sectors, biased technological change, and immigration are inconsistent with the fact that inequality between occupational groups was declining in the last decades of the century. Wealth accumulation patterns by age are also inconsistent with the hypothesis of child default on responsibilities for old age care, at least during the second half of the nineteenth century. To explain the salient facts, we are led to propose a new explanation based on luck, rents and entrepreneurship.

Based on data from several samples of probate inventories we construct and analyze a time series of slave prices for South Carolina from 1722 to 1809. These estimates reveal that prices fluctuated without trend prior to the 1760s and then began to rise rapidly, more than doubling by the early nineteenth century. Estimates of supply and demand functions indicate that while long-run slave supply was highly elastic, the short-run supply function was quite inelastic. Our analysis of the slave price series indicates that the price of rice was the major determinant of the demand for slaves and in turn largely explains the rise in slave prices. These findings have important implications for the interpretation of evidence on rising yields in rice production over the eighteenth century and the sources of wealth accumulation in South Carolina.

The United States is often taken to be the exemplar of the benefits of a monetary union. Since 1788 Americans, with the exception of the Civil War years, have been able to buy and sell goods, travel, and invest within a vast area without ever having to be concerned about changes in exchange rates. But there was also a recurring cost. A shock, typically in financial or agricultural markets, would hit one region particularly hard. The banking system in that region would lose reserves producing a monetary contraction that would aggravate the effects of the initial disturbance. Plots of bank deposits by region show these patterns clearly. Often, an interregional debate over monetary institutions would follow. The uncertainty created by the debate would further aggravate the contraction. During these episodes the United States might well have been better off if each region had had its own currency: changes in exchange rates could have secured equilibrium in interregional payments while monetary policy was directed toward internal stability. It is far from clear, to put it differently, that the United States was an optimal currency area. This pattern held until the 1930s when institutional changes, such as increased federal fiscal transfers (which pumped high-powered money into regions that were losing reserves) and bank deposit insurance, addressed the problem of regional banking shocks. Political considerations, of course, ruled out separate regional currencies in the United States. But thinking about U.S. monetary history in this way clarifies the nature of the business cycle before World War II, and may suggest some lessons for other monetary unions.

This paper presents empirical evidence on the hypothesis that aggregate price disturbances cause or worsen financial instability. We construct two annual indexes of financial conditions for the United States covering 1790-1997, and estimate the effect of aggregate price shocks on each index using a dynamic ordered probit model. We find that price level shocks contributed to financial instability during 1790-1933, and that inflation rate shocks contributed to financial instability during 1980-97. Our research indicates that the size of the aggregate price shocks needed to substantially alter financial conditions depends on the institutional environment, but that a monetary policy focused on price stability would be conducive to financial stability.

This paper describes the first step in a larger project to build up regional estimates of economic growth before 1800 in the parts of North America that became the United States. In it we employ the method of conjectural estimation to develop new estimates of the rate of economic growth in the Lower South (modern day North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee) from 1720 to 1800 for both colonists and the Native American population of the region. Contrary to the widely held view that GDP per capita grew at a rate of 0.3 to 0.6 percent per year during the eighteenth century our best estimate is that per capita GDP grew at just 0.09 percent per year. Despite the slow growth of GDP per capita, however, the region's economy did achieve appreciable extensive growth, and achieving any advance in per capita production can be viewed as a significant accomplishment in light of the challenges that this growth posed for the economy. The difference between our estimate and those of previous studies appears to be the result of earlier scholars' undue focus on export performance. In contrast, our approach allows us to accurately account for the effect of the slowly growing domestic sector of the economy.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the North American agricultural frontier moved for the first time into semi-arid regions where farming was vulnerable to drought. Farmers who migrated to the region had to adapt their crops, techniques, and farm sizes to better fit the environment. But there was very incomplete information for making these adjustments, and ultimately they were insufficient: too many small, dry land wheat farms were founded, only to be abandoned in the midst of drought. In this paper, we examine why homestead failure occurred in the Great Plains, by analyzing two episodes in western Kansas in 1893-94 and in eastern Montana in 1917-21. We focus on the weather information problem facing migrants to the region. We examine the learning process by which migrants mis-interpreted new rainfall information and failed to adequately perceive drought. Homesteaders had neither an analytical framework nor sufficient data for predicting fluctuations in rainfall. Knowledge of the climate was primitive and the underlying mechanisms triggering droughts were not understood. Long-term precipitation records did not exist. Homesteaders gambled on the continuation of previous wet periods due to a possible climate change because of cultivation, and on the optimistic opinions of dryfarming experts.' Dryfarming doctrine argued that moisture could be saved in the soil, allowing small wheat farms to endure any dry period. Accordingly, homesteaders discounted new information that indicated drought. The subsequent waves of homestead busts that swept the region during severe droughts were part of the adjustment toward agricultural techniques, crops, and farm sizes more appropriate for a semi-arid region.

This paper traces the diffusion of fair employment legislation at the state level and evaluates the relative importance of various demographic, political, and economic factors in the promotion (or at least the acceptance) of the principle of government-enforced anti-discrimination policy. The empirics indicate that non-southern states with higher proportions of union members, Jews, and Catholics tended to adopt fair employment legislation sooner than other states. There is weaker evidence that after controlling for other characteristics, the likelihood of passage was lower in states dominated by the Republican Party and that there were spillover or contagion effects across states. The proportion of the population that was black does not appear to have shortened the time to adoption.

Since One Kind of Freedom was published in 1977 there have been enormous advances in computer technology and statistical software, and an impressive expansion of micro-level historical data sets. In this essay we reconsider' our earlier findings on the consequences of emancipation in terms of what might be accomplished using the new technology, methods, and data. We employ the entire sample of 11,202 farms collected for the Southern Economic History Project not the sub-sample used to prepare 1KF. We revisit the question of declining production of foodstuffs, examining the data this time on a farm-by-farm basis. We conclude that 30 percent of farms in the cotton regions were locked-in' to cotton production and another 16 percent were producing too much food in an effort to avoid the trap of debt peonage. Using probit methods to control for the effects of age, farm size, literacy, family workers, and willingness to assume risk, we find that race accounts for two-thirds of the gap between black and white ownership of farms. Comparing sharecropping and renting, we find that race was much less of a factor in tenure choice. We note that these efforts only scratch the surface of what remains to be done.

The Antebellum Puzzle' describes the situation of declining stature and rising mortality in the three decades prior to the American Civil War (1861-65). It is labeled a puzzle, since this period was one of rapid economic growth and development in the United States. Much of the debate regarding this puzzle has centered on whether the American diet, both in terms of protein and caloric intake in the mid-nineteenth century. But the mortality environment also appears to have worsened (or at least failed to improve), a situation associated with rapid urbanization, commercialization, transport improvement, and increased geographic mobility. The disease environment was being nationalized and internationalized. This paper analyzes the relationship between local agricultural surpluses, nutritional status, mortality conditions, and adult heights. Employing a sample of the muster records of Union Army recruits (1861-65) as well as data from the published population and agricultural censuses of 1840 and mortality data from the 1850 census of population, it tests the hypothesis that adult height is positively correlated with local production of nutrients in early childhood and negatively correlated with local mortality conditions, urbanization, proximity to transport, and population mobility. Results indicate that, although the United States was experiencing robust Smithian' economic growth induced by transport improvements and widening markets nation was also suffering from serious negative externalities which affected the health and longevity of the population.

The apogee of anti-smoking legislation in North America was reached early in the last century. In 1903, the Canadian Parliament passed a resolution prohibiting the manufacture, importation, and sale of cigarettes. Around the same time, fifteen states in the United States banned the sale of cigarettes and thirty-five states considered prohibitory legislation. In both the United States and Canada, prohibition was part of a broad political, economic, and social coalition termed the Progressive Movement. Cigarette prohibition was special interest regulation, though not of the usual narrow neoclassical genre; it was the means by which a group of crusaders sought to alter the behavior of a much larger segment of the population. The opponents of cigarette regulation were cigarette smokers and the more organized cigarette lobby. An active Progressive Movement was the necessary condition for generating interest in prohibition, while the anti-prohibition forces played a more significant role later in the legislative process. The moral reformers' succeeded when they faced little opposition because few constituents smoked and/or no jobs were at stake because there was no cigarette industry. In other words, reform is easy when you are preaching to the converted.

One of the most sustained uses of economic warfare by the United States occurred in Spain during WWII. We provide an overview of this episode based on the secondary literature and new research in the Spanish archives. We focus on three key battles: (1) an oil embargo against Spain in the summer of 1940, (2) pre-emptive buying of wolfram (tungsten ore) during the middle years of the war, and (3) a second oil embargo in the first months of 1944. The first oil embargo, although launched when Germany was going from victory to victory, was successful in helping keep Spain neutral because it forced the Franco regime to rethink the costs of joining the war. Pre-emptive buying of wolfram was also successful. It forced Germany to pay more for and to consume less tungsten, a material crucial for hardening steel. Ironically, the second oil embargo, undertaken when the Germans were retreating on all fronts, was less successful. The major goal, halting shipments of wolfram to Germany, was not fully realized. Several special circumstances, in particular the naval blockade and the tendency of sanctions and incentives to push the Franco regime in the direction consistent with its long-run survival, help explain the successes.

The 1830s were a decade of enormous importance in American economic history. A disproportionate amount of attention has been paid to the Panic of 1837. The Crisis of 1839, however, led to four years of deflation and depression. This paper shows that events in 1839 followed a different path than events in 1837. Domestic, rather than international forces, played a key role in the origins and duration of the crisis. The critical element was the massive increase in state borrowing after 1836, and the subsequent collapse of internal improvement projects in the west and south in the summer 1839. This was an American cycle of events.

In the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries, there was a substantial mortality 'penalty' to living in urban places. This circumstance was shared with other nations. By around 1940, this penalty had been largely eliminated, and it was healthier, in many cases, to reside in the city than in the countryside. Despite the lack of systematic national data before 1933, it is possible to describe the phenomenon of the urban mortality transition. Early in the 19th century, the United States was not particularly urban (only 6.1% in 1800), a circumstance which led to a relatively favorable mortality situation. A national crude death rate of 20-25 per thousand per year would have been likely. Some early data indicate that mortality was substantially higher in cities, was higher in larger relative to smaller cities, and was higher in the South relative to the North. By 1900, the nation had become about 40% urban (and 56% by 1940). It appears that death rates, especially in urban areas, actually rose (or at least did not decline) over the middle of the 19th century. Increased urbanization, as well as developments in transport and commercialization and increased movements of people into and throughout the nation, contributed to this. Rapid urban growth and an inadequate scientific understanding of disease processes contributed to the mortality crisis of the early and middle nineteenth century in American cities. The sustained mortality transition only began about the 1870s. Thereafter the decline of urban mortality proceeded faster than in rural places, assisted by significant public works improvements and advances in public health and eventually medical science. Much of the process had been completed by the 1940s. The urban penalty had been largely eliminated and mortality continued to decline despite the continued growth in the urban share of the population.

Despite the significant research on aggregate trends in mortality and physical stature in the middle of the nineteenth century, little evidence on the individual-level characteristics associated with premature mortality has been presented. This essay describes a new project that links individuals from the mortality schedules to the population schedules of the 1850 and 1860 federal population censuses. This makes it possible to assess the link between individual and household characteristics and the probability of dying. The results reveal a strong and negative relationship between household wealth and mortality in 1850 and 1860 and a somewhat weaker negative relationship between occupational status and mortality in 1850. The findings suggest that even when the U.S. population was largely rural and agricultural, changes in the distribution of income and wealth would have had a large impact on mortality rates and life expectancies. Urbanization merely exacerbated already existing disparities in mortality by socioeconomic status.

The state of Indiana set out to build a Mammoth system of canals, railroads, and turnpikes in 1836, after a decade of intense debate in which sectional rivalries prevented any state action. This paper investigates the role played by the adoption of an ad valorem property tax in ameliorating the sectional rivalries and coordinating the costs of financing the transportation system with the taxes levied to finance it. It also traces the rise and fall of land values in the state between 1835 and 1842, estimating the effect of internal improvement projects on land values.

Recent banking theory holds that durable firm-bank relationships are valuable to both parties. Using contract-specific loan records of a nineteenth-century U.S. bank, this paper shows that firms that form extended relationships with banks receive three principal benefits. First, firms with extended relationships face lower credit costs. As the bank-borrower relationship matures credit costs decline. Second, long-term customers are asked to provide fewer personal guarantees. Third-party guarantees are an efficient alternative to collateral in certain circumstances, and long-term clients are asked to provide fewer guarantees. Third, long-term bank customers more likely to have loan terms renegotiated during a credit crunch. Firms without access to public debt markets rely on bank credit, and continued access during a credit crunch is important for small, informationally opaque firms.